

THE
SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAINAS

Edited

WITH CO-OPERATION OF VARIOUS SCHOLARS

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PARĪKSĀMUKHAM

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PARĪKSĀMUKHAM

By

MĀNIKYANANDĪ

(WITH PRAMEYA-RATNAMĀLĀ BY ANANTAVĪRYA)

EDITED WITH TRANSLATION, INTRODUCTION, NOTES AND
AN ORIGINAL COMMENTARY IN ENGLISH

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INTRODUCTION

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Earlier writers
on Jaina Nyāya.

Umāsvāmi.

Parikṣāmukhaṃ is a standard work on Jaina Nyāya philosophy. The earliest writers on this subject were Kundakundāchārya and Umāsvāmi or Umāsvāti (1st century A. D.). Umāsvāmi wrote his work Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra in the form of aphorisms. Parikṣāmukhaṃ is also written in the same style. Commentators to Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra were many and the most famous of them developed this subject in their commentaries. The following among them are worthy of special mention : (1) Puṣyapāda Devanandī, a Digamvara, the writer of Sarvārtha-siddhi (5th century A. D.) ; (2) author of Gandhahasti Mahābhāṣya (Samantabhadra according to the Digamvara view, or Siddhasena Divākara according to the Śvetāmvara view or Siddhasena Gaṇi according to another view) ; (3) Akalaṅka, a Digamvara, the writer of Tattvārtharāja-vārttika (7th century A. D.) ; and (4) Vidyānandī or Vidyānanda, a Digamvara, author of Tattvārthasloka-vārttika (9th century A. D.).

Kundakundā-
chārya.

Kundakundāchārya is the author of many works the most famous of them being Pravachanasāra, Pañchāstikāya-samayasāra, Samayasāra and Niyamasāra.

Samantabhadra.

Samantabhadra (2nd century A. D. ?) a Digamvara scholar-saint whose date has not been definitely ascertained) was the author of the famous work Āpta-mīmāṃsā. Akalaṅka Deva wrote a commentary on this work entitled Aṣṭa-śati. Vidyānanda or Vidyānandī wrote a commentary on Aṣṭa-śati entitled Aṣṭa-sahasrī. Yuktyanuśāsana is another

important work of Samanta-bhadra among his voluminous writings.

Siddhasena
Divākara.

Siddhasena Divākara, a Śvetāmvara (6th or 7th century A. D.) wrote Nyāyāvatāra a short *treatise in verse on Jaina Nyāya*. A commentary on this was written by Siddharṣi (10th century A. D.) and Chandraprabha Sūri (12th century A. D.). Siddhasena's other works are Dvātriṅśikā and Sammati Tarka the latter commented on by Abhayadeva Sūri (10th century A. D.).

Haribhadra.

Haribhadra Sūri the author of Śaddarśana-samuchchaya lived about 700—770 A. D.* Guṇaratna (15th century A. D.) wrote a commentary of this work.

Akalaṅka.

Akalaṅka Deya the great Digamvara writer developed in elaborate treatises the subject of Jaina Nyāya philosophy. His Tattvārtha-rāja-vārttika, Aṣṭaśati, Nyāya-viniśchaya, Laghiya-straya, Pramāṇa-saṅgraha etc. show the masterly way in which he handled this subject and all writers who followed him, modelled their writings on his treatises.

Māṇikyanandī.

Māṇikyanandī the author of Parikṣāmukhaṃ was the first writer who condensed the subject in the form of aphorisms taking materials from Akalaṅka's works. Many commentaries of Parikṣāmukhaṃ the most famous among them being Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa by Prabhāchandra and Prameya-ratna-mālā by Ananta-vīrya came to be written and a large number of commentaries on Prameya-ratna-mālā exist in manuscript form in many Jain libraries scattered throughout India. The work Parikṣā-

* “हरिभद्र सूरि का समय निर्णय” an article in Hindi published in Jain Sāhitya Sāśhodhaka, Bhāga 2, Aṅka I.

Deva-Sūri

mukhaṃ received such a celebrity that Deva-sūri (11th century A. D.) wrote Pramāṇa-naya-tattvā-lokālaṅkāra with its commentary Syādvāda-ratnākara closely imitating the aphorisms of Parikṣā-mukhaṃ and substituting merely synonyms in many of the aphorisms. Ratnaprabha-sūri (12th century A. D.) wrote a commentary Syādvāda-ratnākara-vatārika to Syādvāda-ratnākara. Rājaśekhara (14th century A. D.) wrote a Pañjikā on Ratnaprabha's work and Jñānachandra (14th century A. D.) wrote a Tippiṇa to the same.

Hemachandra.

The next great writer was Hemachandra who wrote voluminous works on almost every subject. His celebrated work Dvātriṅśikā on the model of Siddhasena's work has been commented on in detail by Malliṣena (13th century) in a commentary entitled Syādvādamañjari in which different systems of Hindu, Bauddha, Chārvāka and other systems of philosophy have been reviewed and criticised. His famous work on Jaina Nyāya is Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsa a portion only of which has up to this date been discovered.

Later works
on Jaina
Nyāya.

Many other more or less important works on Jaina Nyāya such as Nyāya-dīpikā of Dharmabhūṣaṇa, Saptabhaṅgitaraṅginī of Vimāla-dāsa, Patra-parikṣā and Āpta-parikṣā of Vidyānanda, Pramā-lakṣma and Pramāṇa-parikṣā of Vidyānandi, Jaina-tarka-bhāṣā, Jaina-tarka-vārttika, Naya-chakraṃ, Naya-pradīpaṃ, Naya-rahasyaṃ, Nayopadeśaḥ, Pramāṇa-nirṇayaḥ and innumerable glosses on the standard works and their commentaries already mentioned came to be written, but no new viewpoint was adopted by any of these later writers whose main object was to explain or amplify the view of older writers.

The goal of
Nyāya
philosophy.

The real object of the Nyāya philosophy in the Hindu śāstras was propounded as attainment of liberation¹. In Brihadāranyaka Upaniṣad, the sage Yājñavalkya told his wife Maitreyi that we should learn about the soul, understand it and meditate on it². For proper understanding of the nature of a thing, help of the Nyāya philosophy is essential. It is said that we suffer misery because we have false knowledge regarding the soul, such as considering the body as soul. When we perceive the error of such a wrong belief, we get true knowledge³. The Jain view also is that the Nyāya philosophy leads to right faith, right knowledge and right conduct which produce liberation⁴.

Difference in philosophical views is based on different kinds and methods of appreciation of the one eternal truth. All Indian philosophies aim at

1. “निःश्रेयसाधिगमः ।” Gautama Nyāya Sūtra I. 1.

“प्रमाणादि-पदार्थ-तत्त्वज्ञानान्निःश्रेयसं दृष्टं, नहि कश्चित् पदार्थो ज्ञायमानो हानोपादानोपेक्षाबुद्धिनिमित्तं न भवतीति । एवञ्च कृत्वा सर्वे पदार्थो ज्ञेयतया उप-क्षिप्यन्ते इति । परन्तु निःश्रेयसमत्यादेस्तत्त्वज्ञानाद् भवति ।”

Nyāya-vārttika by Udyotkara.

2. “आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यो मैत्रेय्यात्मनो वा अरे दर्शनेन श्रवणेन मत्या वा विज्ञानेनेदं सर्वं विदितम् ।” Brihadāranyaka Upaniṣad. 4. 4. 5. Śaṅkarāchārya has mentioned that Manana as laid down in the word “Mantavya” is to be made by Tarka “पश्चान्मन्तव्यस्तर्कतः ।” This gives rise to the development of the Nyāya philosophy.

3. “दोषनिमित्तानां तत्त्वज्ञानादहंकारनिवृत्तिः ।” Nyāya Sūtra, 4. 2. 1.

“मिथ्योपलब्धिविनाशस्तत्त्वज्ञानात् ॥” Ibid. 4. 2. 35.

4. See Pages 3 and 4.

the attainment of real happiness and destruction of misery. In Yogavāsīṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa it is mentioned : "O Rāma ! the idea of creation consisting of Ahaṁkāra, Manas, Buddhi etc. which have been described by me as modification of one, are differently described by the authors of Nyāya philosophy. The Sāṅkhya and Chārvāka philosophies have described the same differently. The followers of Jaimini (Mīmāṃsā philosophy), Arhats (Jainas), Bauddhas, Vaiśeṣikas and others of peculiar views like Pancharātras have described the same in different manner. All of them however will go to the same eternal goal as passengers from different places travelling at different times reach a particular city".¹

The great masters of philosophy knew this truth and in ancient times though each propounded his own theory and even criticised the views of others, intolerance was absolutely absent. All great teachers and writers were always eager to learn what others have thought and said on a particular question and an attempt was always made to discuss a particular point from different aspects. There is indisputable

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1. "अहंकारमनोबुद्धिदृष्टयः सृष्टिकल्पनाः ।
 एकरूपतया प्रोक्ता या मया रघुनन्दन ॥
 नैयायिकैरितरथा तादृशैः परिकल्पिताः ।
 अन्यथा कल्पितैः सांख्यैश्चावर्कैरपि चान्यथा ॥
 जैमिनीयैश्चार्हतैश्च बौद्धैर्वैशेषिकैस्तथा ।
 अन्यैरपि विचित्रैस्तैः पाञ्चरात्रादिभिस्तथा ॥
 सर्वैरपि च गन्तव्यं तैः पदं पारमार्थिकम् ।
 विचित्रं देशकालोत्थैः पुरमेकमिवाध्वगैः ॥"

evidence that Buddha discussed the views of the Jainas as well as of other sects in his time. There is evidence of such discussions by Sri Mahāvira the twenty fourth Tirthaṅkara of the Jainas.

Different
systems of
Indian
philosophy.

The first attempt to give a concise view of the different systems of philosophy was made by Jain sage Haribhadra Sūri in his *Śaḍdarśana-samuchchaya*. In this work he has described (1) Bauddha (2) Nyāya (3) Sāṅkhya (4) Jaina (5) Vaiśeṣika and (6) Mīmāṃsā systems of philosophy.¹ We find that within Sāṅkhya, he has also described Pātañjala philosophy and within Mīmāṃsā, he has dealt with Pūrva-mīmāṃsā as well as Uttara-mīmāṃsā or Vedānta. Thus though Haribhadra's work is named "A compendium of six philosophies", in reality it treats of eight systems of philosophy. In *Viveka-vilāsa* by Jinadatta Sūri (13th century) the same enumeration has been followed. Rajaśekhara Sūri (13th century) mentioning these six (really eight) systems of philosophy has stated that the Nāstika views cannot be accepted as philosophies.²

Āstika and
Nāstika
philosophies.

It is necessary to understand the difference of Āstika and Nāstika philosophies. Though Mādha-vāchārya in his *Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha* has described sixteen systems of philosophy viz. (1) Chārvāka

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1. "बौद्धं नैयायिकं सांख्यं जैनं वैशेषिकं तथा ।
जैमिनीयञ्च षड्विधानि दर्शनानाममून्यहो ॥"

Śaḍdarśana-samuchchaya 3.

2. "जैनं सांख्यं जैमिनीयं योगं वैशेषिकं तथा ।
सौगतं दर्शनान्येवं नास्तिकं न तु दर्शनम् ॥"

Śaḍdarśanasamuchchaya Page 1

(Yaśovijaya series, Benares)

(2) Bauddha (3) Ārhiata (4) Rāmānuja (5) Mādhava (6) Pāśupata (7) Śaiva (8) Pratyavijñā (9) Raseśvara (10) Pāṇīniya (11) Nyāya (12) Vaiśeṣika (13) Sāṅkhya (14) Yoga (15) Pūrva-mīmāṃsā (16) Uttara-mīmāṃsā, it is on the basis of the distinction of the Āstika and Nāstika philosophies that the so-called Nāstika philosophies came to be excluded in the subsequent list of approved philosophies. By six systems of Indian philosophy, according to current acceptance Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, Pātañjala (Yoga), Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta are understood. The Jaina and Bauddha philosophies were excluded from this list by later writers on the ground that these systems are Nāstika philosophies. Raghunandan has quoted a verse from Hayaśirṣa-pañcharātra that the philosophies of Gautama, Kāṇada, Kapila, Patañjali, Vyāsa and Jaimini are the only six systems of philosophy¹.

The word Nāstika is differently interpreted. The derivative meaning from the Sūtra of Pāṇini² is taken to be "he who does not accept Paraloka or existence after death"³ The second interpretation is that by Nāstika we mean the person who does not accept the existence of Īśvara⁴ and the third

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1. "गौतमस्य कणादस्य कपिलस्य पतञ्जलेः ।
व्यासस्य जैमिनेश्चापि दर्शनानि पडेव हि ॥" Devapratisthātattva.
 2. "अस्ति नास्ति दिष्टं मतिः ।" Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini. 4.4.60.
 3. "परलोकः अस्तीति यस्य मतिरस्ति स आस्तिकः ।
तद्विपरीतो नास्तिकः ॥" Kāśikā.
 4. "नास्तिकः परलोकतत्साधनादयभाववादी ।
तत्साक्षिण ईश्वरस्य असत्यवादी च ॥" Nyāyakōṣa.

meaning is that Nāstika indicates the man who denies the authority of the Vedas¹.

Now, if we accept the meaning of Nāstika as one who does not accept Paraloka (existence after death), Karma and the fruits of Karma, we cannot say that Jaina and Bauddha philosophies are Nāstika philosophies for both of these systems of philosophy accept these.

Again, if we interpret 'Nāstika' to mean 'denying the existence of Īśvara', the Sāṅkhya as well as Mīmāṃsā systems of philosophy should be taken as Nāstika philosophies as neither Kapila nor Jaimini has accepted the existence of a creator (Īśvara). But we have shown above that these two systems of philosophy have not been excluded from the list of six philosophies on such a ground.

The conclusion is therefore inevitable that to call Bauddha and Jaina philosophies "Nāstika", the third interpretation of the word "Nāstika" viz. denying the authority of the Vedas, must be accepted, for these philosophies do not accept the Vedas as eternal or as infallible. The Bauddhas accept two Pramāṇas, Pratyakṣa and Anumāna and do not accept the authority of the Vedas. ² In Jain

1. "नास्तिको वेदनिन्दकः ।" Institutes of Manu.

2. "ये तु सौगतसंसारमोचकागमाः कस्तेषु प्रामाण्यमार्योऽनुमोदते,
बौद्धशास्त्रे हि विशिष्टा दृश्यते वेदवाहयता ।

जातिधर्मोदिताचार-परिहारावधारणात् ॥" Nyāyamañjarī.

"महाजनश्च वेदानां वेदार्थानुगामिनां च पुराणधर्मशास्त्राणां वेदाविरोधिनाश्च
केषाञ्चिदागमानां प्रामाण्यमनुमन्यते, न वेदविरुद्धानां बौद्धाद्यागमानाम् ॥"

Nyāyamañjarī.

For a full discussion vide a Bengali article "Āstika and Nāstika Darśana" by Dr. Ashtosh Śāstrī.

philosophy Āgama (words, signs etc. of an Āpta or reliable person), has been accepted as a variety of Pramāṇa but the authority of the Vedas has not been accepted¹.

But this exclusion of Jain philosophy was effected at a very late stage. We find that its doctrines were attempted to be refuted in the Vedānta-sūtras, and Kumārila and Śaṅkarāchārya levelled their arguments against certain Jain views such as existence of omniscient beings. There cannot be any doubt that all the different systems of philosophy whether the same were Āstika or Nāstika according to different interpretations were thoroughly studied and in conferences before saints, kings and scholars, discussions and refutations of various doctrines were of very frequent occurrence. We find in Śaktisaṅgama Tantra [between 1555 to 1604 A. D.] that Jaina philosophy was taken as one of Kāli Darśanas². Even Jayanta Bhatta the celebrated Hindu author of Nyāya mañjarī [9th century] accepted Jaina philosophy to be authoritative³.

1. Vide Pages 44 to 49 of Prameya-ratnamālā appended to this work in which the view that Āgama can include the Vedas is refuted whether it be accepted that the Vedas are Pauruṣeya (produced by human beings) or Apauruṣeya (not produced by human beings and eternal).

2. Śaktisaṅgamantra edited by Binayatosh Bhattacharya M.A. Ph. D. (Gaekwad Oriental Series).

3. Jayanta Bhatta began his argument that others can be Āpta like the author of the Vedas, saying “अन्ये सर्वागमानान्तु प्रामाण्यं प्रतिपेदिरे”. His conclusion is exemplified in the verse :—

“नानाविधैरागममार्गभेदैरादिश्यमाना बहवोऽभ्युपायाः ।

एकत्र ते श्रेयसि संपतन्ति सिन्धौ प्रवाहा इव जाह्नवीयाः ॥”

Nomenclature
of Nyāya.

The name “Nyāya” came to be applied later to a system of philosophy which dealt with logic. The original name was “Ānvikṣiki” from Anvikṣā (discussion). Fruitless Tarka Vidyā was always discouraged¹ but that Ānvikṣiki which will lead to the attainment of a knowledge of self was always regarded as a subject to be learnt. In Manu-samhitā we find that a King should learn Ānvikṣiki². Rājaśekhara in his Kāvya-mimāṃsā has mentioned that Ānvikṣiki knowledge is of two kinds, being of the nature of Pūrvapakṣa and Uttarapakṣa and that Jaina, Bauddha and Chārvāka systems are of the former and Sāṅkhya, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems are of the latter kind³.

In Chhāndogya Upaniṣad (VII-1) and in Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali, we find Nyāya philosophy named as “Vāko-vākya.” Vātsyāyana mentioned the five-limbed syllogism (for Parārthānumāna) as Nyāya.

After describing persecution of persons who set up new sects for worldly enjoyment and profligacy, by king Śankaravarmā of Kashmir, Jayanta Bhatta says that the doctrines of the Jains etc. are not such :

“तदपूर्वमिति विदित्वा निवारयामास धर्मतत्त्वज्ञः ।

राजा शंकरवर्मा न पुनर्जैनादिमतमेवम् ॥”

1. Vide : “आन्वीक्षिकीं तर्कविद्यामनुरक्तो निरर्थिकाम् ।” Mahābhārata Śāntiparva 180. 47. To what extent such wrong arguments can proceed will appear from the attempt of sage Jābali to dissuade Rāma from going to the forest to fulfil the vow of his father. Rāmāyana. Ayodhyākāṇḍa. Canto 109.

2. “आन्वीक्षिकीश्चात्मविद्याम् ।” Manu-samhitā, 7.43.

3. Kāvya-mimāṃsā. Chapter II.

From analogy the science propounding this has also been called Nyāya¹.

The Hindu Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophies are mentioned as Yauga by Jain logicians. The Vaiśeṣika system is earlier than the Nyāya philosophy and its logical principles are accepted by the latter. "The Nyāya analyses the different ways in which our knowledge is acquired. They are said to be intuition (Pratyakṣa), inference (Anumāna), comparison (Upamāna), and verbal testimony (Śabda). Though Pratyakṣa originally meant sense-perception, it soon came to cover all immediate apprehension whether through the aid of senses or otherwise. It is knowledge whose instrumental cause is not knowledge (Jñānākaraṇakam jñānam). In inference comparison etc. we require a knowledge of premises or of similarity, but such knowledge is not an antecedent condition of intuition. The word is used for the result or the apprehension of the truth as well as the process or the operation which leads to the result.

Sense-perception follows on the modification of the self produced by the contact of the senses with their objects. Two kinds of perception are distinguished, determinate (Savikalpaka) and indeterminate (Nirvikalpaka) which correspond roughly to knowledge about and acquaintance with an object.

Inference operates neither with regard to things unknown nor with regard to that known

Essence of
Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika
principles of
reasoning.

1. In Subalopaniṣad we find : "न्यायो मीमांसा धर्मशास्त्राणि ।"
In Yājñavalkya Saṃhitā we read : "पुराणन्यायमीमांसा ।" Some
also use the word Nīti to mean Nyāya e.g. "सांख्ययोगा नीतिविसेसिका"
Milinda-pañha.

definitely for certain ; it functions only with regard to things that are doubtful.' (N. B. I. I. i.). It derives a conclusion from the ascertained fact of the subject possessing a property which is constantly accompanied by another. We ascertain that the hill is on fire from the fact that the hill has smoke and smoke is universally accompanied by fire. Inferential reasoning is stated in the form of a syllogism of which the five members are: 1. Proposition (Pratijñā): the hill is on fire; 2. Reason (Hetu): because it smokes; 3. Example (Udāharaṇa): whatever shows smoke shows fire *e. g.* a kitchen; 4. Application (Upanaya): So is this hill, and 5. Conclusion (Nigamana): therefore, the hill is on fire. The first member states the thesis to be established. It is only a suggestion. It contains a subject of what is observed, which is generally an individual or a class, and a predicate, which is to be proved. The subject is the minor term (Pakṣa, Dharmin) and the predicate the major (Sādhyā, Dharma). The second member of the syllogism states the presence in the minor of the middle term called ground (Hetu). The third takes us to the basis of inference, the major premise. Though Gautama and Vātsyāyana may not have regarded the example as the illustration of a general rule later Nyāya looks upon it as the statement of an invariable concomitance between the mark and the character inferred (Vyāpti-prati-pādakam Vākyaṃ). The conclusion re-states the proposition as grounded. Nāgārjuna is given the credit for dispensing with the last two members of the syllogism as superfluous.

Universal propositions are reached through enumeration, intuition and indirect proof. Uninterrupted agreement (Niyata Sāhacharya) reinforced

by absence of exceptions (Avinābhāva-rūpa-sambandha) leads to unconditional concomitances. Nature does not always supply us with positive and negative instances of the necessary type. In such cases indirect proof (Tarka) may be used. By pointing out the absurdities in which we are landed, if we deny a suggested hypothesis, we indirectly prove its validity. Even when we observe all possible cases and strengthen our conclusion by indirect proof we cannot reach absolute certainty. Experience of sensible particulars, however thorough and exhaustive, cannot give rise to universal relations. Gangeśa recognises the non-sensuous (Alaukika) activity involved in the apprehension of universals (Sāmānyalakṣaṇa)¹."

In my commentary on the Parikṣāmukhaṃ, I have pointed out in detail where and in what manner Jain logicians differ from the above views of Hindu Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika Philosophies.

Pramāṇas.

Pramāṇa is the main theme of all Nyāya philosophies. Different systems admit different number of Pramāṇas. In Tārkika-rakṣā (11th century) we find; "The Chārvākas accept only one Pramāṇa viz. Pratyakṣa; Kaṇāda and Buddha accept two Pramāṇas Pratyakṣa and Anumāna; the Sāṅkhya system and some sects of Nyāya philosophy acknowledge three Pramāṇas viz, Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and Śabda; some followers of the Nyāya philosophy accept four Pramāṇas, Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Śabda and Upamāna; Prabhākara (one school of Mīmāṃsā philosophy) accept five Pramāṇas, Pratyakṣa, Anu-

1. S. Rādhakrishnan : Indian Philosophy Encyclo. Britt. Vol. 12. Page 250.

māna, Upamāna, Śabda and Arthāpatti; the Bhāttas (followers of Kumārila Bhatta, another school of Mīmāṃsā philosophy) as well as the followers of the Vedānta philosophy accept six Pramāṇas viz. Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna, Śabda, Arthāpatti and Abhāva.”¹

Jain Nyāya
before Māṇikya-
nandi.

The earliest detailed reference to the subject of Pramāṇa in Jain Nyāya is found in the Tattvārthadhigama Sūtra of Umāsvāmi. The twelve Āṅgas of the Jainas prevalent at the time of Śrī Mahāvira only give a hint of Anekāntavāda but no specific reference of Pramāṇa, Naya or Sapta-Bhaṅgi is found in the same. Kundakunda in his Pravachanasāra has mentioned the two kinds of Pramāṇa viz Pra-

Kunda-kunda.

(1) “प्रत्यक्षमेकं चार्वाकाः कणादसुगतौ पुनः ।

प्रत्यक्षमनुमानश्च सांख्याः शब्दश्च ते अपि ॥

न्यायैकदेशिनोऽप्येवमुपमानं च केचन ।

अर्थापत्त्या सहैतानि चत्वार्याह प्रभाकरः ॥

अभावषष्ठान्येतानि भाट्टा वेदान्तिनस्तथा ।”

Tārkika rakṣā by Varadarāja

Writers like Varadarāja as above have termed scholars who have formulated different views from the same of Gautama as “Nyāyaika-deśins”. Mallinātha in his commentary on Tārkika-rakṣā has explained Nyāyaikadeśins as Bhūṣaṇa and others (“न्यायैकदेशिनो भूषणीयाः ।”) The Jain scholar Guṇaratna in his commentary on Saddarśanasamuchchaya (Haribhadra Sūri) has mentioned a commentary called Nyāya-bhūṣaṇa among the eighteen commentaries of the work Nyāya-sāra by Bhā-sarvajña (“भासवर्द्धप्रणीते न्यायसारेऽष्टादशटीकाः तासु मुख्या टीका न्यायभूषणाख्या ।”) Some infer that the view of Bhūṣaṇa is novel and opposed to Nyāya-sūtras of Gautama on some points which include the number of Pramāṇas, Bhūṣaṇa accepting only three (Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and Śabda) though Gautama admits four (Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna and Śabda).

tyakṣa and Parokṣa and the Sapta-bhaṅgi. But these references give only the barest outlines without any definite details. For example, Kundakunda says :

“The knowledge of him who beholds the immaterial, the supra-sensorial in material objects (mūrtāni), and the hidden, complete (embracing) the self and the other, is called Pratyakṣa (immediate)” ¹

1. Pravachanasāra. Śrūta-skandha I. 54 Trans. by Barrend Faddegon.

Amritachandra in his commentary thus explains this verse : “Supra-sensorial knowledge beholds the immaterial, the supra-sensorial even in material objects, and the hidden complete, whether included in own as in other. Such knowledge surely is a seer, owing to its immediateness, with reference to (a) immaterial (a-mūrta) substances such as the principles of motion and stationariness (b) immaterial, but supra-sensorial substances, such as the ultimate atom, (c) that which is hidden in respect of substance e. g. time: that which is hidden in respect of place e. g. the Pradeśas of space located outside the world ; that which is hidden in time, e. g. in non-present modifications ; that which is hidden in respect of forms-of-being, namely five (Sukṣma) modifications latent within gross (Sthūla) modifications : thus with reference to all things, distinguished as own and other.

Immediate knowledge indeed, bound to a single self, called the Akṣa and having the immediacy of its manifested infinite purity and beginning-less connection with the generality of perfect intelligence (Siddha-Chaitanya Sāmānya) does not search for exterior means, enjoys infinity, because of its possession of infinite energies. Knowledge enjoying such prestige, seeing that the knowable appearances no more outgo knowledge than combustible appearances the fire, what can resist such knowledge ? Therefore it is acceptable.” Ibid p. 35.

Here Akṣa is taken as synonym of Ātman. This is to be remembered to contrast the interpretation of Akṣa as Indriya (senses) by other Naiyāyikas,

"The soul, in itself immaterial, goes into materiality (mūrti) and then apprehending with this material (body) the material (world), sometimes knows and sometimes does not know that—which-is-fit-for-knowledge (yogya)."

"Touch, taste, smell, colour and sound are the material objects (pudgalas) for the sense-organs ; the sense organs do not grasp them simultaneously."

"The sense-organs are called an exterior (para) substance, and not an innate nature of the self; how then could that which is reached by them be an immediate perception for the self?"

"Knowledge of objects from another is called indirect ; but if knowledge is acquired by the soul alone (Kevala Jñāna) then it is direct." ¹

Kundakunda describes the sensorial joy ; not supremely real of those who possess indirect knowledge (Parokṣa-Jñāna) thus :

"The lords of men, demons and Gods, oppressed by their natural (sahaja) organs of sense, unable to withstand that misery, find pleasure in satisfying objects"².

1. Pravachana-sāra. I. 55-58 Trans by Barend Faddegon.

2. Ibid I-63. Amritachandra explains this verse thus :
 "Those creatures who through lack of immediate knowledge take refuge in indirect knowledge have a congenial affection for their organs of sense, which are the equipment therefor. So in these persons having this affection for their sense-organs and, while devoured by the flaring *Kāla*-fire of great infatuation, utterly longing and thirsty, like heated balls of iron, and unable to withstand the vehemence of this misery, there arises a satisfaction (rati) with these satisfying (ramya) objects, which serve to soothe their disease. Hence since the sense-organs must be compared to a disease and the objects to means for soothing the disease, no really-true joy exists for those who have a limited knowledge." Ibid. pp. 41-42.

Kundakunda lays down that a soul in its perfect condition has omniscience knowing by direct intuition (pratyakṣa) substances, states etc. in all times and places without operation of senses. Parokṣa (indirect) knowledge is sense-knowledge, the senses being a material accretion to the soul.

Saptabhaṅgi is briefly described in Pravachana-sāra II.23. As this matter is not dealt with in Parikṣāmukhaṃ, we do not dilate upon this subject here.

Umāsvāmi in the Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra made a more detailed reference to Pramāṇas and its subdivisions. Laying down the utility of Pramāṇas and Nayas as means of instruction for attaining right faith¹, Umāsvāmi has mentioned that "Mati, Śruta, Avadhi, Manaḥparyaya and Kevala are right knowledge"² and these also consist of two Pramāṇas.³ Mati and Śruta are taken to be Parokṣa⁴ and Avadhi, Manaḥparyaya and Kevala as Pratyakṣa⁵. We find in Kundakunda's Pravachana-sāra the idea of Mati, Śruta, Avadhi and Manaḥparyaya in the following verse :

"The saint (Sādhu) has the scripture for eye ; all creatures have their sense-organs for eyes ; the Devas have eyes which see the remote (avadhi) ; but the liberated souls (siddhas) have eyes which see everywhere."⁶

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1. "प्रमाणनयैरधिगमः ।" Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra, I. 6.
 2. "मतिश्रुतावधिमनःपर्ययकेवलानि ज्ञानम् ।" Ibid I. 9.
 3. "तत् प्रमाणे ।" Ibid I. 10.
 4. "आदये परोक्षम् ।" Ibid I. 11.
 5. "प्रत्यक्षमन्यत् ।" Ibid I. 12.
 6. Pravachana-sāra III. 34. Trans. by Barend

Faddegon p. 177.

Kundakunda's description of Kevala knowledge has already been quoted.

The oldest idea of Pramāṇa in Jainism as expounded by Umāsvāmi and as already described is that the knowledge which is derived without the help of the senses or mind is Pratyakṣa and the knowledge derived from the help of the senses or mind is Parokṣa. Among the three varieties of Pratyakṣa Avadhi, Manahparyaya and Kevala, the first two cognise only objects having form. For this reason knowledge derived from these two kinds of Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa are called Vikala Pratyakṣa, but Kevala knowledge cognises all objects with or without form in the past, present or future and is therefore known as Sakala Pratyakṣa. Mati and Śrūta are the two varieties of Parokṣa and Umāsvāmi has mentioned that Smṛiti, Sañjñā (Pratyabhijñāna), Chintā (Tarka), and Abhinibodha (Anumāna) are within Mati Jñāna (the first variety of Parokṣa)¹.

Samanta-
bhadra.

Samantabhadra first used the nomenclature "Nyāya" and in this respect he inaugurated a separate subject. He however did not compose any special work in Jain Nyāya. He mentions that Pramāṇa illuminates itself as well as other objects² and states that the result of Pramāṇa is acceptance of desirable things, leaving undesirable things or indifference³ He has also mentioned Śrūta Pra-

1. "मतिः स्मृतिः संज्ञा चिन्ताभिनिबोध इत्यनर्थान्तरम् ।"

Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra.

See Parikṣāmukhaṃ page 80. Aphorism 2.

2. "स्वपरावभासकं यथा प्रमाणं सुवि बुद्धिलक्षणम् ।"

Svayambhū Stotra. Verse 63.

3. "उपेक्षा फलमाद्यस्य शेषस्यादानहानधीः ।"

Āpta-mīmāṃsā Verse 102.

māṇa as Syādvāda and has stated Naya to be its part¹.

Siddhasena.

Siddhasena Divākara added the word “Bādhavivarjita” (without any obstruction) to the definition of Pramāṇa by Samanta-bhadra viz. that it illuminates itself as well as other objects². Though Samantabhadra used inference to establish an omniscient being in his Āpta-mīmāṃsā, yet we find the definition of Anumāna with its subdivisions Svārtha and Parārtha for the first time in the Nyāyāvātāra of Siddhasena. In this work also we get definitions of limbs of Parārthānumāna such as Pakṣa, Hetu and Driṣṭānta. The fallacies also have been described in the aforesaid treatise³.

Akalaṅka.

It is of the utmost importance to remember that except in the Jaina Nyāya, we nowhere find knowledge derived from the senses being called Parokṣa Pramāṇa. In Hindu Nyāya philosophy⁴ and in all other Hindu Śāstras, knowledge derived from the senses is known as Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa. Akalaṅka the greatest of Jain logicians attempted to reconcile this in the following way. He accepted Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa as two Pramāṇas but instead of dividing Pratyakṣa into Śakala and Vikala, he laid down two hitherto unknown divisions viz.

1. “स्याद्वाद-प्रविभक्तार्थे विशेषव्यञ्जको नयः ।”

Āpta-mīmāṃsā. Verse 106.

2. Vide Parikṣāmukhaṃ p. 20 Note 9.

3. Verses from Nyāyāvātāra on all these matters have been quoted in footnotes in Parikṣāmukhaṃ in appropriate places.

4. “इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नं ज्ञानमन्यपदेश्यमन्यभिचारि-व्यवसायात्मकं प्रत्यक्षम् ॥” Nyāya Sūtra (Gautama) I. 1. 4.

Sānvyavahārika and Mukhya Pratyakṣa¹. He further laid down that Mati Jñāna derived through the senses and mind is not Parokṣa but Sānvyavahārika Pratyakṣa². As Mati came to be recognised as Sānvyavahārika Pratyakṣa, its correlated Smṛiti, Sañjñā, Chintā and Abhinibodha as mentioned by Umāsvāmi also came under the same head. But a subtle distinction was made by Akalaṅka. He subdivided Sānvyavahārika Pratyakṣa into two heads (a) Indriya-pratyakṣa (knowledge derived through the senses) under which came Mati and (b) Anindriya-pratyakṣa (knowledge derived through mind)³ under which came Smṛiti, Sañjñā, Chintā and Abhinibodha⁴ as mind is prevalent in these four. This change necessitated a change of definition of Pratyakṣa and Akalaṅka accordingly defined Pratyakṣa as "clear knowledge." ("Pratyakṣam viśadam jñānam.")

Now, to meet the argument that if we take Mati as Pratyakṣa we must say that the traditional acceptance of the view that it is Parokṣa is denied undermining the oldest authorities like Umāsvāmi, Akalaṅka has written that Mati, Smṛiti, Sañjñā, Chintā and Abhinibodha will be Pratyakṣa so long as these

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1. "प्रत्यक्षं विशदं ज्ञानं मुख्यसांन्यवहारिकम् ।
परोक्षं शेषविज्ञानं प्रमाणमिति संग्रहः ॥" Laghiyastraya Verse 1.
 2. "आद्ये परोक्षमपरं प्रत्यक्षं प्राहुरंजसा ।
केवलं लोकवुद्धेयव मतेर्लक्षणसंग्रहः ॥" Nyāya-viniśchaya
Verse 93.
 3. "तत्र सांन्यवहारिकं इन्द्रियानिन्द्रियप्रत्यक्षम् ।"
Vivṛiti on Laghiyastraya. Verse 4.
 4. "अनिन्द्रियप्रत्यक्षं स्मृतिसंज्ञाचिन्ताभिनिबोधात्मकम् ।"
Vivṛiti on Laghiyastraya. Verse 61


remain in the mental state. The moment these are connected with words i.e. are expressed in words they will become Parokṣa¹. Thus, Akalaṅka has accepted Mati etc, as Pratyakṣa in one sense and Parokṣa in another sense. According to Akalaṅka Śruta is what is heard and so the knowledge derived through words is Śruta and the knowledge having no connection with words is Sāṅvyavahārika Pratyakṣa.

The peculiarity of Akalaṅka is that under Śruta in Parokṣa Pramāṇa he has two subdivisions Akṣarātmaka and Anakṣarātmaka. Other Jain logicians have mentioned that Anumāna (inference) is of two kinds Svārthānumāna (inference for one's own self) and Parārthānumāna (inference for the sake of others). Akalaṅka says that it is not inference alone that has these two subdivisions but other Pramāṇas also may be for Svārtha and Parārtha. Svārthānumāna is accepted by Akalaṅka to be included in Anakṣarātmaka Śruta Pramāṇa as no help of words is necessary for its acceptance and Parārthānumāna according to Akalaṅka comes within Akṣarātmaka Anumāna as this cannot arise without help of words. The Pramāṇas Arthāpatti, Āgama etc are all recognised by Akalaṅka to be varieties of Śruta Pramāṇa.


The following tables will illustrate the difference between the divisions of Pramāṇa by the oldest writers such as Umāsvāmi and Akalaṅka.

1. “ज्ञानमादयं मतिः संज्ञा चिन्ता चाभिनिबोधनम् ।

प्राङ्नामयोजनाच्छेषं श्रुतं शब्दानुयोजनात् ॥” Laghiyastraya.



Pramāṇa (according to Umāsvāmi)



Later Writers.

The writers who followed Akalaṅka (such as Ananta-vīrya, Vidyānanda etc.) did not accept Smṛiti etc. as Anindriya-pratyakṣa though in one sense they were ready to accept knowledge derived through the senses to be Sāṅkhyavahārika Pratyakṣa. The views of later writers have been fully discussed by me in the commentary of Parīkṣāmukhaṃ and the charts printed in Pages 76 and 77 of the work might be compared with the charts printed above.

Māṇikyanandi in his Parīkṣāmukhaṃ has closely followed the views of Akalaṅka. Before the time of Māṇikyanandi, Pramāṇa was defined as "Svaparavyavasāyi jñāna" (valid knowledge of itself and other). Māṇikyanandi added the word "Apūrvā" (not proved before) in the definition. Akalaṅka has mentioned the same thing by the word "Anadhi-gatārthagrāhi"¹. A verse (the author of which has not been identified) in Mīmāṃsā philosophy shows that the element "Apūrvā" was also accepted as essential to Pramāṇa in that philosophy also².

Māṇikyanandi has not followed Jaināgama by including Avagraha etc. within knowledge. He has mentioned Āgama in place of Śrūta Pramāṇa and has placed it under Parokṣa Pramāṇa.

Subsequent developments and detailed definitions and discussions have been investigated in my commentary on Parīkṣāmukhaṃ where in all cases the original authority has been quoted to give the readers an opportunity to form their own opinions in case they wish to differ from the same of my own.

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1. "प्रमाणमविसंवादि ज्ञानम् अनधिगतार्थाधिगमलक्षणत्वात् ।" Aṣṭa-śati
 2. "तत्रापूर्वार्थविज्ञानं निश्चितं बाधवर्जितम् ।
अदुष्टकारणारब्धं प्रमाणं लोकसम्मतम् ॥"

The use of 'Vyavasāya' or 'Nīśchaya' in the definition of Pramāṇa as used by Māṇikyanandi is to differentiate the Jain view from that of the Buddhists who do not accept this to be essential in Pramāṇa. Some Buddhist philosophers also deny the existence of external objects. To differentiate the Jain view the word "Artha" has been introduced in the definition of Pramāṇa by Māṇikyanandi (see page 29).

The Buddhist
views.

There are four sects of Buddhist philosophers :
1 Mādhyamika 2 Yogāchāra 3 Sautrāntika and
4 Baibhāsika.¹ Those who maintain that everything is void are Mādhyamikas or Śūnyavādins or Nihilists. Those who maintain the reality of everything are known as Sarvāstitvavādin or Realists divided into two groups (a) Sautrāntikas and (b) Baibhāsikas. Those who maintain that thought only is real are known as Vijñānavādins or Idealists.

Śāṅkarāchārya in his Bhāṣya on Vedānta Sūtra II. 2-18 writes that the difference of views arose either from expounding different views at different times by Buddha or from the different views adopted by the disciples of Buddha². Śāṅkarāchārya mentions that there are three kinds of disciples known as Sarvāstitvavādins, Vijñānavādins and Sarvaśūnyatāvādins ³Bāhaspati Miśra in his commentary Bhāmati on the same Sūtra says "Disciples have great, medium or little intelligence. Those who have little

1. "बुद्धस्य हि माध्यमिक-योगाचार-सौत्रान्तिक-वैभाषिक-संज्ञकाश्चत्वारः
शिष्याः ।" Brahmanvidyābharaṇa

2. "स च बहुप्रकारः प्रतिपत्तिभेदाद्विनेयभेदाद् वा ।"

Śāṅkarabhāṣya to Vedānta Sūtra II. 2. 18

3. "तत्रैते त्रयो वादिनो भवन्ति । केचित् सर्वास्तित्ववादिनः, केचिद्विज्ञाना-
स्तित्वमात्रवादिनः, अन्ये पुनः सर्वशून्यत्ववादिन इति ।" Ibid.

intelligence descend into Nihilism following the existence of everything. Those who have medium intellect descend into Nihilism following the view that thought only is real. Those who have great intellectual capacity grasp Nihilism without any intermediate hold of anything”¹. The following verses from Bodhicharyāvatāra are quoted in the Bhamati :

“The instructions of the preceptors of people follow the inclination of their souls and so differ in many ways by various means. Sometimes the instructions are deep, and sometimes superficial. Sometimes these are of both the above kinds. Though these are different, really they are not different being characterised by Śūnyatā (Nihilism)².

The view of Sarvāstitvavādins (Realists) who maintain that everything whether external or internal is real is thus described by Śāṅkarāchārya. “What is external is either element (Bhūta) or elementary (Bhautika); What is internal is either mind (Chitta) or mental (Chaitta). The elements are earth, water and so on; elementals are colour etc.

1. In explaining “Vineyabhedāt vā” in the Śāṅkara Bhāṣya, Bāchaspati Miśra says :

“हीनमध्यमोत्कृष्टधियो हि शिष्या भवन्ति । तत्र ये हीनमतयस्ते सर्वास्तित्ववादेन तदाशयानुरोधाद् शून्यतायामवतार्यन्ते । ये तु मध्यमास्ते ज्ञानमात्रास्तित्वेन शून्यताया—मवतार्यन्ते । ये तु प्रकृष्टमतयस्तेभ्यः साक्षादेव शून्यतातत्त्वं प्रतिपादयते ।”

Bhāmati on Vedānta Sūtra II. 2. 18

2. “देशना लोकनाथानां सत्त्वाशयवशानुगाः ।
भिद्यन्ते बहुधा लोक उपायैर्वहुभिः पुनः ॥
गंभीरोत्तानभेदेन क्वचिच्चोभयलक्षणा ।
भिन्नापि देशनाभिन्ना शून्यताद्वयलक्षणा ॥” Bodhichittavivarāṇa.

on the one hand, and the eye and the other sense-organs on the other hand. Earth and the other three elements arise from the aggregation of the four different kinds of atoms; the atoms of earth being hard, those of water viscid, those of fire hot, those of air mobile.

The inward world consists of the five so-called 'groups' (skandha), the group of sensation (rupa-skandha), the group of knowledge (vijñānaskandha), the group of feeling (vedanā-skandha) the group of verbal knowledge (sañjāskandha) and the group of impressions (saṃskāraskandha); which taken together constitute the basis of all personal existence". (Dr. Thibaut's translation. Sacred Books of the East. Vol. XXXIV Page 403).

The Skandhas are thus described in the following Note of Dr. Thibaut to the above. This will explain the Ālayavijñāna and Pravṛttivijñāna mentioned in Page 29.

"The rūpaskandha comprises the senses and their objects, colour etc.; the sense-organs were above called Bhautika, they here reappear as Chaittika on account of their connection with thought. Their objects likewise are classed as Chaittika in so far as they are perceived by the senses. The vijñānaskandha comprises the series of self-cognitions (ahamāham ityālayavijñānapravavaḥ) according to

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1. "सर्वास्तित्ववादिनो बाह्यमान्तरञ्च वस्त्वभ्युपगच्छन्ति, भूतं भौतिकं चित्तं चैतञ्च । तत्र भूतं पृथिवीधात्वादयः, भौतिकं रूपादयश्चक्षुरादयश्च । चतुष्टये च पृथिव्यादिपरमाणवः खरस्नेहोष्णोरणस्वभावास्ते पृथिव्यादिभावेन संहन्यन्ते इति मन्यन्ते । तथा रूपविज्ञानवेदनासंज्ञासंस्कारसंज्ञकाः पञ्च स्कन्धाः, तेऽप्याध्यात्मं सर्वव्यवहारास्पदभावेन संहन्यन्ते इति मन्यन्ते ।" Śāṅkarabhāṣya to Vedānta Sūtra II. 2. 18

all commentators ; and in addition according to Brahnavidyābharāṇa, the knowledge determinate and indeterminate of external things (savikalpakam nirvikalpakañcha pravrittivijñānasāṅgitaṁ). The vedanāskandha comprises pleasure, pain etc. The sañjāskandha comprises the cognition of things by their names (Gauraśva ityādi-śabda-sañjalpita-pratyayah, Ānanda Giri ; Gauraśva ityevam nāma-viśiṣṭa-savikalpaḥ pratyayah, Go. Au ; Sañjñā Yajnadattādipada-tadullekhi savikalpapratyayo vā dvitīyapakṣe vijñānapadena savikalpapratyayo na grāhyah. Brahnavidyābharāṇa) The Saṁskāra-skandha comprises passion, aversion etc. dharma and adharma...The Vijñānaskandha is Chitta, the other skandhas Chaitta."

Similarities between the aphorisms in Parikṣā-mukhaṁ and the same in Nyāya-praveśa and Nyāyavindu of Dharma-kīrti have been shown by Pandit Kailās Chandra Śāstri¹.

Nyāya-praveśa	Parikṣāmukhaṁ
1. शुचि नरःशिरःकपालं प्राण्यङ्गत्वात् शंखशुक्तिवत् । VI. 19
2. माता मे बन्ध्या । VI. 20
3. बाष्पादिभावेन संदिह्यमानो भूतसंधातोमिसिद्धा- वुपदिश्यमानः संदिग्धासिद्धः ।	... VI. 25, 26
4. तत्र पक्षः प्रसिद्धो धर्मी । III. 26, 27
Nyāya-vindu	
1. अनुमानं द्विधा । III. 52
2. स्वार्थं परार्थं च । III. 53
3. नेहाप्रतिबद्धसामर्थ्यानि धूमकारणानि सन्ति, धूमाभावात् । III. 81
4. नात्र शिशपा वृक्षाभावात् । III. 80
5. नास्त्यत्र शीतस्पर्शः धूमात् । III. 73

Meaning of the title "Parikṣā-mukhaṃ."

The title of the work Parikṣāmukhaṃ is thus derived according to the author of Nyāyamaṇi-dīpikā : Parikṣa or Tarka is the discussion used in finding out the strength or weakness of various arguments which are opposed to one another. 'Pari' means 'full' and 'Īkṣaṇam' means 'discussion' (of subjects). 'Āmukha' means 'the entrance' to those who want to understand this subject. This work (Parikṣāmukhaṃ) is like such a door."¹

Another derivation is also suggested by the same writer as follows : "As examination of all objects is made by Pramāṇa so Pramāṇa is the first thing (Āmukha) in Parikṣa (discussion). Here the work itself describing Pramāṇa (which is Parikṣāmukhaṃ) is also titled in the same name. As ascertainment is made by Pramāṇas leaving aside fallacies, discussion goes on with the help of Pramāṇas by those engaged in arguments. So the name 'Parikṣāmukhaṃ' of this work is justified."²

Māṇikyanandi, Nothing in detail is known about Māṇikyanandi the author of Parikṣāmukhaṃ. In the Visvakōṣa

1. "अन्योन्यविरुद्ध-नानायुक्तिप्रावल्यदौर्बल्यावधारणाय प्रवर्तमानो विचारः परीक्षा तर्क इति यावत् । 'परि' समन्तादशेष निःशेषत 'ईक्षणं' विचारणं यत्र अर्थानाम् इति व्युत्पत्तेः । तस्य 'आमुखं' तद्व्युत्पत्तौ प्रवेशार्थिनां प्रवेशद्वारमिदं प्रकरणम् ।"

2. "अथवा समस्तप्रमेयजालपरीक्षायाः प्रमाणपूर्वकत्वात् प्रमाणं परीक्षामुखम् । अत्र मुखशब्दस्य प्रथमार्थवाचित्वात् प्रमाणप्रतिपादकं प्रकरणमपि परीक्षामुखमित्युच्यते । प्रमाणनिश्चयस्यापि एतत् प्रकरणपूर्वकत्वात् तदाभासव्यावृत्त्या निश्चितं हि प्रमाणं पुरस्कृत्य परीक्षा क्रियते प्रेक्षापूर्वकारिभिरिति प्रकरणस्य परीक्षामुखनामधेयमनुपचरितम् ॥"

Nyāyamaṇi-dīpikā, a commentary on Prameya-ratna-mālā.

[From a Manuscript preserved in Jain Siddhānta Bhavan, ARRAN].

(a Bengali encyclopaedia) it is mentioned "According to the Pattāvali of the Sarasvatī Gachcha of the Digamvaras, Māṇikyanandi became Pattadhara in 585 Vikrama Samvat (523 A. D.) Before he became a Pattadhara that is to say, in the beginning of the 6th century, Māṇikyanandi wrote Parikṣāmukhaṃ.

Māṇikyanandi
was later than
Akalaṅka.

This view is untenable. It is accepted by everyone that Māṇikyanandi was later than Akalaṅka and that he based his work on Akalaṅka's writings. Anantavīrya, the author of Prameya-ratna-mālā a commentary on Parikṣāmukhaṃ begins his work by saluting Māṇikyanandi in this manner :

Salutation to that Māṇikyanandi who has churned the nectar of the knowledge of Nyāya from the ocean of the words of Akalaṅka¹.

In Nyāyamaṇi-dīpikā a commentary on Prameya-ratna-mālā we find :

"Bhatta Akalaṅka Deva promulgated the influence of the true religion by the weapon of arguments delighting the hearts of all scholars of the world in the court of King Hima-śīta....Afterwards the great sage Māṇikyanandi wrote the Prakaraṇa Parikṣāmukhaṃ culling the subject matter from the ocean of the śāstra written by him (Akalaṅka). This work (of Māṇikyanandi) is like a vessel to cross the ocean (of the work of Akalaṅka.)"²

1. "अकलंकवचोऽस्मोधेरुद्ध्रे येन धीमता ।

न्यायविद्यामृतं तस्मै नमो माणिक्यनन्दिने ॥" Prameyaratnamālā.

2. "सकलराजाधिराजपरमेश्वरस्य हिमशीतलस्य महाराजस्य महास्थानमध्ये ...भगवान् भट्टाकलंकदेवो विश्वविद्वन्मण्डलहृदयाहादियुक्तिशस्त्रेण जगत्सद्धर्मप्रभाव-मबूधुत्तमाम् । तदनु...माणिक्यनन्दिमुनिवृन्दारकस्तत्प्रकाशितशास्त्रमहोदधेरुद्धृत्य तदवगाहनाय पोतोपमं 'परीक्षासुख' नामधेयमन्वर्थमुद्धृत्यप्रकरणमारचयन् मुदा ।"

Nyāyamaṇidīpikā (A Mss.).

Prabhāchandra the author of Prameyakamalamārtanḍa has written: "As the subject as laid down by Akalaṅka could be understood only by the wise, the Āchārya (Māṇikyanandi) composed this Prakaraṇa to explain that subject quoting the same with the object of laying down the same and wishing to explain the same (to all)¹.

Time of
Akalaṅka.

There are differences of opinion as to the time during which Akalaṅka flourished. In Ārādhana-kathā-koṣa (15th or 16th century A.D.), Akalaṅka is described as the son of the minister of Subhātuṅga the King of Mānyakheta. It is also mentioned that there was a discussion in the court of King Himāśītala between him and the Buddhists. In the Malliṣeṇa Praśasti in Sravana Belgola the latter incident is supported. It is also mentioned therein that Akalaṅka visited the court of King Sāhasatuṅga. Dr. Satish Chandra Vidyābhūṣana has taken Subhātuṅga or Sāhasatuṅga as Kriśṇarāja I of the Rashtrakuta dynasty². Pandit Nathuram Premi following this view has mentioned that the time of Akalaṅka was from Vikram Samvat 810 to 832 (753 to 775 A.D.)³ Dr. K. B. Pathak holds the view

1. "श्रीमदकलंकार्थोऽव्युत्पन्नप्रज्ञैरवगन्तुं न शक्यत इति तदव्युत्पादनाय करतलामलकवत् तदर्थमुद्धृत्य प्रतिपादयितुकामस्तत्परिज्ञानानुग्रहेच्छाप्रेरितस्तदर्थ-प्रतिपादनप्रवर्णं प्रकरणमिदमाचार्यः प्राह ।" Prameya-kamala-mārtanḍa.

2. "Māṇikyanandi was a Digamvara author... As his work is based on that of Akalaṅka, he must have lived after 750 A. D.... Māṇikyanandi seems to have lived about 800 A.D." History of the Medieval School of Indian Logic. Page 28.

3. Jain Hitaishi Bhāga 11. Page 428. Vide "अकलंकदेव ८१० से ८३२ तक के किसी समय में जीवित थे ।"

that Akalaṅka was a contemporary of Sāhasatuṅga Dantidurga. B. Kamta Prasad Jain criticising the view of Mr. Premi, has accepted the view that Sāhasatuṅga was none other than Dantidurga who reigned from 744 to 759 A.D. and has suggested that the time of Akalaṅka was from 744 to 782 A. D. B. Kamata Prasad has given arguments to support his view in his article in Hindi entitled "Sree Bhattākalaṅka Deva" published in Jain Siddhānta Bhāskar Bhāga 3, Kiraṇ 4. This view has however been ably refuted by Pandit Kailās Chandra Śāstri in his article "Bhattākalaṅka kā Samaya" printed in the same journal (Bhāga 4 Kiraṇ 3).

The first argument of B. Kamtaprasad is that Akalaṅka has been mentioned by Jinasena in his Harivaṃśapurāṇa and two verses have been quoted in support of this view¹ and it is also mentioned that Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar has also mentioned this fact². It has however been pointed out by Pandit Kailās Chandra Śāstri that it is not correct to interpret the word 'Deva' in the first verse to mean Akalaṅka. It really refers to Devanandi alias Pūjyapāda the author of Jainendra Vyākaraṇa. In the second verse it is merely mentioned that the fame of Virasena is 'akalaṅka' ('free from any flaw'). It has no

1. "इन्द्रचन्द्रार्कजैनेन्द्रव्याडिव्याकरणेक्षिणः ।

देवस्य देवसंघस्य न वन्द्यन्ते गिरः कथम् ॥"

Verse 31. Harivaṃśa Purāṇa.

"वीरसेनगुरोः कीर्तिरकलंकावभासते ।"

Verse 39. Harivaṃśa Purāṇa.

2. Principal Results of my last two years studies in Sanskrit Mss. Literature by R. G. Bhandarkar (Wier, 1889) Page 31.

connection with the author 'Akalaṅka'. Had Jinasena any desire to enlogise Akalaṅka, he would have done this in an un-ambiguous manner.

It is however not disputed by Pandit Śāstri that Jinasena was a writer later than Akalaṅka. Vidyānanda in his *Aṣṭasahasrī* a commentary on Akalaṅka's *Aṣṭaśati* has mentioned Kumārasena. This Kumārasena has also been mentioned in *Harivaṃśapurāṇa* of Jinasena. Prabhāchandra a commentator on *Parikṣāmukhaṃ* who was undoubtedly later than Māṇikyanandi who followed Akalaṅka is mentioned in the *Ādipurāṇa* of Jinasena. The next argument of B. Kamtaprasad is that Akalaṅka was later than Dharmakīrti, the Buddhist philosopher who flourished in the beginning of the seventh century (635 to 650 A.D. approximately) Pandit Śāstri admits this and gives examples showing that Akalaṅka has quoted and refuted the views of Dharma-kīrti¹. Pandit Śāstri however

1. The following instances are given : (a) The *Kārikā* in Akalaṅka's *Laghiya-straya* beginning with "स्वसंवेद्यविकल्पानां" mentions "सर्वतः संहृत्य चिन्तास्तिमितान्तरात्मना" found in *kārikā* 124 Chapter III of *Pramāṇa-vārttika* written by Dharma-kīrti.

Vide also "Dharmakīrti who is not referred to by Hieun Thsang but is referred to by I-Tsing very probably belonged to a period between 600-650 A.D." Introduction to *Sādhana-mālā* Page XXVII by B. Bhattacharya M.A. (Gaekwad's Oriental Series).

(b) The argument "भेदानां बहुभेदानां तत्रैकस्मिन्नयोगतः ।" mentioned in *Pramāṇa-vārttika* I. 91 has been met by Akalaṅka in his *Nyāyaviniśchaya* in the verse beginning with "भेदानां बहुभेदानां तत्रैकत्रापि संभवात् ।"

(c) In *Aṣṭa-śati* of Akalaṅka on *Āptamimāṃsā* verse 53 we

is unable to accept the conclusion of B. Kamtaprasad from this fact that Akalaṅka was at least hundred years later than Dharmakīrti, for it is urged that even contemporary writers can quote and refute each other's views and many examples can be given of such refutations.

Dr. K. B. Pathak has mentioned that as Kumārila Bhaṭṭa has attacked some of the views of Samantabhadra and Akalaṅka, it must be supposed that he was a contemporary of those writers and lived even after the death of Akalaṅka. In his article discussing the date of Samanta-bhadra¹ he has mentioned that the refutations of each other's views by Kumārila and Akalaṅka took place at the latter half of the eighth century A.D. B. Kamtaprasad has accepted this view and lays down that the time of Kumārila is 700 to 760 A.D. Pandit Śāstri points out that as B. Kamtaprasad accepts the time of Akalaṅka to be 744 to 782 A.D., how can it be possible that Kumārila lived even after the death of Akalaṅka as Kumārila according to B. Kamtaprasad (following Dr. K. B. Pathak) lived only up to 760 A.D. ? Further, Pandit Śāstri is unable to accept this date of Kumārila without satisfactory proof, but is willing to accept that Kumārila

find “न तस्य किञ्चिद् भवति न भवत्येव केवलम्”. This is exactly the second half of verse 279, Chapter I of *Pramāṇa-vārttika*.

(d) The view of Akalaṅka expressed in the sentence beginning with “मतान्तरप्रतिक्षेपार्थं वा” mentioned in *Aṣṭasahasrī* Page 81 discussing the *Nigraha-sthānas* of the Buddhist philosophers is a refutation of the *Vāda-nyāya* of Dharmakīrti.

1. *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* Vol. II. p. 141.

existed during the latter part of the seventh century refuting the view of Dr. K. B. Pathak that Kumārila flourished in the 8th century¹.

In the work 'Akalaṅka-charitra' it is mentioned that in 700 Vikrama Samvat (643 A.D.) there was a great discussion between Akalaṅka and the Buddhists². Pandit Śāstri points out that B. Kamta Prasad has taken the date as saka 700 but it is clear from the Sanskrit verse that Vikram Samvat is referred herein.

Pandit Śāstri holds the view that Akalaṅka flourished in the middle of the 7th century. After criticising the views of B. Kamtaprasad, Dr. Pathak, Dr. Bhandarkar, and Dr. S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa as mentioned above, he mentions the following evidence regarding the time of Akalaṅka.

Siddhasena Gaṇi has written a commentary on the Tattvārtha Bhāṣya. Siddhasena has mentioned Dharmakīrti (7th century). Silāṅka (9th century) has mentioned Siddhasena as Gandhabastī. The date of Siddhasena therefore lies between these broad periods. Siddhasena has mentioned the work

1. Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute Vol. XIII. P. 157.

2. "विक्रमार्कशताब्दीयशतसप्तप्रमाजुषि ।

कालेऽकलंकपतिनो बौद्धैर्बादो महानभूत् ॥".

Epigraphia Carnatika II. Introduction.

Pandit Jugalkishore Mukhtar in his article "समन्तभद्र का समय और डा० के० वि० पाठक" (Jaina Jagat. Year IX. Vol. 15 Page 16) has given the reading "विक्रमार्कशकाब्दीय" which appears to be the correct one.

'Siddhi-viniśchaya', of Akalaṅka in his Tattvārtha Bhāṣya Tikā¹.

Jinadāsa Gaṇi Mahottar composed a Chūrṇi on Niśītha-sūtra. In a Mss. of this work, the date of its composition is mentioned as Śaka Samvat 598 (676 A.D.) Jinadāsa has mentioned the work Siddhi-viniśchaya of Akalaṅka². So Akalaṅka cannot have flourished later than 676 A.D.

Pandit Śāstrī quotes the following internal evidence from Akalaṅka's works which may be valuable to ascertain his date.

Dignāga the celebrated Buddhist philosopher in laying down the definition of Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa has mentioned that Pratyakṣa is 'Kalpanāpoḍha' Dharmakīrti who was later than Dignāga added 'Abhrānta' to it in defining Pratyakṣa. Akalaṅka in his Tattvārtha-rājavārttika has criticised the definition of Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa as laid down by Dignāga. A verse from Dignāga's Pramāṇa-samuchchaya has also been quoted by Akalaṅka³.

Pandit Śāstrī is of opinion that as Akalaṅka has not criticised Dharmakīrti's definition of Pramāṇa in his Tattvārtha-rāja-vārttika, though he criticised views of Dharmakīrti in his other works, we may infer that Dharmakīrti's works Pramāṇa-

1. 'एवं कार्यकारणसम्बन्धः समवायपरिणामनिमित्तनिर्वर्तकादिरूपः सिद्धि-
विनिश्चयसृष्टिपरीक्षातो योजनीयो विशेषार्थिना दूषणद्वारेण ।' Page 37.

2. "दंसणगाही—दंसणणाणप्यभावगाणि सत्थाणि सिद्धिविनिच्छय-
संमदिमादि गेण्हंतो असंथरमाणे जं अकप्पियं पडिसेवति जयनाथे तत्थ से सुद्धो
अप्रायश्चित्ती भवतीत्यर्थः ।"

3. "प्रत्यक्षं कल्पनापोदं नामजात्यादियोजना ।
असाधारणहेतुत्वादक्षैस्तद्व्यपदिश्यते ॥"

Pramāṇa-samuchchaya by Dignāga.

vārttika, Pramāṇa-viniśchaya etc. were composed later than Tattvārtha-rāja-vārttika. In Tattvārtha-rāja-vārttika, Akalaṅka has quoted a verse which is said to be the first verse of the Prakaraṇa entitled 'Santānantara-siddhi' of Dharmakīrti¹. Pandit Śāstrī holds the view that as Dharmakīrti flourished from 635 to 650 A. D. Akalaṅka's date can be ascertained from this.

Akalaṅka has also quoted from the work 'Abhidharmakośa' of Vasubandhu².

Pandit Śāstrī concludes from the above that Dharmakīrti flourished from 635 to 650 A. D. and that Akalaṅka lived in the middle of the 7th century A. D.

In my opinion, no great help is derived from the internal evidence namely that Akalaṅka has mentioned Dharmakīrti, Vasubandhu or Dignāga. There is a view that Vasubandhu and Dignāga were contemporaries³. Udyotakara in his Nyāya-vārttika refuted the views of Dignāga while discussing Prameya of Anumāna Pramāṇa. Udyotakara has also mentioned Dharmakīrti and Vinita-deva in Nyāyavārttika. This Udyotakara has been men-

1. "बुद्धिपूर्वा क्रियां दृष्ट्वा स्वदेहेऽन्यत्र तद्ग्रहात् ।

मन्यते बुद्धिसद्भावं सा न येषु न तेषु धीः ॥"

Tattvārtharāja vārttika. P. 19.

[Sanātana Jaina Granthamālā]

2. "सवितर्कविचारा हि पञ्च विज्ञानधातवः ।

निरूपणानुस्मरणविकल्पनविकल्पकाः ॥"

Abhidharma-kośa of Vasubandhu.

We find the reading "विकल्पादविकल्पकाः" in Abhidharma-kośa.

3. Nyāyadarśana by Mahamahopādhyāya Phaṇibhūṣaṇa
Tarkabāgis Vol. I. (first edition) Page 39.

tioned by Subandhu the author of *Vāsavadattā*¹. Subandhu was earlier than Bāṇabhatta who lived in the court of king Harshavardhana of Kanauj (beginning of the 7th century). Bāṇabhatta has praised the work *Vāsavadattā* in his work *Harṣacharita*². Thus only this much can be mentioned with certainty that Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and Vasubandhu could not have flourished later than the sixth century. Dr. Jacobi says 'He (Udyotakara) may therefore have flourished in the early part of the sixth century or still earlier'³.

But Vasubandhu and Dignāga might have lived long before the 6th century A. D. Yuan Chwang who came to Nālandā Vihāra in 637 A. D. has written that within a thousand years from the death or the Nirvāṇa of Buddha, Manaratha and his disciple Vasubandhu lived⁴. Samuel Beal in his note to the above passage has written that at that time the Chinese Buddhists, accepted the date of Nirvāṇa of Buddha as 850 B. C. On this calculation

1. "न्यायस्थितिमिव उद्योत्कर-स्वरूपम् ।" *Vāsavadattā*.

2. "कवीनामगलहर्षो नूतं वासवदत्तया ।" *Harṣa-charitaṃ*.

3. The Dates of the Philosophical Sūtras of the Brahmanas by Hermann Jacobi [*Journal of the American Oriental Society* Vol. 31, 1911].

4. "This Master (Manoratha) made his auspicious advent within the 1000 years after the Buddha's decease...Manoratha... sent an account of the circumstances to his disciple Vasubandhu and died." (*Ta-T'ang-Hsi-yü-chi* by Yuan Chwang).

Thomas Watters writes : "According to Yuan-Chwang Manoratha flourished...within 1000 years after the decease of Buddha. This, taking the Chinese reckoning would place the date of the Śāstra-master before A.D. 150".

the date of Vasubandhu will fall in the 2nd century B. C.¹ Dignāga accordingly will be of the same date.

The commentator Mallinātha has mentioned while explaining a verse in Kalidāsa's Meghadūta² that Dignāga was a contemporary of Kalidāsa. This view has however been not generally accepted.

It is difficult to lay down definitely as has been done by Pandit Śāstri that because Akalaṅka has criticised the definition of only Dignāga and not that of Dharmakīrti in his Tattvartharājavārttika, we should conclude that the work 'Pramāṇa-viniśchaya' of Dharmakīrti was not then written. In our opinion, it is very unsafe to draw such a conclusion from only this material specially as Pandit Śāstri himself shows that Akalaṅka named his work 'Nyāya-viniśchaya' on the line of Dharmakīrti's 'Pramāṇa-viniśchaya' and the views of Dharmakīrti have been refuted in other works of Akalaṅka.

Kumārila Bhatta was not referred to in the Nyāya Vārttika of Udyotakara³. This may sup-

1. But see : "Asaṅga brother of Vasubandhu (280-360) must have flourished in the first half of the fourth century". Introduction to Sādhana-mālā (Geakwad's 'Oriental Series) Page XXVII by B. Bhattacharya M.A.

2. "दिङ्नागानां पथि परिहरण् स्थूलहस्तावलेपान् ॥" Meghadūtam.

Pūrva-meghaḥ verse 14.

"दिङ्नागाचार्यस्य कालिदासप्रतिपक्षस्य हस्तावलेपान् हस्तविन्यासपूर्वकदूषणानि अद्वैतद्विकल्पस्य दिङ्नागाचार्यस्य शृङ्गं प्राधान्यं हरति ।"

Sanjivani (commentary by Mallinātha).

3. Nyāyadarśana by Mahāmohopādhyāya Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkabagis Vol. 1 (first edition P. 37-38).

port the view of Pandit Śāstri that Kumārila Bhatta was not at least earlier than the 7th century A. D.

A. B. Keith in his *Karma-Mimāṃsā* Pages 10-11 writes : “Kumārila’s date is determinable within definite limits ; he used the *Vākyapadiya* of Bhartrihari ; neither Hienn-Thsang nor It-sing mentions him ; he was before Śaṅkara ; he attacked the Jain theory of an omniscient being as propounded in the *Āpta-mimāṃsā* of Samanta-bhadra, but is not answered by Akalaṅka in his *Aṣṭaśatī* which comments on the *Āpta-mimāṃsā*. On the other hand he is freely attacked by Vidyānanda and Prabhāchandra who both lived before 838 A. D. Vidyānanda assures us, doubtless correctly, that he criticised the Buddhist *Dharmakīrti* and *Prabhākara*, on the latter point agreeing with the result above arrived from internal evidence. The upper limit is therefore, not earlier than 700 A. D. The lower limit depends on his precise chronological relation to Śaṅkara and the latter’s exact date. Later tradition, the *Śaṅkara-vijayas* of Mādhava and the pseudo-*Ānandagiri* would make him an older contemporary, but the interval may have been considerably longer.”

We agree with the views of Pandit Śāstri regarding his conclusion about the time of Akalaṅka so far as materials are available up to the present.

We have dealt with the date of Akalaṅka in detail as we have no other data for fixing the date of Māṇikyanandi who we only know flourished later than Akalaṅka and based his work on Akalaṅka’s writings. From what have already been discussed, we may infer that Māṇikyanandi flourished during

Commentaries
on Parīkṣā-
mukhaṃ.

I. Prameya-
kamala-
mārtanḍa by
Prabhāchandra.

the end of the 7th or the beginning of the 8th century A. D. He has mentioned the Chārvāka school of philosophy¹ as well as the Buddhist, Sāṅkhya and Nyāya-vaiśeṣika systems of philosophy and Prabhākara and Jaimini². Prabhāchandra was the most celebrated commentator of Parīkṣā-mukhaṃ. His work is entitled "Prameya-kamala-mārtanḍa". This Prabhāchandra has been mentioned (with his work Nyāya-kumuda-chandrodaya) by Jinasena in Ādi-purāṇa (838 A. D.) in the following verse :

"I praise Prabhāchandra the poet whose fame is white as the rays of the moon and who has encompassed the whole world by making 'Chandrodaya' ('rising of the moon' ; another meaning 'the work entitled Kumudachandrodaya')"³.

Prabhāchandra saluted Māṇikyanandi at the beginning of Prameya-kamala-mārtanḍa⁴.

1. "लौकायतिकस्य प्रत्यक्षतः परलोकादिनिषेधस्य परबुद्ध्यादेश्चासिद्धे-
रतद्विषयत्वात् ॥" Parīkṣāmukhaṃ VI. 56.

2. "सौगतसारव्ययौगप्रभाकरजैमिनीयानां प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमोपमानार्था-
पत्यभावेरेकैकाधिकैर्व्याप्तिवत् ॥" Ibid VI. 57.

3. "चन्द्रांशुशुभ्रयशसं प्रभाचन्द्रं कविं स्तुवे ।

कृत्वा चन्द्रोदयं येन शश्वदाच्छादितं जगत् ॥" Ādi-purāṇa.

Jinasena lived in the court of Amoghavarṣa I who reigned according to Vincent Smith from 815 to 877 A.D. (Early History of India P. 328).

4. "शास्त्रं करोमि वरमल्पतरावबोधो

माणिक्यनन्दिपदपंकजसत्प्रसादात् ।

अर्थं किं न स्फुटयति प्रकृतं लघीयां-

लोकस्य भानुकरविस्फुरिताद् गवाक्षः ॥"

Prameyakamala-mārtanḍa.

Prabhāchandra's commentary is specially valuable as it quotes the views of various Hindu and Buddhist writers on Nyāya philosophy and criticising the same establishes the Jain view.

The view of Dr. K. B. Pathak that Prabhāchandra was a disciple of Akalaṅka is erroneous¹.

II. Prameya-ratnamālā by Anantavīrya. The most widely read commentary of Parikṣā-mukhaṃ is Prameya-ratnamālā. We have published the full text of it in this edition. The writer of this is Ananta-vīrya who also wrote commentaries of Akalaṅka's works. Prabhāchandra has mentioned at the beginning of the fourth Chapter of his Nyāya-kumudachandra that he has been able to study and discuss many times through the writings of Ananta-vīrya, the difficult expositions of Akalaṅka imparting a knowledge of all objects in the three worlds². Vādirāja Sūri in his Nyāya-viniśchaya-vivaraṇa writes that at every step the deep meaning of Akalaṅka's writing has been illuminated by the writings of Anantavīrya like a lamp³.

1. Dr. Pathak has taken the following verse of Prabhāchandra in his work Nyāyakumudachandrodaya to mean that Prabhāchandra was a disciple of Akalaṅka, but no such interpretation is possible (Vide article by Pandit Jugalkisore published in Anekānta Vol. I. Page I30).

“बोधः कोऽप्यसमः समस्तविषयं प्राप्याकलंकं पदम्
जातस्तेन समस्तवस्तुविषयं व्याख्यायते तत्पदम् ।
किं न श्रीगणभृज्जिनेन्द्रपदतः प्राप्तप्रभावः स्वयं
व्याख्यायप्रतिमं वचो जिनपतेः सर्वात्मभावात्मकम् ॥”

2. “त्रैलोक्योदरवर्तिवस्तुविषयज्ञानप्रभावोदयो
दुष्प्रापोऽप्यकलंकदेवसरणिः प्राप्तोऽत्र पुण्योदयात् ।
स्वभ्यस्तश्च विवेचितश्च शतशः सोऽनन्तवीर्योक्तितो
भूयान्मे नयनीतिदत्तमनसस्तद्बोधसिद्धिप्रदः ॥”
3. “गूढमर्थमकलंकवाङ्मयागाधभूमिनिहितं तदर्थिनाम् ।
व्यञ्जयत्यमलमनन्तवीर्यवाक् दीपवर्तिरनिशं पदे पदे ॥”

Though such a great writer, Anantavīrya professed utmost humility in saying at the beginning of his commentary on Siddhiviniśchaya :—"It is a great wonder that even Anantavīrya (in another sense 'one who has infinite power') is unable to explain fully the meaning of the work of Akalaṅka"¹.

In this commentary on Siddhiviniśchaya, Anantavīrya has mentioned Dharmottar, Prajñākar and Archata. The date of Archata the author of the commentary on Hetu-vindu is according to Rāhula Sankrityāyana 825 A. D. Ananta-vīrya must have therefore flourished not earlier than the 9th century A. D.

In Prameyaratnamālā, Anantavīrya has referred to Dharmakīrti (page 10) Vyāsa (page 20), Patañjali (page 20) Avadhūta (page 20) and Manu (page 49). He has mentioned the works Āpta-parīkṣā (page 23), Devāgamālāṅkāra also known as Āpta-mīmāṃsā (page 24) by Samantabhadra and Naya-chakra. He has quoted from the Vedas (page 20) and Sāṅkhya-kārika (page 52) of Īśvara-kriṣṇa.

Sāyana-Mādhava in his Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha while explaining Saptabhaṅginaya of Ārḥata Darśana has quoted Ananta-vīrya².

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1. "देवस्यानन्तवीर्योऽपि पदं व्यक्तुं तु सर्वतः ।
न जानीतेऽकलंकस्य चित्रमेतद् परं भुवि ॥"
 2. "तत्सर्वमनन्तवीर्यः प्रत्यपीपदत्—
तद्विधानविवक्षायां स्यादस्तीति गतिर्भवेत् ।
स्यान्नास्तीति प्रयोगः स्यात्तन्निषेधे विवक्षिते ॥
क्रमेणोभयवाङ्मयां प्रयोगः समुदायभाक् ।
युगपत्तद्विवक्षायां स्याद्वाच्यमशक्तिः ॥
आद्यावाच्यविवक्षायां पञ्चमो भंग इष्यते ।
अन्त्यावाच्यविवक्षायां षष्ठ्यभंगसमुद्भवः ॥
समुच्चयेन युक्तश्च सप्तमो भंग उच्यते ॥ इति ।"

Ananta-virya has mentioned Prabhāchandra in the beginning of his work : "When there is a moon like the work of Prabhāchandra, how can I resembling a fire-fly expect to be counted ?"¹

It is mentioned in the beginning of Prameya-ratna-mālā that this commentary 'Pañchikā'² on Parikṣāmukhaṃ was composed for study of Śānti-śeṇa at the request of Hīrapa the favourite son of Vaijeya³. At the colophon of this work it is mentioned that Vaijeya was born in the family of Vadaripāla. His wife was Nāṇāmba who was also known as Revatī, Prabhāvatī and Prathitāmbikā. Hīrapa was their son. At his request, Anantavīrya has cleared the meaning of the work of Māṇikyā-nandi⁴.

Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha Edited by V. S. Abhayankar
Pages 83-84.

1. "प्रमेन्दुवचनोदारचन्द्रिकाप्रसरे सति ।
मादृशाः क नु गण्यन्ते ज्योतिरिङ्गणसन्निभा ॥"
Prameya-ratnamālā.
2. Pañchikā is a commentary in which each word of the original work is explained. c.f.
"कारिका स्वल्पवृत्तिस्तु, सूत्रं सूचनकं स्मृतम् ।
टीका निरन्तरं व्याख्या, पंचिका पदभञ्जिका ॥"
3. "वैजेयप्रियपुत्रस्य हीरपस्योपरोधतः ।
शान्तिपेणार्थमारब्धा परीक्षासुखपंचिका ॥" Prameyaratnamālā.
4. "श्रीमान् वैजेयनामाभूदग्रणीर्गुणशालिनाम् ।
वदरीपालवंशालिव्योमदयुमणिरुजितः ॥
तदीयपत्नी मुवि विश्रुतासीन्नाणाम्बानाम् गुणशीलसीमा ।
यां रेवतीति प्रथिताम्बिकेति प्रभावतीति प्रवदन्ति सन्तः ॥
तस्यामभूद्विश्वजनीनवृत्तिर्दानाम्बुवाहो भूवि हीरपारव्यः ।
स्वगोत्रविस्तारनभोगुमाली सम्यक्त्वरत्नाभरणाचिंतांगः ॥
तस्योपरोधवशतो विशदोरुकीर्त्तौर्माणिक्यनन्दिकृतशास्त्रमगाधबोधम् ।
स्पष्टीकृतं कतिपर्यैर्वचनैरुदारैर्बालप्रबोधकरमेतदनन्तवीर्यैः ॥"

Colophon to Prameyaratnamālā.

Commentaries
on Prameya
ratna-mālā.

Prameyakamalamārtanḍa being a voluminous work and full of discussions regarding views of logicians other than Jain logicians, could not easily be tackled by those who wanted to learn the subject-matter only of Parikṣāmukhaṃ. Prameya-ratna-mālā satisfied their want being a shorter and simpler work though it briefly alluded to the views of other logicians wherever necessary. Many expositions of this commentary Prameyaratnamālā were written. Three of these are preserved in Jain Siddhānta Bhavan, Arrah.

(a) Artha-
prakāśikā.

The first is Arthaprakāśikā. In the verses at the beginning it is mentioned that it is written by Panditāchārya (no specific name being given)¹. Some attribute it (without however any definite proof) to Chārūkīrti. There were several Chārūkīrtis and nothing definite can be said as who really was the author of this treatise. The Maṅgalā-charaṇa, the colophon and a portion from the middle of this work have been printed from the Mss. in Jain Siddhānta Bhāskara. Bhāga 4. Kiraṇa 1. Praśasti-saṅgraha page 66.

(b) Prameya-
ratnamālā-
lāṅkāra.

The second is Prameya-ratna-mālā-lāṅkāra. After saluting Akalaṅka², and Māṇikyanandi³ the author praises Prabhāchandra the author of Prameya-

1. “श्रीमन्नेमिजिनेन्द्रस्य वन्दित्वा पादपंकजम् ।

प्रमेयरत्नमालार्थः संक्षेपेण विविच्यते ॥

प्रमेयरत्नमालायाः व्याख्यास् सन्ति सहस्रशः ।

तथापि पण्डिताचार्यकृतिर्गृह्यैव कोविदैः ॥” Arthaprakāśikā.

2. “जित्वा श्लाघ्यतमोऽभवत् सपदि तं वंदेऽकलकं मुनिम् ।”

Prameyaratnamālālāṅkāra.

3. “हर्षं वर्षतु सन्ततं हृदि गुरुर्माणिक्यनन्दी मम ।” Ibid.

kamalamārtanḍa¹. The author then mentions his name as Chāru-kīrti and the name of the work as Prameyaratnamālālaṅkāra². From the colophon of this work we learn that this Chārukīrti resided in Śravana Belgola (where the world-renowned image of Gommateśvara exists) and belonged to Deśi Gaṇa³. Gommateśvara or Vāhuvali is saluted in two verses at the end⁴.

Pandit Bhujavali Śāstri is of opinion that it is very probable that this Chārukīrti was the author of the same name who composed commentaries on Pārśvābhyudaya, Chandraprabha kāvya, Ādipurāṇa, Yaśodharacharita, Nemīnirvāṇa etc. The Pattādhīśas of Śravana Belgola are all known by the common name of Chārukīrti. So it is difficult to settle who this particular person was⁵.

The Mangalācharaṇa, the colophon and some portions from the middle of this manuscript have been printed in Jain Siddhānta Bhāskar. Bhāga 4. Kirāṇa 1. Praśasti saṅgraha pages 68-71.

1. “जयतु प्रमेन्दुसूरिः प्रमेयकमलप्रकाण्डमार्त्तण्डेन ।” Ibid.

2. “श्रीचारुकीर्त्तिधुर्यस्सन्तनुते पण्डितार्यमुनिवर्यः ।

व्याख्यां प्रमेयरत्नलंकाराख्यां मुनीन्द्रसूत्राणाम् ॥” Ibid.

3. “श्रीमद्देशिगणाप्रगण्यस्य श्रीमद् वेल्गुलपुरनिवासरसिकस्य चारुकीर्त्ति-
पण्डिताचार्यस्य कृतौ परीक्षामुखसूत्रव्याख्यायां प्रमेयरत्नमालालंकारसमाख्यायाम् ...”
Ibid.

4. “किं च श्रीगुप्तेश्वरस्य कृपया विंध्याद्रिचूडामणेः ।” Ibid.

Also :

“श्रीमद् वेल्गुलमध्यभासुरमहाविन्ध्याद्रिचिन्तामणिः

श्रीमद् बाहुवली करोतु कुशलं भव्यात्मनां सन्ततम् ।” Ibid.

5. Notes by Pandit K. Bhujavali Śāstri on Praśasti saṅgraha Page 71 (Jain Siddhānta Bhāskara. Bhāga 4. Kirāṇa 1).

(c) Nyāyamaṇi
dīpikā.

The third work is Nyāyamaṇidīpikā. Two Mss. of this work are preserved in Jain Siddhānta Bhavan, Arrah. The name of the author is not found in the Mss. Pandit Subayya Śāstri says that in some palm leaf Mss. of this work, the name of the writer is mentioned as Ajitasenāchārya. Pandit K. Bhujavali Śāstri says that this is supported by "Catalogue of Sanskrit and Prākṛita Manuscripts in the Central Provinces and Berar by R. B. Hiralal B. A. Appendix B"¹.

The author has made obeisance to Akalaṅka, Anantavīrya, Māṇikyanandi and Prabhāchandra in the Maṅgalācharaṇa of his work². As regards commentaries to Paṛikṣāmukhaṃ, he mentions that Prabhāchandra wrote an exhaustive commentary entitled Prameyakamalamārtanḍa. Though this work was suitable to scholars, there was a necessity for a shorter and easier commentary. Hirapa Vaiśya the son of Vaijeya of the family of Badripāla requested Ananta-vīrya to teach Śāntiṣeṇa. Ananta-vīrya composed Prameya-ratna-mālā under these circumstances³.

1. Notes by Pandit K. Bhujavali Śāstri on Praśasti saṅgraha Page 2-3 (Jain Siddhānta Bhāskar Bhāga II. Kirāṇa 1).

2. श्रीवर्द्धमानमकलंकमनन्तवीर्यमाणिक्यनन्दियतिभाषितशास्त्रवृत्तिम् ।

“भक्त्या प्रमेन्दुरचितालघुवृत्तिदृष्ट्या नत्वा यथाविधि वृणोमि

लघुप्रपञ्चम् ॥”

Nyāya-maṇi-dīpikā.

3. “तदनु तत्प्रकरणस्य विशिष्टतमोऽतिस्पष्टं....प्रभाचन्द्रभट्टारकः प्रमेय-
कमलमार्त्तण्डनामवृहद्वृत्तिं चरीकरोति स्म । तद् वृत्तिग्रन्थस्य....सकलविद्वच्चित्त-
प्रकाशकत्वेऽपि....बालान्तःकरण....प्रकाशनसामर्थ्याभावमाकलय्य तत्प्रकाशनाय....
प्रमेयरत्नमालेत्यन्वर्थनामोद्बहती....लघ्वी वृत्ति....अनन्तवीर्याचार्यवर्यो....वैजेय-
प्रियसूनुना हीरपाख्यवैश्योत्तमेन बदरीपालवंशद्रयुमणिना शान्तिषेणाध्यापनाभिलाषिणा
प्रेरितः सन् प्रारीप्सुः....” Ibid.

III. Prameya-
kaṇṭhikā.

A commentary named Prameya-kaṇṭhikā on Parikṣāmukhaṃ was written by Śāntivarni. It has not been possible to ascertain details about this Śāntivarni or the probable time when his work was written. There are five Sections (स्तवक) in this work. Following the Sūtras of Parikṣāmukhaṃ the author has refuted the views of other logicians (Bauddha etc.) and established the Jain view. A Mss. of this work is preserved in Jain Siddhānta Bhavan, Arrah and the portions at the beginning and the colophon have been published in Jain Siddhānta Bhāskara Bhāga 4, Kirāṇas 1 and 2. Praśasti-Saṅgraha, pages 72 and 73¹.

Parikṣāmukhaṃ
and Pramāṇa-
naya-tattvā-
lokālaṅkāra.

Vādivēva Sūri (12th century A. D.) composed Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālaṅkāra closely following Parikṣāmukhaṃ. Many aphorisms are exactly the same, only synonyms being used². In some aphorisms, an attempt is seen to show some novelty by giving examples of a different kind but the examples

1. The Maṅgalācharaṇa runs thus :

“श्रीवर्धमानमानस्य विष्णुं विश्वसृजं हरं ।
परोक्षामुखसूत्रस्य ग्रन्थस्यार्थं विवृणुमहे ॥”

The Colophon is :

“श्रीशान्तिवर्णिविरचितायां प्रमेयकण्ठिकायां पञ्चमः स्तवकः समाप्तः ।
प्रमेयकण्ठिका जीयात् प्रसिद्धानेकसद्गुणा ।
लसन् मार्त्तण्ड-साम्राज्ययौवराज्यस्य कण्ठिका ॥
स निष्कलङ्कं जनयन्तु तर्के वा बाधितको मम तर्करत्ने ।
केनानिशं ब्रह्मकृतः कलंश्चन्द्रस्य किं भूषणकारणं न ॥”

2. Compare “हिताहितप्राप्तिपरिहारसमर्थं हि प्रमाणं ततो ज्ञानमेव तत् ॥”

Parikṣāmukhaṃ. I. 2.

and “अभिमतानभिमतवस्तुस्वीकारतिरस्कारक्षमं हि प्रमाणमतो
ज्ञानमेवेदम् ।” Pramāṇanaya-tattvālokālaṅkāra I. 3.

ॐ

परीक्षासुखम्

PARĪKSĀMUKHAM

प्रमाणादर्थसंसिद्धिस्तदाभासाद्विपर्ययः ।

इति वक्ष्ये तयोर्लक्ष्म सिद्धमल्पं लघीयसः ॥

Pramāṇādarthasamsiddhistadābhāsādviparyayaḥ.

Iti vakṣye tayorlakṣma siddhamalpaṁ laghiyasah.

Padapāṭha. प्रमाणात् Pramāṇāt, from Pramāṇa (valid knowledge), अर्थसंसिद्धिः Arthasamsiddhiḥ, knowables are rightly ascertained, तदाभासात् Tadābhāsāt, from Pramāṇābhāsa (false knowledge), विपर्ययः Viparyayaḥ, the opposite (happens), इति Iti, for that reason, लघीयसः Laghiyasah, for those who desire a short exposition, तयोः Tayoh, of those (i. e. Pramāṇa and Pramāṇābhāsa), सिद्धम् Siddham, as laid down by authorities, अल्पम् Alpaṁ, short, लक्ष्म Lakṣma, definition, वक्ष्ये Vakṣye, (I shall) speak (describe).

1. From Pramāṇa (valid knowledge) knowables are rightly ascertained and from Pramāṇābhāsa (false knowledge), the opposite happens. For this reason, I shall describe the definitions of these as laid down by authorities in a concise manner for the benefit of those who desire a short exposition (of this subject).

Commentary

Māṇikyanandi the author of Parīkṣāmukhaṁ begins his work by mentioning the subject matter of the treatise and says that he will define and deal with Pramāṇa (valid knowledge) and Pramāṇābhāsa (false knowledge).

Prabhāchandra in his commentary named *Prameyakamala-mārtanda* on *Parikṣāmukhaṃ* writes that the wise only appreciate a work which has coherence in its subject-matter, which has some object in view and this object is possible of attainment. Incoherent words like those of a mad man find no hearing. Useless attempts like counting the hairs of an ass or teeth of a crow or finding the weight of an egg of a sheep (which are impossibilities) are not made by wise men.¹ They are not also attracted to a task which is unpalatable such as finding out another husband to one's own mother or to follow an advice to perform a task incapable of being fulfilled like the finding out of a jewel on the head of a snake known as *Takṣaka* which is said to cure all kinds of fever.²

Prabhāchandra quotes these verses to support his view :

“At the beginning of every Śāstra, the object with its connection should be mentioned, for a hearer pays attention to only a definite subject and things connected with the same. Who would pay attention to a treatise or do any kind of work till its necessity is patent? That Śāstra for which no necessity is explained is not desired by the wise. So at the outset, the necessity is to be explained. When the results of studying a Śāstra are known, the wise begin to read it with the object of attaining these results. Until connection with the subject matter is established, the writing is regarded as speech of a man uttering incoherent words in delirium. So commentators should explain the necessity of a work with its connected subject-matter. Otherwise it will be useless.”³

1 “काकस्य कति वा दन्ता सेपस्याण्डं कियत्पलम् ।

गर्दभे कति रोमाणीत्येवं मूर्खविचारणा ॥”

2 “सम्बन्धाभिधेयशक्यानुष्ठानेष्टप्रयोजनवन्ति हि शास्त्राणि प्रेक्षावद्भिराद्रियन्ते, नेतराणि । सम्बन्धाभिधेयरहितस्योन्मत्तादिवाक्यवत्, तद्वतोऽप्यप्रयोजनवतः काकदन्तपरीक्षावद्, अनभिमतप्रयोजनवतो वा मातृविवाहोपदेशवद्, अशक्यानुष्ठानस्य वा सर्वज्वरहरतक्षकचूडारत्नालंकारोपदेशवद्, तैरनादरणीयत्वात् ॥”

3 “सिद्धार्थं सिद्धसम्बन्धं श्रोता श्रोतुं प्रवर्त्तते ।

शास्त्रादौ तेन वक्तव्यः सम्बन्धः सप्रयोजनः ॥

The necessity for studying logic and attaining right knowledge will be evident from the following. The path of liberation according to Jain doctrines, consists of right faith, right knowledge and right conduct.¹ These three are called the three jewels in Jain works. These are attained in a particular stage of development by the householder. Their perfection is attained in the Arhat stage. Right faith is the belief in the seven Tattvas (essential principles) of Jainism.² The Tattvas are Jīva, Ajīva, Āsrava, Bandha, Saṃvara, Nirjarā and Mokṣa.³

सर्वस्यैव हि शास्त्रस्य कर्मणो वापि कस्यचित् ।
 यावत् प्रयोजनं नोक्तं तावत्तत् केन गृह्यताम् ॥
 अनिर्दिष्टफलं सर्वं न प्रेक्षापूर्वकारिभिः ।
 शास्त्रमाद्रियते तेन वाच्यमग्रे प्रयोजनम् ॥
 शास्त्रस्य तु फले ज्ञाते तत्प्राप्त्याशावशीकृताः ।
 प्रेक्षावन्तः प्रवर्तन्ते तेन वाच्यं प्रयोजनम् ॥
 यावत् प्रयोजनेनास्य सम्बन्धो नाभिधीयते ।
 असम्बद्धप्रलापित्वाद्भवेत्तावदसङ्गतिः ॥
 तस्माद् व्याख्याङ्गमिच्छद्भिः सहेतुः सप्रयोजनः ।
 शास्त्रावतारसम्बन्धो वाच्यो नान्योऽस्ति निष्फलः ॥”

1 “सम्यग्दर्शनज्ञानचारित्राणि मोक्षमार्गः ।”

Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra I. 1.

“कृतस्ननकर्मक्षयो मोक्षो भव्यस्य परिणामिनः ।

ज्ञानदर्शनचारित्र-त्रयोपायः प्रकीर्तितः ॥”

Chandraprabha-charitaṃ XVIII. 123.

“ज्ञानदर्शनचारित्रैरुपायैः परिणामिनः ।

भव्यस्यायमनेकाङ्गविकल्पैरेव जायते ॥”

Dharmaśarmābhyudayaṃ XXI. 161.

2 “तत्त्वार्थश्रद्धानं सम्यग्दर्शनम् ।”

Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra I. 2.

3 “जीवाजीवासंख्यवंधसंवरनिर्जरा मोक्षास्तत्त्वम् ।”

Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra I. 4.

A sincere belief in the Tattvas which is called right faith or Samyaktva arises either of itself or through instruction.¹ That is to say, it may arise from intuition independently of any precept or it may come to exist from external sources e. g. from precept of others or by reading the scriptures. There is no necessity for any work on Logic for those who get right faith through intuition, but as regards others, Pramāṇa and Nāya are the means of instruction.² Thus the connection of Pramāṇa with the highest goal viz. the attainment of liberation is established.³

The pursuit of study of Pramāṇas accordingly cannot be unpalatable. It is the object of every being to acquire what is desirable and leave what is un-desirable. In Nyāya philosophy, an example is commonly cited that people like to have garlands of flowers, sandal paste etc. while they wish to avoid snakes, thorns etc. This like or dislike arises from actual perception. People act accordingly towards these objects to acquire or avoid the same. Vātsyāyana, the writer of the Bhāṣya on the Nyāya Sūtras of Gautama writes "The knower by Pramāṇa only understands the real nature of knowables and wishes to have or leave the same."⁴

These Tattvas have been explained in detail in Dravya-saṃgraha (Edited by S. C. Ghoshal), Vol. I, Sacred Books of the Jains.

1 "तन्निर्गर्हाधिगमाद् वा ।"

Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra I. 3.

2 "प्रमाणनयैरधिगमः ।"

Tattvārthādhigama sūtra I. 6.

3 Dharmabhūṣana Yati has begun his Nyāya-dīpikā in the above strain :

‘प्रमाणनयैरधिगम इति महाशास्त्रतत्त्वार्थसूत्रम् । तत् खलु परमपुरुषार्थनिःश्रेय-
ससाधनसम्यग्दर्शनादिविषयीभूत-जीवादि-तत्त्वाधिगमोपायनिरूपणपरम् । प्रमाणनयाभ्यां
हि विवेचिता जीवादयः सम्यग्धिगम्यन्ते । तद्व्यतिरेकेण जीवादयधिगमे प्रमाणान्तरा-
संभवात् । तत एव जीवादयधिगमोपायभूतौ प्रमाणनयावपि विवेक्तव्यौ ॥’

4 "प्रमाणेन खल्वयं ज्ञाताऽर्थमुपलभ्य तमर्थमभीप्सति जिहासति वा ।"

In spiritual activities also, a man who understands the transitory character of the worldly objects of enjoyment and the eternal nature of the supreme being, leaves the temporal things and turns to God. This knowing of the real nature of things is a path to liberation and this knowledge is Pramāṇa. Māṇikyanandi has expressed the same idea in the third aphorism of Samuddeśa I of Parikṣāmukhaṃ.¹

The result of Pramāṇa has been mentioned to be the destruction of wrong knowledge, leaving (undesirable objects), acquiring (desirable objects) or acting indifferently towards objects.² Siddhasena Divākara has mentioned in his Nyāyāvatāra: "The immediate effect of Pramāṇa is the removal of ignorance, the mediate effect of the absolute knowledge is bliss and equanimity while that of the ordinary practical knowledge is the facility to select or reject".³ (Translation by Dr. Satis Chandra Vidyabhusan)

In another way, it may be urged that it is only when we use our faculties after understanding the real nature of a thing, that our efforts succeed. If a man wants water but wrongly supposes oil to be water, his efforts towards the oil would be fruitless in the attainment of his object. By Pramāṇa we understand the real nature of objects and by Pramāṇābhāsa, we get false knowledge. So we must leave Pramāṇābhāsa and through Pramāṇas, understand the real nature of objects. This is the meaning of the first

1 "हिताहितप्राप्तिपरिहारसमर्थं हि प्रमाणं ततो ज्ञानमेव तत् ।"

Parikṣāmukhaṃ I. 3.

2 "अज्ञाननिवृत्तिर्हानोपादानोपेक्षाश्च फलम् ।"

Parikṣāmukhaṃ V. 1.

3 "प्रमाणस्य फलं साक्षादज्ञानविनिवर्तनम् ।

केवलस्य सुखोपेक्षे शेषस्यादानहानधीः ॥"

Nyāyāvatāra Ed. by S. C.

Vidyābhusana p. 26.

line of the first Śloka of Parikṣāmukhaṃ. The same has been mentioned by Vātsyāyana¹ and by Vidyānanda Svāmi.²

The importance of Pramāṇa is thus established both as regards our worldly pursuits and as regards the attainment of liberation by understanding the way to it with the removal of hindrances by Pramāṇas and Nayas.³

In Parikṣāmukhaṃ the author deals mainly with Pramāṇas without discussing the Nayas. Many authors like Hemachandra have held that Nayas are part of Pramāṇas and many authors on Jain Logic have set out only the word "Pramāṇa" in the title though they discussed both Pramāṇas and Nayas in their works. For example, Hemachandra has named his work "Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā" though he dealt with both Pramāṇas and Nayas in his treatise. Hemachandra writes in his Bhāṣya to the first aphorism of Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā : "In this work we have not only a discussion of Pramāṇas but also of Nayas which form part of Pramāṇas and by which a correct knowledge is obtained by refutation of wrong Nayas".⁴ There are also separate works like Saptabhaṅgitarāṅgiṇi in which Nayas have been discussed in detail.

Prabhācandra mentions that the word "Pramāṇa" is used in the singular number in the Śloka, in the general sense as the author has no intention to set up the various kinds of Pramāṇas in the enumeration.⁵

1 "प्रमाणतोऽर्थप्रतिपत्तौ प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्यादर्थवत् प्रमाणं, प्रमाणमन्तरेण नार्थ-
प्रतिपत्तिः, नार्थप्रतिपत्तिमन्तरेण प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्यं ।"

2 "प्रमाणादिष्ट-संसिद्धिः ।"

3 Hemachandra affirms this : "तत् स्थितमेतत् प्रमाणनयपरिशोधित-
प्रमेयमार्गं सोपायं सप्रतिपक्षमोक्षं विवक्षितुं ।" Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā I. 1.

4 "न प्रमाणमात्रस्यैव विचारोऽत्राधिकृतः किन्तु तदेकदेशभूतानां दुर्णय-
निराकरणद्वारेण परिशोधितमार्गानां नयानामपि ।" Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā

[Translated by S. C. Ghoshal.

Jain Gazette (1915) Vol. XI. Page 278]

5 'वक्ष्यमाणलक्ष्णलक्षितप्रमाणभेदमनभिप्रेत्यानन्तरसकलप्रमाणविशेषसाधारण-
प्रमाणलक्षणपुरःसरः 'प्रमाणाद्' इत्येकवचननिर्देशः कृतः ।'

An objection is raised by the commentator Prābhācandra "Does the author Māṇikyanandi wish to define Pramāṇa and Pramāṇābhāsa according to the previous authors on the subject or according to his own inclination? If the former, there is no reason for his undertaking this labour, for a thing which has already been reduced to powder, should not be powdered again. If the latter, there is no necessity to take all this trouble, for scholars would not consider with regard any compilation produced according to one's own inclination (as opposed to the works of old writers)." The commentator replies to this objection by saying that (i) by the use of the word "Siddham", it is meant that the author will follow the definitions as laid down by venerable writers of old and (ii) by the use of the word "Alpaṃ" it is meant that the method of treatment will be different viz. that the author will treat the subject in a concise manner leaving aside the detailed exposition of writers like Akalaṅka. That is to say, though the writer will follow the definitions of the older writers, the method of treatment being new (as it will be brief as distinguished from the detailed statement of older writers) there cannot be any apprehension that the work will be a use-less repetition. Those who do not want a very lengthy and detailed treatment of a subject would be satisfied with a short exposition. The author whose mind is always prone to doing good to others cannot be said to have any intention of cheating the disciples by promulgating definitions opposed to older writers and invented by himself.¹

1 "ननु चेदं वक्ष्यमाणं प्रमाणलक्षणं पूर्वशास्त्राप्रसिद्धं तद्विपरीतं वा, यदि पूर्वशास्त्राप्रसिद्धं, तर्हि तद्व्युत्पादनप्रयासो नारम्भणीयः, स्वरुचिविरचितत्वेन सतामना-
दरणीयत्वात्। तत्प्रसिद्धं तु नितरामेतन्न व्युत्पादनीयं, पिष्टपेषणप्रसंगाद् इत्याहः
'सिद्धमल्पम्'। प्रथमविशेषणेन व्युत्पादनवत् तल्लक्षणप्रणयने स्वातन्त्र्यं परिहृतम्।
तदेवाकलंकमिदं पूर्वशास्त्रपरम्पराप्रमाणप्रसिद्धं लघूपायेन प्रतिपाद्य प्रज्ञापरिपाकार्थं
व्युत्पद्यते, न स्वरुचिविरचितं; नापि प्रमाणानुपपन्नं, परोपकारनियतचेतसो ग्रन्थकृतो
विनेयसंवादाने प्रयोजनाभावात्। तथाभूतं हि वदन् विसंवादकः स्यात्। 'अल्प'
मिति विशेषणेन यदन्यत्राकलंकदेवैर्विस्तरेणोक्तं प्रमाणेतरलक्षणं, तदेवात्र संक्षेपेण विनेय-
व्युत्पादनार्थं अभिधीयते इति पुनरुक्तत्वनिरासः।"

In older works of Jain writers, logic was mixed up with metaphysics and religion. Subsequent writers composed separate works confining themselves exclusively to the subject of pure Logic. These writers however did not depart from the original definitions of older works though in delineation they adopted different methods and even when they tried to modify the definitions, they laid down that the modified meaning was the intention of the old writers. The veneration to the oldest propounders of Logic will be universally found in the works of all subsequent writers. So Māṇikyanandi also begins his work by saying that he will lay down the definitions of Pramāṇa and Pramāṇābhāsa according to ancient authorities ("Siddham").

The same fact appears in Hindu philosophies where the authors attempt to base their theories on texts of the Vedas which are universally accepted as undisputable authorities. We find attempts to explain a particular passage from the Vedas in diverse ways to suit the purpose of different expositors.

Māṇikyanandi has based his Parikṣāmukhaṃ on the work of Akalaṅka Deva. Anantavīrya the writer of Prameyārātnamālā a commentary on Parikṣāmukhaṃ has offered his obeisance to Māṇikyanandi thus : "Salutation to that Māṇikyanandi who has churned the nectar of Nyāya-vidyā from the ocean of Akalaṅka's words."¹ Prabhāchandra also states that as the work of Akalaṅka would not be easily understood by all, Māṇikyanandi has composed the Prakaraṇa Parikṣāmukhaṃ.² In Nyāyamaṇḍīpikā the same has been mentioned.³

1 "अकलंकवचोऽम्भोधेरुद्वे येन धीमता ।

न्यायविद्यामृतं तस्मै नमो माणिक्यनन्दिने ॥"

Prameyārātnamālā 2.

2 "श्रीमदकलंकार्थोऽव्युत्पन्नप्रज्ञैरवगतुं न शक्यते, इति तदव्युत्पादनाय करतलामलकवत् तदर्थमुद्धृत्य प्रतिपादयितुकामस्तत्परिज्ञानानुग्रहेच्छाप्रेरितस्तदर्थ-प्रतिपादनप्रवर्णं प्रकरणमिदमाचार्यः प्राह ।" Prameyakamala-Mārtanda.

3 "भगवान् भट्टाकलंकदेवो विश्वविद्वन्मण्डलहृदयाल्हादियुक्तिशास्त्रेण जगत-

in Parikṣāmukhaṃ are more simple and easily understood¹. In many places some extra words have been introduced in aphorisms². A detailed comparison between Parikṣāmukhaṃ and Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālaṅkāra will be found in the article in Hindi entitled 'Pramāṇa-nayatattvālaṅkāra ki samikṣa' by Pandit Bāṇśidhar Ji in Jain Siddhānta Bhāskar, Bhaga 2. Kiraṇas 1 and 2. Pages 18 and 70.

1. Compare : "घटमहमात्मना वेद्मि ।" Parikṣāmukhaṃ I. 8.
 "करिकलभकमहमात्मना जानामि ।"
 Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāra I. 16.
 or "प्रदीपवत् ।" Parikṣāmukhaṃ I. 12.
 "मिहिरालोकवत् ।"
 Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāra I. 17.
 or "यथा नद्र्यास्तीरे मोदकराशयः सन्ति धावध्वं मानवकाः ।"
 Parikṣāmukhaṃ VI. 52.
 "यथा मेकलकन्यकायाः कूले तालहिन्तालयोर्मूले सुलभाः
 पिण्डखजुराः सन्ति त्वरितं गच्छत गच्छत शावकाः ।"
 Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāra VI. 84.
2. Compare : "सहचारिणोरपि परस्परपरिहरेणावस्थानात्
 सहोत्पादाच्च ।" Parikṣāmukhaṃ III. 64.
 "सहचारिणोः परस्पररूपत्यागेन तादात्म्यानुपपत्तेः सहोत्पादेन
 तदुत्पत्तिविपत्तेश्च सहचरहेतोरपि प्रोक्तेषु नानुप्रवेशः ।"
 Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāra III. 76.
 or "उपलम्भानुपलम्भनिमित्तं व्याप्तिज्ञानमूहः ॥ इदमस्मिन् सत्येव
 भवत्यसति न भवत्येवेति च ॥" Parikṣāmukhaṃ III. 11. 12.
 "उपलम्भानुपलम्भसंभवं त्रिकालीकलितसाध्यसाधनसम्बन्धाद्-
 यालंबनम् इदमस्मिन् सत्येव भवतीत्याद्याकारं संवेदनमूहापरनामा
 तर्कः ॥" Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālaṅkāra III. 7.

Hemachandra also wrote his *Pramāṇa mimāṃsā* in aphorisms though *Sūtra* works at such a late period when he flourished were unnecessary. (Vide *Pramāṇa mimāṃsā* by S. C. Ghoshal. Jain Gazette Vol. XI p. 108).

Subject matter
of
Parīkṣāmukhaṃ.

Parīkṣāmukhaṃ is divided into six sections (*Samuddeśa*). In the first section *Pramāṇa* is defined and explained. In the second section two kinds of *Pramāṇa* viz. *Pratyakṣa* and *Parokṣa* are mentioned and *Pratyakṣa* with its varieties are described. The third section deals with *Parokṣa Pramāṇa* and its subdivisions *Smṛiti*, *Pratyabhijñāna*, *Tarka*, *Anumāna* and *Āgama*. The greater portion of this section is devoted to *Anumāna* (inference) the most important subject in all logical works. The two varieties of *Anumāna* viz. *Svārtha* and *Parārtha* are described in detail. The fourth section treats with the subject of *Pramāṇa* with its two varieties *Sāmānya* and *Viśeṣa* with their subdivisions. In the fifth section, the result of *Pramāṇa* is described. The sixth and the last section deals with fallacies.

There are 13 aphorisms in the first, 12 in the second, 101 in the third, 9 in the fourth, 3 in the fifth and 74 in the sixth section of this work.

In the present edition, a new line has been struck out in writing the English commentary. Without entering into the usual refutations and counter-refutations of views of Jain, Hindu and Buddhist logicians as is found in Sanskrit commentaries which will create a voluminous work and cloud the main theme, I have taken special pains to make a comparative study of the subject matter and have quoted the views of all important older and later writers on this subject. It is hoped that the reader by going

through this commentary will not only gain a thorough idea of Jain Nyāya as succinctly put down by the celebrated Digamvara writer Māṇikyanandi who was never surpassed by any other author in making a clear and brief exposition of the subject but he will also have a grasp of the work of other Digamvara as well as śvetāmvara authors many of whom like Vālideva composed works which attempted to rival that of Māṇikyanandi. My attempt has been to explain in a simple and clear way the views of Jain Nyāya taking great pains to cull authorities from all available important Jain works. I have not left out the views of Hindu and Buddhist philosophers which are referred to in the work itself though I have dealt with the same only so far as is necessary for the understanding of the subject.

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A GUIDE TO TRANSLITERATION

VOWELS

अ—A	उ—U	लृ—LI	ओ—O
आ—Ā	ऊ—Ū	लृ - LLI	औ—OU
इ—I	ऋ—RĪ	ए—E	—M
ई—Ī	ॠ—RĪ	ऐ—AI	:—H

CONSONANTS

क—Ka	ट—Ṭa	प—Pa	ष—Ṣa
ख—Kha	ठ—Ṭha	फ—Pha	स—Sa
ग—Ga	ड—Ḍa	ब—Ba	ह—Ha
घ—Gha	ढ—Ḍha	भ—Bha	
ङ—Ṇa	ण—Ṇa	म—Ma	
च—Cha	त—Ta	य—Ya	
छ—Chha	थ—Tha	र—Ra	
ज—Ja	द—Da	ल—La	
झ—Jha	ध—Dha	व—Va	
ञ—Ṇa	न—Na	श—Śa	

The commentators of Parikṣāmukhaṃ were faced with the fact that there is no Maṅgalācharaṇa in this work. In most of Brahmanical works, Maṅgalācharaṇa verses are found and even where there are no special verses, attempts are made by commentators to show that the first words of such works e. g. "Atha" is auspicious and serves the purpose of Maṅgalācharaṇa.¹ The Jain writers also hold that Maṅgalācharaṇa should be used to remove obstacles to a successful completion of the work, as even the great men are subject to many obstructions even in good work.² The use of Maṅgalācharaṇa is also supported by Śiṣṭāchāra (practice of the good or the respectable).

Prabhāchandra and Anantavīrya write that salutation can be made by words, by the body and also mentally. So though salutation in words is not found in this work, it can be urged that salutation by bodily movements or a mental salutation has been made. If any one is unwilling to accept this, it can be said that the words in the beginning viz. "Pramāṇa" can have a secondary meaning which would serve the purpose of salutation. "Mā" means "Lakṣmī" and "Āṇa" means "Śabda". He who has "Pra" (Prakriṣṭa =

सद्धर्मप्रभावमवबुधत्तमाम् । तदनु वालानुजिघृक्षुः.....माणिक्यनन्दिमुनिवृन्दारकस्तत्-
प्रकाशित-शास्त्रमहोदधेरुद्धृत्य तदवगाहनाय पोतोपमं परीक्षामुखनामधेयमन्वर्थमुद्वहत्
प्रकरणमारचयन्....." Nyāyamaṇi-dīpikā. (This work has not been printed. The quotation is from a MSS. preserved in the Jain Siddhānta Bhaban, Arrah. See also Jaina Siddhānta Bhāskara, Bhāga. II. Kirāṇa I. Praśasti-saṅgraha P. 1.)

1 "ओंकारश्चाथशब्दश्च द्वावेतौ ब्रह्मणः पुरा ।
कण्ठं मित्वा विनिर्यातौ तेन मांगलिकावुभौ ॥"

2 "श्रेयांसि बहुविघ्नानि भवन्ति महतामपि ।
अश्रेयसि प्रवृत्तानां कापि यान्ति विनायकाः ॥

तस्मादशेषप्रत्यूहोपशमनाय मंगलमभिधेयम् ।"

Śilāṅkāchārya's Commentary on the Āchārāṅga Sūtras.

excellent) Māṇa is Pramāṇa (i. e. the omniscient Arhat) from whom right knowledge can be obtained (Arthasāmsiddhiḥ) and from his Ābhāsa (viz. Gods like Hari, Hara etc.) the opposite happens.¹ It must be confessed that this interpretation is too farfetched. There are instances of writers like Dharma-kīrti beginning his work² without any Maṅgalācharaṇa, which was completed and there are instances of works like Bāṇa-bhatta's Kādambari which was never completed though it began with a Maṅgalācharaṇa. To readers of the present day, this question of Maṅgalācharaṇa may appear to be of little importance, but in old texts and commentaries, a good deal of ingenuity has been displayed to

1 “ननु निःशेषविघ्नोपशमनायेष्टदेवतानमस्कारः शास्त्रकृता कथं न कृत इति न वाच्यम् । तस्य मनःकायाभ्यामपि सम्भवात् । अथवा वाचनिकोऽपि नमस्कारोऽनेनैवादिवाक्येनाभिहितो वेदितव्यः । केषांचिद् वाक्यानामुभयार्थप्रतिपादनपरत्वेनापि दृश्यमानत्वात् ।...तत्रादिवाक्यस्य नमस्कारपरताभिधीयते ।...अनन्तचतुष्टयस्वरूपान्तरंगलक्षणा समवसरणादिस्वभावा वहिरंगलक्षणा लक्ष्मीर्मा इत्युच्यते । आणः शब्दः । मा च आणश्च माणौ । प्रकृष्टौ माणौ यस्यासौ प्रमाणः । हरिहरादयः संभविविभूतियुक्तो दृष्टेष्टाविरुद्धवाक् च भगवान् अर्हन्नेव अभिधीयते, इत्यसाधारणगुणोपदर्शनमेव भगवतः संस्तवनमभिधीयते । तस्माद् प्रमाणाद् अवधिभूताद् अर्थसंसिद्धिर्भवति । तदाभासाच्च हरिहरादेरर्थसंसिद्धिर्न भवति ।”

Prameyaratnamālā.

2 Dharmakīrti the celebrated Buddhist philosopher is said to have flourished in the 7th Century A.D. He is mentioned by the Jain writer Vidyānandi Svāmi in Aṣṭa-sāhasrī and Patraparīkṣā. He begins his work without any Maṅgalācharaṇa thus : “सम्यग्ज्ञानपूर्विका सर्वपुरुषार्थसिद्धिः ।” Prabhāchandra hints that Dharmakīrti must have made mental or bodily obeisance though not verbal salutation : “दृश्यते धर्मकीर्त्यादीनामप्येवंविधा प्रवृत्तिः, वाङ्मनस्कारमन्तरेणैव ‘सम्यग्ज्ञानपूर्विका सर्वपुरुषार्थसिद्धिः’ इत्यादि वाक्योपन्यासात् ।”

Prameyakamalamārtanda.

explain away the exceptional cases of works of Dharma-Kīrti and Bāṇa-bhaṭṭa. It is mentioned in Mukṭāvalī that in cases where the work is completed without any hindrance though no Maṅgalā-charaṇa is made, the explanation is that a counteraction of bad luck by Maṅgalācharaṇa was made in a previous life and where we see that in spite of a Maṅgalācharaṇa, the work is not completed, we should suppose that the evil karma of the writer offering hindrances to a successful completion was so great that the merit obtained by Maṅgalācharaṇa is not sufficient to counteract the same.¹

1 “इत्थं च यत्र मंगलं न दृश्यते तत्र जन्मान्तरीयं तत् कल्प्यते । यत्र च सत्यपि मंगले समाप्तिर्न दृश्यते तत्र बलवत्तरो विप्रो विप्रप्राचुर्यं च बोध्यम् ।”
Mukṭāvalī.

In Jain tradition Maṅgalācharaṇa is observed in three ways :

- (i) by reciting the word Namaḥ, especially bowing to the worshipful, as Samantbhadra has done in the beginning of Ratṇa Karāṇḍa Śrāvakaśāhāra, नमः श्रीवर्द्धमानाय etc.
- (ii) by singing a song of victory in the name of the worshipful, as has been done by Amritachandra in Puruṣārtha Siddhyupāya, तज्जयति परं ज्योतिः etc.
- (iii) by proclaiming the basic principles so as to include both the above ideas, as has been done by Umasvāmi in Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra, सम्यग्दर्शन-ज्ञानचारित्राणि मोक्षमार्गः ।

All these modes show the good and pious thought-activities of the writer. According to Jainism thoughts are the main causes of bondage, liberation, or decrease in the intensity or duration of Karmas already bound. Thoughts bring about a change in the nature of the obstructive Karma. If that Karma is mild, it will be altered ; if very strong, it cannot be altered. That is why some authors succeed in their undertaking, while others do not. Pious motives of an author considerably help in combating vicious Karmas, if they are not of a very strong kind.

प्रथमः समुद्देशः

स्वापूर्वार्थव्यवसायात्मकं ज्ञानं प्रमाणम् । १ ।

I. Svāpūrvārvāthavyavasāyātmaṁ jñānaṁ Pramāṇaṁ.

I. Pramāṇa is valid knowledge of itself and of things not proved before.

Commentary

The word 'Apūrvārtha' will be explained in sūtra 4 which follows and the word 'Sva-vyavasāya' will be explained in sūtra 6. Briefly speaking, Apūrvārtha is that whose nature was not definitely ascertained before by any Pramāṇa. The valid knowledge of such an object is Pramāṇa. Knowledge illumines itself at the same time as well as its object. That is to say, Pramāṇa knows itself simultaneously with the object not definitely ascertained before.

This view of the Jains is in great contrast with the view as laid down in the Nyāya philosophy of the Hindus. In Tarkasaṅgraha we find "of whatever description anything is, when our idea of that thing is of that same description, it is called a right notion; as in the case of silver, the idea of its being silver. This is called Pramā (commensurate with its object). The supposing a thing to be as the thing is not, is called a wrong notion; as in the case of a shell, the notion of its being silver. This is called Apramā." (Dr. Ballantyne's translation).¹

The principle of Pramāṇa in the Nyāya philosophy of the Hindus, is that there are causes which produce right notion (Pramā)

1 "तद्वति तत्प्रकारकोऽनुभवो यथार्थः । यथा रजत इदं रजतमिति ज्ञानम् । सैव प्रमेत्युच्यते । तदभाववति तत्प्रकारकोऽनुभवोऽयथार्थः । यथा शुक्ताविदं रजतमिति ज्ञानम् । सैवाप्रमेत्युच्यते ।" Tarka-saṅgraha.

and because these causes produce Pramā they are called Pramāṇas. The causes are of four kinds and the right notion produced by them are also of four kinds. In Tarka-saṅgraha we find "Right notion is of four kinds through the divisions of Pratyakṣa (Perceptions), Anumiti (Inferences) Upamiti (conclusions from similarity) and Śābda (Authoritative Assertions) understood. The efficient (peculiar) cause of those also is of four kinds, through the divisions of Perception, Inference, Recognition of similarity and Authoritative Assertion" (Dr. Ballantyne's translation).¹

Vātsyāyana in his Bhāṣya on Nyāyasūtras of Gautama says "Pramā is the right knowledge of objects"² that is to say "it is a notion of that which exists in its right form"³ or in other words "it is a knowledge of a thing in the same form as it really is".⁴ The instrument of this Pramā is Pramāṇa.

The Jain doctrine is that Pramāṇa is not the cause of right knowledge but right knowledge of itself and of the objects not previously ascertained rightly.

The subject of Pramāṇa is treated in older Jain works like the Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra in connection with knowledge. Umāsvāmi writes "Matī, Śruta, Avadhi, Manahpariyaya and Kevala (are right) knowledge".⁵ These (five kinds of knowledge) are the (two kinds of) Pramāṇas".⁶ "The first two (kinds

1 "यथार्थानुभवश्चतुर्विधः प्रत्यक्षानुमित्युपमितिशाब्दभेदात् । तत्करणमपि चतुर्विधं प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दभेदात् ।" Tarka-saṅgraha.

2 "यदर्थविज्ञानं सा प्रमा ।" Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya.

3 "यदत्र यदस्ति तत्र तस्यानुभवः ।" Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya.

4 "तद्वति तत्प्रकारको ज्ञानम् ।" Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya.

5 "मतिश्रुतावधिमनःपर्ययकेवलानि ज्ञानम् ।"

Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra I. 9.

6 "तत् प्रमाणे ।" Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra I. 10.

of knowledge viz. Mati and Śruta) are Paroksa (Pramaṇas)”¹ and “the remaining (three) are Pratyakṣa (Pramāṇas)”²

With these five kinds of knowledge, Kumati, Ku-Śruta and Vibhaṅgāvadhi are added to make up eight kinds of knowledge. These three are nothing but false knowledges of Mati, Śruta and Avadhi, that is to say, Kumati is Ajñāna (false knowledge) of Mati ; Kuśruta is Ajñāna of Śruta and Vibhaṅgāvadhi is Ajñāna of Avadhi. Kundakundāchārya has mentioned all these eight varieties of Jñāna in Pañchāstikāyasamayāsāra : “Ābhinibodhika or Mati, Śruta, Avadhi, Manaḥ-paryaya and Kevala—these are the five varieties of Jñāna. Kumati, Ku-śruta and Vibhaṅga—these three also are connected with Jñāna.”³

Mati Jñāna is knowledge derived through the senses including the knowledge which arises from the activity of the mind. In Jain psychology, four stages of Mati Jñāna which follow Darśana (inexpressible contact of an object with sense consciousness) have been mentioned. These are (i) Avagraha (ii) Īhā (iii) Avāya and (iv) Dhāranā. When an object is brought in contact with a sense-organ, we have a general knowledge of an object. There is an excitation in the sense-organ by the stimulus i.e. the object present in the outside world. Then there is an excitation in the consciousness. Thus, in the first stage, a person is barely conscious of the existence of an object. This is Avagraha.⁴ The second stage Īhā consists in the desire to know

1 “आद्ये परोक्षम् ।” Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra I. 11.

2 “प्रत्यक्षमन्यत् ।” Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra I. 12.

3 “अभिनिबोधिसुदोधिमणकेवलाणि जाणाणि पंचभेयाणि ।

कुमदिसुद-विभंगाणि य तिणि वि जाणेहि संजुते ॥”

Pañchāstikāyā samayasāra 41.

4 “अक्षार्थयोगे दर्शनानन्तरमर्थग्रहणमवग्रहः ।”

Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā I. 1. 27.

whether it is this or that, That is to say, similarities and differences of the object with and from other objects become the subject of consciousness in this stage.¹ For example, when we see a man, the first stage is that we are simply conscious that it is a human being and in the second stage we want to know the particulars such as that this man is a resident of Karṇāṭa or Lāṭa country²; or, when we hear a noise, at first we are conscious of merely a sound, then we desire to know whether it is from blowing a conch shell or from blowing a horn."

In the third stage Avāya, there is a definite finding of the particulars which we desired to know in the second stage. The

“विषयविषयिसंनिपातसमन्तरमाद्यग्रहणमवग्रहः ।”

Tattvārtharājavārttika.

“विषयविषयिसंनिपातानन्तर--समुद्भूत--सत्तामात्र--गोचरदर्शनाज्जातमाद्य--मवान्तर-सामान्याकार-विशिष्टवस्तुग्रहणमवग्रहः ।”

Pramāṇa-Naya-tattvālokālāṅkāra. II. 7.

“अक्षार्थयोगजाद् वस्तुमात्रग्रहणलक्षणात् ।

जातं यद्वस्तुभेदस्य ग्रहणं तदवग्रहः ॥” Tattvārthaslokavārttika.

1. “अवगृहीतविशेषकाङ्क्षणमीहा ।” Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā I. I. 28.

“अवगृहीतार्थविशेषकाङ्क्षणमीहा ।”

Pramāṇa-Naya-tattvālokālāṅkāra II. 8.

“अवगृहीतेऽर्थे तद्विशेषकाङ्क्षणमीहा ।” Tattvārtharājavārttika.

“तद्वगृहीतार्थसामान्ये यद्विशेषस्य काङ्क्षणम् ।

निश्चयाभिमुखं सेहा संशीतेभिन्नलक्षणा ॥” Tattvārthaslokavārttika.

2. “अवग्रहेण विषयीकृतो योऽर्थोऽवान्तर-मनुष्यत्वादिजातिविशेषलक्षणस्तस्य विशेषः कर्णाट-लाटादिभेदस्तस्याकाङ्क्षणं भवितव्यताप्रत्ययरूपतया ग्रहणाभिमुख्य-मीहेत्यभिधीयते ।” Ratnākarāvatārikā II. 8.

3. “अवग्रहगृहीतस्य शब्दादेरर्थस्य किमयं शब्दः शाङ्खः शार्ङ्गो वेति संशये सति माधुर्यादयः शङ्खधर्मा एवोपलभ्यन्ते न कार्कश्यादयः शार्ङ्गधर्मा इत्यन्वयव्यतिरेक-रूपविशेषपर्यालोचनरूपा मतिश्चेष्टेहा ।” Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā.

second stage is merely an attempt to know the particulars, while the third stage consists of the ascertainment of these particulars.¹ There may be some doubt in the first and second stages but in the third stage this is absent. For example, in the third stage there is a finding that the sound is of a conch shell and not that of a horn.²

The fourth stage *Dhāraṇā* consists of the lasting impression which results after the object with its particulars is definitely ascertained.³ It is this impression (*Samskāra*) which enables us to remember the object afterwards.⁴

- 1 “ईहितविशेषनिर्णयोऽवायः ।” *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* I. 1. 29. and
Pramāṇa-Naya-tattvālokālāṅkāra I. 9.

“विशेषनिर्ज्ञानाद्याथात्म्यावगमनमवायः ।” *Tattvārtharājavārttika*.
 “तस्यैव निर्णयोऽवायः ।” *Tattvārthaslokavārttika*.

- 2 “इह चावग्रहेहयोरन्तराले अभ्यस्तेऽपि विषये संशयज्ञानमस्त्येव ।”
 “ईहाक्रोडीकृते वस्तुनि विशेषस्य शाङ्ख एवायं शब्दो न शाङ्ख इत्येवं-
 रूपस्यावधारणमवायः ।” *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*.

- 3 “निर्ज्ञातार्थाविस्मृति धारणा ।” *Tattvārtharājā-vārttika*.
 “स एव दृढतमावस्थापन्नो धारणा ।”

Pramāṇa-Nayatattvālokālāṅkāra I. 10.

- 4 “स्मृतिहेतुः सा धारणा ।” *Tattvārthaslokavārttika*.
 “स्मृतिहेतुर्धारणा ।” *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* I. 1. 30.

All these four stages of *Matijñāna* have been summarised by *Vidyānandi* thus :

“अक्षार्थयोगजाद् वस्तुमात्रग्रहणलक्षणात् ।
 जातं यद् वस्तुभेदस्य ग्रहणं तदवग्रहः ॥
 तद्गृहीतार्थसामान्ये यद्विशेषस्य काङ्क्षणम् ।
 निश्चयाभिमुखं सेहा संशयाद् भिन्नलक्षणा ॥
 तस्यैव निर्णयोऽवायः स्मृतिहेतुः सा धारणा ।”

Śruta Jñāna is knowledge derived from words spoken or from gestures or facial expressions, from reading books and from all other kinds of signs or symbols.

Avadhi Jñāna is the knowledge directly acquired by the soul without the medium of the activity of the mind or the senses¹. Knowledge in the hypnotic state is the nearest approach to an illustration. As this knowledge also is acquired through the medium of the brain and the senses according to the Jain view, this can not be accepted as an example of Avadhi Jñāna.

Manahparyaya Jñāna is the knowledge of thoughts of others². Thought-reading may be mentioned to convey some feeble idea of this kind of knowledge. According to Jainism, no lay man can have this knowledge. Only a saint in a particular stage of spiritual advancement can acquire or develop this knowledge. Kevala Jñāna is omniscience or knowledge unlimited by space, time or object. According to Jainism, Jain saints who completely practise right faith, right knowledge and right conduct can attain this knowledge. In the Hindu Purāṇas, some saints are said to have such a knowledge and are called Sarvajñas or Trikāladarśis.

These eight kinds of knowledge viz. Mati, Kumati, Śruta, Ku-śruta, Avadhi, Vibhaṅgāvadhi, Manahparyaya and Kevala are classified from another point of view into two classes viz. Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa³ and these two constitute the Pramāṇas of the Jain Logic⁴.

- 1 “परापेक्षां विना ज्ञानं रूपिणां भणितोऽवधिः ।”

Tattvārthasāra by Amritachandra Sūri I. 25.

- 2 “परकीयमनःस्वार्थज्ञानमक्षानपेक्षया ।

स्यान्मनःपर्ययो ॥” Tattvārthasāra I. 28.

- 3 “णाणं अट्टवियप्पं मदिसुदओही अणाणणाणाणि ।

मणपज्जय केवलमत्ति पच्चक्ख परोक्खमेयं च ॥”

Dravya-saṃgraha 5.

- 4 “मतिश्रुतावधिमनःपर्ययकेवलानि ज्ञानम् ।”

According to Umasvāmi, Mati and Śruta are Parokṣa knowledge and Avadhi, Manahparyaya and Kevala are Pratyakṣa knowledge. A detailed description of Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa will follow in the present treatise and we shall discuss later on the criticism how Mati and Śruta Jñāna described as Parokṣa Pramāṇa in the Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra, can be called Sāṅvyavahārika Pratyakṣa in works on Jain Logic.

We shall now deal with the derivation of the word 'Pramāṇa' according to the writers of Jain Logic.

It has been laid down by Prabhāchandra in Prameyakamalamārtanda that the word Pramāṇa may be derived in three ways. In the first place, the suffix "Anat" may be held to be used in active voice meaning "That which knows rightly (viz the soul) is Pramāṇa". From the definition of Pramāṇa, we learn that Pramāṇa is right knowledge of itself and of objects not previously ascertained. This derivation means that just as a lamp illumines itself as well as other objects, the soul knows itself as well as other objects. In the second place the suffix may be used in the sense of instrumentality. The meaning would then be "That by which right knowledge is gained is Pramāṇa¹. In this case just as light appears when obstructions to it are removed, so right knowledge will come on removal of obstructions to it. In the third derivation there is use of the suffix in Bhāva-vāchya (passive intransitive

“तत् प्रमाणे ।”

“आद्ये परोक्षम् ।”

“प्रत्यक्षमन्यत् ।” Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra I. 9-12.

1 “अत्र प्रमाणशब्दः कर्तृकरणभावसाधनो ।...तत्र...स्वपरप्रमेयस्वरूपं प्रमिमीते यथावज्जानातीति प्रमाणमात्मा...आत्मन एव हि कर्तृसाधनप्रमाणशब्देनाभिधानं स्वातन्त्र्येन विवक्षितत्वात् स्वपरप्रकाशात्मकस्य प्रदीपादेः प्रकाशाभिधानवत् । साधकतमत्वादिविवक्षायां तु प्रमीयते येन तत् प्रमाणं प्रमितिमात्रं वा प्रतिबंधापाये प्रादुर्भूतविज्ञानपर्यायस्य प्राधान्येनाश्रयणात् प्रदीपादेः प्रभाभारात्मकप्रकाशवत् ।”

Prameyakamalamārtanda.

voice) where stress is laid on the verb only, the meaning being the same as in active voice.

In Tattvārtharājavārttika it has been mentioned : “What is the meaning of the word Pramāṇa ? The meaning of the word Pramāṇa can be understood according to one’s desire by deriving it in Bhāva-vāchya (passive intransitive voice) Kartri-vāchya (active voice) and Karaṇa-vāchya (instrumental voice)”².

A grammarian might object that according to Jainendra Vyākaraṇa the suffix Anat is used only in the sense of Karaṇa (instrumentality) and Ādhāra (or Adhikaraṇa, locative sense)³. So how can it be suffixed in Kartri or Bhāva-vāchya ? The reply to this is given by a commentator on Prameyaratnamālā that though the aforesaid aphorism exists in Jainendra Vyākaraṇa, we may accept the principle that “There are exceptions in krit suffixes” and this covers cases like the present one where suffixes are used in senses not provided in particular aphorisms⁴.

2 “प्रमाणशब्दस्य कोऽर्थः ? भावकर्तृकरणत्वोपपत्तेः प्रमाणशब्दस्येच्छातोऽ-
र्थाध्यवसायः ।”

“अयं प्रमाणशब्दः, भावे, कर्तरि, करणे च वर्तते । तत्र भावे, तावत् प्रमेयार्थं
प्रति निवृत्तव्यापारस्य तत्त्वकथनात् प्रमाणमिति । कर्तरि, प्रमेयार्थं प्रति प्रमातृत्व-
शक्ति-परिणतस्याश्रितत्वात् तत् प्रमिणोति प्रमेयमिति प्रमाणं । करणे प्रमातृप्रमेययोः
प्रमाणप्रमेययोश्च स्यादन्यत्वात् प्रमिणोत्यनेनेति प्रमाणम् ।”

Tattvārtharājavārttika.

3 “करणाधारे चानट् ।” Jainendra Vyākaraṇa II. 3. 112.

4 “ननु प्रमाणशब्दो...कथं कर्तृसाधन इति चेत्, न । ‘करणाधारे चानट्’
इति करणाधिकरणभावेष्वनटो विहितत्वेऽपि ‘कृद्बहुलम्’ इति वचनात् अन्यत्र
कारकेष्वपि बहुलं कृतप्रत्ययसद्भावादनटोऽपि कृत्यादन्यत्रापि भावादपादीयतेऽस्मादित्य-
पादानं संप्रदीयतेऽस्मादिति संप्रदानमित्यादिवत् ।” Nyāyamāṇi-dīpikā.

(A. Mss. in Jain Siddhānta Bhaban, Arrah).

Other writers have derived the word *Pramāṇa* by holding that the suffix “Anat” is used in the sense of instrumentality as laid down in *Jainendra Vyākaraṇa*.

Dharmabhūṣaṇa in his *Nyāya-dīpikā* has laid down that the word *Jñāna* as well as *Pramāṇa* are derived with the affix “Anat” in the *Karaṇa-vāchya* (instrumental voice)⁵. *Dharma bhūṣaṇa* supports his view by a quotation from *Pramāṇa-nirṇaya*⁶. *Hema-chandra* in his *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* writes “That by which the essence of substances is rightly understood by eliminating doubt etc. is *Pramāṇa* which is the instrumental cause of *Pramā* (right knowledge)”⁷. In *Pramā lakṣma* the same has been laid down in another language⁸.

The definition of *Pramāṇa* as given by other Jain writers may be compared with that of *Māṇikyanandi*. First, we may mention the definition as laid down in *Nyāyāvatāra* :

“*Pramāṇa* (valid knowledge) is the knowledge which illumines itself and other things without any obstruction” (Trans. by Dr. S. C. *Vidyābhūṣaṇa*)⁹.

Dr. *Vidyābhūṣaṇa* writes in his commentary on this definition : “The Jains maintain that it is only when knowledge illumines itself that it can take cognizance of the external object. So, accord-

5 “करणसाधनं खल्वेतत् ज्ञायते अनेन इति ज्ञानमिति ।...एवमेव प्रमाण-पदमपि प्रमीयतेऽनेनेति करणसाधनं कर्तव्यम् ।” *Nyāya-dīpikā*.

6 “इदमेव हि प्रमाणस्य प्रमाणत्वं यत् प्रमितिक्रियां प्रति साधकतमत्वेन करणत्वम् ।” *Pramāṇa-nirṇaya*.

7 “प्रकर्षेण संशयादिव्यवच्छेदेन मीयते परिच्छिद्यते वस्तुतत्त्वं येन तत् प्रमाणं प्रमायां साधकतमं ।” *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*.

8 “प्रमीयते स्वान्यात्मकोऽर्थोऽनेनेति करणसाधनं प्रमाणं तच्चान्यवधानेन प्रमितौ साधकतमत्वात् ।” *Pramā-lakṣma*.

9 “प्रमाणं स्वपराभासि ज्ञानं बाधविवर्जितम् ।” *Nyāyāvatāra*.

ing to them, knowledge like a lamp illumines itself as well as the object lying outside it.

Those whose sight has been obscured by darkness often see many false images, such as two moons etc.; men bewildered by sophism are found to believe that everything is momentary or the like. With a view to differentiate such kinds of false knowledge from Pramāṇa (valid knowledge) the phrase 'without obstruction' has been used." (Nyāyāvatāra, page 7).

The definition in Pramā-lakṣma of Buddhisāgara is the same as that in Nyāyāvatāra.

In Nyāya-dīpikā we find "Pramāṇa is perfect knowledge¹⁰." Vidyānanda in his Pramāṇa-parikṣā also lays down the same definition.

Hemachandra defines Pramāṇa thus : "Pramāṇa is the perfect ascertainment of a knowable"¹¹ and criticises the definition of Māṇikyanandi in Parikṣāmukhaṃ. He says "Some say that if we accept that we again know a thing which had been previously ascertained by Pramāṇa, the result would be that a thing which has already been powdered will be powdered again. Also, by accepting this view, Pramāṇa would apply to knowledge of objects already ascertained and in the case of continuous knowledge of an object. So, according to those who object thus, the definition should be that Pramāṇa is ascertainment of objects not previously ascertained. So some one (referring to the definition adopted by Māṇikyanandi) has laid down the definition of Pramāṇa to be 'Pramāṇa is valid knowledge of itself and of things not proved before'.¹²

10 "सम्यग्ज्ञानं प्रमाणम् ।" Nyāya-dīpikā.

11 "सम्यगर्थनिर्णयः प्रमाणम् ।" Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā. I. I. 2.

12 "ननु च परिच्छिन्नमर्थं परिच्छिन्दता प्रमाणेन पिष्टं पिष्टं स्यात् । तथाच गृहीतग्राहिणां धारावाहिकज्ञानानामपि प्रामाण्यप्रसङ्गस्ततोऽपूर्वार्थनिर्णय इत्यस्तु लक्षणम् ,

Hemachandra criticises the definition of *Pramāṇa* as mentioned in the *Parikṣamukhaṃ* on two grounds. First, that this definition excludes the knowledge of a thing already ascertained. According to Hemachandra, it is equally *Pramāṇa* when a thing is ascertained for the first time, as when a thing which has previously been ascertained, is again known¹³. So Hemachandra says that *Pramāṇa* is perfect ascertainment of a knowable.

The second objection refers to *Dhārābāhik Jñāna*. This is a series of states throughout which the same object is presented in consciousness. This for example arises when we see an object continuously for some time. Each state of consciousness in this case lasts only for a moment. Then follows a second state and is lost. Then a third state succeeds and is lost and so on. Now if we define *Pramāṇa* as knowledge of things not ascertained before, the objection is that in the first state of *Dhārābāhik Jñāna*, this may apply. But in the second and subsequent stages of the presentation of the object, the object cannot be said to be 'Apūr-vārtha' (not previously ascertained) as mentioned in the definition for it was ascertained after it had been cognised in the first momentary state. So *Dhārābāhik Jñāna* will be excluded from *Pramāṇa* if we accept the definition of *Pramāṇa* in *Parikṣamukhaṃ*.

A similar objection was raised and refuted in works in Hindu philosophy. To give an example, we may quote the definition of *Pramāṇa* in *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*. The author *Dharmarāja-dhvarindra* writes that if re-collection be included within *Pramā* (right knowledge), the definition of *Pramāṇa* will be of one kind and if re-collection be excluded from *Pramā*, the definition will be of a different kind. According to this writer : "Pramāṇa is the instrumental cause of right knowledge (*Pramā*). When the defini-

यथाहुः 'स्वापूर्वार्थव्यवसायात्मकं ज्ञानं प्रमाणम्' इति तथापूर्वार्थविज्ञानमिति ।"

Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā.

13 "गृहीष्यमानग्राहिण इव गृहीतग्राहिणोऽपि नाप्रामाण्यम् ।" *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* I. 1. 4.

tion of Pramā excludes re-collection, Pramā is defined as consisting in the knowledge of an object, which has not been previously perceived and which is not rejected as false. But when re-collection is included, Pramā consists in the knowledge of an object which is not rejected as false”¹.

Now, in the first place when Pramā is taken to exclude re-collection, the definition being knowledge of an object not previously perceived and not rejected as false, how can this definition apply to Dhārābāhik Jñāna ? For as we have noted before in Dhārābāhik Jñāna, in the second and succeeding presentations of an object, it cannot be “not previously perceived” as it was perceived in the first momentary state. This criticism is met by Dharmarājādhyakṣa by saying “In the definition of Pramā from which re-collection is excluded, there is no fault of non-pervasiveness. For since it is admitted that time though destitute of form can be cognised through the sense-organs, even a persistent state of cognition has for its object that which is particularised by association with each separate moment and is not the object of each previous cognition”². That is to say, knowledge of a jar even at the first moment will be different from knowledge of the same jar at the second moment for there will be distinct knowledge in each case e. g. this is a jar seen at the first moment, this is a jar seen at the second moment and so on. “The object known in each moment is particularised or determined by that moment and thus differs from the object presented in each previous or succeeding moment”³. Further, the

1 Translation by A. Venis. “तत्र प्रमायाः करणं प्रमाणं । तत्र स्मृतिव्यावृत्तं प्रमात्वमनधिगतावाधितार्थविषयज्ञानत्वं, स्मृतिसाधारणन्तु अवाधितार्थ-विषयज्ञानत्वम् ।” Vedānta-paribhāṣā. Chapter I.

2 Translation by A. Venis. “नीरुपस्यापि कालस्य इन्द्रिय-वेद्यत्वाभ्युपगमेन धारावाहिकबुद्धेरपि पूर्वपूर्वज्ञानाविषय-तत्तत्क्षणविशेषविषयकत्वेन न तत्र अव्याप्तिः ।” Vedānta-paribhāṣā.

3 A. Venis. Notes on Vedānta-paribhāṣā.

objection may be met in another way, if we say that really speaking the knowledge in Dhārābāhik Jñāna is one and the same throughout and not different in each of the different moments. Dharmanādhvarīndra says : "More-over, according to (Vedantic) tenet, there is no variation of knowledge in the case of a persistent cognition ; but as long as there is a presentation of the jar, so long the modification of the internal organ in the form of the jar is one and the same and not various. For the persistence of the modification is admitted until there arises a modification which excludes the former. And thus the knowledge of a jar or like object, consisting in the intelligence which is reflected in the modification of the internal organ persists there during that time and is one and the same. Therefore the fault of non-pervasiveness is not to be feared in our definition"⁴.

The criticism of Hemachandra as regards the definition of Pramāṇa as laid down by Māṇikyanandi may be met in the manner described above.

We may note that Udayanāchārya in his Kusumāñjali has also said that faults of non-pervasiveness (Avyāpti) and Ativyāpti will arise if we accept the definition of Pramāṇa to be the cause of knowledge of an object which was not perceived before. So Pramāṇa should be defined only as right knowledge⁵. In Jain works like Tattvārathasāra⁶ the same has been laid down.

4 Translation by A. Venis. "किञ्च सिद्धान्ते धारावाहिकबुद्धिस्थले न ज्ञानभेदः, किन्तु यावद् यावद् घटस्फुरणं तावद् घटाकारान्तःकरणवृत्तिः एकैव, न तु नाना, वृत्तेः स्वविरोधिवृत्त्युत्पत्तिपर्यन्तस्थायित्वाभ्युपगमात् । तथाच तत्प्रतिफलित-चैतन्यरूपं घटादिज्ञानमपि तत्र तावत्कालीनम् एकमेव, इति न अव्याप्ति-शङ्कापि ।" Vedānta-paribhāṣā. Chapter I. For a detailed treatment, the reader may refer to Vedantaparibhāṣā edited by S. C. Ghoshal Pages 5-8.

5 "अप्राप्तेरधिकप्राप्तेरलक्षणमपूर्वदृक् ।

यथार्थानुभवो मानं अनपेक्षतयेष्यते ।" Kusumāñjali.

In the Sāṃkhya philosophy, it is laid down that Pramā (right knowledge) consists of ascertainment of a thing which was not previously ascertained and Pramāṇa (which according to the Sāṃkhya doctrine is of three kinds) is the instrumental cause of Pramā⁶. Prabhākara Bhatta in his exposition of Mimāṃsā philosophy has defined Pramāṇa to be ascertainment of things not ascertained before.¹ Thus, the definition in Parikṣāmukhaṃ is in agreement on this point with the Sāṃkhya philosophy.

Though by means of explanation and argument as adopted in Vedānta-paribhāṣā as quoted above, the definition of Pramāṇa can be applied to Dhārābāhika Jñāna even if we hold the ascertainment of things not perceived before (Apūrvārtha) as one of its characteristics, yet commentators of Parikṣāmukhaṃ have held that Dhārābāhika Jñāna is excluded from Pramāṇa. For example, Anantavīrya in Prameyaratnamālā writes "The adjective Apūrva is used to exclude from Pramāṇa Dhārābāhika Jñāna which cognises things already cognised²." This has been expanded in Arthaprakāśikā an unpublished commentary on Prameya-ratnamālā in this manner :—

"Why has the adjective Apūrva been applied to Artha? We reply, it is to exclude Dhārābāhika Jñāna. Dhārābāhika Jñāna means a series of knowledge like 'this is a pitcher, this is a pitcher, etc'. In this series, the first knowledge is Pramāṇa as this consists

6 "सम्यग्ज्ञानात्मकं तत्र प्रमाणमुपवर्णितम् ।" Tattvārthasāra.

7 "द्वयोरेकतरस्य वाच्यसन्निकृष्टार्थपरिच्छित्तिः प्रमा, तत्-साधकतमं यत् तत् त्रिविधं प्रमाणम् ।" Sāṃkhya-darśana. Chapter I. Sūtra 87. Here the word Asannikṛṣṭārtha means the same as Apūrvārtha in Parikṣāmukhaṃ.

1 In Nyāyadīpikā, this definition of the Mimāṃsā philosophy is quoted : "अनधिगततथाभूतार्थनिश्चायकं प्रमाणं" इति भाट्टः ।"

2 "अस्य चापूर्व-विशेषणं गृहीतग्राहिधारावाहिज्ञानस्य प्रमाणतापरिहारार्थ-मुक्तम् ।" Prameya-ratnamālā.

of ascertainment of the object. The second and succeeding knowledge is not *Pramāṇa* as in the same the object is not ascertained. As the object is ascertained by the first knowledge, the subsequent knowledge is quite insignificant. So the word *Apūrvā* has been used as an adjective to *Artha* so that the (definition of *Pramāṇa*) may not extend to the second and succeeding states of knowledge which would become included (in the definition if merely *Pramāṇa* be defined) as ascertainment of object. By *Apūrvā* it is understood that which has not become the object of previous knowledge. So in *Dhārābāhika Jñāna*, in the second and subsequent states of knowledge, the definition does not apply as in the first stage the object has been ascertained and in the second and subsequent stages, the object is not one which is previously unascertained"¹.

Nyāyamanidipikā also follows *Artha-prakāśikā* by laying down "*Dhārābāhika Jñāna* is excluded by this adjective, *Apūrvārtha*."² In *Nyāyadīpikā* it has been mentioned that in Jain logic, *Dhārābāhika Jñāna* is not recognised as *Pramāṇa*³.

1 "अर्थस्य अपूर्वविशेषणं किमर्थम् ? इति चेत्, धारावाहिकज्ञान-व्यवच्छेदार्थमिति ब्रूमः । घटोऽयं घटोऽयं इत्यादि-ज्ञानपरंपरा धारावाहिकज्ञानम् । तादृशज्ञानपरंपरायां प्राथमिकज्ञानमेव प्रमाणं, तस्यैव विषयपरिच्छित्तिजनकत्वात् । द्वितीयादिज्ञानं तु न प्रमाणं, तस्य विषयपरिच्छित्तिजनकत्वाभावात् । प्रथमज्ञानेनैव परिच्छित्तेः जनितत्वेन द्वितीयादिज्ञानस्य अकिञ्चित्करत्वात् । तादृशद्वितीयादिज्ञाने अर्थविषयकव्यवसायात्मकत्वज्ञानत्वरूपनिरुक्तलक्षणसत्त्वेन अतिव्याप्तिनिरासार्थं अर्थे अपूर्वविशेषणम् । अपूर्वत्वं च पूर्वकालीनज्ञानान्तराविषयत्वं । तथाच, धारावाहिक-ज्ञानेषु द्वितीयादिज्ञाने प्राथमिक-ज्ञानगृहीतार्थविषयकत्वस्यैव सत्त्वेन पूर्वकालीनज्ञानान्तरा-गृहीतार्थविषयकव्यवसायात्मकत्वरूपलक्षणस्य अभावात् नातिव्याप्तिः ।" *Artha-prakāśikā* (from a Mss. in Jain Siddhānta Bhavan, Arrah.)

2 "अनेन अपूर्वार्थविशेषणेन धारावाहिकज्ञानमेव निरस्यते ।" *Nyāyamanidipikā* (from a Mss. in Jain Siddhānta Bhavan, Arrah)

3 "अथापि धारावाहिकबुद्धिष्वतिव्याप्तिस्तासां सम्यग्ज्ञानत्वात् । न च तासामार्हतमते प्रामाण्याभ्युपगम इति । उच्यते एकस्मिन्नेव घटे घटविषयाज्ञानविधटनार्थं आद्ये ज्ञाने प्रवृत्ते तेन घटप्रमितौ सिद्धायां पुनर्घटोऽयं घटोऽयमित्येवमुत्पन्नान्युत्तरोत्तर

We have thus seen that in all earlier works on Nyāya philosophy Pramāṇa has been taken to consist of knowledge of an object not ascertained before. The Mīmāṃsā philosophy of the Hindus have accepted that Gautama the propounder of the old school of the Nyāya philosophy of the Hindus must have taken Pramāṇa in this sense and we have shown that the Mīmāṃsakas led by Kumārila Bhatta have defined Pramā as ascertainment of an object not ascertained before. The older writers on Jain logic like Māṇikya-nandī lay down a definition of Pramāṇa which is not at all different in this particular point (though there are differences on other points as already mentioned). Later writers specially those of the new school of Nyāya philosophy of the Hindus led by Gaṅgeśa the author of Tattva-Chintāmaṇi who flourished in the 14th Century have discarded this peculiarity in the definition of Pramāṇa and satisfied themselves by saying that Pramā is knowledge free from fallacy¹. Their view has been summarised in the extract from Tarka-saṅgraha quoted above. Later Jain writers like Hemachandra who flourished in the twelfth century as shown

ज्ञानानि खलु धारावाहिकज्ञानानि । न ह्येषां प्रमितिं प्रति साधकतमत्वं प्रथमज्ञानेनैव प्रमितेः सिद्धत्वात् । कथं तत्र लक्षणमतिन्याप्नोति तेषां गृहीतग्राहित्वात् ।” Nyāya-dīpikā. i.e. “This definition that Pramāṇa is right knowledge may overlap the case of Dhārābāhika Jñāna. These knowledges (viz Dhārābāhika knowledges) are not Pramāṇas according to Jain doctrine. It may be mentioned that when a pitcher is seen, first of all there is Pramāṇa of a pitcher when the Ajñāna regarding a pitcher is removed. In the first knowledge, there is right conception of a pitcher. The subsequent knowledges ‘this is a pitcher’ are Dhārābāhika Jñāna. As by the first knowledge, we have Pramiti (right conception), the subsequent knowledges not being instrumental in producing Pramiti, are not Pramāṇas. So the definition does not overlap as there are cases where a thing already perceived are again perceived.”

1 “भ्रमभिन्नन्तु ज्ञानमत्रोच्यते प्रमा ।” Vide Viśva-koṣa 1st Edition Vol. X. P. 481.

above similarly discarded this peculiarity in the definition of Pramāṇa and criticised the older writers.

The writers who appeared still later reverted to the definition of the earliest writers and we have shown an example from Vedānta-paribhāṣā how this was done. The writer of the Vedānta-paribhāṣā was later than Gaṅgeśa as he wrote a commentary on the works of Gaṅgeśa. The main object of attack of writers like Hemachandra was the inapplicability of the definition of Pramāṇa in Dhārābāhika Jñāna. Though some of the Jain commentators lay down that only the first state of knowledge in Dhārābāhika Jñāna is Pramāṇa, if we follow the arguments in Vedānta-paribhāṣā, the object cognised in the second and subsequent stages can also be said to be Apūrvārtha and hence the knowledge in these stages also would be Pramāṇa. The main point of attack being thus met, we do not see any fault in the definition as adopted by Māṇikya-nandi. The subtle discussions in the new school of Nyāya philosophy on this point will necessitate a separate work and so we refrain from embodying the same in this commentary.

In Prameya-ratnamālā each of the words in the definition of Pramāṇa as laid down by Māṇikya-nandi has been explained as refuting definitions of other philosophies. According to this commentary, the word Jñāna (knowledge) shows that the Jain doctrine does not follow the view of Naiyāyikas that Pramāṇa consists of connection of the senses with the objects¹. The word Vyavasāya is used refuting the view of the Buddhists viz. Pramāṇa consists of Nirvikalpa Pratyakṣa of four kinds i.e. Sva-saṃvedana-pratyakṣa (understanding of the self), Indriya-pratyakṣa, (cognition through senses), Manopratyakṣa (understanding by mind) and Yogipratyakṣa (cognition of the Yogis)². The Buddhists do

1 “तस्य च ज्ञानमिति विशेषणं अज्ञानरूपस्य सन्निकर्षादि-नैयायिकादि-परिकल्पितस्य प्रमाणत्वव्यवच्छेदार्थमुक्तम् ।” Prameyaratnamālā.

2 “तथा ज्ञानस्यापि स्वसंवेदनेन्द्रियमनोयोगिप्रत्यक्षस्य निर्विकल्पकस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वेन प्रामाण्यं सौगतैः परिकल्पितं तन्निरासार्थं व्यवसायात्मकग्रहणम् ।” Ibid.

not accept Vyavasāya or Nīśchaya to be essential in Pramāṇa. The word Artha is used to refute the views of those who deny the existence of external objects like Vijñānādvaitavādins, Māyāvādins and Mādhyamikas¹. The view of Vijñānādvaitavādins is that every object consists of knowledge and there is nothing to be cognised. Knowledge according to this view is of two kinds Ālaya-vijñāna and Pravrittivijñāna. Ālaya-vijñāna is the self and Pravrittivijñāna is jar, cloth etc.² A verse is quoted in Arthaprakāśikā meaning "That is Ālaya-vijñāna which consists of the self and the knowledge of bluishness etc., is Pravrittivijñāna"³. The persons holding this view say that everything is knowledge and there is nothing to be cognised. The Māyāvādins say that everything is Brahma, that what we see as a jar, a cloth etc., are all unreal, and only Brahma is real. Mādhyamikas are Śūnyavādins who say that the essence is void. It does neither exist, nor is non-existent, nor existent as well as non-existent, nor distinct from existence and non-existence⁴. The word 'Sva' is used to refute the views of the

For details of Bauddha Nyāya view on this point, the reader may refer to the work Nyāyavindu of Dharma-kīrti.

1 "तथा वहिरर्थपह्नोतृणां विज्ञानाद्वैतवादिनां पुरुषाद्वैतवादिनां पश्यतोहराणां शून्यैकान्तवादिनां च विपर्यासव्युदासार्थमर्थ- ग्रहणम् ।" Prameyaratnamālā.

2 "तत्र तावद्विज्ञानाद्वैतवादि...सर्वं वस्तु ज्ञानात्मकमेव, तदितरज्ञेयाकारस्तु नास्त्येव । तच्च ज्ञानं द्विविधं, आलयविज्ञानं प्रवृत्तिविज्ञानं च तत्र आलयविज्ञानं आत्मपदवाच्यं, प्रवृत्तिविज्ञानं तु घटपटादिपदवाच्यम् ।" Arthaprakāśikā.

3 "तत् स्यादालयविज्ञानं यत्तु स्यादहमास्पदं ।
तत् स्यात् प्रवृत्तिविज्ञानं यत्तु नीलादिगोचरं ।"

Verse quoted in Arthaprakāśikā.

4 "माध्यमिकास्तु...शून्यमेव तत्त्वं । तथाहि सर्वं जगत् । न सत्, नास्तित्वप्रतीतिविरोधात् । नाप्यसत्, अस्तित्वप्रतीतिविरोधात् । नापि सदसत्, सत्त्वासत्त्वयोरत्यन्तविरुद्धयोरेकत्र समावेशासंभवात् । नापि सदसद्विलक्षणं सत्त्वादि-प्रतीतिविरोधादेव । तस्मान्निरुक्तचतुःप्रकाररहितं शून्यमेव तत्त्वं । तदुक्तं

Nyāya, Sāṃkhya, Mīmāṃsā and Yoga philosophies in which Pramāṇa does not include the knowledge itself as well as the objects known at the same time¹.

We have thus seen that most of the definitions of Pramāṇa lay down that it is the right knowledge of objects. Some hold like Māṇikyanandi that the object must be one which was not ascertained before; while others are of view that this is not at all essential. The main difference in Jain doctrine is that knowledge as Pramāṇa like the sun or a lamp illumines itself as well as the objects simultaneously.

हिताहितप्राप्तिपरिहारसमर्थं हि प्रमाणं, ततो ज्ञानमेव तत् ॥ २ ॥

2. Hitāhitaprāptiparihārasamarthaṃ hi pramāṇaṃ tato jñāna-meva tat.

2. Because Pramāṇa enables acquiring beneficial things and leaving non-beneficial objects, this is nothing but knowledge.

Commentary

Pramāṇa leads to the acquirement of pleasure and its causes and abstention from sorrow and its causes. When a man is thirsty, he searches for an object to quench the thirst and begins to seek water. That Pramāṇa which points out this water is sought by a thirsty man, for by a right knowledge that this is water acquired by Pramāṇa there is no want of receipt of the object desired viz., water².

न सन्नासन्न सदसन्न चाप्यनुभयात्मकं ।

चतुष्कोटिविनिर्मुक्तं तत्त्वं माध्यमिका विदुः ॥

इति तथाच शून्यमेव तत्त्वमिति वदन्ति ।” Arthaprakāśikā. (Mss.)

1 “तथा परोक्षज्ञानवादिनां मीमांसकानामस्वसंवेदनज्ञानवादिनां सांख्यानां ज्ञानान्तरप्रत्यक्षज्ञानवादिनां यौगानां च मतमपाकर्तुं स्वपदोपादानम् ।”

Prameyaratnamālā.

2 This is shortly expressed by Prabhācandra as follows :

“हितं सुखं तन् साधनं च, तद्विपरीतं अहितं, तयोः प्राप्तिपरिहारौ । प्राप्तिः खलूपादेयभूतार्थक्रियाप्रसाधकार्यप्रदर्शकत्वम् । अर्थक्रियार्थी हि पुरुषः तन्निष्पादनसमर्थ

The acquirement of desired objects depends on the activities (Pravritti) and not on Pramāṇa. One first desires to have an object and then performs activities. It cannot be said that without the activity to acquire the object, Pramāṇa points out objects because this view is contrary to our every day experience. It is known to every body that even such prominent objects like the sun and the moon are not seen by men when they do not direct their activities to the same¹. Where the sun and the moon are not causes of activities (Pravritti), there is no showing (Pradarśakattva) and hence there is no Pratyakṣa. The function of Pramāṇa is not to give objects (Prāpaka) but to show them (Pradarśaka).

By this aphorism the view that Pramāṇa can be anything which is not knowledge like connection of the senses with external objects (which is technically called Sannikarṣa) is refuted². Chandra-prabha Sūri in his Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛiti has mentioned that as the Jains accept that knowledge illumines itself as well as the object, they refute the views of Yogācāra Buddhists who hold that knowledge only illumines itself and the views of Mimāṃsakas, Naiyāyikas etc., who maintain that knowledge illumines the external object alone, as it cannot illumine itself³.

प्राप्तुकामस्तत्प्रदर्शकमेव प्रमाणमन्वेषत इत्यस्य प्रदर्शकत्वमेव प्रापकत्वम् । न हि तेन प्रदर्शितेऽर्थे प्राप्त्यभावः” Prameyakamala-mārtanda.

1 “प्रवृत्तिमूला तूपादेयार्थप्राप्तिर्न प्रमाणाधीना तस्याः पुरुषेच्छाधीन प्रवृत्ति-प्रभवत्वात् । न च प्रवृत्त्यभावे प्रमाणस्यार्थप्रदर्शकत्वलक्षणव्यापाराभावो वाच्यः प्रतीतिविरोधात् । न खलु चन्द्रार्कादिविषयं प्रत्यक्षमप्रवर्त्तकत्वात् न तत् प्रदर्शकमिति लोके प्रतीतिः ।” Prameyakamala-mārtanda.

2 “यस्माद्धिताहितप्राप्तिपरिहारसमर्थं प्रमाणं, ततस्तत् प्रमाणत्वेनाभ्युपगतं वस्तु ज्ञानमेव भवितुमर्हति । नाज्ञानरूपं सन्निकर्षादि ।” Prameyaratnamālā.

3 “ये स्वाभास्येव ज्ञानं मन्यन्ते ते ज्ञानवादिनो बौद्धविशेषाः, ये च पराभास्येव मीमांसकनैयायिकादयः, ते निरस्तास्ते हि बहिरर्थाभावात् ज्ञानं स्वांशपर्यवसित-सत्ताकम् इत्याचक्षीरन् । तदयुक्तम् । ज्ञेयार्थाभावे ज्ञानाभावप्रसङ्गात् ।...पराभास्यपि

This is laid down in "An Epitome of Jainism" as follows :

"The question, therefore, to begin with is, what is Pramāṇa from our point of view ? Pramāṇa, we define, is the valid knowledge which reveals itself as well as its knowable. It is worthy of note that by this we, first, put aside the Buddhist view that there being nothing external, knowledge only reveals itself and secondly, we contradict as well the Naiyāyika and the Mīmāṃsaka schools of thought who teach that knowledge does not reveal itself but reveals external relations. We hold however, that just as colour reveals itself as well as the object to which it belongs, so knowledge revealing itself reveals the knowable as well."¹

तन्निश्चयात्मकं समारोपविरुद्धत्वादानुमानवत् ॥ ३ ॥

3. Tanniśchayātmakam samāropaviruddhatvādanumānavat.

3. That (viz. Pramāṇa) being opposed to Samāropa (viz. fallacies) consists of definiteness like Anumāna (inference).

Commentary

Pramāṇa must be free from Samāropa (fallacies) which is of three kinds Saṁśaya, Anadhyavasāya and Viparyaya². Saṁśaya arises when there is a doubt about an object i.e. when our mind sways between this or that, without being able to assert the true nature of a thing³. For example, when a person sees some-

स्वप्रकाशाभावात् अभिदधीरन् तदप्यसम्बद्धम् । स्वप्रकाशाभावे परप्रकाशायोगात् ।
न हि प्रदीपः स्वरूपमनुद्योतयन् घटाद्युद्योतने व्याप्रियते ।" Nyāyavatāra-vivṛiti

1 An Epitome of Jainism by Nahar & Ghosh. P. 70.

2 "अतस्मिंस्तदध्यवसायः समारोपः ।" Pramāṇa-nayatattvāloka-lāṅkāra. I. 7

"स विपर्ययसंशयानध्यवसायभेदात् त्रेधा ।" Pramāṇa-nayatattvā-lokālāṅkāra. I. 8.

3 "अनुभयत्रोभयकोटिसंस्पर्शी⁴ प्रत्ययः संशयः ।"

Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā I. I. 5.

"साधकवाधकप्रमाणामावादनवस्थिताऽनेककोटिसंस्पर्शि ज्ञानं संशयः ।"

Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka-lāṅkāra. I. 11.

thing at a distance in the darkness, a doubt arises in his mind whether it is a man or a post¹. The knowledge in this case touches two ideas without being able to fix it to a particular right knowledge of the object seen. It must be understood that when a thing is capable of two conceptions, there is no Doubt, though there are two ideas in the same object. For example in the Saptabhaṅgi Naya in Jain philosophy a pitcher is in one sense, said to exist while in another, it is said not to exist². When the details of the head, hands etc. of a man or the branches, hollow etc. of a tree are not perceived being at a distance and in the darkness, we have knowledge of only something high. In this case a doubt arises whether it is a tree or a man³.

When we have a knowledge that this is something without any clear idea what it is, we have Anadhyavasāya which is also known as Vibhrama (Indefiniteness). If a man touches something when he walks but does not understand what it is, his knowledge is Anadhyavasāya. He is conscious that he has touched something but is unable to say what its real nature is⁴.

1 “यथाऽयं स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वा ।” Pramāṇanayatattvālokā-lāṅkāra. I. 12.

“यथान्धकारे दूरादूर्ध्वाकारवस्तूपलम्भात् साधकबाधकप्रमाणाभावे सति स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वेति प्रत्ययः ।” Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā. Bhāṣya to Aphorism I. 1. 5.

2. To emphasize this, Hemachandra has used the word “Anubhayatra” in the definition of Saṃśaya quoted above e. g. “अनुभयत्र-ग्रहणमुभयरूपे वस्तुन्युभयकोटिसंस्पर्शोऽपि संशयत्वनिराकरणार्थं, यथाऽस्ति च नास्ति च घटः नित्यश्चानित्यश्चात्मेत्यादि ।” (Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā.)

3 “विरुद्धानेककोटिस्पर्शि ज्ञानं संशयः । यथाऽयं स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वेति । स्थाणुपुरुषसाधारणोर्द्धतादिदर्शनाद् तद्विशेषस्य वक्रकोटर-शिरः-पाण्यादेः साधकप्रमाण-स्याभावादनैककोट्यवलंबित्वं ज्ञानस्य ।” Nyāya-dīpikā.

4 “किमित्यालोचनमात्रमनध्यवसायः । यथा गच्छतस्तृणस्पर्शज्ञानम् ।” Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokā-lāṅkāra. I. 13. 14.

The knowledge of an object as quite the contrary to its real self is known as Viparyaya or Vimoha. When we think nacre to be silver or a rope to be a snake, we have a knowledge vitiated by Viparyaya or Vimoha (Perversity¹). Such is also the case when a person attacked by a particular disease tastes a sweet thing as bitter, or sees two moons by a defect in vision or thinks trees to be moving while travelling in a boat or a railway carriage or sees a circle of fire when a burning brand is spun round².

Pramāṇa is free from these three kinds of fallacies. These

“किमित्यालोचनमात्रमनध्यवसायः । यथा पथि गच्छतस्तृणस्पर्शदिज्ञानम्”

Nyāya-dīpikā. Dharmabhūṣaṇa lays down that Anadhyavasāya does not touch different ideas, so it is not Saṃśaya. It is also not Viparyaya as it does not comprehend the reality of the opposite idea :

“इदं हि नानाकोट्यवलंबनाभावाद् न संशयः ।

विपरीतैककोटि-निश्चयाभावान्न विपर्ययः ।” Nyāya-dīpikā.

“विशेषानुल्लेख्यमनध्यवसायः ।” Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā I. 1. 7.

“दूरान्धकारादिवशादसाधारणधर्मावमर्शरहितः प्रत्ययोऽनिश्चयात्मकत्वादनध्यवसायः यथा किमेतदिति ।” Bhāṣya on Ibid.

1 “विपरीतैककोटिनिष्टं कर्तुं विपर्ययः । यथा शुक्तिकायामिदं रजतमिति ।”

Pramāṇanayatatvālokaṅkāra. 1. 9. 10.

“अतस्मिंस्तदेवेति विपर्ययः ।” Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā I. 1. 7.

“विपरीतकोटिनिश्चयो विपर्ययः । यथा शुक्तिकायामिदं रजतमिति ज्ञानम् । अत्रापि सादृश्यादिनिमित्तवशात् शुक्तिविपरीते रजते निश्चयः ।” Nyāya-dīpikā.

2 “यथा धातुवैषम्यान्मधुरादि-द्रव्येषु तिक्तादिप्रत्ययः, तिमिरादिदोषादे-कस्मिन्नपि चन्द्रे द्विचन्द्रादिप्रत्ययः, नौयानादगच्छत्स्वपि वृक्षेषु गच्छत्-प्रत्ययः आशुभ्रमणादलातादावचक्रेऽपि चक्रप्रत्ययः ।” Bhāṣya to Aphorism 1. 1. 7 in Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā.

are termed Pramāṇābhāsas by Māṇikyanandi and are mentioned in the sixth chapter of Parikṣāmukhaṁ¹.

According to the Jain doctrine, liberation is attained by a soul possessed of certain characteristics, viz. right faith, right knowledge and right conduct. Right faith or Samyaktva is a sincere belief in the seven Tattvas (essential principles) of Jainism viz. Jīva, Ajīva, Āsrava, Bandha, Saṁvara, Nirjarā and Mokṣa. It is only after a person has right faith that he can attain right knowledge. Right knowledge or Samyak Jñāna is the detailed cognition of the ego and non-ego and is free from the fallacies Saṁśaya, Anadhyavasāya and Viparyaya as described above². A person may have a knowledge of the aforesaid seven principles of Jainism but that knowledge may be vague or indefinite or it may be full of doubts or it may be entirely wrong. When indecision, doubts or belief in opposite principles disappear from removal of fallacies, a person attains perfect knowledge. The understanding of Pramāṇas is therefore not useless even to a person who has given up worldly pursuits and is bent upon obtaining liberation.

Anantavīrya says that the Buddhists might say that they agree to the view that Pramāṇa is knowledge as mentioned in the second aphorism but they do not agree that all Pramāṇas consist of definite knowledge. According to them it is only in case of one variety of Pramāṇa viz. inference that correctness can be asserted. In other cases for example in Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa as understood by the Buddhists, definiteness is not essentially found. In opposition to this view this aphorism has been laid down in which

1 “अस्वसंविदितगृहीतार्थदर्शनसंशयादयः प्रमाणाभासाः।” Parikṣāmukhaṁ VI. 2.

2 “संसयविमोहविव्भमविवल्लियं अप्परसरुवस्स ।

गहणं सम्मं णाणं सायारमणेयभेयं च ॥”

it has been mentioned that not only in Anumāna but in all kinds of Pramāṇa, there is definite knowledge¹.

अनिश्चितोऽपूर्वार्थः ॥ ४ ॥

4. Anīśchitohpūrvārthah.

4. Apūrvārtha is that which has not been ascertained.

Commentary

In the definition of Pramāṇa as laid down in the first aphorism, the word Apūrvārtha has been used. This word is explained in this aphorism. Apūrvārtha is that which has not previously been ascertained by any Pramāṇa by making it free from fallacies like Doubt, Indefiniteness or Perversity².

We have previously mentioned that there are four stages of knowledge. First, we have a general knowledge of a thing brought into contact with a sense organ (Avagraha). Then we have a desire to know the particulars (Īhā). A doubt may be started by saying that as Avagraha precedes Īhā, the knowledge in the second stage viz. Īhā cannot be said to be a knowledge of a thing not ascertained before as in the first stage (Avagraha) it has already been ascertained. The reply to this is that as details are not ascertained by Avagraha but only by Īhā it cannot be said that ascertainment of the object takes place during the first stage viz. Avagraha³. The ascertainment consists of a perfect and correct idea of the thing.

1 “अत्राह सौगतः, भवतु नाम सन्निकर्षादिव्यवच्छेदेन ज्ञानस्यैव प्रामाण्यं, न तदस्माभिर्निषिध्यते । तत्तु व्यवसायात्मकमेवेत्यत्र न युक्तिमुत्पश्यामः । अनुमानस्यैव व्यवसायात्मनः प्रामाण्याभ्युपगमात् । प्रत्यक्षस्य तु निर्विकल्पकत्वेऽप्यविस्वादादकत्वेन प्रामाण्योपपत्तेरिति तत्राह ।” Prameyaratnamālā.

2 “यः प्रमाणान्तरेण संशयादिव्यवच्छेदेनानध्यवसितः सोऽपूर्वार्थः ।”

Prameyaratnamālā.

3 “तेनेहादिज्ञानविषयस्यावग्रहादिगृहीतत्वेऽपि न पूर्वार्थत्वम् । अवग्रहादिनेहादिविषयभूतत्वान्तरविशेषनिश्चयाभावात् ।” Prameyaratnamālā.

दृष्टोऽपि समारोपात्तादृक् ॥ ५ ॥

5. Driṣṭohpi samāropāttādrīk.

5. Even an ascertained thing becomes so (i. e., unascertained) through Samāropa (fallacies).

Commentary

It is urged in this aphorism that by Apūrvārtha, we not only mean a thing not ascertained before but also a thing previously ascertained but which has subsequently become involved in fallacies¹. In the latter class, we do away with the fallacies and ascertain the thing again correctly. This subsequent ascertainment is also said to be of a thing not ascertained before as in the interval there were fallacies destroying the true idea of the object.

Dharmabhūṣaṇa has quoted this aphorism in Nyāya-dīpikā saying that after we see a pitcher, we may see other things and then again see the pitcher and the question may arise whether the subsequent knowledge of the pitcher is Pramāṇa as it had been already ascertained before. The answer to this question is that in this case the pitcher is to be taken as unascertained because there may be fallacies in the interval².

This however can be explained in another way following the argument in the case of Dhārāvāhika Jñāna. Though a section of Jain writers exclude Dhārāvāhika Jñāna from Pramāṇa, we have shown how it can be fitted to the definition of Pramāṇa. Similarly when we have knowledge of a pitcher followed by knowledge of other things and then again we have knowledge of the pitcher it

1. “अथोक्तप्रकार एवापूर्वार्थः किमन्योऽप्यस्तीत्याह...दृष्टोऽपि गृहीतोऽपि न केवलमनिश्चित एवेत्यपिशब्दार्थः । तादृगपूर्वार्थो भवति । समारोपादिति हेतुः ।”
Prameyaratnamālā.

2. ननु घटे दृष्ट पुनरन्यव्यासंगे पश्चाद् घट एव दृष्टे पश्चात्तमं ज्ञानमप्रमाणं प्राप्नोति...इति चेत्, न । दृष्टस्यापि मध्ये समारोपे सत्यदृष्टत्वात् । तदुक्तं ‘दृष्टोऽपि समारोपात्तादृक्’ इति ।” Nyāya-dīpikā.

may be said that different knowledges of the pitcher on the two occasions are different ascertainment characterised by different time, place, etc. So the second ascertainment can be Pramāṇa as well as the first.

The view is therefore clear that not only an object never ascertained before can be Pramāṇa but the same object after previous ascertainment can again be Pramāṇa for fallacies may vitiate the first ascertainment making it necessary for another ascertainment of the true characteristics of the object. In our everyday life we may see an object previously perceived but be unable to find out its real nature owing to its being covered by dirt etc., when we see it for the second time. But if this dirt be removed we get a real knowledge of it. So a Pramāṇa also may be vitiated by fallacies and again become Pramāṇa when the fallacies are removed¹.

स्वोन्मुखतया प्रतिभासनं स्वस्य व्यवसायः ॥ ६ ॥

6. Svonmukhatayā pratibhāsanam svasya vyavasāyah.

6. The ascertainment of self is the illumination of it towards itself.

Commentary

This aphorism explains the words "Sva... vyavasāya" used in the definition of Pramāṇa in the first aphorism.

When the knowledge becomes its own object, it illumines itself and we say that in Pramāṇa there is ascertainment of itself (as well as of the object)².

This is further explained in the next aphorism.

1. "एतदुक्तं भवति, गृहीतमपि ध्यामल्लितकारतया यन्निर्णेतुं न शक्यते तदपि वस्त्वपूर्वमिति व्यपदिश्यते प्रवृत्तसमारोपान्यवच्छेदात् ।" Prameyaratnamālā.

2. The word स्वोन्मुखतया is explained as स्वविषयकत्वम् i.e. becoming its own object of ascertainment or in other words, स्वतः प्रकाशनं ज्ञानं i.e. the knowledge illumines itself. (Arthaprakāśikā) ...

अर्थस्येव तदुन्मुखतया ॥ ७ ॥

7. Arthasyeva tadunmukhatayā.

7. It becomes its own object, like other objects.

Commentary

This aphorism gives an example explaining the preceding aphorism. As the ascertainment of external objects results from directing attention towards them, so the knowledge itself is ascertained by it. In every knowledge there is a subject and an object and in valid knowledge the object as well as the knowledge itself is ascertained. A concrete example is given in the next aphorism to elucidate this.

घटमहमात्मना वेद्मि ॥ ८ ॥

8. Ghatamahamātmanā vedmi.

8. I know the pitcher through myself.

Commentary

Here "I" is the subject (Pramātā) and "the pitcher" is the object (Prameya), "knowing" is the action (Pramiti) and "through myself" is the instrumental cause of this knowledge (Pramāṇa). Thus in such a knowledge we have an understanding of a subject, an object, an instrumental cause and a verb signifying action. This is mentioned in the next aphorism.

Aphorisms 6, 7, 8 are embodied in a different language in a single Sūtra in Pramāṇanayatattvālokāṅkāra. Instead of a pitcher, the example given there is that of a baby elephant¹.

कर्मवत्कर्तृकरणक्रियाप्रतीतेः ॥ ९ ॥

9. Karmavatkartrikaraṇakriyāpratīteḥ.

1. "स्वस्य व्यवसायः स्वामिमुख्येन प्रकाशनं वाक्यस्येव तदामिमुख्येन करि-
कलभकमहमात्मना जानामि ।" Pramāṇanayatattvālokāṅkāra, I. 17.

9. Because (in our knowledge) we have an understanding of the subject, an instrumental cause and the verb, in the same manner as the object.

Commentary

Anantavīrya says that this aphorism denies the views of those who maintain that knowledge ascertains only the object but not itself, others who hold that knowledge ascertains either itself or an object, others again who lay down that in knowledge there is understanding of only the subject and the object and of others who say that in knowledge there is understanding of subject, object and a verb¹. By this aphorism it is laid down that according to the Jain view, in knowledge there is understanding of four things, a subject, an object, a verb and an instrumental cause. The thing which is known is the object. The subject is the self. Pramāṇa is the instrumental cause and Pramiti is the verb.

In Arthaprakāśikā, it is mentioned that this is in contradiction with the view of Naiyāyikas who hold that in Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa only the object (Prameya) is understood e. g. that this is a pitcher and that the knowledge does not know itself or the subject (Pramātā) or the result (Pramiti). It is urged that this is also in opposition to the view of Mimāṃsakas following Prabhākara who say that objects like pitchers and the self are ascertained by Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa and who deny that Pramiti or the instrumental cause is ascertained by such Pramāṇa. Further it is mentioned that this refutes the view of the followers of Jaimini who admit the understanding of Pramāṇa, Prameya and Pramiti in Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa but deny the instrumental cause².

1. “ननु ज्ञानमर्थमेवाध्यवस्यति न स्वात्मानम् । आत्मानं फलं वेति केचित् । कर्तृकर्मणोरेव प्रतीतिरित्यपरे । कर्तृकर्मक्रियाणामेव प्रतीतिरित्यन्ये । तेषां मतमखिलमपि प्रतीतिवाधितमिति दर्शयन्नाह ।” Prameyaratnamālā.

2. “अत्राहुर्नैयायिकादयः अज्ञानं प्रमेयमेव प्रत्यक्षीकरोति । अयं घट इत्याकारेण ज्ञानेन प्रमेयरूपघटादेरेव प्रत्यक्षीकरणात् । अतः तादृशज्ञानं न स्वस्वरूपं, नाप्यात्मानं प्रमातारं, नापि प्रमितिरूपं फलं वा प्रत्यक्षीकरोति ।

शब्दानुच्चारणेऽपि स्वस्यानुभवनमर्थवत् ॥ १० ॥

10. Śabdānuchchāraṇepi svasyānubhavanamarthavat.

10. Just as in the case of objects, there is understanding of itself (the knowledge) without utterance of the word (signifying it).

Commentary

It is our everyday knowledge that though the word "pitcher" is not uttered, we can have experience of a pitcher. So we can have experience of the knowledge itself though no word signifying knowledge is uttered. This is urged to meet the view of those who say that there can be no experience without the help of words. It cannot be urged that as there is no use of the word 'knowledge' in an experience of an object, the knowledge cannot become its own object ; for we see that even when the word 'pitcher' is not uttered we can have experience of a pitcher.

को वा तत्प्रतिभासिनमर्थमध्यक्षमिच्छंस्तदेव तथा नेच्छेत् ॥ ११ ॥

11. Ko vā tatpratibhāsinamarthamadhyakṣamichchhamstadeva tathā nechchhet.

11. Who does not accept it (i. e. knowledge) to be of that manner (i. e. being the subject-matter of experience) when one admits that in Pratyakṣa the object is illumined by knowledge ?

प्रदीपवत् ॥ १२ ॥

12. Pradīpavat.

12. Like a lamp.

भाट्टास्तु प्रमाणप्रमेययोरेव प्रत्यक्षतः प्रतिपत्तिः । प्रत्यक्षेण प्रमेयस्य घटादेः प्रमातुश्च आत्मनः प्रत्यक्षीकरणात् । न तु प्रमितिकरणज्ञानयोरपि प्रत्यक्षतः प्रतिपत्तिः सम्भवतीति वदन्ति ।

प्रमाणप्रमेयप्रमितीनामेव प्रत्यक्षतः प्रतिपत्तिः, न तु प्रमितिकरणज्ञानस्येति जैमिनीयाः ।

तेषां सर्वेषामपि मतमनुभवपराहतमिति दर्शयन्नाह ।" Arthaprakāśikā.

Commentary

Just as a lamp illumines itself as well as objects like a jar etc., so knowledge illumines itself as well as objects known. There cannot be any one who would accept objects as knowable by knowledge but deny that knowledge itself can be known.

In *Pramāṇanayatattvālokāṅkāra*, aphorisms 11 and 12 of *Parikṣāmukhaṃ* are written in a slightly different language¹. The example there given is that of the sun instead of a lamp.

The fact that knowledge illumines itself is accepted by later Jain writers like Hemachandra though in the definition of *Pramāṇa* accepted by them they exclude this. Hemachandra mentions that older writers have laid down that as objects are ascertained by knowledge, so the knowledge itself becomes its own object. Hemachandra quotes two definitions of older writers : one is of Siddhasena in *Nyāyāvatāra* in which it is laid down that *Pramāṇa* illumines itself as well as other objects and the other is of Māṇikyanandi in *Parikṣāmukhaṃ* as we have already discussed². Hemachandra admits following the example as given by Māṇikyanandi 'I know a pitcher', that the knowledge illumines itself in such a case like the subject and object³. He also mentions that as an object reveals itself, so the knowledge reveals itself and consequently a knowledge can know itself⁴. It is also stated by him that like a lamp, knowledge reveals an object capable of revealing itself as knowledge has the power of illumination⁵. It cannot be urged that.

1. "कः खलु ज्ञानस्यालंबनं बाह्यं प्रतिभातमभिमन्यमानस्तदपि तत्प्रकारं नाभिमन्येत मिहिरालोकवत् ।" *Pramāṇanayatattvālokāṅkāra*, I. 18.

2. "नन्वर्थनिर्णयवत् स्वनिर्णयोऽपि वृद्धैः प्रमाणलक्षणत्वेनोक्तः 'प्रमाणं स्वपराभासि' इति, 'स्वार्थव्यवसायात्मकं प्रमाणम्' इति च" *Pramāṇamimāṃsā*. Bhāṣya to 1. 1. 2.

3. "घटमहं जानामीत्यादौ कर्तृकर्मवज्ज्ञप्तेरप्यवभासमानत्वात्" *Ibid*.

4. "अथोन्मुखतयेव स्वोन्मुखतयापि ज्ञानस्य प्रतिभासात् स्वनिर्णयात्मकत्वमप्यस्ति ।" *Ibid*.

5. "तथाहि ज्ञानं प्रकाशमानमेवार्थं प्रकाशयति प्रदीपवत् ।" *Ibid*.

as illumination is the very essence of knowledge, it cannot be the illuminator for its illuminating characteristic is established by the destruction of wrong knowledge¹. But admitting all these Hemachandra propounds the following aphorism "The ascertainment of itself though it happens, is not the definition (of Pramāṇa) as this happens also in fallacies (which are not Pramāṇas)"².

Hemachandra himself in his own Bhāṣya to this aphorism writes that the views of others who lay down that knowledge illumines itself is approved by me. But in laying down a definition that quality only which distinguishes the object defined should be mentioned and not all the qualities which exist in a thing. In other words, a definition is not a description. Hemachandra adds that there is no knowledge whether right or wrong which does not illumine itself. So even in doubt etc., the knowledge illumines itself but this kind of knowledge being false is excluded from Pramāṇas. For this reason, Hemachandra says that he has excluded self-illumination as a characteristic of Pramāṇa in his definition³.

But he supports the older writers by saying that they have not committed any fault by using this characteristic in the definition of Pramāṇa as they have done so for examination of the characteristics of Pramāṇa⁴.

1. "संवेदनस्य प्रकाशत्वात् प्रकाशकत्वमसिद्धमिति चेत्, न, अज्ञान-
निरासादिद्वारेण प्रकाशकत्वोपपत्तेः ।" Ibid.

2. "स्वनिर्णयः सन्नप्यलक्षणमप्रमाणेऽपि भावात् ॥"

Pramāṇamīmāṃsā. 1. 1. 3.

3. "सन्नपि परोक्तमनुमोदते अयमर्थो, नहि अस्तीत्येव सर्वं लक्षणं वाच्यं
किन्तु यो धर्मो विपक्षाद् व्यावर्तते, स्वनिर्णयस्त्वप्रमाणेऽपि संशयादौ वर्तते, नहि
काचित् ज्ञानमात्रा सास्ति या न स्वसंविदिता नाम ततो न स्वनिर्णयो लक्षणमुक्तोऽ-
स्माभिः ।" Bhāṣya to Aphorism I. 1. 3. in Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā.

4. "वृद्धैस्तु परीक्षार्थमुपक्षिप्त इत्यदोषः ।" Ibid.

तत्प्रामाण्यं स्वतः परतश्च ॥१३॥

13. Tatpramāṇyam svataḥ parataścha.

13. The validity of Pramāṇa rises from itself or through another (Pramāṇa).

Commentary

In this aphorism, the point how a Pramāṇa establishes its validity, is discussed. In the Nyāya philosophy as propounded by Gautama, it has been laid down that the validity of Pramāṇa arises through other help. Vātsyāyana the writer of the Bhāṣya of Nyāya-sūtras of Gautama says that through inference, the validity of a Pramāṇa is established. We know that Pramāṇa is not the opposite of a correct understanding by the help of inference. So we must say in such a case that the validity of Pramāṇa is established through another viz. inference.

An example will make this clear. A thirsty man seeks water. That which causes a knowledge of water in a mirage is not Pramāṇa, for in a mirage the thirst of that man cannot be mitigated. Such a knowledge is a fallacy. Conformity with the object presented is known as the validity of Pramāṇa, and non-conformity with the object presented is the opposite of Pramāṇa¹.

A criticism may be made of the view that if by inference, the validity of a Pramāṇa is established, we may ask : if an inference which is itself a Pramāṇa confirms another Pramāṇa to establish its validity, how will this inference be validated ? If we say, that another inference will validate this, the result would be an endless chain of inferences. So we must accept that in some cases Pramāṇa validates itself and in other cases, its validity is established by inference. Jain writers accordingly hold that validity of Pramāṇa

1. “किमिदं प्रमाणस्य प्रामाण्यं नाम ? प्रतिभातविषयाव्यभिचारित्वम् ।”

Nyāyadīpikā.

“ज्ञानस्य प्रमेयाव्यभिचारित्वं प्रामाण्यम् । तदितरत्त्वप्रामाण्यम् ।”

Pramāṇanayatatvālokaṅkāra, I. 19. 20.

arises either from itself or through another Pramāṇa (like inference).

It may be asked, in what case does the validity of a Pramāṇa arises of itself and in what case through another Pramāṇa ? The answer is that in the case of objects with which we are already familiar, the Pramāṇa rises of itself. For example, when we look at our palm and have a knowledge of the same, no inference is necessary to establish its validity. Similarly when we see a pond previously seen many times in our own village, the validity does not require the help of inference but arises of itself. This is shown by the fact that immediately afterwards we go to it to wash ourselves or drink water. But when we see a reservoir of water not seen before at any time, we may have a doubt at first whether this is really water or a mirage. Then we use our inference and say that as we are having a smell of lotuses, feeling cool wind etc., it must be water and no mirage and so our former knowledge of water is Pramāṇa and not a fallacy¹.

Hemachandra also mentions that we become certain of the validity of a Pramāṇa either by itself or through the help of others². When we look at our palm of hand which is familiar to us, we have no wish to examine whether this knowledge is valid or not, for we have not the slightest doubt regarding it. Similarly

1. 'तत्र तावदभ्यस्तविषये जलमिदमिति ज्ञाने जाते ज्ञानस्वरूपज्ञप्तिरसमय एव तद्गतं प्रामाण्यमपि ज्ञायत एव । अन्यथोत्तरक्षण एव निःशङ्कप्रवृत्तेर-योगात् । अस्ति हि जलज्ञानोत्तरक्षण एव निःशङ्का प्रवृत्तिः । अनभ्यस्ते तु विषये जलज्ञाने जाते जलज्ञानं मम जातमिति ज्ञानस्वरूपनिर्णयेऽपि प्रामाण्य-निर्णयोऽन्यत एव । अन्यथोत्तरकाले संदेहानुपपत्तेः । अस्ति हि संदेहो जल-ज्ञानं मम जातं, तत् किं जलमुत मरीचिकेति ? ततः कमलपरिमलशिशिरमंदमरुत्-प्रचारप्रभृतिभिरवधारयति । . प्रमाणं प्राप्तं जलज्ञानं, कमलपरिमलाद्यन्यथानुपपत्तेः ।'

Nyāyadīpikā.

2. "प्रामाण्यनिश्चयः स्वतः परतो वा ।" Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā, I. I. 8.

when we are afflicted by thirst and want to drink water, or when we want to bathe or to assuage the heat of our body and see a tank already familiar to us, we at once proceed to it without stopping to examine, whether the knowledge is valid or not. But in other cases regarding objects with which we are not already familiar, we take the help of inference etc., to establish the validity of the knowledge¹.

Vidyānanda has affirmed this by saying “Pramāṇa establishes itself regarding objects with which we are already familiar and takes the help of other in other cases”.²

In Pramāṇanayatattvālokālankāra, it is mentioned that Prāmāṇya and Aprāmāṇya (validity and its opposite) arise through others, but regarding their knowledge, they arise by themselves or through others.³ In Prameyaratnamālā also we find that Prāmāṇya arises by itself.⁴

In Arthaprakāśikā it is mentioned that in this aphorism the words “utpattau” (“when it arises”) and “svakārye” (“in its working”) may be taken as understood. The meaning would then be that when Prāmāṇya arises it takes help of others but regard-

1. “प्रामाण्यनिश्चयः क्वचित् स्वतो यथाऽभ्यासदशापन्ने स्वकरतलादिज्ञाने स्नानपानावगाहनोदन्योपशमादावर्थक्रियानिर्भासे वा प्रत्यक्षज्ञाने, नहि तत्र परीक्षा-कांक्षाऽस्ति प्रेक्षावताम्, तथाहि जलज्ञानं ततो दाहपिपासार्त्तस्य तत्र प्रवृत्तिस्ततस्तत्प्राप्तिः ततः स्नानपानादीनि ततो दाहोदन्योपशम इत्येतावतैव भवति कृती प्रमाता न पुनर्दाहोदन्योपशमज्ञानमपि परीक्षते इत्यस्य स्वतः प्रामाण्यम् ।...क्वचित् परतः प्रामाण्य-निश्चयो यथाऽनभ्यासदशापन्ने प्रत्यक्षे ।” Bhāṣya to Pramāṇa-mimāṃsā I. 1. 8.

2. “प्रामाण्यं तु स्वतः सिद्धमभ्यासात् परतोऽन्यथा ॥”

Pramāṇa-parikṣā.

3. “तदुभयमुत्पत्तौ परत एव ज्ञप्तौ तु स्वतः परतश्च ।”

Pramāṇa-nayatattvālokālankāra I. 11.

4. “अथवा प्रामाण्यमुत्पत्तौ परत एव ।” Prameyaratnamālā.

ing its work viz. determination of objects, it takes its own help in the case of familiar objects and help of others in other cases.¹

Here ends the first chapter of Parikṣāmukhaṃ. We have seen that in the first aphorism of this chapter, the definition of Pramāṇa has been given. In the aphorisms which follow this definition is explained. For example in the second aphorism it is laid down that Pramāṇa cannot be anything else than knowledge as indicated in the definition. The words “sva-vyavasāya” in the definition is explained in aphorisms 6 and 7 and a concrete example is given in aphorism 8. The word “Apūrvārtha” is explained in aphorism 4. Thus defining Pramāṇa and explaining the general characteristics of Pramāṇa in the first chapter the author will proceed in the next chapter to mention the different varieties of Pramāṇa viz. Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa. Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa will be discussed in detail in the second chapter and Parokṣa Pramāṇa will be examined in the third chapter.

End of Chapter I.

1. “अथवा उत्पत्तौ स्वकार्यं च इति पदद्वयमपि अस्मिन् सूत्रे अभ्याहर्तव्यं । तथाच अयमर्थः । प्रामाण्यमुत्पत्तौ परत एव ।...विषयपरिच्छित्यादिलक्षणस्वकार्ये प्रामाण्यमभ्यासदशायां स्वतो गृह्यते । अनभ्यासदशायां परतो गृह्यत इति ।”

द्वितीयः समुद्देशः

SAMUDDĒŚA II

तद्वेधा ॥ १ ॥

1. Taddvedhā.

1. This (Pramāṇa) is of two kinds.

Commentary

Jain Logic accepts only two kinds of Pramāṇas, Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa. This distinguishes the Jain view from the views of Hindu and Buddhist philosophers. According to the Chārvāka school of philosophy there is only one Pramāṇa named Pratyakṣa. Buddhist philosophy admits two varieties of Pramāṇa viz. Pratyakṣa and Anumāna. In Vaiśeṣika philosophy also Pratyakṣa and Anumāna are the only Pramāṇas which are recognised, for according to this system of philosophy Śabda etc. (which are recognised by some as Pramāṇas) are included within Anumāna. In Sāṃkhya and Yoga philosophies, three kinds of Pramāṇas viz. Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and Āgama (Śabda) are accepted. In Nyāya philosophy four kinds of Pramāṇas, Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna and Śabda are recognised. The Mimāṃsā school of philosophy as propounded by Prabhākara and his followers recognise five Pramāṇas, Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna, Śabda and Arthāpatti. The Bhatta school of Mimāṃsā philosophy recognises one more Pramāṇa viz. Abhāva in addition to the five Pramāṇas accepted by Prabhākara. The Vedānta view as discussed in the Vedānta-paribhāṣā is that there are six kinds of Pramāṇas viz. Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna, Śabda, Arthāpatti and Anupalabdhī.

Hemachandra in his Pramāṇamimāṃsā laying down that "Pramāṇa is of two varieties¹ mentions in his Bhāṣya that this refutes the views of Chārvāka, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, Nyāya,

I. "प्रमाणं द्विधा ।" Pramāṇa-mimāṃsā, I. I. 9.

Prābhākara and Bhāṭṭa (the two schools of Mīmāṃsā) philosophy.¹

In Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāra we have "Pramāṇa is of two kinds—Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa"². Dharmabhūṣaṇa also lays down the same³.

प्रत्यक्षेतरभेदात् ॥ २ ॥

2. Pratyakṣetarabhedāt.

2. As it is of two varieties, Pratyakṣa and another (viz. Parokṣa).

Commentary

This is connected with the previous aphorism which lays down that Pramāṇa is of two kinds and this aphorism mentions the two kinds of Pramāṇas. In Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāra as we have already quoted these two aphorisms have been put down in a single aphorism. Hemachandra follows Māṇikyanandi and after mentioning that Pramāṇa is of two kinds⁴ lays down in the next aphorism that the Pramāṇas are Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa⁵. In Nyāyāvatāra we find "Pramāṇa is divided as Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa as knowables are ascertained in two ways"⁶. Haribhadra Sūri lays down "According to the (Jain) view, Pratyakṣa and

1. "तेन प्रत्यक्षमेवैकं प्रमाणमिति चार्वाकाः, प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमाः प्रमाणानीति वैशेषिकाः, तान्येवेति सांख्याः, सहोपमानेन चत्वारोति नैयायिकाः, सहार्थापत्त्या पञ्चेति प्राभाकराः, सहाभावेन षडिति भाट्टा इति न्यूनाधिक-प्रमाणवादिनः प्रतिक्षिप्ताः ।" Bhāṣya to Ibid.

2. "तद्विभेदं प्रत्यक्षं च परोक्षं च ।" Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāra, II. I.

3. "प्रमाणं द्विविधं प्रत्यक्षं परोक्षं च ।" Nyāyadīpikā. Prakāśa II.

4. "प्रमाणं द्विधा ।" Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā. I. I. 9

5. "प्रत्यक्षं च परोक्षं च ।" Ibid I. I. 10

6. "प्रत्यक्षं च परोक्षं च द्विधा मेयविनिश्चयाद् ॥" Nyāyāvatāra I,

Parokṣa are two kinds of Pramāṇas¹. In Tattvārtha Sūtra, Pramāṇas have been laid down in three aphorisms : "This knowledge consisting of Mati, Śruta, Avadhi, Manahpariyaya and Kevala² consists of two Pramāṇas³. The first two are Parokṣa Pramāṇas⁴. The remaining ones are Pratyakṣa⁵."

विशदं प्रत्यक्षम् ॥ ३ ॥

3. Viśadam Pratyakṣam.

3. (The knowledge) which is clear is Pratyakṣa.

Commentary

The word "Knowledge" (Jñānam) is to be understood in this aphorism⁶. Clearness is the characteristic of Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa. This clearness is expressed by the words Viśada, Spaṣṭa, Nirmala etc. in works on Jain Logic⁷. The idea may be thus explained by an example. We may have knowledge of fire directly or when we are told by a reliable person whom we believe "Here is fire" or when we see smoke and infer that there is fire. The second and third kind of knowledge is not direct and not therefore styled as clear. That there is difference between this direct and indirect knowledge is understood by every one. This direct knowledge is not dependant on Śabda or Anumāna. It

1. "प्रत्यक्षं च परोक्षं च द्वे प्रमाणे तथा मते ।" Śaddarsāṇasamuchchaya. Śloka 55.

2. "मतिश्रुतावधिमनःपर्ययकेवलानि ज्ञानम् ।" Tattvārtha Sūtra. I. 9.

3. "तत् प्रमाणे ।" Ibid I. 10.

4. "आद्ये परोक्षं ।" Ibid I. 11

5. "प्रत्यक्षमन्यत् ।" Ibid I. 12.

6. "ज्ञानमिति वर्तते ।" Prameyaratnamālā.

7. "स एव नैर्मल्यं वैशद्यं स्पष्टत्वमित्यादिभिः शब्दैरभिधीयते ।"

arises when there is destruction or mitigation of the obstruction to Jñāna¹.

Akalaṅka Deva in Nyāyaviniśchaya has mentioned that the definition of Pratyakṣa has been mentioned to be clear knowledge². Syādvāda-vidyāpati has explained in the commentary that clearness means perspicuous illumination. This is felt by every one when one proceeds to examine the character of the knowledge³.

In Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāra, the word Spāṣṭa has been used in place of Viśāda. The meaning is the same. In Nyāyadīpikā⁴ and in Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā⁵ the word Viśāda has been followed.

The older Jain logicians have accepted the view which is contrary to that adopted in other philosophies that knowledge derived through the senses is Parokṣa and not Pratyakṣa. Their view is based on the authority of Umāsvāmi (as already quoted), Akalaṅka etc., who maintain that knowledge derived through meditation independent of the senses is Pratyakṣa (direct knowledge). Later writers on Jain logic however have laid down that sense-perception is Pratyakṣa and other kinds of knowledge are Parokṣa. For example Siddhasena Divākara writes "Such knowledge that

1. "किमिदं विशदप्रतिभासत्वं नाम ? उच्यते :—ज्ञानावरणस्य क्षयाद्-विशिष्टक्षयोपशामाद्वा शब्दानुमानादयसंभवि यन्नैर्मल्यमनुभवसिद्धं । दृश्यते खल्वग्नि-रस्तीत्याप्तवचनाद् घूमादिलिंगाच्चोत्पन्नाज् ज्ञानादयमग्निरित्युत्पन्नस्यैन्द्रियिकस्य ज्ञानस्य विशेषः ।" Nyāya-dīpikā.

2. "प्रत्यक्षलक्षणं प्राहुः स्पष्टं साकारमंजसा ।" Nyāyaviniśchaya-lāṅkāra.

3. "निर्मलप्रतिभासत्वमेव स्पष्टत्वं । स्वानुभवप्रसिद्धं चैतत् सर्वस्यापि परीक्ष-कस्येति नातीव निर्बाध्यते ।" Comm. by Syādvāda-vidyāpati.

4. "तत्र विशदप्रतिभासं नाम प्रत्यक्षम् ।" Nyāyadīpikā.

5. "विशदः प्रत्यक्षम् ।" Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā. I. I. 13.

takes cognizance of objects, not beyond the range of the senses, is Pratyakṣa (direct knowledge or perception) ; the other is known as Parokṣa (indirect knowledge) in reference to the manner of taking the cognizance”¹. (Translation by Dr. S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa).

Dr. S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa in his notes on the above verse of Siddhasena Divākara has mentioned the difference between the views of the older and later writers on Jain Logic thus :

“The words Pratyakṣa (direct knowledge) and Parokṣa (indirect knowledge) have been used here in their ordinary acceptations, namely, the first for sense-perceptions, and the second for inference and verbal testimony. In the ancient Jaina scriptures, however, Pratyakṣa (direct knowledge) signified perfect knowledge acquired by the soul direct through meditation and not through the channels of the senses, while Parokṣa (indirect knowledge) signified knowledge derived through the medium of the senses or signs comprising perception, inference and the verbal testimony”².

Now we may turn to the derivation of the word Pratyakṣa as given by different Jain writers. In Syādvādaratnākara we find that the derivative meaning of Pratyakṣa is that which rests on Akṣa (i. e., a sense). There it is also mentioned that the derivation is by Tatpuruṣa Samāsa. It cannot be Avyayibhāva, as in that case the word should always be in the neuter gender but we use Pratyakṣa in all the three genders³. Haribhadra Sūri derives

1. “अपरोक्षतयार्थस्य ग्राहकं ज्ञानमीदृशम् ।

प्रत्यक्षमितरत् ज्ञेयं परोक्षं ग्रहणेक्षया ॥” Nyāyāvatāra. 4

2. Nyāyāvatāra Edited by Dr. S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa P. 9.

3. “अक्षमिद्विषयं प्रति गतं कार्यत्वेनाश्रितं प्रत्यक्षम् । ‘कुगतिप्रादयः’ इति तत्पुरुषः । ततश्च ‘द्विगुप्राप्तापन्नालं पूर्वगतिसमासेषु’ परवर्द्धिगताप्रतिषेधादभिधेयवर्द्धिगतायां वर्द्धिगताः प्रत्यक्षशब्दः सिद्धः । एवं च प्रत्यक्षं ज्ञानं, प्रत्यक्षो बोधः, प्रत्यक्षा

the word thus : “Akṣa means Jīva as it enjoys or pervades all Dravya, Kṣetra, Kāla and Bhāva. Akṣa also means Indriya (senses) as it enjoys objects. When Akṣa meets Akṣa we have Pratyakṣa that is to say knowledge arises through the senses”¹. Hemachandra also lays down the derivation adopted by Haribhadra². These derivations have been criticised in Syādvādaratnākara as already mentioned.

Now a question may be asked, if by the derivation we get that knowledge arising from sense-perception is Pratyakṣa, how can the view of writers who call such knowledge Parokṣa and only direct knowledge derived through meditation Pratyakṣa, be tenable. The answer has been given in Syādvādaratnākara that whatever the derivative meaning of a word may be, in use we do not stick to it. For example the derivative meaning of the word “Gauḥ” (a cow) is that which goes. This meaning can apply to any moving thing but use of the word Gauḥ is not at all made in its derivative sense. So in the case of Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa also, its derivative meaning cannot stop its being applied to knowledge like Avadhi etc., derived without the help of any sense³.

बुद्धिरित्यादयो व्यपदेशाः प्रवर्तन्ते । अक्षमक्षं प्रति वर्तत इति प्रत्यक्षमिति त्वव्ययी-
भावे ‘अव्ययीभावश्च’ इत्यनेन सदा नपुंसकत्वं स्यात् ।” Syādvādaratnākara, II. 1.

1. “अश्नुतेऽक्ष्णोति वा व्याप्नोति सकलद्रव्यक्षेत्र-कालभावानित्यक्षो जीवोऽ-
श्नुते विषयमित्यक्षमिन्द्रियं च । अक्षमक्षं प्रतिगतं प्रत्यक्षमिन्द्रियाण्याश्रित्य व्यवहार-
साधकं यज्ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते तत् प्रत्यक्षमित्यर्थः ।” Śaḍdarśanasamuchchaya.
Comm. on Verse 55.

2. “अश्नुते अक्ष्णोति वा व्याप्नोति सकलद्रव्यक्षेत्रकालभावानित्यक्षो जीवः ।
अश्नुते विषयमित्यक्षमिन्द्रियं च प्रतिः प्रतिगतार्थः अक्षं प्रतिगतं तदाश्रितं अक्षाणि
चैन्द्रियाणि तानि प्रतिगतमिन्द्रियाण्याश्रित्योज्झीते यज्ज्ञानं तत् प्रत्यक्षम् ।” Pramāṇa
mīmāṃsā. Bhāṣya on I. I. 10.

3. “नन्वेवं प्रत्यक्षशब्दस्य व्युत्पत्तौ कथमिन्द्रियानाश्रितस्य मानसस्यावध्या-
देश्च प्रत्यक्षव्यपदेशः स्यादिति चेत् ? उच्यते । प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तस्य तत्रापि सद्भावात् ।

We have already mentioned that according to the Jain doctrine, knowledge is of five kinds : (1) *Mati* (knowledge derived through the senses including the knowledge which arises from the activity of the mind), (2) *Śruta* (knowledge derived through symbols or signs e. g. words, gestures etc.), (3) *Avadhi* (psychic knowledge which the soul acquires without the help of any sense), (4) *Manaḥparyaya* (knowledge of thoughts of others) and (5) *Kevala* (omniscience). There are false knowledges of *Mati*, *Śruta* and *Avadhi* which make up a total of eight kinds of knowledge recognised in Jainism. We have seen that in *Tattvārtha Sūtra*, *Mati* and *Śruta Jñāna* have been described as *Parokṣa Pramāṇas* and *Avadhi*, *Manaḥparyaya* and *Kevala* as *Pratyakṣa Pramāṇas*. The distinction between *Pratyakṣa* and *Parokṣa* according to *Tattvārtha Sūtra* is that in the former the soul gets a clear knowledge of an object without depending upon any other knowledge while in the latter, the cognition is not clear by itself but has to depend upon some other kind of knowledge. We have already given an example of this dependance when, to have a knowledge of fire by seeing smoke, we have to depend on the knowledge of smoke and then infer the existence of fire.

But later writers like Jain logicians have laid down that *Mati* and *Śruta Jñāna* are *Sāṅgyavahārika Pratyakṣas* and *Avadhi*, *Manaḥparyaya* and *Kevala* are *Pāramārthika* or *Mukhya Pratyakṣa*. *Brahmadeva* in his commentary on *Dravya-saṃgraha* tries to reconcile this contradiction in the following manner. First he raises the question : "The disciple asks 'In *Tattvārtha Sūtra*, *Mati* and *Śruta* have been described as *Parokṣa* in the aphorism *Ādye*

अक्षाश्रितत्वं हि प्रत्यक्षशब्दस्य व्युत्पत्तिनिमित्तं, गतिक्रियेव गोशब्दस्य, प्रवृत्ति-
निमित्तं त्वेकार्थसमवायिनाऽक्षाश्रितत्वेनोपलक्षितमर्थसाक्षात्कारत्वं गतिक्रिययोपलक्षितं
गोत्वमिव गोशब्दस्य । अन्यद्वि शब्दस्य व्युत्पत्तिनिमित्तं, अन्यच्च प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम् ।
इतरथा गच्छन्नेव गौर्गौरिति व्यपदिश्येत नापरो व्युत्पत्तिनिमित्ताभावात् । जात्यन्तर-
विशिष्टं हि तुरगादिकं गति-क्रियापरिणतं व्युत्पत्तिनिमित्तसद्भावात् गोशब्दाभिधेयं
स्यात् ।” *Syādvādaratnākara*, II. 1.

Parokṣaṃ (I. 11). How can these be Pratyakṣa (according to the view of Jain writers on Logic ?¹ Brahmadeva then answers this question by saying that the aphorism of Umāsvāmi is to be regarded as a general rule (utsarga) while the sayings of Jain logicians are to be taken as special rules or exceptions (Apavāda). In special or exceptional cases, the general rule is not followed. So though in Tattvārtha Sūtra it has been mentioned that Mati and Śruta Jñānas are Parokṣa knowledge, there are particular cases which may be taken as exceptions where these may be called Pratyakṣa². For example, Śruta Jñāna can be wholly Parokṣa as when it arises from words only or when it consists of knowledge of outside objects e. g. heaven, liberation etc. But when the soul has internal knowledge that it has happiness or misery or it consists of infinite knowledge, this Śruta Jñāna is partially Parokṣa. But Śruta Jñāna is Pratyakṣa in case of ordinary householders (though Parokṣa in case of Kevalins who have omniscience) when it cognizes the soul³. Brahmadeva further says that we all know

1 “अत्राह शिष्यः :—‘आदये परोक्षम्’ इति तत्त्वार्थसूत्रे मतिश्रुतद्वयं परोक्षं भणितं तिष्ठति, कथं प्रत्यक्षं भवति ?” Commentary on Dravyasaṃgraha, Verse 5.

2 “परिहारमाह । तदुत्सर्गव्याख्यानम्, इदं पुनरपवादव्याख्यानम् । यदि तदुत्सर्गव्याख्यानं न भवति, तर्हि मतिज्ञानं कथं तत्त्वार्थे परोक्षं भणितं तिष्ठति ? तर्कशास्त्रे सांख्यवहारिकं प्रत्यक्षं कथं जातम् ? यथा अपवादव्याख्यानेन मतिज्ञानं परोक्षमपि प्रत्यक्षज्ञानं तथा स्वात्माभिमुखं भावश्रुतज्ञानमपि परोक्षं सत् प्रत्यक्षं भण्यते ।” Brahmadeva : Dravyasaṃgraha—Vritti Verse 5.

3 “शब्दात्मकं श्रुतज्ञानं परोक्षमेव तावत् । स्वर्गापवर्गादिवहिर्विषयपरिच्छित्ति-परिज्ञानं विकल्परूपं तदपि परोक्षं । यत्पुनरभ्यन्तरे सुखदुःखविकल्परूपोऽहमनन्त-ज्ञानादिरूपोऽहमिति वा तदीषत्परोक्षम् । यच्च निश्चय-भावश्रुतज्ञानं तच्च शुद्धात्माभि-मुखसुखसंवित्तिस्वरूपं स्वसंवित्त्याकारेण सविकल्पमपीन्द्रियमनोजनितरागादिविकल्प-जालरहितत्वेन निर्विकल्पम्, अभेदनयेन तदेवात्मशब्दवाच्यं, वीतरागचारित्राविनाभूतं केवलज्ञानापेक्षया परोक्षमपि संसारिणां क्षायिकज्ञानाभावात् क्षायोपशमिकमपि प्रत्यक्ष-मभिधीयते ।” Ibid.

that the knowledge of our happiness and misery is Pratyakṣa, but if we say that according to Tattvārtha Sūtra, Mati and Śruta Jñāna are always Parokṣa, the knowledge of our happiness or misery should also become Parokṣa which is absurd¹.

In this connection we may mention the view of Dharma-bhūṣaṇa who says: "Some say that Pratyakṣa should only be that which arises through the senses, eye etc., as Akṣa means the senses (and according to the derivative meaning Pratyakṣa means that arising from the senses). This view is not correct. The knowledges Avadhi, Manahpariyaya and Kevala arise through the soul and are independent of the senses. There is no doubt that these are Pratyakṣa. The characteristic of Pratyakṣa is clearness and not being caused by the senses. For this reason among the five kinds of knowledge Mati, Śruta, Avadhi, Manahpariyaya and Kevala, it has been mentioned (in the Tattvārtha Sūtra) that the former two are Parokṣa and the others are Pratyakṣa"². Whatever may be the derivative meaning, the meaning fixed by use makes Avadhi, Manahpariyaya and Kevala to be Pratyakṣa.³ Or the derivation can be changed in the following manner. Akṣa means the soul as it pervades or knows and that which arises in the soul

1 "यदि पुनरेकान्तेन परोक्षं भवति तर्हि सुखदुःखादिसंवेदनमपि परोक्षं प्राप्नोति, न च तथा ।" Ibid.

2 "कश्चिदाह 'अक्ष' नाम चक्षुरादिकर्मिन्द्रियं तत् प्रतीत्यं यदुत्पद्यते तदेव प्रत्यक्षमुचितं नान्यत्' इति तदप्यसत् । आत्ममात्रसापेक्षाणामवधिमनःपर्ययकेवलाना-मिन्द्रियनिरपेक्षाणामपि प्रत्यक्षत्वाविरोधात् । स्पष्टत्वमेव हि प्रत्यक्षत्वप्रयोजकं नैन्द्रियजन्यत्वं । अत एव हि मतिश्रुतावधिमनःपर्ययकेवलानां ज्ञानत्वेन प्रतिपन्नानां मध्ये 'आद्ये परोक्षः', 'प्रत्यक्षमन्यत्' इत्यादयोरिति श्रुतयोः परोक्षत्वकथनमन्येषां त्ववधिमनःपर्ययकेवलानां प्रत्यक्षत्ववाचो युक्तिः ।" Nyāyadīpikā. Prakāśa II.

3 "कथं पुनरेतेषां प्रत्यक्षशब्दवाच्यत्वमिति चेत् ? रुढित इति ध्रुमः ।" Ibid.

independent of the senses is Pratyakṣa¹. So if we quarrel that we must follow the derivative meaning, a solution is given by adopting a derivation which fits with the definition.

प्रतीत्यन्तराव्यवधानेन विशेषवत्तया वा प्रतिभासनं वैशद्यम् ॥४॥

4. Pratityantarāvyavadhānena viśeṣavattayā vā pratibhāsanam vaiśadyam.

4. Clearness means illumination without any other intermediate knowledge or illumination in details.

Commentary

In Aphorism 3, it was mentioned that the knowledge which is clear is Pratyakṣa. In the present aphorism, clearness is explained.

Clearness of knowledge means illumination of an object when there is no intermediate knowledge. For example, in inference we have an intermediate knowledge. When we see smoke and infer that there is fire, there is the intermediate knowledge of smoke before we have the knowledge of fire. Where there is no such intervention of another knowledge, we hold that the knowledge is clear. Another definition is also given. Clearness means knowledge of an object with all its details.

Hemachandra has laid down : “Clearness means illumination which does not depend on any other Pramāṇa (Anumāna, Śabda etc.) or understanding that it is of such and such a nature”². In Anumāna and Śabda, the knowledge depends on other Pramāṇas but that is not the case in Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa. There is another

1 “अथवा अक्ष्णोति व्याप्नोति जानातीत्यक्ष आत्मा तन्मात्रापेक्षोत्पत्तिकं प्रत्यक्षमिति ।” Ibid.

2 “प्रमाणान्तरानपेक्षेदन्तया प्रतिभासो वा वैशद्यम् ।” Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā I. 1. 14.

definition of clearness viz. that it grasps all the details and hence forms a correct knowledge by being a Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa¹.

In Syādvādaratnākara this aphorism is criticised. It is mentioned there : "Some say 'Clearness means illumination without any intermediate knowledge'. They say that in Parokṣa Pramāṇas like Anumāna, the knowledge of fire arises after the intermediate knowledge of smoke, so that knowledge is not clear but in Pratyakṣa there is no such intermediate knowledge, so it is clear. Those who hold this view have not got an idea of Jain philosophy even in their dreams. For, how will they establish the knowledge Īhā etc. when connected with doubt ?"² So in Syādvādaratnākara, support is given to the definition of clearness as laid down in Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālaṅkāra which is as follows :

"Clearness means the illumination of details in excess of that produced by Anumāna etc."³. A verse is quoted in Syādvādaratnākara meaning the same thing⁴.

1 "प्रस्तुतात् प्रमाणादन्यत् प्रमाणं शब्दलिङ्गादिज्ञानं तत् प्रमाणान्तरं, तन्निर-
पेक्षता वैशद्यम् । न हि शब्दानुमानादिवत् प्रत्यक्षं स्वोत्पत्तौ शब्दलिङ्गादिज्ञानं
प्रमाणान्तरमपेक्षते इत्येकं वैशद्यलक्षणम् । लक्षणान्तरमपि इदन्तया प्रतिभासो
वेति । इदन्तया विशेषनिष्ठतया यः प्रतिभासः सम्यगर्थनिर्णयस्य सोऽपि वैशद्यम् ।
वा शब्दः लक्षणान्तरत्वसूचनार्थः ।" Bhāṣya on Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā I. 1. 14.

2 "केचित्तु तार्किकम्मन्याः प्रतीत्यन्तराव्यवधानेन प्रतिभासनमपि ज्ञानस्य
वैशद्यं वदन्ति । अनुमानादिपरोक्षप्रमाणभेदेषु हि धूमादिगोचरप्रतीतिव्यवधानेन
धूमध्वजादिवस्तुनः प्रतीतिरित्यवैशद्यं तेषाम्, प्रत्यक्षे तु नैवं प्रतीत्यन्तरव्यवधानम-
स्तीति वैशद्यं तस्य । न ते जैनदर्शनोपनिषदं स्वप्नेऽपि प्रापुः । एवं प्रकारं
वैशद्यं वदन्तस्ते कथमीहादिज्ञानस्य संदेहाद्यपेक्षिणः प्रत्यक्षतां व्यवस्थापयिष्यन्ति ?"
Syādvādaratnākara.

3 "अनुमानाद्याधिक्येन विशेषप्रकाशनं स्पष्टत्वम् ।"

Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāra. II. 3

4 "अनुमानाद्यतिरेकेण विशेषप्रतिभासनं ।

तद्वैशद्यं मतं बुद्धेरवैशद्यमतः परम् ॥"

Verse quoted in Syādvādaratnākara.

We have already mentioned while discussing the definition of Pramāṇa, the four kinds of Mati Jñāna viz. Avagraha, Īhā, Avāya and Dhāraṇā. The first stage is the bare knowledge of an object. In the second stage there is an attempt to know the particulars of the object whereby similarities with or differences from other objects are known. In the third stage there is a definite finding of these particulars and in the fourth stage there is a lasting impression which arises after the object is known with all its particulars.

Now these four stages are accepted in Sāṅvyavahārika Pratyakṣa which will be discussed in the next aphorism. The criticism of Syādvādaratnākara is that as in the case of Sāṅvyavahārika Pratyakṣa we recognise one knowledge after another (viz. Avagraha, Īhā, Avāya and Dhāraṇā) there are intermediate knowledges and so the definition of clearness that it is bereft of intermediate knowledge cannot be correct. For clearness being the characteristic of Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa we see that it cannot apply to Sāṅvyavahārika Pratyakṣa where four stages of knowledge arise one after another.

This criticism however has been met in the commentaries of Parikṣāmukhaṃ and other works on Jain Logic. In Prameyaratnamālā, it is mentioned that "by intervention of another knowledge" it should be understood that the intermediate knowledge is of a quite different object and not of the same object. For example, in Anumāna we have knowledge of one object, smoke and a quite different object, fire, later on. But in Sāṅvyavahārika Pratyakṣa we have knowledge of the same object in four stages. For example, first we are merely conscious of a man ; then we desire to know his particulars. In the third stage we ascertain the particulars that he belongs to such and such a country etc., and in the fourth stage we get a lasting impression¹. In Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa, the

1 "यद्व्यप्यवायस्यावग्रहेहाप्रतीतिभ्यां व्यवधानं, तथापि न परोक्षत्वं विषय-
विषयिणोर्भेदे सति व्यवधानं तत्र परोक्षत्वम् । तर्हि अनुमानाध्यक्षविषयस्यैकात्मग्राह्य-
स्याग्नेरभिन्नस्योपलम्भादध्यक्षस्य परोक्षतेति तदप्ययुक्तम् । भिन्नविषयत्वाभावात् ।

definition of Māṇikyanandī has been supported. That view has again been criticised in Syādvādaratnākara¹. It will serve no purpose to go into details of this controversy. We have explained the main point fully and we have seen that no fault appears in the definition of clearness as given by Māṇikyanandī. Though in Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokāṅkāra an attempt is made to give a different definition, later writers like Hemachandra have followed Māṇikyanandī.

इन्द्रियानिन्द्रियनिमित्तं देशतः सांव्यवहारिकम् ॥ ५ ॥

5. Indriyānindriyanimittam deśataḥ sāṅvyavahārikam.

5. (The knowledge) which is partially clear and arises from Indriya (the senses) and Anindriya (the mind) is Sāṅvyavahārika Pratyakṣa.

विसदृशसामग्रीजन्यभिन्नविषया प्रतीतिः प्रतीत्यन्तरमुच्यते नान्यदिति न दोषः ।”
Prameyaratnamālā.

1 “नन्वेवमीहादिज्ञानस्यावप्रहाद्व्यपेक्षत्वादव्यवधानेन प्रतिभासनलक्षण-
वैशद्व्याभावात् प्रत्यक्षता न स्यात्तदसारम् । अपरापरेन्द्रियव्यापारादेवावप्रहादीनामुत्पत्तेस्तत्र तदपेक्षत्वासिद्धेः । एकमेव चेदं विज्ञानमवप्रहाद्व्यतिशयवदपरापरचक्षुरादिव्यापारादुत्पन्नं सत् स्वतन्त्रतया स्वविषये प्रवर्तते इति प्रमाणान्तराव्यवधानमत्रापि प्रसिद्धमेव । अनुमानादिप्रतीतिस्तु लिङ्गादिप्रतीत्यैव जनिता सति स्वविषये प्रवर्तते इत्यव्यवधानेन प्रतिभासनाभावान्न प्रत्यक्षता” Prameya-kamala-mārtanda

The above has been criticised in Syādvādaratnākara thus :
“अथ ग्रथुरपरापरेन्द्रियव्यापारादेवेहादीनामुत्पत्तेः सन्देहाद्व्यनपेक्षत्वात् प्रतीत्यन्तराव्यवधानेन प्रत्यक्षतेति, तदपि प्रतीतिपराङ्मुखत्वम् । ईहादयो हि संदेहादिभ्यः समुपजायमानाः प्रतीयन्ते एवेति कथं तदनपेक्षत्वम् ? प्रतीयमानस्यापि कार्यकारणभावस्यात्रापहवे सर्वत्र तदपहवः किं न स्यात् ? अथैकमिदं संवेदनमवप्रहाद्व्यतिशयोपेतमित्यत्रापि प्रतीत्यन्तराव्यवधानमस्तीति, ननु तथापि तदनेकत्वपक्षे प्रतीत्यन्तराव्यवधानमलब्धसमाधानं, स्याद्वादिना ह्यवप्रहादीनामेकत्वमिवानेकत्वमपि वक्तव्यम् ।”

Commentary

Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa is subdivided into two classes Sāṅvyavahārika and Mukhya or Pāramārthika. In this aphorism the definition of Sāṅvyavahārika Pratyakṣa is given¹

In Pramāṇaparikṣā, Vidyānanda Svāmi has divided Pratyakṣa into three classes Indriya-pratyakṣa, Anindriya-pratyakṣa and Atindriya-pratyakṣa.² The first two however can be included under Sāṅvyavahārika Pratyakṣa. So the twofold division of Pratyakṣa will be sufficient. In Pramāṇa-nayatattvālokālāṅkāra, Pratyakṣa has been divided into Sāṅvyavahārika and Pāramārthika and Sāṅvyavahārika again has been subdivided into Indriya-nivandhana and Anindriya-nivandhana³. In Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā Pratyakṣa has been divided into Mukhya and Sāṅvyavahārika⁴ and in Nyāyadīpikā the divisions are Sāṅvyavahārika and Pāramārthika⁵. Mukhya or Pāramārthika are one and the same thing.

1 “तच्च प्रत्यक्षं द्वेधा मुख्यसंव्यवहारभेदाद् इति मनसि कृत्य प्रथमं सांन्यवहारिकप्रत्यक्षस्योत्पादिकां सामग्रीं तदभेदं च प्राह ।” Prameyaratnamālā.

2 “तत् त्रिविधं, इन्द्रियानिन्द्रियातीन्द्रियप्रत्यक्षविकल्पनात् ।”

Pramāṇaparikṣā.

3 “तद्विप्रकारं सांन्यवहारिकं पारमार्थिकं च ।”

“तत्राद्र्यं द्विविधमिन्द्रियनिवन्धनमनिन्द्रियनिवन्धनं च ।”

Pramāṇanayatattvālokālāṅkāra. II. 4. 5

4 “तत् सर्वथावरणविलये चेतनस्य स्वरूपाविर्भावो मुख्यं केवलम् ।”

Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā I. 1. 15

“तत् तारतम्येऽवधिमनःपर्ययौ च ।” Ibid 1. 1. 18

“इन्द्रियमनोनिमित्तावग्रहेहावायधारणात्मा सांन्यवहारिकम् ।”

Ibid, 1. 1. 21

5 “तत् प्रत्यक्षं द्विविधं सांन्यवहारिकं पारमार्थिकं च ।”

Nyāya-dīpikā.

The knowledge which is partially clear is Sāṅvyavahārika Pratyakṣa and the knowledge which is fully clear is Mukhya or Pāramārthika Pratyakṣa¹.

Sāṅvyavahāra is the perfect satisfaction of a desire to cognize². That which arises from Sāṅvyavahāra is called Sāṅvyavahārika³. The knowledge in Sāṅvyavahārika Pratyakṣa being partially clear, it is also called Amukhya Pratyakṣa as opposed to Mukhya Pratyakṣa where the knowledge is fully clear⁴.

Sāṅvyavahārika Pratyakṣa is caused by Indriya and Anindriya. According to Jainism, the Indriyas (senses) are five viz. touch, taste, smell, sight and hearing⁵. Mind is called Anindriya or No-indriya. But by this distinction it should not be supposed that mind is not Indriya. Akalaṅka Deva in Tattvārtharāja-vārttika has laid down "We call a female who is unable to conceive, 'a woman without a belly'. This does not mean that really this female has no belly at all but the meaning is that she is unable to conceive. So when we call mind to be Anindriya it means that it does not produce impressions of objects like organs of sense eye etc. on contact. This does not however mean that mind is not a sense".⁶

1 "यज्ज्ञानं देशतो विशदमीपन्निर्मलं तत् सांन्यवहारिकप्रत्यक्षम् ।"

"यज्ज्ञानं साकल्येन स्पष्टं तत् पारमार्थिकप्रत्यक्षं मुख्यप्रत्यक्षमिति यावत् ।"

Nyāya-dīpikā.

2 "समीचीनः प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिरूपो व्यवहारः संन्यवहारः ।"

Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsā Vṛtti on I. I. 21.

3 "समीचीनः प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिरूपो व्यवहारः संन्यवहारः, तत्र भवं सांन्यवहारिकम् ।" Prameya-ratna-mālā.

4 "इदं च अमुख्यप्रत्यक्षमुपचारसिद्धत्वात् ।" Nyāya-dīpikā.

5 'स्पर्शरसगन्धरूपशब्दग्रहणलक्षणानि स्पर्शनरसनघ्राणचक्षुःश्रोत्राणीन्द्रियाणि द्रव्यभावभेदानि ।' Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā I. 1. 22.

6 "अनिन्द्रियं मनोज्ञुदरावत् ।" Tattvārtharājavārttika on Sūtra I. 1.4. It is thus explained in the Commentary on this :

In Nyāya philosophy of the Hindus, mind has been accepted as Indriya. But a distinction has been made from other senses. It has been mentioned that the true senses touch, taste etc. are fixed in their particular objects. For example, the sense of smell can produce a knowledge of smell but not of taste, sight etc. The mind however can apply itself to every object in all its qualities. In mind there is no special quality like those existing in senses e. g. smell etc.¹ This has been affirmed by Uddyotkara² and in substance this view is the same as that of Hemachandra already quoted in the footnote.

Gautama has taken consideration of the five Jñānendriyas, eye, ear etc., but in Smritis and other philosophies of the Hindus, five Karmendriyas (Vāk, Pāda, Pāṇi, Pāyu and Upastha) have also been mentioned as senses. Thus the total number of senses according to this view is ten. Manu has mentioned that mind is

“मनोऽतंकरणमनिन्द्रियमित्युच्यते । कथं इन्द्रियप्रतिषेधेन मन उच्यते ?.... यथानुदरा कन्या इति नास्या उदरं न विद्यते, किन्तु गर्भभारोद्बहनसमर्थोदराभावादनुदरा । तथानिन्द्रियमिति नास्येन्द्रियत्वाभावः । किन्तु चक्षुरादिवत् प्रतिनियत-देशविषयावस्थानाभावादनिन्द्रियं मन इत्युच्यते ।”

This is affirmed in Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā : “सर्वार्थग्रहणं मनः ।” I. 1. 25. The Bhāṣya on it lays down “सर्वे न तु स्पर्शनादीनां स्पर्शादिवत् प्रतिनियता एवार्था गृह्यन्ते तेनेति सर्वार्थग्रहणं मनोऽनिन्द्रियमिति नो इन्द्रियमिति चोच्यते ।”

1 “भौतिकानीन्द्रियाणि नियतविषयाणि, सगुणानाञ्चैषामिन्द्रियभाव इति । मनस्तु अभौतिकं सर्वविषयञ्च, नास्य सगुणस्येन्द्रियभाव इति । सति चेन्द्रियार्थ-सन्निकर्षे सन्निधिमसन्निधिश्चास्य युगपज्ज्ञानाऽनुत्पत्तिकारणं वक्ष्याम इति । मन-श्चेन्द्रियभावान्न वाच्यं लक्षणान्तरमिति । तन्त्रान्तरसमाचाराच्चैतत् प्रत्येतव्यमिति ।” Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya to Nyāya-sūtra I. 1. 4.

2 “मनः सर्वविषयं स्मृतिकारणसंयोगाधारत्वात् आत्मवत् सुखग्राहक-संयोगाधिकरणत्वात् समस्तेन्द्रियाधिष्ठातृत्वात् ।” Nyāya-vārttika.

the eleventh sense¹ In Sāṅkhyā Sūtra² and Sāṅkhyakārikā³ of Īśvarakriṣṇa we find that mind is both Jñānendriya and Karmendriya.

In Vedānta paribhāṣā however it is laid down that mind is not a sense⁴. To support this view the following is quoted from Kātha Upaniṣad III. 10 : "Objects are beyond the organs of senses, mind is beyond the sense-organs."⁵ In Vedānta Sūtra however (II. 4. 17) we find mind accepted as a sense. Śaṅkarāchārya in his Bhāṣya to the above Sūtra has taken mind as a sense supporting his view by quoting Smṛiti. In Bhāmati, Vāchaspati Miśra quoted different views regarding the acceptance of mind as a sense but his own conclusion is that mind is a sense. In Śrīmad-bhagavadgītā mind has been accepted as a sense⁶.

- 1 "एकादशेन्द्रियाण्याहुर्नानि पूर्वे मनीषिणः ।
तानि सम्यक् प्रवक्ष्यामि यथावदनुपूर्वशः ॥
श्रोत्रं त्वक् चक्षुषी जिह्वा नासिका चैव पञ्चमी ।
पायूपस्थं हस्तपादं वाक् चैव दशमी स्मृता ॥
बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि पञ्चैषां श्रोत्रादीन्यनुपूर्वशः ।
कर्मेन्द्रियाणि पञ्चैषां पाद्यादीनां प्रवक्षते ॥
एकादशं मनो ज्ञेयं स्वगुणेनोभयात्मकम् ।"

Manusamhitā II. 89-92

- 2 "उभयात्मकं मनः ।" Sāṅkhyā Sūtra II. 26.
3 "उभयात्मकमत्र मनः ।" Sāṅkhyā-kārikā 27.
4 "न तावत् अन्तःकरणम् इन्द्रियम् इत्यत्र मानमस्ति ।"

Vedānta-paribhāṣā.

- 5 "इन्द्रियेभ्यः परा ह्यर्थाः अर्थेभ्यश्च परं मनः ।
इत्यादि श्रुत्या मनसोऽनिन्द्रियत्वावगमाच्च ।" Vedānta-paribhāṣā.
6 "वेदानां सामवेदोऽस्मि देवानामस्मि वासवः ।
इन्द्रियाणां मनश्चास्मि भूतानामस्मि चेतना ॥" Gītā X. 22.

Thus the view of the Jain Logic is in accordance with the view which preponderates in the Hindu philosophy regarding mind being a sense. But though Jain Logic accepts mind as a sense it calls it a small or intangible sense (No-indriya or Īśat-indriya) because it is not materially cognisable like the other senses. Its function according to Jain view is discernible only by highly developed souls who have Manahparyaya-jñāna as described in the commentary on Aphorism I. Samuddeśa I of this work.

नार्थालोकौ कारणं परिच्छेद्यत्वात्तमोवत् ॥ ६ ॥

6. Nārthālokau kāraṇaṃ parichchedyatvāttamovat.

6. The object and light is not the instrument (of Pratyakṣa knowledge) as the same are capable of being ascertained as in the case of darkness.

“ममैवांशो जीवलोके जीवभूतः सनातनः ।

मनःषष्ठानीन्द्रियाणि प्रकृतिस्थानि कर्षति ॥” Ibid XIV. 7.

In Vedānta-paribhāṣā the latter verse has been tried to be explained away thus : “If you object that the quotation from the Bhagavadgita is conclusive ‘the organs of sense with the mind to make up six’ (‘मनःषष्ठानीन्द्रियाणि’), we reply, no ; for no contradiction results in filling up the number six with mind, though mind be not reckoned as an organ of sense. There is no positive injunction restricting the completion of the number relating to the organs of sense to such an organ only. Instance the text : ‘the five including the sacrificer eat the Īdā oblation’ ; here we notice that the completion of the number five, relating to the Ritvik priests, is effected by means of the sacrificer (himself the fifth) who is not a Ritvik. And in the quotation—‘He taught the five, the Vedas and Mahābhārata, we observe that the completion of the number five relating to the Vedas, is effected by the Mahābhārata which is not a Veda.” (Trans. by A. Venis)

But this argument is use-less as in the first verse (X. 22), it is unmistakably mentioned “I am Manas (the Mind) among the senses,” where the best among the senses is meant.

Commentary

In the preceding aphorism, it has been mentioned that mind and the senses cause Pratyakṣa knowledge. One may urge that light or a particular object is also necessary to give rise to Pratyakṣa knowledge. So these should also be mentioned as cause of Pratyakṣa knowledge. To refute this, it is mentioned in the present aphorism that an object or light does not cause Pratyakṣa knowledge. The example of darkness is cited to establish this for it is well-known that we have a knowledge of darkness though it obstructs perception and is not the cause¹

This is further elucidated in the following two aphorisms.

तदन्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधानाभावाच्च केशोंडुकज्ञानवन्नक्तंचरज्ञानवच्च ॥ ७

7. Tadanvayavyatirekānuvidhānābhāvāchcha keśōṇduka-jñānavannaktañcharajñānavachcha.

7. That (is established) from universal affirmative and universal negative propositions like the knowledge of mosquito on a hair and like the knowledge of animals which see during the night.

Commentary

Some may urge, that it may be established by inference that an object or light is the cause of Pratyakṣa knowledge². To refute this it is mentioned that even by inference this cannot be established. For a deduction by inference follows from a knowledge of a concomitance expressed in an universal affirmative proposition (Anvayavyāptijñāna) e. g. where there is smoke, there is fire or from a knowledge of a concomitance expressed in a universal negative proposition e. g. where is no smoke, there is no fire.

1. "प्रसिद्धं हि तमसो विज्ञानप्रतिबन्धकत्वेनातत्कारणस्यापि परिच्छेद्यत्वम् ।" Prameyakamala-mārtāṇḍa.

2. "अथानुमानात् तत्कार्यतावसायः । तथा हि, 'अर्थालोककार्यं विज्ञानं तदन्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधानात् । यद् यस्यान्वयव्यतिरेकावनुविधत्ते, तत् तस्य कार्यम् ।

To establish an inference, it will be necessary to hold where there is light, there is knowledge but we see that even where there is no light there can be knowledge as in the case of cats or owls in a dark night when there is no light. Further lice cannot see even when there is light. So, it cannot be propounded that where there is an object there is knowledge, for some persons in a particular state may have a knowledge of a mosquito on a hair though really there is no such mosquito¹. A person suffering from jaundice may perceive yellowness while really there is no yellowness. So the relationship of cause and effect which is recognised by concomitance expressed in an universal affirmative or negative proposition cannot be found in light or object with knowledge.

Hemachandra in his *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* also affirms this by saying "An object or light is not the cause of knowledge as knowledge can arise without the universal negative proposition (viz. where there is no object or light, there is no knowledge)."² Hemachandra cites examples of knowledge of water in a mirage though there is really no water or knowledge of objects in darkness by certain animals and the knowledge of Yogis about things in the past and the future and urges that this proves that object or light is not the cause of knowledge³.

यथा अग्नेर्धूमः । अन्वयव्यतिरेकावनुविधत्ते चार्थालोकयोर्ज्ञानम्, इति । न चात्रासिद्धो हेतुस्तत्सद्भावे सत्येवास्य भावादभावे चाभावाद् ।" *Prameyakamalamārtanda*.

1. "अन्वयव्यतिरेकगम्यो हि कार्यकारणभावः । तत्रालोकस्तावन्न ज्ञानकारणं तदभावेऽपि घूकादीनां तदनुत्पत्तेः । तद्वदर्थोऽपि न ज्ञानकारणं तदभावेऽपि केशमशकादिज्ञानोत्पत्तेः । तथा च कुतोऽर्थजत्वं ज्ञानस्य ? तदुक्तं परीक्षामुखे 'नार्थालोकौ कारणं' इति । प्रामाण्यस्य चार्थव्यभिचार एव निवन्धनं, न त्वर्थजन्यत्वं, स्वसंवेदनस्य विषयाजन्यत्वेऽपि प्रामाण्याभ्युपगमात् । नहि किञ्चित् स्वस्मादेव जायते ।" *Nyāya-dīpikā*.

2. "नार्थालोकौ ज्ञानस्य निमित्तमव्यतिरेकात् ।" *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* I. 1. 26

3. "मरुमरीचिकादौ जलाभावेऽपि जलज्ञानस्य वृषदंशादीनां चालोका-

अतज्जन्यमपि तत्प्रकाशकं प्रदीपवत् ॥ ८ ॥

8. Atajjanyamapi tat-prakāśakam pradipavat.

8. Though it (i. e. knowledge) is not caused by it (i. e. the object), it (i. e. knowledge) illumines it (i. e. the object) like a lamp.

Commentary

The knowledge of an object though not caused by the object illumines the object. By the expression 'without being caused by it', it is also implied "though of not the same shape". An object is illuminated by a lamp which is neither caused by an object, nor is of the same shape as the object¹.

स्वावरणक्षयोपशमलक्षणयोग्यतया हि प्रतिनियतमर्थं व्यवस्थापयति ॥ ९ ॥

9. Svāvaranākṣayopāśamalakṣaṇayogyatayā hi pratiniyata-marthaṁ vyavasthāpayati.

9. Surely (Pratyakṣa knowledge) always illumines objects according to its power characterised by the mitigation of its hindrances.

Commentary

According to Jain philosophy, Upayoga is the sole characteristic of Jīva. Upayoga is a sort of inclination which arises from consciousness. This inclination is either towards Darśana or towards Jñāna. Darśana is of four kinds Chakṣu, Achakṣu, Avadhi

भावेऽपि सान्द्रतमतमःपटलविलिप्तदेशगतवस्तुप्रतिपत्तेश्च दर्शनात् द्योगिना चातीतानागतार्थग्रहणे किमर्थस्य निमित्तत्वं, निमित्तत्वे चार्थक्रियाकारित्वेन सत्त्वादतीतानागतत्वक्षतिः ।” Bhāṣya to Aphorism I. I. 26 in Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā.

1. “अर्थाज्जन्यमप्यर्थप्रकाशकमित्यर्थः । अतज्जन्यत्वमुपलक्षणम् । तेनातदाकारमपीत्यर्थः । उभयत्रापि प्रदीपो दृष्टान्तः । यथा प्रदीपस्यातज्जन्यस्याऽतदाकारधारिणोऽपि तत्प्रकाशकत्वं, तथा ज्ञानस्यापि ।” Prameyaratnamālā.

and Kevala¹ and Jñāna as already expounded in commentaries of previous aphorisms in this work is of eight kinds viz. Mati, Śruta, Avadhi, Manaḥparyaya and Kevala and false knowledges of Mati, Śruta and Avadhi.

In Darśana, details are not perceived but in Jñāna details are perceived. “Before we know things in a detailed way, there is the stage where we simply see, hear, or otherwise become conscious of it in a general way without going into its ins and outs. This is the first state of knowledge : it may be called indefinite cognition (Darśana). If this stage is not experienced, there can be no knowledge of the thing”². In Jñāna, there is cognition of details.

Jain philosophy lays down that there are certain classes of Karma which obscure the four kinds of Darśana as well as the eight kinds of Jñāna. “Darśana is of four kinds : Chakṣu, Achakṣu, Avadhi and Kevala ; so there are also four kinds of Karma which obscure each of these varieties. When there is a cessation or mitigation (Kṣayopasāma) of one or more of these varieties of Karma, the corresponding class or classes of Darśana is or are evolved. Thus by the removal of these Karmas, which obscure the Darśana which is received through the eye, a Jīva can see through the eyes. This is Chakṣu Darśana (Darśana through the eye). Again, by the removal of that Karma which obscures the Darśana through any sense other than the eye, or mind, a Jīva can cognize through the four organs of sense—ear, nose, tongue or skin and through the mind.

1. “उवओगो खलु दुविहो णाणेण य दंसणेण संजुत्तो ।

जीवस्स सव्वकालं अणण्णभूदं वियाणीहि ॥

दंसणमवि चक्खुजुदं अचक्खुजुदमवि य ओहिणा सहियं ।

अणिघणमणंतविसयं केवलियं च्चावि पणत्तं ॥”

Pañchāstikāyasamayāsāra 40, 42.

“उवओगो दुवियप्पो दंसण णाणं च दंसणं चदुधा ।

चक्खू अचक्खू ओही दंसणमघ केवलं णेयं ॥” Dravya-saṃgraha 4.

2. Jainism by Herbert Warren, Page 29.

This is called Achakṣu Darśana (Darśana not through the eye). Similarly, when Karmas obscuring Avadhi Darśana are removed, a Jīva can have Avadhi Darśana (conation before particular kind of psychic knowledge, limited by space and time and obtained directly by the soul e.g. clairvoyance). Lastly by the removal of the Karmas which obscure Kevala Darśana, a Jīva can have Kevala (or perfect) Darśana (in which everything in the three worlds existent in the present, past and future is at once cognized).

Besides the four varieties of Karmas obscuring Darśana already mentioned, there are also five others mentioned by Umāsvāmi e. g. Nidrā (sleep), Nidrānidrā (deep sleep), Prachalā (Trance), Prachalāprachalā (drowsiness) and Styānagriddhi (Somnambulistic state)¹. These together with the Karmas obscuring Chakṣu, Achakṣu, Avadhi and Kevala Darśana already mentioned, make up nine Darśanāvaraṇīya Karmas².

Just as there are Darśanāvaraṇīya Karmas which obscure Darśana, so there are Jñānāvaraṇīya Karmas which obscure Jñāna. Umāsvāmi has mentioned that there are five sorts of Jñānāvaraṇīya Karmas which obscure Mati, Śruta, Avadhi, Manahpariyaya and Kevala knowledge³.

One may argue that in a knowledge of a pitcher, the pitcher and nothing else is the object of knowledge. Here the substance is the cause of its being the object of knowledge. But by denying as in the previous aphorism that the object is not the cause of knowledge, you must satisfy us by laying down the cause which particularises that such and such a thing would produce such and such a knowledge.

1. 'चक्षुरचक्षुरवधिकेवलानां निद्रानिद्रानिद्राप्रचलाप्रचलाप्रचलास्त्यानगृध्यश्च ।'
Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra VIII. 7.

2. Dravyasaṃgraha Edited by S. C. Ghoshal Page 10.

3. "मतिश्रुतावधिमनःपर्ययकेवलानाम् ।" Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra VIII. 6.

Raising this objection in Nyāyadīpikā, Dharmabhūṣaṇa meets it by saying that Yogyatā is the cause regarding the object of knowledge and this Yogyatā is nothing but the mitigation or cessation of Karma obstructing knowledge. Dharmabhūṣaṇa quotes the present aphorism of Parikṣāmukhaṃ to support his view¹.

That is to say when a Karma obstructing a particular kind of Jñāna is mitigated or entirely removed, knowledge arises and illumines objects like a lamp. This knowledge is not therefore caused by the object and is not of the same shape as the object.

In Vedānta-paribhāṣā it has been laid down that just as water goes out from a pond and entering fields of different shape, assumes different shape, so mind getting out through the sense-organs eye etc. goes to objects like pitchers and is changed like those objects². This view is not accepted by Jain logicians as laid down in this aphorism. According to Jain view, the object is neither the cause nor the transformer of the mind to its shape.

कारणस्य च परिच्छेद्यत्वे करणादिना व्यभिचारः ॥ १० ॥

10. Kāraṇasya cha parichchedyatve karaṇādinā vyabhichārah.

10. There will be non-application in the case of senses etc. if you accept the cause as the thing perceived.

Commentary

This aphorism is laid down to refute the view that a cause of a knowledge can be the object of knowledge. We know that the

1. “यदुक्तं घटज्ञानस्य घट एव विषयो, न पर इति । अर्थजत्वं हि विषयं प्रति नियमकारणं, तज्जन्यत्वात् । यद्विषयमेव चैतदिति । तत्तु भवता नाभ्युपगम्यते इति चेत्, यौग्यतैव विषयं प्रति नियमकारणमिति ब्रूमः । का नाम योग्यतेति, उच्यते—स्वावरणक्षयोपशमः । तदुक्तं ‘स्वावरणक्षयोपशमलक्षणयोग्यतया हि प्रतिनियतमर्थं व्यवस्थापयति’ इति ।” Nyāyadīpikā.

2. “तत्र यथा तद्गोदकं छिद्रान्निर्गत्य कुल्यात्मना केदारान् प्रविश्य तद्वदेव चतुष्कोणाद्याकारं भवति तथा तैजसमन्तःकरणमपि चक्षुरादिद्वारा निर्गत्य घटादिविषय-देशं गत्वा घटादिविषयाकारेण परिणमते ॥” Vedānta-paribhāṣā Chapter I.

senses or mind are instrumental in producing knowledge. In this sense, these can be said to be the cause of knowledge. But these cannot be the objects of knowledge for when we get knowledge of objects through these, we have not the knowledge of the senses or mind. So we cannot accept that a cause of knowledge is the object of knowledge.

सामग्रीविशेषविश्लेषिताखिलावरणमतीन्द्रियमशेषतो मुख्यम् ॥११॥

11. Sāmagrīviśeṣaviślēṣitākhlāvaranamatindriyamaśeṣato mukhyaṃ.

11. Mukhya or supreme (Pratyakṣa) is clear in every respect, has no dependance on any sense and arises after destruction of all obstructions by perfection of Sāmagrī (Dravya, Kṣetra, Kāla and Bhāva).

Commentary

That knowledge which is absolutely clear is called Pāramārthika or Mukhya Pratyakṣa. This is of two kinds, Sakala and Vikala. Vikala Pratyakṣa is subdivided into Avadhī and Manahparyaya (which we have previously described)¹.

Vikala Jñāna is knowledge of certain things while Sakala Jñāna is knowledge of all things or omniscience². Sakala Jñāna is also known as Kevala Jñāna. Ordinary individuals do not have this knowledge. According to Jain view it is only the Arhats who can have this knowledge³. When Mohaniya or alluring Karmas are destroyed and the Karmas obstructing Jñāna and Darśana are

1. “सर्वतो विशदं पारमार्थिकं प्रत्यक्षं । यज्ज्ञानं साकल्येन स्पष्टं तत् पारमार्थिकप्रत्यक्षं मुख्यप्रत्यक्षमिति यावत् । तद्विद्विधं सकलं विकलं च ।...तदपि द्विविधं अवधिज्ञानं मनःपर्ययज्ञानं चेति ।” Nyāyadīpikā.

2. “तत्र कतिपयविषयं विकलं...सर्वद्रव्यपर्यायविषयं सकलं ॥”

Nyāyadīpikā.

3. “तद्वान्नर्हन्निर्दोषत्वात् ।”

Pramāṇanayatattvālokaṅkāra. II. 14.

removed and the Antarāyas (obstructive Karmas) are also destroyed, Kevala knowledge arises¹.

Siddhasena defines Mukhya Pratyakṣa as follows : “That which is characterised as free from all obstructions and shines as the absolute is called supreme or transcendental perception ; it uninterruptedly illumines the nature of all objects.”²

In Mukhya Pratyakṣa, knowledge is acquired by the soul direct without the intervention of senses or signs³.

In Pramāṇanayatattvālokāṅkāra, the two varieties of Pārmārthika Pratyakṣa viz. Vikala and Sakala have been mentioned. The two subdivisions (Avadhi and Manahparyaya Jñāna) of Vikala have also been laid down⁴. Hemachandra defines Kevala

1. “मोहक्षयाज्ज्ञानदर्शनावरणान्तरायक्षयाच्च केवलम् ।”

Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra X. 1.

During different stages of development, these Karmas disappear. At the end of the tenth Guṇasthāna, Mohaniya Karmas are destroyed and at the end of the twelfth Guṇasthāna, Antarāya Karmas disappear.

2. Nyāyāvatāra. Tr. by S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa Pages 25-26.
The original verse is as follows :—

“सकलावरणमुक्तात्मकेवलं यत् प्रकाशते ।

प्रत्यक्षं सकलार्थात्मसत्तत्प्रतिभासनम् ॥” Nyāyāvatāra 27.

3. “पारमार्थिकं पुनरुत्पत्तावात्ममात्रापेक्षम् ।”

Pramāṇanayatattvālokāṅkāra II. 18.

4. “तद्विकलं सकलं च ।”

“तत्र विकलमवधिमनःपर्ययज्ञानतया द्वेधा ।” Ibid. II. 19
and II. 20.

The difference between Avadhi and Manahparyaya is shown in the next two aphorisms :

Pratyakṣa as the appearance of the true nature of itself when all the obstructions are thoroughly removed¹. Hemachandra also mentions that besides Kevala, Avadhī and Manahpariyaya are also Mukhya Pratyakṣa and Avadhī is of two kinds Bhava-pratyaya and Guṇa-pratyaya. Bhava-pratyaya concerns celestials or inmates of hell and Guṇapratyaya concerns human and sub-human beings².

When we establish Kevala Jñāna, we must accept the existence of omniscient beings. So, the celebrated Jain writer Samantabhadra in his work Āpta-mīmāṃsā has laid down :

“सूक्ष्मान्तरितदूरार्थाः प्रत्यक्षाः कस्यचिद् यथा ।

अनुमेयत्वतोऽन्यादिरिति सर्वज्ञ-संस्थितिः ॥”

i.e. The existence of an omniscient being is established from the fact that to some beings invisible things like atoms, things or persons remote in time or things far beyond (like the Meru hill) become known as objects of direct perception just like the knowledge of the existence of fire in a hill (which ordinary people know through inference by seeing the smoke) is also the subject of perception.

This knowledge can not be derived through the senses for in that case it could not have cognated all objects, for the senses can only stimulate knowledge of objects which can be perceived by them. So when there is knowledge of things beyond the perception of

“अवधिज्ञानावरणविलयविशेषसमुद्भवं भवगुणप्रत्ययं रूपिद्रव्यगोचरमवधिज्ञानम् ।” Ibid II. 21.

“संयमविशुद्धिनिबन्धनाद् विशिष्टावरणविभेदाज्जातं मनोद्रव्यपर्यायालंबनं मनःपर्ययज्ञानम् ।” Ibid II.22.

1. “तत् सर्वथावरणविलये चेतनस्य स्वरूपाविर्भावो मुख्यं केवलम् ।”

Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā. I. 1. 15

2. “तत्तारतम्येऽवधिमनःपर्ययौ च ।” Ibid I. 1. 18.

“स द्वेधा भवप्रत्ययगुणप्रत्ययश्च ।” Ibid I. 1. 19.

senses it must be held that this arises without the intervention of senses and so it is Atindriya and acquired by the soul direct.

सावरणत्वे करणजन्य च प्रतिबन्धसम्भवात् ॥ १२ ॥

12. Sāvaraṇatve karaṇajanya cha pratibandhasambhavāt.

12. Obstruction may arise in the case of a knowledge which is caused by senses and which has hindrances.

Commentary

It has been mentioned in the previous aphorism that in Mukhya Pratyakṣa, we have a knowledge absolutely clear in all respects. A question may now be asked "What is the cause which may give rise to such a clearness?" The answer is "Removal of all obstruction is the cause of clearness." Where there is possibility of obstruction there may be hindrance of knowledge and similarly where there is dependance on the senses knowledge might not arise of things which are beyond the perceptive power of the senses. So in this aphorism the definition of the previous aphorism is supported by saying that we have defined Mukhya Pratyakṣa as not arising through senses and as arising after destruction of hindrances because there is possibility of obstruction of perfect knowledge when hindrances exist or senses are depended on for acquiring knowledge.

The second chapter ends here. In this chapter we have seen that Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa is of two kinds Sāṅvyavahārika and Mukhya. Māṇikyanandi has not given the subdivisions of these two kinds of Pratyakṣa but we have shown from other works on Jain logic that Sāṅvyavahārika Pratyakṣa is of four kinds Avagraha, Īhā, Avāya and Dhāraṇā and Mukhya or Pāramārthika or Atindriya Pratyakṣa is of two kinds Vikala and Sakala or Kevala. Vikala Pratyakṣa is of two kinds Avadhi and Manaḥparyaya. Avadhi again may be of Bhava-pratyaya or Guṇapratyaya and Manaḥparyaya is of two kinds Riju (the knowledge of simple impressions in the mind of another) and Vipula (the knowledge of all kinds of thoughts and impressions whether simple or complex).

End of Chapter II.

CHART I.

[CHAPTER II]





CHART II.

[CHAPTER III.]



तृतीयः समुद्देशः ।

CHAPTER III.

परोक्षमितरत् ॥ १ ॥

1. Parokṣamitarat.

1. The other variety of Pramāṇa is Parokṣa.

Commentary

In Chapter I Pramāṇa has been defined. In Chapter II, aphorism I it has been mentioned that Pramāṇa is of two kinds (Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa). Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa with its subdivisions has been described in detail in Chapter II. In the third chapter, the author proceeds to describe Parokṣa Pramāṇa with its varieties.

Parokṣa Pramāṇa is knowledge which is not clear.¹ What is meant by clearness has been explained in Aphorism II. 4 of Parikṣā-mukhaṃ. The knowledge in which the illumination is not clear according to this exposition is Parokṣa².

In Śaddarśana-samuchchaya, the derivation of Parokṣa has thus been given : “अक्षाणां परं परोक्षं, अक्षेभ्यः परतो वर्तते इति वा, परेणेन्द्रियादिना वोक्ष्यते परोक्षम्” ।

In Nyāyāvatāra, Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa have thus been defined :

1. “अस्पष्टं परोक्षम् ।” Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokāṅkāra III. I.

“स्वपरव्यवसायज्ञानं यदस्पष्टमुक्तलक्षणात् स्पष्टाद्विपरीतमविशदं तत् परोक्ष-मित्यवगन्तव्यम् ।” Syādvādaratnākara, Chapter III. I.

“अविशदः परोक्षम् ।” Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā, I. 2. I.

“अविशदः सम्यगर्थनिर्णयः परोक्षप्रमाणम् ।” Bhāṣya to Ibid.

“अविशदप्रतिभासं परोक्षम् ।” Nyāya-dīpikā.

2. “यस्य ज्ञानस्य प्रतिभासो विशदो न भवति तत् परोक्षप्रमाणम् ।”

Nyāya-dīpikā.

“Such knowledge that takes cognizance of objects, not beyond the range of the senses, is Pratyakṣa (direct knowledge or perception) ; the other is known as Parokṣa (indirect knowledge) in reference to the manner of taking the cognizance” (Trans. by Dr. S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa)¹.

In a note to this Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa writes “The words Pratyakṣa (direct knowledge) and Parokṣa (indirect knowledge) have been used here in their ordinary acceptations, namely, the first for sense-perceptions, and the second for inference and verbal testimony. In the ancient Jain Scriptures, however, Pratyakṣa (direct knowledge) signified perfect knowledge acquired by the soul direct through meditation and not through the channels of the senses, while Parokṣa (indirect knowledge) signified knowledge derived through the medium of the senses or signs comprising perception, inference and the verbal testimony.” Nyāyāvatāra p. 9.

In defining clearness, Māṇikyanandī has mentioned in Parikṣā-mukhaṃ II. 4 that in case of clear knowledge there is no existence of any intermediate knowledge. In Parokṣa there is always an intermediate knowledge. For example, Parokṣa Pramāṇa as will be mentioned in the next aphorism is of five kinds : Smṛiti, Pratyabhijñāna, Tarka, Anumāna and Āgama. Of these Smṛiti (remembrance) is dependant on a previous experience. Pratyabhijñāna (recognition) depends on Smṛiti (remembrance) and cognition, Tarka depends on cognition, Smṛiti and Pratyabhijñāna ; Anumāna depends on recognition of Liṅga (middle term) and Āgama depends on hearing of words. In each variety of Parokṣa

1. “अपरोक्षतयार्थस्य ग्राहकं ज्ञानमीदृशम् ।
प्रत्यक्षमितरत् ज्ञेयं परोक्षं ग्रहणेक्षया ॥”

Nyāyāvatāra IV.

This is identical with Verse 86 in Śaḍdarśana-samuchchaya of Haribhadra Sūri.

Pramāṇa, therefore, there is a dependance on another cognition while as shown before there is no such dependance in Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa¹.

प्रत्यक्षादिनिमित्तं स्मृतिप्रत्यभिज्ञानतर्कानुमानागमभेदम् ॥ २ ॥

2. Pratyakṣādinimittam smritipratyabhiññānatarkānumānāgamabhedam.

2. (Parokṣa) consists of varieties Smṛiti, Pratyabhiññāna, Tarka, Anumāna and Āgama and is caused by Pratyakṣa etc.

Commentary

In this aphorism the five kinds of Parokṣa Pramāṇa are enumerated. It is mentioned that all these are caused by Pratyakṣa etc. In Prameya-ratnamālā it is mentioned that by the word "etc."² Parokṣa is to be understood as included as a cause. That is to say that some variety of Parokṣa Pramāṇa may be caused by Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa and some may be caused by Pratyakṣa as well as Parokṣa Pramāṇa or only by Parokṣa Pramāṇa. We have mentioned in the commentary on the previous aphorism how each of these varieties of Parokṣa Pramāṇa is dependant on Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa Pramāṇa.

Hemachandra mentions these varieties of Parokṣa mentioning "Ūha" in place of "Tarka" which is merely a synonym³. In

1. "पंचविधस्याप्यस्य परोक्षस्य प्रत्ययांतरसापेक्षत्वेनैवोत्पत्तिः । तद् यथा, स्मरणस्य प्राक्तनानुभवापेक्षा, प्रत्यभिज्ञानस्य स्मरणानुभवापेक्षा, तर्कस्यानुभवस्मरण-प्रत्यभिज्ञानापेक्षा, अनुमानस्य च लिंगदर्शनाद्यपेक्षा, आगमस्य शब्दश्रवणसंकेतप्रहणाद्य-पेक्षा । प्रत्यक्षं तु न तथा, स्वातंत्र्येणैवोत्पत्तेः ।" Nyāya-dīpikā.

2. "प्रत्यक्षादिनिमित्तमित्यत्रादिशब्देन परोक्षमपि गृह्यते ।" Prameya-ratna-mālā.

3. "स्मृतिप्रत्यभिज्ञानोद्धानुमानागमास्तद्विधयः ।"



Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāra, the varieties are the same as mentioned in Parikṣāmukhaṃ¹.

Maṇibhadra mentioning these five varieties of Pramāṇa adds that Mati-jñāna and Śruta-jñāna also are Parokṣa Pramāṇa².

संस्कारोद्बोधनिबन्धना तदित्याकारा स्मृतिः ॥ ३ ॥

3. Saṃskārodbodhanivandhanā tadityākārā smṛtiḥ.

3. Remembrance is of the form "it is that" produced by the raising up of previous experience.

Commentary

We have mentioned before that when an object with all its particulars is definitely ascertained, we get a lasting impression of the object which is called Dhāraṇā. This impression is the Saṃskāra which enables us to remember the object afterwards. Remembrance consists of the knowledge "this is that" when this impression is aroused by any cognition.

In Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālaṅkāra it is mentioned "Remembrance arises from the awakening of the impression regarding an object previously cognised to the effect that this is that"³. Hemachandra calls this impression (Saṃskāra) Vāsanā and defining remembrance as caused by the awakening of Vāsanā to the form

1. "स्मरणप्रत्यभिज्ञानतर्कानुमानागमभेदस्तत् पञ्चप्रकारम् ।"

Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāra, III. 2.

2. "परोक्षं स्मरणप्रत्यभिज्ञानतर्कानुमानागमभेदम् । अमुयैव भङ्ग्या मतिश्रुतज्ञाने अपि परोक्षमेव ।" Commentary on Śaddarśana-samuchchaya.

Dharmabhūṣaṇa also mentions the same five varieties of Parokṣa thus : "तत् पञ्चविधं—स्मृतिः प्रत्यभिज्ञानं तर्कोऽनुमानागमश्चेति ।" Nyāyadīpikā.

3. "तत्र संस्कारप्रबोधसंभूतमनुभूतार्थविषयं तदित्याकारं वेदनं स्मरणम् ।"

Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāra III. 3.

that 'this is that'¹ lays down that though the impression exists always, it does not become the cause of remembrance unless it is awakened from its dormant state by the mitigation or disappearance of the obstructions and cognition of the previously experienced objects².

In remembrance, therefore, there must be a previous cognition. For example, when we see a man named Devadatta and subsequently again see him, the impression of him derived at the first cognition is aroused on the second occasion and we have a knowledge "This is that Devadatta". Remembrance cannot arise when there is no previous cognition³.

The root of remembrance is Dhāraṇā⁴. Avagraha, Īhā and Avāya cannot cause remembrance as there is no Dhāraṇā in these stages of cognition. We have already stated that in the first stage (Avagraha) we have simply a knowledge of an object e. g. a man ; in the second stage (Īhā) we desire to know particulars about the man and in the third stage (Avāya) we find the particulars. It is not until we go to the fourth stage (Dhāraṇā) that we acquire a lasting impression. This Dhāraṇā so modifies the soul that it produces knowledge in that object even after a lapse of time⁵.

1. "वासनोद्बोधहेतुका तदित्याकारा स्मृतिः ।"

Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā I. 2. 3.

2. "चिरकालस्थायिन्यपि वासनाऽनुद्बुद्धा न स्मृतिहेतुः, आवरणक्षयोपशम-सदृशदर्शनादिसामग्रीलब्धप्रबोधा तु स्मृतिं जनयति ।" Bhāṣya to Ibid.

3. "तत्र का नाम स्मृतिः ? तदित्याकारा प्रागनुभूतवस्तुविषया स्मृतिः । यथा स देवदत्त इति । अत्र हि प्रागनुभूत एव देवदत्तस्तत्तया प्रतीयते, तस्मादेया प्रतीतिस्तत्तोद्बोधिन्यनुभूतविषया च, अननुभूतविषये तदनुत्पत्तेः ।" Nyāya-dīpikā.

4. "स्मृति-हेतुधारणा ।" Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā I. I. 29.

"तन्मूलं चानुभवो धारणारूप एव ।" Nyāyadīpikā.

5. "अवग्रहाद्यनुभूतेऽपि धारणाया अभावे स्मृतिजननायोगात् । धारणा हि तथात्मानं संस्करोति यथासावात्मा कालान्तरेऽपि तस्मिन् विषये ज्ञानमुत्पादयति ।" Nyāya-dīpikā.

One may object that Smṛiti can never be Pramāṇa as it cognises an object already once cognised. The reply to this is that this objection is not maintainable. For as the different stages of Avagraha, Īhā, Avāya and Dhāraṇā are Pramāṇas though an object is perceived through these stages owing to peculiarities of each stage as distinct from those in other stages, so remembrance having a peculiarity viz. the knowledge "this is that" is a separate Pramāṇa being not identical with the simple knowledge of an object on the first occasion¹. Further, remembrance is opposed to forgetfulness, doubt etc. and so is recognised as a separate Pramāṇa².

Again, when one sees smoke and infers a fire, he goes to the spot to get fire if he wants it. Here the knowledge of fire is at first Parokṣa Pramāṇa being caused by inference and then when the person goes to the spot and sees the fire with his eyes, there is Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa. If we say that there cannot be any Pramāṇa when there is a first cognition, this Pratyakṣa knowledge of fire which follows an inference of fire does not also become Pramāṇa³.

स देवदत्तो यथा ॥ ४ ॥

4. Sa devadatto yathā.

4. As for example, "This is Devadatta".

Commentary

This is an example of remembrance defined in the previous aphorism. When one sees a man named Devadatta previously seen

1. "नन्वेवं धारणागृहीत एव स्मरणस्योत्पत्तौ गृहीतग्राहित्वादप्रामाण्यं प्रसज्यत इति चेन्न, विषयविशेषसद्भावादीहादिवत् । यथा हि अवग्रहादिगृहीत-विषयानामीहादीनां विषयविशेषसद्भावात् स्वविषयसमारोपन्यवच्छेदकत्वेन प्रामाण्यं तथा स्मरणस्यापि धारणागृहीतविषयप्रवृत्तावपि प्रामाण्यमेव । धारणाया हीदन्ता-वच्छिन्नो विषयः, स्मरणस्य तु तत्तावच्छिन्नः ।" Nyāya-dīpikā.

2. "विस्मरणसंशयविपर्ययसलक्षणः समारोपोऽस्ति तन्निराकरणाच्चास्याः स्मृतेः प्रामाण्यम् ।" Prameyakamala-mārtanda.

3. "यदि चानुभूते प्रवृत्तमित्येतावता स्मरणप्रमाणं स्यात्, तर्हि अनुमिते अग्नौ पश्चात् प्रवृत्तं प्रत्यक्षमपि अप्रमाणं स्यात् ।" Nyāya-dīpikā.

and remembers that this is Devadatta we have Smṛiti. In Pramāṇanayatattvālokāṅkāra, this example is given "As for example, this is that image of the Tirthaṅkara"¹.

दर्शनस्मरणकारणकं संकलनं प्रत्यभिज्ञानम्, तदेवेदं तत्सदृशं
तद्विलक्षणं तत्प्रतियोगित्यादि ॥ ५ ॥

5. Darśanasmaranākāraṇakam saṅkalanam pratyabhijñānam tadevedam tatsadriśam tadvilakṣaṇam tatpratīyogītyādi.

यथा स एवायं देवदत्तः ॥ ६ ॥

6. Yathā sa evāyam devadattah.

गोसदृशो गवयः ॥ ७ ॥

7. Go-sadriśo gavayah.

गोविलक्षणो महिषः ॥ ८ ॥

8. Go-vilakṣaṇo mahiṣah.

इदमस्माद् दूरम् ॥ ९ ॥

9. Idamasmād dūram.

वृक्षोऽयमित्यादि ॥ १० ॥

10. Vrikṣoyamityādi.

5. Pratyabhijñāna is the deduction following from Darśana and Smṛiti e. g. this is verily that, this is like that, this is different from that, this is opposite to that etc.

6. As for example, this is that Devadatta.

7. A Gavaya is like a cow.

8. A buffalo is different from a cow.

9. This is far from this.

10. This is a tree etc.

1. "तत्तीर्थकरविम्बमिति यथा ।"

Commentary

In Pratyabhijñāna, we recognise an object by noticing similarities and differences. The differences between Smṛiti and Pratyabhijñāna may be illustrated thus. We see a certain man. We then remember that we have seen him previously. This is Smṛiti or Smaraṇa. Then if we deduce that this is that very man named Devadatta, we have Pratyabhijñāna. Again, we may go to a forest and see a strange creature like a Gavaya. Then we remember that we have read or heard about such a creature and deduce from its similarities with a cow and the description read or heard before, that this is a Gavaya. We notice the characteristics of a buffalo and distinguish it from a cow. We judge the distance of an object and say that this is far or near. We decide that this is a tree or other object. All these and others are examples of Pratyabhijñāna.

In Hindu philosophies, a deduction from similarities has been recognised as a separate Pramāṇa named Upamāna¹. The Jain

1. “उपमितिकरणमुपमानम् । तच्च सादृश्यज्ञानात्मकम् । उपमितित्व-
जातिमत्युपमितिः । कथमियम् उत्पद्यत इति चेदुच्यते । गवयमजानन् कश्चिन्नागरिकः
कंचिद्वनेचरं कीदृशो गवयपदवाच्य इति पृच्छति । ततस्तेनोक्तो गोसदृशो गवयपदवाच्य
इत्युत्तरितः स कदाचिद् वनं गतो गोसदृशं पिंडं पश्यन् प्रागुक्तातिदेशवाक्यार्थं स्मृत्वासौ
गवयपदवाच्य इति प्रतिपद्यते सोपमितिः ।” Tarka-kaumudī

“तत्र सादृश्यप्रमाकरणमुपमानम् । तथाहि नगरेषु दृष्टगोपिण्डस्य पुरुषस्य वनं
गतस्य गवयेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षे सति भवति प्रतीतिः अयं पिंडो गोसदृश इति । तदनन्तरञ्च
भवति निश्चयः अनेन सदृशी मदीया गौरिति ।” Vedānta-paribhāṣā.
Chapter IV.

“Comparison or the recognition of likeness, is the cause of an inference from similarity. Such an inference consists in the knowledge of relation between a name and the thing so named. Its instrument is the knowledge of a likeness. The recollection of the purport of a statement of resemblance is the operation of that instrument. For example, a person not knowing what is meant by

view is that there is no necessity to recognise a separate Pramāṇa named Upamāṇa arising from noticing similarities as this can be included within Pratyabhijñāna and not only similarities but dissimilarities (e. g. those distinguishing a buffalo from a cow) and knowledge of distance or nearness is got from Pratyabhijñāna. Dharmabhūṣaṇa summarises this and a detailed exposition of the same has been made by Prabhāchandra¹.

Hemachandra has followed the definition of Pratyabhijñāna as laid down in Parikṣā-mukhaṃ². The substance of the definition in Pramāṇa-nayatattvālokālaṅkāra is the same though the language is somewhat different³.

the word Gavaya having heard from some inhabitant of the forest that a Gavaya is like a cow, goes to the forest. Remembering the purport of what he has been told, he sees a body like that of a cow. Then this inference from similarity arises (in his mind) that this is what is meant by the word Gavaya.” Tarka-saṅgraha, Translated by Jacob. Page 12.

1. “सादृश्यप्रत्यभिज्ञानमुपमानाख्यं पृथक् प्रमाणमिति केचित् कथयन्ति तदसत् । स्मृत्यनुभवपूर्वकसंकलनज्ञानत्वेन प्रत्यभिज्ञानत्वानतिवृत्तेः । अन्यथा गोविलक्षणो महिष इत्यादिविसदृशत्वप्रत्ययस्य इदमस्माददूरम् इत्यादेश्च प्रत्ययस्य स-प्रतियोगिकस्य पृथक्-प्रमाणत्वं स्यात् । ततो वैसादृश्यादि-प्रत्ययवत् सादृश्यप्रत्ययस्यापि प्रत्यभिज्ञानलक्षणाक्रान्तत्वेन प्रत्यभिज्ञानत्वमेवेति प्रामाणिकपद्धतिः ।”

Nyāya-dīpikā.

“गोसदृशगवयाभिधानयोर्वाच्यवाचकसंबन्धं प्रतिपद्य पुनर्गवयदर्शनात् तत्प्रतिपत्तिः प्रत्यभिज्ञा किं नेष्यते ?” Prameyakamala-mārtanḍa.

2. “दर्शनस्मरणसंभवं तदेवेदं तत्सदृशं तद्विलक्षणं तत्प्रतियोगीत्यादिसंकलनं प्रत्यभिज्ञानम् ।” Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā I. 2. 4.

3. “अनुभवस्मृतिहेतुकं तिर्यग्धूर्वतासामान्यादिगोचरं संकलनात्मकं ज्ञानं प्रत्यभिज्ञानम् ।”

“यथा तज्जातीय एवायं गोपिण्डो गोसदृशो गवयः स एवायं जिनदत्त इत्यादि ।”

Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāra. III. 5. 6.

In the tenth aphorism, the word “etc.” has been used. In Prameya-ratna-mālā, it is mentioned that by this word the recognition of other objects from distinguishing characteristics is included. For example, a swan is recognised from its power of separating milk from water, a bee is recognised from having six legs, a Saptaparṇa tree is recognised from having seven leaves, a Mechaka jewel is recognised from its having five colours, a young woman is recognised from her high breasts, a rhinoceros is recognised from its single horn, a Śarabha (a fabulous creature) is recognised from its eight legs and a lion is recognised from its manes”¹.

उपलम्भानुपलम्भनिमित्तं व्याप्तिज्ञानमूहः ॥११॥

11. Upalambhānupalambhanimittam vyāptijñānamūhaḥ.

इदमस्मिन् सत्येव भवत्यसति न भवत्येवेति च ॥१२॥

12. Idamasmin satyeva bhavatyasati na bhavatyeveti cha.

यथाग्नावेव धूमस्तदभावे न भवत्येवेति च ॥१३॥

13. Yathāgnāveva dhūmastadabhāve na bhavatyeveti cha.

11. The knowledge of universal concomitance arising from finding and not finding, is Ūha (or Tarka).

17. Such as, this exists when that exists and this does not exist when that does not exist.

13. For example, smoke exists only in fire and when there is no fire, there is no smoke.

1. “पर्योवुभेदी हंसः स्यात् पट्पदैः भ्रमरः स्मृतः ।
 सप्तपर्णैस्तु तत्त्वज्ञैर्विज्ञेयो विषमच्छदः ॥
 पंचवर्णैर्भवेद् रत्नं मेचकाख्यं पृथुस्तनी ।
 युवतिश्चैकशृंगोऽपि गण्डकः परिकीर्तितः ॥
 शरभोऽप्यष्टभिः पादैः सिंहश्चारुसटान्वितः ॥”

Verses quoted in Prameya-ratnamālā.

Commentary

From this aphorism, begins the most important subject of inference which attracted the subtle brains of all the Jain, Hindu and Buddhist logicians. In this aphorism Vyāptijñāna (the knowledge of universal concomitance) which is the basis of all inference is defined. It should be remembered that in Hindu Nyāya philosophy Tarka is defined as a special kind of knowledge (Sambhāvanā). Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara have followed this interpretation in their commentaries on the Nyāyasūtra of Gautama. The later writers like Udayana also define Tarka as a special kind of objection. But in Jain logic Tarka is defined as knowledge of universal concomitance. In Nyāya-dīpikā we find "The knowledge of universal concomitance is Tarka"¹.

Vyāpti (universal concomitance) is a kind of relation-ship between the middle term and the major term. The middle term is technically called (as will be seen later on) Hetu, Liṅga or Sādhana. The major term is known as Sādhya or Vyāpaka. The minor term is known as Pakṣa. Vyāpti is also called Avinābhāva². The example given universally to explain Vyāpti is this : 'Where there is smoke, there is fire'.

In other words, Tarka is a separate Pramāṇa which is instrumental in producing a knowledge of Vyāpti or Abinābhāva³. In Śloka-vārttika it is mentioned "Tarka is the instrumental cause of the result consisting of cessation of ignorance regarding the relationship of the major term and the middle term"⁴.

Ūha is another name of Tarka⁵.

1. "व्याप्तिज्ञानं तर्कः ।" Nyāya-dīpikā.

2. "साध्यसाधनयोर्गम्यगमकभावप्रयोजको व्यभिचारगंधासहिष्णुः संबंध-विशेषो व्याप्तिरविनाभाव इति च व्यपदिश्यते ।" Nyāya-dīpikā.

3. "तस्याश्चाविनाभावापरनाम्न्या व्याप्तेः प्रमितौ यत् साधकतमं तदिदं तर्कार्थं पृथक् प्रमाणम् ।" Nyāya-dīpikā.

4. "साध्यसाधनसंबन्धव्यज्ञाननिवृत्तरूपे हि फले साधकतमस्तर्कः ।"

Śloka-vārttika.

5. "ऊह इति तर्कस्यैव व्यपदेशान्तरम् ।" Nyāya-dīpikā.

Tarka or Ūha concludes the presence or absence of one thing in connection with another in all places and times. We find fire when we see smoke. After constant knowledge of this kind we conclude that in all places and at all times smoke is inseparable from fire. This Tarka Pramāṇa is different from Pratyakṣa in which the relationship of fire and smoke is perceived only in a place which is near but no knowledge of universal concomitance arises from Pratyakṣa¹.

In Pramāṇanayatattvālokālāṅkāra, it has been mentioned "Tarka which is also called Ūha is knowledge produced from finding and not finding, dependant on the relationship of the major term and the middle term in the past, present and future viz. that this happens on that. As for example, wherever there is some smoke, this must be on account of the existence of fire and when it (i.e. fire) does not exist, this (smoke) does not exist"².

Hemachandra's definition of Tarka or Ūha is identical with that in Parikṣā-mukhaṃ³.

In the relation of two things like smoke and fire, one object (e. g. smoke) is called Vyāpya, and the other (e. g. fire) is known as Vyāpaka. Hemachandra therefore defines Vyāpti thus : "Vyāpti is existence of Vyāpaka whenever there is Vyāpya or the existence of Vyāpya whenever there is Vyāpaka"⁴.

1. "अत्र हि धूमे सति भूयोऽन्युपलंभे, सर्वत्र सर्वदा धूमोऽग्निं न व्यभिचरति, एवं सर्वोपसंहारेणाविनाभाविज्ञानं पश्चादुत्पन्नं तर्करित्यं प्रत्यक्षादेः पृथगेव । प्रत्यक्षस्य सन्निहितदेश एव धूमाग्निसंबंधप्रकाशनान्न व्याप्तिप्रकाशकत्वम् ।" Nyāya-dīpikā.

2. "उपलंभानुपलंभसंभवं त्रिकालीकलितसाध्यसाधनसंबध्याद्यालंबनमिदमस्मिन्सत्येव भवतीत्याद्याकारं संवेदनमूहापरनामा तर्कः ॥

"यथा यावान् कश्चिद् धूमः स सर्वो वह्नौ सत्येव भवतीति तस्मिन्नसत्यौ न भवत्येवेति ॥" Pramāṇanayatattvālokālāṅkāra. III. 7. 8.

3. "उपलंभानुपलंभनिमित्तं व्याप्तिज्ञानमूहः ।"

Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā. I. 2. 5.

4. "व्याप्तिव्यापकस्य व्याप्ये सति भाव एव व्याप्यस्य वा तत्रैव भावः ।"

Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā. 1. 2. 6.

साधनात् साध्यविज्ञानमनुमानम् ॥१४॥

14. Sādhanaṭ sādhyavijñānamanumānam.

14. Anumāna (inference) is the knowledge of Sādhyā (the major term) from Sādhana (the middle term).

Commentary

A definition of Sādhana will be given in the next aphorism and Sādhyā will be defined in aphorism 20.

Sādhana as we have already mentioned is the middle term and Sādhyā the major term. In inference we have a knowledge of Sādhyā (e. g. fire) from Sādhana (e. g. smoke). The syllogism will be detailed later on.

It may be mentioned here that in Hindu philosophies like the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems, the knowledge derived from Anumāna Pramāṇa is called Anumiti but in Jain logic, the knowledge itself is called Anumāna. The result of Anumāna, according to Jain logic, is the cessation of ignorance. Māṇikya-nandi has devoted a separate chapter (Samuddeśa V) where the result of Pramāṇas is discussed in detail. We shall deal with this subject there.

Hemachandra and Dharma-bhūṣaṇa's definition of Anumāna is the same as mentioned in this aphorism¹. In Śloka-vārttika it is mentioned "The wise know Anumāna to be the knowledge of Sādhyā from sādhanā"². The Sādhana must be Jñāyamāna (in a knowing state) to produce Anumāna. Otherwise no inference can arise. For example, to a sleeping man, smoke cannot give rise

1. "साधनात् साध्यविज्ञानमनुमानम् ।"

Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā I. 2. 7 and Nyāya-dīpikā.

2. "साधनात् साध्यविज्ञानमनुमानं विदुर्वुधाः ।" Śloka-vārttika.

to an inference of fire¹. Sādhana is also known as Liṅga or Hetu. Vātsyāyana in his Bhāṣya on Nyāya-sūtras of Gautama (I. 1. 3) has mentioned "Anumāna is the subsequent knowing of the Liṅgi (e. g. fire) by the Liṅga (e. g. smoke) in its knowing state"². Udayanāchārya while explaining "Tallīngamanu-māpakam" of the Praśastapādabhāṣya has mentioned that Jñāyamāna liṅga is the instrumental cause of Anumāna³.

It appears from the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra of Kaṇāda⁴ and the statement of Praśastapāda the writer of the Bhāṣya on the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras⁵ that they also admit that inference results from Jñāyamāna Liṅga.

साध्याविनाभावित्वेन निश्चितो हेतुः ॥१५॥

15. Sādhyāvinābhāvitvena niśchito hetuḥ.

15. Hetu (or Sādhana or Liṅga) is that which is fixed in concomitance with Sādhyā.

Commentary

In this aphorism Sādhana is defined. That which cannot be without Sādhyā is Sādhana or Hetu, e. g. smoke which can never

1. "साधनाज्ज्ञायमानाद् धूमादेः साध्येऽग्न्यादौ लिङिनि यद्विज्ञानं तदनुमानम् । अज्ञायमानस्य तस्य साध्यज्ञानजनकत्वे हि सुप्तादीनामप्यग्न्यादिज्ञानोत्पत्तिप्रसंगः ।" Nyāya-dipikā.

2. "मितेन लिङ्गेन लिङिनोऽर्थस्य पश्चान्मानमनुमानम् ।"

Vātsyāyana-Bhāṣya.

3. "अनुमितिरूपप्रमाणम् । एतेन परामृष्यमाणं लिङमनुमानम् ।"

Guṇa-Kiraṇāvali.

4. "हेतुरपदेशो लिङं प्रमाणं करणमित्यनर्थान्तरम् ।"

Vaiśeṣika Sūtra. 9. 2. 4.

5. "अनुमेयेन संबंधं प्रसिद्धं च तदन्विते ।

तदभावे च नास्त्येव तल्लिङमनुमापकम् ॥" Praśastapāda.

be without fire. This is also known as Liṅga (sign or mark) and is the same as the middle term of a syllogism.

Kumāranandi Bhaṭṭāraka has mentioned "A Liṅga has the characteristic of being non-existent otherwise" ("अन्यथानुपपत्त्येकलक्षणे लिङ्गमभ्येत ।") e. g. smoke is non-existent otherwise than with fire. In Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālāṅkāra the same view is expressed¹. In other words, a Sādhana can exist only in relation with Sādhya. It is therefore the determinant of Sādhya.

सहक्रमभावनियमोऽविनाभावः ॥ १६ ॥

16. Sahakramabhāvanīyamo a-vinābhāvaḥ.

16. Avinābhāva (or Vyāpti) is the rule of co-existence or the existence of one following the other (being related as cause and effect).

Commentary

Vyāpti, which has already been explained before, is here described as being of two kinds being connected in co-existence or in existence of one after another as in the case of a cause and its effect. These are being elucidated in the aphorisms which follow. Hemachandra also defines Avinābhāva in a similar manner².

सहचारिणोऽर्थाप्यव्यापकयोश्च सहभावः ॥ १७ ॥

17. Sahachārinorvyāpyavyāpakayoścha sahabhāvaḥ.

17. Sahabhāva exists in objects co-existent or in objects Vyāpya and Vyāpaka.

1. "निश्चितान्यथानुपपत्त्येकलक्षणो हेतुः ॥"

Pramāṇa-nayatattvālokālāṅkāra III. 11.

2. "सहक्रमभाविनोः सहक्रमभावनियमोऽविनाभावः ।"

Pramāṇa-mimāṃsā 1. 2. 10.

Commentary

The universal concomitance as exemplified by Sahabhāva can be seen in the form and colour in a fruit or being a tree and being a Śimśapā (a kind of tree). The former is an example of co-existence and the latter a relationship of Vyāpya and Vyāpaka¹.

पूर्वोत्तरचारिणोः कार्यकारणयोश्च क्रमभावः ॥ १८ ॥

18. Pūrvottarachāriṇoḥ kāryakāraṇayoścha kramabhāvaḥ.

18. Krama-bhāva exists in cases when one follows the other or in the case of cause and effect.

Commentary

The example commonly given in Jain logic of one following the other is : the constellation Krittikā is followed by the constellation Rohiṇī. The example of cause and effect is given as smoke following fire².

तर्कात्तन्निर्णयः ॥ १९ ॥

19. Tarkāt tannirṇayaḥ.

19. This is ascertained by Tarka.

Commentary

We have already explained that by Tarka (universal concomitance) inference is caused. The Jain philosophers sometimes hold that cause and effect are the same (Abhedā) and according to such a view though universal concomitance itself is called Tarka, it is mentioned in this aphorism that Tarka determines universal concomitance. Hemachandra also holds this view³.

1. "सहचारिणोः रूपरसयोः व्याप्यन्यापकयोश्च वृक्षत्वशिंशपात्वयोरिति ।"

Prameya-ratna-mālā.

2. "पूर्वोत्तरचारिणोः कृत्तिकोदयशक्रदोदययोः कार्यकारणयोश्च धूमधूमध्वजयोः क्रमभावः ।" Prameya-ratna-mālā.

3. "उहात्तन्निश्चयः ।" Pramāṇa-mimāṃsā I. 2. 11.

इष्टमबाधितमसिद्धं साध्यम् ॥ २० ॥

20. Iṣṭamabādhitamasiḍḍham sādhyam.

सन्दिग्धविपर्यस्ताव्युत्पन्नानां साध्यत्वं यथा
स्यादित्यसिद्धपदम् ॥ २१ ॥

21. Sandigdhaviparyastāvvyutpannānām sādhyatvaṃ yathā syādityasiḍḍhapadam.

अनिष्टाध्यक्षादिबाधितयोः साध्यत्वं माभूदितिष्टा-
बाधितवचनम् ॥ २२ ॥

22. Aniṣṭādhyakṣādivādhitayoh sādhyatvaṃ mā bhūditīṣṭāvādhitavachanam.

न चासिद्धवदिष्टं प्रतिवादिनः ॥ २३ ॥

23. Na chāsiddhavadiṣṭaṃ prativādinah.

प्रत्यायनाय हीच्छा वक्तुरेव ॥ २४ ॥

24. Pratyāyanāya hīchchhā vaktureva.

20. Sādhyā is what is desired and what is Abādhita (i. e. opposed to Pratyakṣa etc.) and what is not Siddha (already established).

21. The word "Asiddha" has been used in defining Sādhyā so that the doubtful, the false and the not understood may become Sādhyā.

22. The words "Iṣṭa" and "Abādhita" have been used so that what is not desired and what is opposed to Pratyakṣa etc. might not be (included in the definition of) Sādhyā.

23. In the case of an adversary, "Iṣṭa" is not required like "Asiddha".

24. The intention to explain exists only in the speaker.

Commentary

Sādhya (the major term) is defined in Aphorism 20. That which one wishes to establish is Sādhya. For example, we want to establish fire when we see smoke. So fire is Sādhya. But it should be noted that there should not be any Bādhā (hindrance). Hemachandra has mentioned that Bādhā is of six kinds (i) that which is opposed to Pratyakṣa (ii) that which is opposed to Anumāna (iii) that which is opposed to Āgama (iv) that which is opposed to popular belief (v) that which is opposed to one's own words and (vi) that which is opposed to belief¹

That which is opposed to Pratyakṣa is thus illustrated. If one says that fire is cold, honey is not sweet, jasmine flowers are not sweet-scented, a pitcher is invisible etc. we have examples of Pratyakṣabādhā. The instance of Bādhā by Anumāna is : "The palm of the hand is hairy". Āgama-bādhā is what is against the injunctions of scriptures, for example, "Dharma does not produce happiness after death". It is enjoined in the scriptures that Dharma leads to happiness after death. Loka-bādhā is what is against popular belief. For example, "The skull of a human being is a clean object". The popular belief in this case is that skulls of human beings are unclean objects. Bādhā regarding one's own words are exemplified in "My mother is barren." That which is against belief is Pratiti-bādhā e. g. Chandra (the moon) is not Śaśi (the moon) We know that Chandra and Śaśi are synonyms signifying the moon².

1. "प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमलोकस्ववचनप्रतीतयो वाधाः ॥"

Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā I. 2. 14.

2. "तत्र प्रत्यक्षवाधा यथा अनुष्णोऽग्निः, न मधु मधुरं, न सुगंधि विदलन्-मालतीमुकुलं, अचाक्षुषो घटः, अश्रावणः शब्दः, नास्ति वहिरर्थ इत्यादि । अनुमान-वाधा यथा, सरोम हस्ततलं, नित्यः शब्द इति वा ।...आगमवाधा यथा प्रेत्यासुखप्रदो धर्म इति, परलोके सुखप्रदत्वं धर्मस्य सर्वागमसिद्धम् । लोकवाधा यथा, शुचि नरशिरः-कपालमिति, लोके हि नरशिरःकपालादीनां अशुचित्वं सुप्रसिद्धं । स्ववचनवाधा

Śādhya again should be one not previously established. Objects in cases of doubt e. g. when we are not certain whether this is a post or a man, cases of mistake e. g. when we mistake nacre to be silver and cases where we have no clear knowledge as when we merely touch a thing while going without clearly perceiving what it is, can become Śādhya. For, in these cases we establish by inference what the real thing is.

The three adjectives “Iṣṭa”, “Abādhita” and “Asiddha” are therefore necessary. These have been termed “Abhispita”, “Anirākṛita” and “Apratita” in Prameya-naya-tattvālokālāṅkāra¹ and “Sisādhayaṣṭa”, “Abādhya” and “Asiddha” by Hemachandra².

Some may say, you have mentioned that what is desired is Śādhya. The desire of human beings is to sit, lie down, eat, go etc. So these should be Śādhya. In Prameyaratnamālā this is refuted by saying that by desire is meant the desire in connection with Śādhana. The meaning is to be understood according to the context. When we see a Śādhana (e. g. smoke) we desire to know of what this is a sign and the desired object inferred from the Śādhana (e. g. fire) is the Śādhya³.

यथा माता मे वन्द्येति । प्रतीतिवाधा यथा, अचन्द्रः शशीति, अत्र शशिनश्चन्द्रशब्द-
वाच्यत्वं प्रतीतिसिद्धम् इति प्रतीति-वाधा ।” Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsā Bhāṣya
to 1. 2. 14.

1. “अप्रतीतमनिराकृतमभीप्सितं साध्यम् ॥ शङ्कितविपरीतानध्यवसितवस्तूनां
साध्यताप्रतिपत्त्यर्थमप्रतीतवचनम् ॥ प्रत्यक्षादिविरुद्धस्य साध्यत्वं मां प्रसज्यता-
मित्यनिराकृतग्रहणम् ॥ अनभिप्रेतस्यासाध्यत्वप्रतिपत्त्येऽभीप्सितपदोपादानम् ॥”

Pramāṇanayatattvālokālāṅkāra. III. 14-17

2. “सिसाधयिपितमसिद्धमवाध्यं साध्यं पक्षः ॥”

Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā I. 1. 13.

3. “अत्रापरे दूषणमाचक्षते, आसनशयनभोजनयाननिधुवनादेरपीष्टत्वात्तदपि
साध्यमनुपज्यत इति । तेऽप्यतिवालिशा अप्रस्तुतप्रलापित्वात् । अत्र हि साधनमधि-
क्रियते । तेन साधनविषयत्वेनेप्सितमिष्टमुच्यते ।” Prameya-ratna-mālā.

This adjective “Iṣṭa” (desired) is to be taken in connection with one’s own intention. For, the person wishing to know fire from the smoke has this desire. When the inference of fire from smoke is explained to another person (who is technically called Prativādi), the Sādhya (fire) is not “Iṣṭa” to the latter. All the adjectives are not applicable to all parties but some to some parties according to use¹. Hemachandra has used the word “सि साधयिषितम्” explaining it as “साधयितुमिष्टं” (i. e. desired to establish) to evade this controversy in his definition of Sādhya.

Akalaṅka Deva in Nyāya-viniśchaya has thus defined Sādhya :—

“साध्यं शक्यमभिप्रेतमप्रसिद्धं ततोऽपरं ।

साध्याभासं विरुद्धादि साधनाविषयात्त्वतः ॥”

i. e. “Sādhya is Śakya (fit to be established not being opposed to Pramāṇa etc.), Abhipreta or Iṣṭa (desired) and Aprasiddha or Asiddha (like objects in cases of doubt, mistake or non-distinction). The opposite to Sādhya is Sādhyaābhāsa. These are Viruddha (opposed to Pratyakṣa etc) etc. because these cannot be made known by Sādhana.”

In Śloka-vārttika Sādhana and Sādhya have been similarly defined :

“अन्यथानुपपत्त्येकलक्षणं तत्र साधनं ।

साध्यं शक्यमभिप्रेतमप्रसिद्धमुदाहृतं ॥”

i. e. “the characteristic of Sādhana is that it does not arise otherwise and “Sādhya is Śakya, Abhipreta and Aprasiddha.”

Dharmabhūṣaṇa also has followed these definitions².

1. “न हि सर्वं सर्वापेक्षया विशेषणम्, अपि तु किञ्चित् कमप्युद्दिश्य भवतीति ।...यथा असिद्धं प्रतिवाद्यपेक्षया न तथेष्टम् इत्यर्थः ।”

Prameyaratnamālā.

2. “शक्यमभिप्रेतमप्रसिद्धं साध्यं । यत्प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणावाधितत्वेन साधयितुं शक्यं, वाद्यभिमतत्वेनाभिप्रेतं, संदेहाद्याक्रान्तत्वेनाप्रसिद्धं तदेव साध्यम् ।” Nyāyadīpikā.

साध्यं धर्मः क्वचित्द्विशिष्टो वा धर्मो ॥२५॥

25. Sādhyam dharmah kvachittadviśiṣṭo vā dharmī.

25. Sādhyā is a Dharma and sometimes it is Dharmī in which there is the abode of the Dharma.

Commentary

In our familiar example we have seen that fire is the Sādhyā (or the major term). Now, a distinction is being made. It is urged that when we have a knowledge of universal concomitance, Sādhyā is a Dharma. For in such cases we hold : wherever there is smoke there is fire. Here Sādhyā is fire. But after the inferential process we have the Dharmī (e.g. the mountain in which the fire is) which is the abode of the Dharma (Sādhyā) as described above. This Dharmī is technically called the Pakṣa (the minor term) as will be mentioned in the next aphorism. When Sādhyā is merely Dharma, there is no knowledge of Dharmī. For example, whenever we see smoke, we have an idea of fire but not of mountain or other object containing the fire. It is only when Sādhyā is Dharmī, that we have the idea of the thing which is the abode of Dharma which is technically called Pakṣa¹.

पक्ष इति यावत् ॥ २६ ॥

26. Pakṣa iti yāvat.

26. This is also known as Pakṣa (the minor term).

Commentary

It has been explained in the previous aphorism that the Dharmī containing the Dharma of Sādhyā is called Pakṣa. For

1. “साध्यं साध्यधर्मविशिष्टो धर्मो क्वचित्तु धर्मः ।” Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā I. 2. 15

“व्याप्तिग्रहणसमयापेक्षया साध्यं धर्म एवान्यथा तदनुपपत्तेः ॥

न हि यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र चित्रभानोरिव धरित्रीधरस्याप्यनुवृत्तिरस्ति ॥

आनुमानिकप्रतिपत्त्यवसरापेक्षया तु पक्षापरपर्यायस्तद्विशिष्टः प्रसिद्धो धर्मो ॥”

Pramāṇanayatatvālokaṅkāra III. 19-21

example, a mountain is Pakṣa as in it there is fire (Sādhya). In other words when we want to separate Dharma and Dharmī, we say that Sādhya is Dharma (viz. in the case of fire) but when we do not want to separate Dharma from Dharmī, we say that Sādhya is Dharmī or Pakṣa (e. g. the mountain in which there is abode of fire).

प्रसिद्धो धर्मो ॥ २७ ॥

27. Prasiddho dharmī.

27. Dharmī is well known.

Commentary

A Dharmī is known sometimes by Pramāṇa, sometimes by Vikalpa (imagination) and sometimes both by Vikalpa and Pramāṇa¹. Hemachandra writes that a Dharmī is Pramāṇa-siddha as well as Buddhi-siddha².

The example of knowledge of a Dharmī by Vikalpa is : "There exists an omniscient being". The example of knowledge of a Dharmī by Pramāṇa is : "This mountain has fire." The example of knowledge of a Dharmī both by Pramāṇa and Vikalpa is "Sound is not eternal"³.

विकल्पसिद्धे तस्मिन् सत्तेतरे साध्ये ॥ २८ ॥

28. Vikalpa-siddhe tasmin sattetare sādhye.

अस्ति सर्वज्ञो नास्ति खरविषाणम् ॥ २९ ॥

29. Asti sarvajño nāsti kharaviṣaṇaṃ.

1. "प्रसिद्धत्वं च धर्मिणः क्वचित् प्रमाणात्, क्वचिद्विकल्पात्, क्वचित् प्रमाणविकल्पाभ्याम् ।" Nyāyadīpikā.

"क्वचिद्विकल्पतः कुत्रचित् प्रमाणतः कापि विकल्पप्रमाणाभ्याम् ।"

Pramāṇanayatatvālokāṅkāra III. 21

2. "धर्मो प्रमाणसिद्धः ॥ बुद्धिसिद्धोऽपि ॥"

Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā. I. 2. 16-17

3. "यथा समस्ति समस्तवस्तुवेदी, क्षितिधरकंधरेयं धूमध्वजवती, ध्वनिः परिणतिमान् ॥" Pramāṇanayatatvālokāṅkāra III. 22

28. When it (Dharmī) is established by Vikalpa, the Sādhyā consists of existence and non-existence.

29. The omniscient exists. Horns of the ass do not exist.

Commentary

When we see smoke and infer fire, the object in which the fire is (e. g. the mountain) is known by Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa. But in the case of our belief in the existence and non-existence viz. "the omniscient exists" or "Horns of the ass do not exist" the Sādhyā consisting of existence or non-existence is preceded by our such belief. So these are cases of Vikalpa-siddhi of the Dharmī¹.

प्रमाणोभयसिद्धे तु साध्यधर्मविशिष्टता ॥ ३० ॥

30. Pramāṇobhayasiddhe tu sādhyadharmaviśiṣṭatā.

अग्निमानयं देशः परिणामी शब्द इति यथा ॥ ३१ ॥

31. Agnimānayaṃ deśaḥ pariṇāmī śabda iti yathā.

30. When (a Dharmī) is established by Pramāṇa or by both (i. e. by Pramāṇa and Vikalpa), it is characterised by having the Dharma as Sādhyā.

31. As for example, this place has fire ; sound is transient.

Commentary

In a Dharmī which is established by Pramāṇa, the Sādhyā exists as Dharma. For example, we see by Pratyakṣa a place

1. "विकल्पसिद्धो यथा, सर्वज्ञः अस्ति सुनिश्चितासंभववाचकप्रमाणत्वात् इत्यस्तित्वे साध्ये सर्वज्ञः । अथवा खरविपाणं नास्तीति नास्तित्वे साध्ये खरविपाणं । सर्वज्ञो ह्यस्तित्वसिद्धेः प्राङ् न प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणसिद्धः । अपि तु प्रतीतिमात्र-सिद्ध इति विकल्पसिद्धोऽयं धर्मः । तथा खरविपाणमपि नास्तित्वसिद्धेः प्राग् विकल्प-सिद्धं ॥" "विकल्पसिद्धे तु धर्मिणि सत्तासत्तयोरेव साध्यत्वमिति नियमः ।"

Nyāyadīpikā.

containing fire and the place (which is Dharmī or Pakṣa) has the Dharma (or Sādhya) e. g. fire. The example of a Dharmī established by Pramāṇa as well as by Vikalpa is this : Sound is transient because it is caused (by some). Here sound can be established by Pramāṇa as well as by Vikalpa¹.

व्याप्तौ तु साध्यं धर्म एव ॥ ३२ ॥

32. Vyāptau tu sādhyam dharma eva.

अन्यथा तदघटनात् ॥ ३३ ॥

33. Anyathā tadaghaṭanāt.

32. In universal concomitance, the Sādhya is only Dharma (and not Dharmī)

33. Otherwise, it (i. e. universal concomitance) cannot happen.

Commentary

It is not possible to find an universal concomitance seeing smoke that all mountains contain fire². So in such a case the Sādhya viz. the fire is only Dharma and not Dharmī or Pakṣa viz. mountain. In other words, the universal concomitance is between fire and smoke but not between smoke and the object which is the abode of fire. So, a distinction should be made in this case by saying that here the Sādhya is only a Dharma and not a Dharmī.

साध्यधर्माधारसंदेहापनोदाय गम्यमानस्यापि पक्षस्य वचनम् ॥ ३४ ॥

34. Sādhya dharmādhārasandehāpanodāya gamyamānasyāpi pakṣasya vachanam.

1. “तत्र प्रमाणसिद्धौ धर्मी यथा धूमवत्त्वादग्निमत्वे साध्ये पर्वतः खलु प्रत्यक्षेणानुभूयते ।... उभयसिद्धौ धर्मी यथा शब्दो परिणामी कृतकत्वात् इत्यत्र शब्दः ।”
Nyāya-dīpikā.

2. “न हि धूमदर्शनात् सर्वत्र पर्वतोऽग्निमानिति व्याप्तिः शक्या कर्तुं प्रमाण-विरोधात् ॥” Prameyaratnamālā.

साध्यधर्मिणि साधनधर्मावबोधनाय पक्षधर्मोपसंहारवत् ॥ ३५ ॥

35. Sādhya dharmiṇi sādhanadharmaāvavodhanāya pakṣa-dharmopasaṃhāravat.

को वा त्रिधा हेतुमुक्त्वा समर्थयमानो न पक्षयति ॥ ३६ ॥

36. Ko vā tridhā hetumuktva samarthayamāno na pakṣayati.

34. The Pakṣa is used though it is understood (from Pratyakṣa) to dispel doubts regarding the abode of Sādhya when it is a Dharma.

35. As for example, Upanaya is used to explain the Dharma of Sādhana (the middle term, sign or mark) in the Dharmi containing Sādhya.

36. Is there any one who does not use a Pakṣa to substantiate after mentioning the three kinds of Hetu ?

Commentary

It may be urged that in inference, there is no necessity of a Pakṣa. For in the case of inference of fire in a mountain by seeing smoke, the mountain (Pakṣa) is established by Pratyakṣa. So it is not necessary to establish it again by inference (Anumāna). It is redundant to establish by inference, what we get by Pratyakṣa.

In answer to this, it is urged, that mention of Pakṣa is necessary to localize the Sādhya. Smoke may be in the mountain or in kitchens or in other places. To remove doubts as to where the smoke exists, the use of Pakṣa is necessary. Excluding the Pakṣa, we will only get a mention of the abstract relationship between smoke and fire. It may in such a case reduce Anumāna to Tarka e. g. 'where is this fire which is indicated by smoke ?' Or it may lead to an absurd inference e. g. existence of fire in a lake.

"Some philosophers hold that the minor term (Pakṣa) is not an essential part of an inference. But this view according to the Jainas, is untenable, it being absolutely necessary to state the minor term (Pakṣa) in the inference¹."

Siddhasena Divākara has mentioned in his Nyāyāvatāra :

“It (i. e. Pakṣa) is to be used here (in an inference for the sake of others), as exhibiting an abode of the reason (i. e. the middle term called Hetu).

Otherwise owing to a misconception as to the abode of reason (i. e. Pakṣa or the minor term) as intended by the disputant his reason (Hetu or the middle term) may appear to his opponent as absurd.

A man who has come to behold the excellence of an archer will have to behold the opposite of it, if the archer hits without fixing an aim¹.”

Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa has amplified this as below :

“If any disputant does not explicitly state the minor term (Pakṣa) his reason might be misunderstood by his opponent e. g.

(1) This hill (the minor term) is full of fire (the major term) ;

(2) Because it is full of smoke (the middle term).

The above inference, if the minor term is omitted, will assume the following form :—

(1) Full of fire (the major term)

(2) because full of smoke (the middle term)

Here the opponent might not at once recollect any abode or place (the minor term, Pakṣa) in which the fire and smoke abide in union, and might mistake a lake for such an abode. In such a case the whole argument will be misunderstood.

Just as a clever archer, with a view to preventing his arrow from going to a wrong direction, fixes his aim before hitting, so a

1. “तत्प्रयोगोऽत्र कर्तव्यो हेतुर्गोचरदीपकः ।”

“अन्यथा वाद्यभिप्रेतहेतुर्गोचरमोहितः ।

प्रत्यायस्य भवेद्धेतुर्विरुद्धारेकितो यथा ॥

धानुष्कगुणसंप्रेक्षि जनस्य परिविध्यतः ।

धानुष्कस्य विना लक्ष्यनिर्देशेन गुणेतारौ ॥” Nyāyāvatāra 14-16

skilful disputant, in order to avoid being misunderstood, should, in stating an inference, mention the minor term (Pakṣa) with which the major term (Sādhya) and the middle term (Hetu) are both connected.

In Pramāṇanayatattvālokāṅkāra the same is mentioned as follows : "The use of Pakṣa must be adopted as we always mention as conclusion by word expressing Dharmī (Pakṣa or the minor term e. g. mountain) Dharma (Sādhya or the major term e. g. fire) and Hetu (the middle term). Who will not agree to the use of Pakṣa in support of the Sādhana (the middle term) after mentioning the three varieties of the same¹.

The three kinds of Hetu will be described later on.

Hemachandra has mentioned the subject of this aphorism in a similar language².

एतद्वयमेवानुमानाङ्गं नोदाहरणम् ॥ ३७ ॥

37. Etaddvayamevānumānāṅgaṃ nodāharaṇaṃ.

37. These two only are the limbs of Anumāna, and not the Udāharaṇa.

Commentary

In Prameyaratnamālā, it is mentioned that this Aphorism refutes the view of the Sāṅkhya philosophy which holds that Anumāna has three limbs viz. Pakṣa, Hetu and Dīṣṭānta or Udāharaṇa, that of the Mīmāṃsā philosophy according to which there are four limbs of Anumāna viz. Pratijñā, Hetu, Udāharaṇa and Upanaya and that of the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika philosophies which hold

1. "साध्यस्य प्रतिनियतधर्मिधर्महेतोरुपसंहारवचनवत् पक्षप्रयोगोऽप्यवश्यमाश्रयितव्यः ।" "त्रिविधं साधनमभिधायैव तत्समर्थनं विदधानः कः खलु न पक्षप्रयोगमङ्गीकुरुते ।" [प्रमाणनयतत्त्वालोकालंकारः । ३१२४।२५ ।]

2. "गम्यमानत्वेऽपि साध्यधर्माधार-सन्देहापनोदाय धर्मिणि पक्षधर्मोपसंहारवत्तदुत्पत्तिः ।" Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā 2. 1. 8.

that there are five limbs of Anumāna viz. Pratijñā, Hetu, Udāharaṇa, Upanaya and Nigamana¹.

It may be urged that the words “and not the Udāharaṇa” are redundant in this aphorism, as the word ‘only’ in the aphorism is sufficient for the purpose. The commentator Anantavīrya says that these words have been used to refute the views of others².

In the Nyāya philosophy of Gautama, five limbs of syllogism are recognised. These are Pratijñā (proposition), Hetu, Udāharaṇa (illustration), Upanaya (application) and Nigamana (conclusion). The following is an example :—

(1) This hill is full of fire. (Pratijñā)

(2) Because it is full of smoke. (Hetu)

(3) Whatever is full of smoke is full of fire, as a kitchen
(Dṛṣṭānta)

(4) So is this hill full of smoke. (Upanaya)

(5) Therefore this hill is full of fire. (Nigamana)

According to the view of Jain logicians as propounded in Parikṣāmukhaṃ, only Pakṣa and Hetu are the two limbs of Anumāna.

In Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāra, it is mentioned : “Inference derived from the speech of another has only two parts viz. Pakṣa and Hetu and not Dṛṣṭānta etc³.

1. “ननु भवतु पक्षप्रयोगस्तथापि पक्षहेतुदृष्टान्तभेदेन त्र्यवयवमनुमानमिति सांख्यः । प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयभेदेन चतुरवयवमिति मीमांसकः । प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनभेदात् पंचावयवमिति यौगः । तन्मतमपाकुर्वन् स्वमतसिद्धमवयवद्वयमेवोपदर्शयन्नाह ।” Prameyaratnamālā.

2. “एवकारेणै”वोदाहरणादिव्यवच्छेदे सिद्धेऽपि परमतनिरासार्थं पुनर्नोदाहरणमित्युक्तम् ।” Prameyaratnamālā.

3. “पक्षहेतुवचनलक्षणमवयवद्वयमेव परप्रतिपत्तेरंगं न दृष्टान्तादिवचनम् ।”

Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāra III. 28

This aphorism is amplified in the aphorisms which follow.

न हि तत् साध्यप्रतिपत्त्यङ्गं तत्र यथोक्तहेतोरेव व्यापारात् ॥ ३८ ॥

38. Na hi tat sādhyapratipatyāṅgaṃ tatra yathoktahetoreva vyāpārāt.

तदविनाभावनिश्चयार्थं वा विपक्षे बाधकादेव तत्सिद्धेः ॥ ३९ ॥

39. Tadvinābhāvaniśchayārtham vā vipakṣe vādhakādeva tat-siddheḥ.

38. That (Udāharṇa) is not the cause of understanding the Sādhya because, the aforesaid Hetu works there (as the cause)

39. (That Udāharṇa) also is (not necessary) for establishing the universal concomitance (with the Sādhya). That (universal concomitance) is established from the opposition to its adverse (character).

Commentary

When we give the example of a kitchen to illustrate the universal concomitance 'where there is smoke, there is fire,' we cannot say that the illustration is of any help in the understanding of the Sādhya viz. fire, for the knowledge of fire is derived from the Hetu (viz. 'Because it is full of smoke'). The Udāharṇa therefore is not a part of inference. It cannot also be said that Udāharṇa causes a belief of universal concomitance with the Sādhya, because the universal concomitance is established when we get proof opposed to its adverse character.

व्यक्तिरूपं च निदर्शनं सामान्येन तु व्याप्तिस्तत्रापि तद्वि-

प्रतिपत्तावनवस्थानं स्यात् दृष्टान्तान्तरापेक्षणात् ॥ ४० ॥

40. Vyaktirūpaṃ cha nidarśanaṃ sāmānyena tu vyāpti-statrāpi tadvipratipattāvanavasthānam syāt dṛṣṭāntāntarāpekṣanāt.

40. A Udāharṇa deals only with particular but Vyāpti deals with universal concomitance. If that is not understood, the fault of Anavasthā will arise, as recourse to another example will have to be made.

Commentary

The existence of smoke in a kitchen is a particular instance of the concomitance of smoke and fire. It cannot establish universal concomitance of smoke and fire. If we doubt the example of the kitchen, another example will have to be cited and even if the latter again be disbelieved, a third illustration will be necessary. So the Udāharāṇa cannot be said to be the cause of the knowledge of universal concomitance. At the utmost it can be said to yield a knowledge of concomitance in a particular instance. The fault of Anavāsthā (no final settlement) arises when we seek one instance after another to come at the idea of universal concomitance from particular instances.

This aphorism in another language is given in the Pramāṇa-nayatattvālokāṅkāra III. 36¹.

नापि व्याप्तिस्मरणार्थं तथाविधहेतुप्रयोगादेव तत्स्मृतेः ॥ ४१ ॥

41. Nāpi vyāpti-smaraṇārthaṃ tathāvidhahetuprayogādeva tatasmriteḥ.

41. (This Udāharāṇa) cannot remind the universal concomitance, because such a reminiscence arises from the use of Hetu of that kind (which is connected with previously understood knowledge of the connection between smoke and fire).

Commentary

The knowledge of relationship between Sādhyā and Sādhana (e. g. fire and smoke) must exist before there can be any Anumāna. Udāharāṇa gives an example of this relationship or Vyāpti (universal concomitance) and only tends to establish the validity of Vyāpti. It cannot be said to be of any real help in reminding us about the universal concomitance. This Vyāpti is reminded by the Hetu "where there is smoke, there is fire" and not by the Udāharāṇa viz. "As in the kitchen". Only a thing which had been

1. "नियतैकविशेषस्वभावे च दृष्टान्ते साकल्येन व्याप्तेरयोगतो विप्रतिपत्तो सत्यां तदन्तरापेक्षायामनवस्थितेर्दुर्निवारः समवतारः ।"

experienced before, can be remembered. So universal concomitance can be reminded only by the Hetu and not by hundreds of examples¹. This is also mentioned in *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka-lāṅkāra* III. 37².

तत्परमभिधीयमानं साध्यधर्मिणि साध्यसाधने सन्देहयति ॥४२॥

42. Tatparamabhidhiyamāṇaṁ sādhyadharmini, sādhyasādhane sandehayati.

42. This (Udāharāṇa) only raises a doubt in establishing Sādhyā (e. g. fire) in the Dharmī (e. g. mountain) containing Sādhyā (e. g. fire).

Commentary

Udāharāṇa is not the cause of universal concomitance. On the contrary, it raises a doubt whether fire is really in the mountain or not for we are given an illustration where fire may exist without the mountain which we see. It is after we remember the universal concomitance through Hetu that we come to the conclusion that the mountain is full of fire. Udāharāṇa therefore is not an essential part of inference.

कुतोऽन्यथोपनयनिगमने ॥४३॥

43. Kutohnyathopanaya-nigamane.

43. Otherwise, why should there be Upanaya and Nigamana ?

Commentary

We have already mentioned the five parts of the inference as accepted in the Nyāya philosophy of Gautama. The fourth and the fifth parts are Upanaya and Nigamana, viz. 'So is this hill full of smoke' (Upanaya) and 'Therefore this hill is full of

1. "गृहीतसम्बन्धस्य हेतुप्रदर्शनेनैव व्याप्तिसिद्धिरगृहीतसम्बन्धस्य दृष्टान्त-शतेनापि न तन्स्मरणमनुभूतविषयत्वान् स्मरणस्येति भावः ।" *Prameyaratnamālā*.

2. "नाप्यविनाभावस्मृतये प्रतिपन्नप्रतिबन्धस्य व्युत्पन्नमतेः पक्षहेतु-प्रदर्शनेनैव तत्प्रसिद्धेः ।"

fire' (Nigamana). Mānikyanandi urges that acceptance of these two presupposes some doubt about the existence of fire in the mountain owing to the use of the Udāharaṇa. Otherwise, what is the use of having these two parts Upanaya and Nigamana ?

The modern syllogism of European philosophy following the same of Aristotle is of three propositions.

1. All things which are full of smoke are full of fire,
2. This mountain is full of smoke,
3. Therefore this mountain is full of fire.

It will be seen that in the first proposition, Vyāpti or universal concomitance is laid down. In the second proposition the Hetu is mentioned and in the third the Pratijñā is given. The Upanaya, Nigamana and Dṛṣṭānta are not accepted in modern syllogism. Really speaking, the Upanaya and Nigamana (which will be defined in Aphorisms 50 and 51 which follow) are merely repetitions of what is stated in the Pratijñā and Hetu. So these are not necessary parts of Anumāna. This is laid down in the next aphorism.

न च ते तदङ्गे । साध्यधर्मिणि हेतुसाध्ययोर्वचनादेवासंशयाद् ॥४४॥

44. Na cha te tadāṅge. Sādhyadharminī hetu-sādhyayorva-
chanādevāsamsayāt.

44. These (Upanaya and Nigamana) are not parts of that (Anumāna) because by mentioning the Sādhya and the Hetu in the Dharmī containing the Sādhya, no doubt exists.

Commentary

When we mention the Hetu (the middle term e. g. smoke) and the Sādhya (the major term e. g. fire) in the Dharmī (e. g. mountain) which contains the Sādhya (e. g. fire), we have no kind of doubt in the knowledge of the Sādhya (e. g. fire) or in other words the existence of the Hetu (smoke) and Sādhya (fire) is ascertained by their mention without there being any kind of doubt. So it is redundant to repeat them again in the form

of Upanaya and Nigamana. So these two parts should not be considered as necessary limbs of Upamāna.

“There is no power of Upanaya and Nigamana to produce a knowledge in the mind of others as this knowledge arises from the use of the Pakṣa and the Hetu.” *Pramāṇanayatattvālokā-
laṅkāra*. III. 40.

**समर्थनं वा वरं हेतुरूपमनुमानावयवो वाऽस्तु
साध्ये तदुपयोगात् ॥ ४५ ॥**

45. *Samarthanam vā varam heturūpamanumānāvayavo
vāhstu sādhye tadupayogāt.*

45. (The establishment e. g. fire) is got from the support of the limb of Anumāna named Hetu (e. g. smoke) as this (Hetu e. g. smoke) is connected with the Sādhyā (e. g. fire).

Commentary

The purport of this aphorism is that there is no necessity of the parts of Anumāna, Dīṣṭānta, Upanaya and Nigamana because the Sādhyā (e. g. fire) is established by Hetu (e. g. smoke). As we have knowledge of the Sādhyā without the help of Dīṣṭānta, Upanaya and Nigamana these cannot be said to be essential parts of Anumāna.

When faults of Hetu are dispelled and it is supported, it is said to have samarthana. If you say that that which is not supported can never be a Hetu, and so after mentioning Dīṣṭānta etc. a support should be given to the same, we reply that it is the very Hetu which is a part of Anumāna which establishes the Sādhyā and it is not at all necessary to give any other support by mentioning Udāharana etc. first¹.

1. “किं चाभिधायपि दृष्टान्तादिकं समर्थनमवश्यं वक्तव्यम्, असमर्थितस्य अहेतुत्वात्, इति ; तदेव वरं हेतुरूपम् अनुमानावयवो वाऽस्तु साध्यसिद्धौ तस्यैवोपयोगान्नोदाहरणादिकम् ।” *Prameyaratnamālā*.

Pramāṇanayatattvālokaṅkāra mentions the same in another language¹.

बालव्युत्पत्त्यर्थं तत्रयुपगमे शास्त्र एवासौ
न वादे, अनुपयोगात् ॥ ४६ ॥

46. Bālavyyutpattiyartham tattrayopagame śāstra evāsau na vāde, anupayogāt.

46. These (Dṛiṣṭānta) etc. may be for understanding of those who have little knowledge and for this purpose may be discussed only in the Śāstra, but these are quite unfit to be used in logical discussions.

Commentary

When we try to teach others who have no full knowledge of inference, we may use Dṛiṣṭānta etc. and for this purpose in works on logic, we may treat this subject. Such words may be of use to students. But in logical discussions between trained men, these are useless.

“The statement of Pakṣa...and Hetu are alone needed in an inference at the instance of another. It is obvious that the true basis of Anumāna is always the force of Vyūpti (logical connection), so that the moment this relationship is asserted by mentioning the Sādhana, smoke and the like, mind is immediately led to that which is inseparably connected therewith, and discovers the Sādhya... Upanaya and Nigamana besides serving no useful purpose, are also objectionable as pure repetition of what is already stated in the Pratijñā and Hetu ; and Udāharaṇa would reduce logic to a child’s play. For while it may be necessary to cite an actual instance of Vyūpti (logical connection) in a Vitarāgakathā (lecture to a pupil) to enable little children to familiarize themselves with the basis of inference it is bad rhetoric to do so in the course of a

1. “समर्थनमेव वरं परप्रतिपत्त्यंगमास्तां तदन्तरेण दृष्टान्तादिप्रयोगेऽपि तदसंभवात् ।”
Pramāṇanayatattvālokaṅkāra III. 41.

Vijigīśukathā (logical diseussion) with a clever and presumably learned opponent. And after all Udāharaṇa only tends to establish the validity of Vyāpti and may be useful in showing the necessary relationship between the Sādhana and its Sādhya ; it is of no real help in Anumāna which presupposes the knowledge of this relationship.

The modern syllogism of three steps, or propositions, as they are called, is also open to objection for similar reasons. It is the culmination of a highly elaborate system of ratioeination, it is true, but it is no less true that the system of which it is the outcome is not a natural but a highly artificial one. The practical value of modern logic, as a science, is to be judged from the fact that its inferential processes, though suitable to a certain extent, for the purposes of the school room, are never actually resorted to by men—not even by lawyers, philosophers and logicians—in their daily life, nor can they be carried out without first bending the current of thought from its natural channel, and forcing it into the artificial and rigid frame-work of an Aristotelian syllogism.

The syllogism that answers the practical requirements of life and is natural to rational mind, then, consists of two and only two steps—Pratijñā and Hetu¹."

दृष्टान्तो द्वेधा, अन्वयव्यतिरेकभेदात् ॥ ४७ ॥

47. Dṛṣṭānto dvedhā anvayavyatirekabhedāt.

47. The Dṛṣṭānta is of two kinds, being with Anvaya and Vyatireka.

Commentary

It has been mentioned that Dṛṣṭānta, Upanaya and Nigamana are not parts of Anumāna. But in the previous aphorism it was stated that these may be discussed in the Śāstras

1. The Science of Thought by C. R. Jain Pp. 42, 43,
Foot note.

for teaching students. So in this and the next two aphorisms the two kinds of *Driṣṭānta*, and in aphorisms 50 and 51 *Upanaya* and *Nigamana* are explained.

साध्यव्याप्तं साधनं यत्र प्रदर्श्यते सोऽन्वयदृष्टान्तः ॥ ४८ ॥

48. *Sādhyavyāptam sādhanam yatra pradarśyate sohnvaya-driṣṭāntaḥ.*

साध्याभावे साधनाभावो यत्र कथ्यते स व्यतिरेकदृष्टान्तः ॥ ४९ ॥

49. *Sādhyābhāve sādhanābhāvo yatra kathyate sa vyatireka-driṣṭāntaḥ.*

49. Where the *Sādhana* is shown as always concomitant with *Sādhya*, that is (an example) of *Anvaya Driṣṭānta*.

50. Where the absence of *Sādhana* is mentioned through the absence of *Sādhya*, that is (an example) of *Vyatireka Driṣṭānta*.

Commentary

The *Driṣṭānta* or illustration which states a connection between the *Sādhya* (fire) and *Sādhana* (smoke) affirmatively e. g. 'where there is smoke, there is fire as in a kitchen' is *Anvaya Driṣṭānta*. The *Driṣṭānta* which mentions the same connection negatively e.g. 'where there is no smoke, there is no fire as in a lake' is *Vyatireka Driṣṭānta*.

This is propounded in another language in the *Nyāyāvatāra* as follows :

"Where the inseparable connection of the major term (*Sādhya*) and the middle term (*Sādhana* or *Hetu*) is shown by homogeneousness (*Sādharmya*) the example is called a homogeneous one, on account of the connection (between those terms) being recollected.

The heterogeneous example is that which shows that the absence of the major term (*Sādhya*) is followed by the absence of the middle term." Verses 18 and 19¹.

1. "साध्यसाधनयोर्व्याप्तिर्यत्र निश्चीयतेतराम् ।

साधर्म्येण स दृष्टान्तः सम्बन्धस्मरणान्मतः ॥

Dr. Satischandra Vidyābhūṣaṇa has commented on the above thus :

“An example (Driṣṭānta) is a familiar case which re-assures the inseparable connection (Vyāpti) between the major term (Sādhya) and the middle term (Hetu). It is of two kinds : 1. homogeneous (Sādharmya) and 2. heterogeneous (Vaidharmya). The homogeneous example is that which re-assures the connection (Vyāpti) by homogeneousness (Sādharmya) thus :

1. This hill is full of fire (major term) ;
2. Because it is full of smoke (middle term) ;
3. Just as the kitchen (homogeneous example).

Here the fire and smoke abide homogeneously in the kitchen.

The heterogeneous example re-assures the connection (Vyāpti) by contrariety, that is, by showing that absence of the major term (Sādhya) is attended by the absence of the middle term (Hetu) thus :

1. This hill has no smoke (major term) ;
2. Because it has no fire (middle term) ;
3. Just as a lake (heterogeneous example)¹.”

In Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāra (III. 43-46) we find : “Illustration (Driṣṭānta) consists of knowledge of obstruction. It is of two kinds being connected with homogeneousness or heterogeneousness. Homogeneous example is that where the existence of the quality of the Sādhya is invariably revealed with the existence of the quality of Sādhana. Heterogeneous example is that where the invariable absence of Sādhana is shown on account of the absence of the Sādhya².”

साध्ये निवर्तमाने तु साधनस्याप्यसंभवः ।

ख्याप्यते यत्र दृष्टान्ते वैधर्म्येणेति स स्मृतः ॥”

1. Nyāyavatāra by Dr. S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa p. 17.

2. “प्रतिबंधप्रतिपत्तेरास्पदं दृष्टान्तः ।

स द्वेधा साधर्म्यतो वैधर्म्यतश्च ।

यत्र साधनधर्मसत्तायामवश्यं साध्यधर्मसत्ता प्रकाश्यते स साधर्म्यदृष्टान्तः ।

यत्र तु साध्याभावे साधनस्यावश्यमभावः प्रदर्श्यते स वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तः ।”

The Naiyāyikas following Gautama also mention “Udāharāṇa is illustration following a mention of universal concomitance, e. g. whatever is full of smoke is full of fire as a kitchen. This is Sādharmya Udāharāṇa. Whatever is not full of fire is not full of smoke as a lake. This is an example of Vaidharmya Udāharāṇa¹.”

हेतोरुपसंहार उपनयः ॥ ५० ॥

50. Hetorupasamhāra upanayaḥ.

50. Upanaya is the application (asserting the existence) of the Hetu (in the Dharmi after a knowledge of concomitance).

Commentary

Upanaya is the description of the undoubted existence of the Hetu (e. g. smoke) in the Pakṣa (e. g. mountain) in concomitance².

We have already mentioned the five parts of Anumāna as adopted by Gautama viz. Pratijñā, Hetu, Udāharāṇa, Upanaya and Nigamana³. Upanaya or application is used after Driṣṭānta e. g. “So is this hill full of smoke.”

प्रतिज्ञायास्तु निगमनम् ॥ ५१ ॥

51. Pratijñāyāstu nigamanam.

51. Nigamana is the (conclusion) of the Pratijñā.

1. “व्याप्तिपूर्वकदृष्टान्तवचनमुदाहरणम् । यथा यो धूमवानसावसावग्निमान् यथा महानसः । इति साधर्म्योदाहरणम् । यो योऽग्निमान्न भवति स स धूमवान्न भवति यथा महाह्रदः । इति वैधर्म्योदाहरणम् ।” Nyāya-dīpikā. Prakāśa III.

2. “हेतोः साध्यधर्मिणि उपसंहरणमुपनयः ।”

Pramāṇa-naya-tattvalokālaṅkāra, III. 47.

3. “प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनान्यवयवाः ।”

Nyāyasūtra of Gautama.

Commentary

Pratijñā is the proposition to be proved. In other words the statement of the Pakṣa is the Pratijñā¹, e. g. this hill (minor term) is full of fire (the major term). This proposition is the Pratijñā.

After setting out the Pratijñā, we mention the Hetu, Udāharāṇa and Upanaya. Last of all we come to the conclusion as already set forth in the Pratijñā. This conclusion is the fifth part of Anumāna and is called Nigamāna.

It may be urged that as according to the Jain. logicians Udāharāṇa, Upanaya and Nigamāna are not accepted as parts of inference, why have these been described in this work ? In answer to this, it may be said that we have already mentioned that in works on Logic, these may be described for teaching students. According to the different manners of exposition, the parts of Anumāna in Vitarāgakathā (lecture to pupils) may be two (Pratijñā and Hetu), three (Pratijñā, Hetu and Udāharāṇa), four (Pratijñā, Hetu, Udāharāṇa and Upanaya) or five (Pratijñā, Hetu, Udāharāṇa, Upanaya and Nigamāna)². This use of different parts depends upon the suitability of persons to whom the subject is explained³.

तदनुमानं द्वेषा ॥ ५२ ॥

52. Tadanumānaṃ dvedhā.

1. "साध्यधर्मस्य पुनर्निगमनम् ।"

Pramāṇanayatatvālokāṅkāra, III. 48.

2. "वीतरागकथायां तु प्रतिपाद्याशयानुरोधेन प्रतिज्ञाहेतू द्वाववयवौ, प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणानि त्रयः, प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयाश्चत्वारः, प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनय-निगमनानि वा पञ्चेति यथायोग्यं प्रयोगपरिपाटी ।" Nyāya-dīpikā. Prakāśa III.

3. "प्रयोगपरिपाटी तु प्रतिपाद्यानुरोधतः ।"

Kumaranandi Bhattāraka, quoted in Nyāya-dīpikā.

स्वार्थ-परार्थभेदात् ॥ ५३ ॥

53. Svārtha-parārthabhedāt.

स्वार्थमुक्तलक्षणम् ॥ ५४ ॥

54. Svārthamuktalakṣaṇam.

परार्थं तु तदर्थपरामर्शिवचनाज्जातम् ॥ ५५ ॥

55. Parārtham tu tadarthaparāmarśivachanājjātaṃ.

52. This Anumāna is of two kinds :

53. Svārtha and Parārtha.

54. Svārtha (Anumāna) has already been defined.

55. Parārtha (Anumāna) arises from words touching that (Svārthānumāna)*.

Commentary

Anumāna is of two kinds, Svārthānumāna and Parārthānumāna. The former variety has been defined in aphorism 14 of the third samuddeśa of this work viz. "the knowledge of Sādhya (the major term e. g. fire) from Sādhana or Hetu (the middle term e. g. smoke) is Anumāna." Parārthānumāna arises through words of another.

"Inference is of two kinds : 1. Svārthānumāna, inference for one's own self, and 2. Parārthānumāna, inference for the sake of others. The first kind is the inference drawn in one's own mind after having made repeated observations. Suppose that having repeatedly seen in the kitchen and other places, that where there is smoke there is fire, and having realised in his mind that there is a universal antecedence of fire in respect of smoke, a man after-

* "तद्विधा स्वार्थं परार्थं च ।" "स्वार्थं स्वनिश्चितसाध्याविनाभावैकलक्षणात् साधनात् साध्यज्ञानम् ॥" "यथोक्तसाधनाभिधानजः परार्थः ।"

wards goes to a hill and entertains a doubt as to whether or not there is fire in it. Instantly when he observes smoke on it, he recollects the inseparable connection between fire and smoke, and concludes in his mind that the hill has fire in it, as it has smoke on it. This is an inference for one's own self¹."

Parārthānumāna has thus been defined in Nyāyāvatāra :

"A statement expressive of the reason (i. e. mark or the middle term, called Hetu) which is inseparably connected with that which is to be proved (i. e. the major term, called Sādhya) having been composed of the minor term (called Pakṣa, signifying a side or place) etc., is called an inference for the sake of others (Parārthānumāna)²."

This is amplified by Dr. Satischandra Vidyābhūṣaṇa as follows :

"In an 'inference for the sake of others' the minor term (pakṣa) etc. must be explicitly set forth. The major term or 'proven' (Sādhya) is that which is to be proved. The middle term or reason (hetu, līṅga or sādhanā) is that which cannot exist except in connection with the major term or 'proven' (sādhyā or līṅgi). The minor term or abode (Pakṣa) is that with which the reason or middle term (hetu) is connected, and whose connection with the major term (Sādhya) is to be proved. In a proposition the subject is the minor term (pakṣa) and the predicate the major term (sādhyā). The following is an inference for the sake of others :

1. This *hill* (minor term) is full of *fire* (major term)—
Proposition (pratijñā),

2. Because it is full of *smoke* (middle term),

1. Nyāyāvatāra by Dr. S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa, p. 9.

2. "साध्याविनामुचो हेतोर्वचो यत् प्रतिपादकम् ।

परार्थमनुमानं तत् पक्षादिवचनात्मकम् ॥"

Nyāyāvatāra. verse 10.

3. Whatever is full of smoke is full of fire, just as the kitchen (example, *dṛiṣṭānta*),

4. So is this hill full of smoke (application, upanaya),

5. *Therefore*, this hill is full of fire (conclusion, niga-mana)¹.”

The example given above consists of five parts as acknowledged in the Nyāya philosophy of Gautama. But Jain logicians accept only two parts. So according to them “Parārthānumāna means the knowledge of Sādhya from its Sādhana arising in the mind in consequence of the speech of another. It consists of two parts, Pratijñā and Hetu. Pratijñā means the proposition to be proved and Hetu is the statement of the logical connection called Vyāpti advanced in proof thereof. Illustration : There is fire in this hill (Pratijñā), because there is smoke on it (Hetu)”².

तद्वचनमपि तद्वेतुत्वात् ॥ ५६ ॥

56. Tadvachanamapi taddhetutvāt.

56. The words expressing this (Parārthānumāna) is also Parārthānumāna as these (words) are the cause of that (knowledge arising in Parārthānumāna)³.

Commentary

Anantavīrya says that though really the knowledge is Parārthānumāna, the words in a secondary sense are also called so. In such cases the cause is taken as the effect or the effect is taken as the cause⁴.

1. Nyāyāvatāra by Dr. S. C. Vidhyābhūṣaṇa, pp. 13-14.


2. The Science of Thought by C. R. Jain pp. 41-43.

3. “वचनमुपचारात् ।” Pramāṇa-mimāṃsā. II. 1. 2.

4. “परार्थानुमानप्रतिपादकवचनमपि परार्थानुमानम् । कारणे कार्यस्योपचारात् । अथवा तत्प्रतिपादकानुमानं हेतुर्यस्य तत्तद्वेतुत्तस्य भावत्तत्त्वं ततस्तद्वचनमपि तथा....अस्मिन् पक्षे कार्ये कारणस्योपचारः ।”

CHART III.
CHAPTER III.
HETU

(Aphorism 57)



स हेतुर्द्वयोपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिभेदात् ॥ ५७ ॥

57. Sa hetur dvedhopalabdhyanupalabdhibhedāt.

57. That Hetu is of two kinds : Upalabdhi and Anupalabdhi.

Commentary

We have already mentioned that universal concomitance can be expressed in two ways viz. affirmatively called Anvaya e. g. 'wherever there is smoke there is fire' or negatively called Vyatireka e. g. 'where there is no fire there is no smoke.' The first kind of Hetu is known as Upalabdhi and the second Anupalabdhi¹.

उपलब्धिर्विधिप्रतिषेधयोरनुपलब्धिश्च ॥ ५८ ॥

58. Upalabdhirbidhipratishedhayoranupalabdhiścha.

58. Upalabdhi is subdivided into Vidhi and Pratishedha. Anupalabdhi also (is subdivided into the same two kinds).

Commentary

In Upalabdhi Hetu, the Sādhya may be of two kinds, Vidhi and Pratishedha. These two kinds of Sādhya also can exist in Anupalabdhi Hetu. It should not be said that in Upalabdhi the Sādhya is only in the form of Vidhi and in Anupalabdhi, it is in the form of Pratishedha.

The Upalabdhi and Anupalabdhi Hetus are subdivided into two kinds each : those which prove the existence of a fact (Vidhi) and those that prove the non-existence of a fact (Niṣedha).

A Hetu may also be of Viruddha (contradictory) nature implying existence of a fact which is incompatible with the Sādhya e. g. there is no fire in this pitcher, because it is full of water ; or it may be of Aviruddha (non-contradictory) nature such as in an argument which is not based on any fact incompatible with the

1. "तद् द्वेधा ।" "तथोपपत्त्यन्यथानुपपत्तिभेदात् ।"

Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā II. 1. 3 and II. I. 4.

existence of Sādhya e. g. there is fire in this hill, because there is smoke on it. (Vide The Science of Thought by C. R. Jain, p. 44).

**अविरुद्धोपलब्धिर्विधौ षोढा व्याप्यकार्यकारणपूर्वोत्तर-
सहचरभेदात् ॥ ५९ ॥**

59. Aviruddhopalabdhirvidhau ṣoḍhā vyāpya-kārya-kāraṇa-pūrvo-ttara-sahachara-bhedāt.

59. Aviruddha Upalabdhi is of six kinds in Vidhi viz. Vyāpya, Kārya, Kāraṇa, Pūrvachara, Uttarachara and Sahachara.

Commentary

Upalabdhi in Vidhi will be explained in Aphorisms 65, 66, 67, 68, 69 and 70 respectively.

In Pramāṇanayatattvālokaṇkāra III. 6. 4. it is mentioned that the Aviruddhopalabdhī in establishing a Vidhi is of six kinds¹.

In the Buddhist philosophy it is held that the inference proving the existence of a fact (Vidhi) is only of two kinds Svabhāva (own nature) and Kārya (effect)². But in this aphorism, six varieties of Aviruddha Upalabdhi establishing Vidhi have been mentioned. So in the following five aphorisms the view of the Buddhist logicians is refuted and that of the Jain logicians established.

The next aphorism lays down why Kāraṇa should be accepted as a Hetu.

**रसादेकसामग्र्यनुमानेन रूपानुमानमिच्छद्भिरिष्टमेव किञ्चित्
कारणं हेतुर्यत्र सामर्थ्याप्रतिबन्धकारणान्तरावैकल्ये ॥ ६० ॥**

60. Rasādekasāmagryanumānena rūpānumānamicchadbhirīṣṭameva kiñchit kāraṇaṁ heturyatra sāmartyāpratibandha-kāraṇāntarā-vaikalye.

1. "तत्राविरुद्धोपलब्धिर्विधेः सिद्धौ षोढा ।"

2. "अत्राह सौगतः, विधिसाधनं द्विविधमेव, स्वभावकार्यभेदात् ।"

60. From Rasa (juice), one thing is inferred and from that, Rūpa (form) is inferred. Those who accept this, accept also some Kāraṇa as Hetu where there is no other Kāraṇa to obstruct the potency of the Kāraṇa (or cause).

Commentary

Kāraṇa (cause) is not accepted by all logicians as a true Hetu because according to their view, a Kāraṇa (cause) is not always followed by its appropriate Kārya (effect). Dharma-bhūṣaṇa says, "An effect may preclude a cause for without a cause no effect can take place. But a cause can exist without any effect¹ e. g. we see fire though there is no smoke. So a fire cannot be said to indicate smoke. To this argument, the following is the reply. Whenever there is a cause having potency, we invariably find its effect".² There may be cases in which a cause is opposed by some other cause by which the potency of the first cause is lost. In such cases the first cause may not cause any effect but where this potency is not obstructed, we are certain to find a result. By accepting Kāraṇa as a Hetu, we mean a Kāraṇa having potency. "The true Kāraṇa always implies an active, potent (having Sāmarthya) cause which nothing can prevent from producing its effect. In the instance of rain-clouds, the absence of all those causes which prevent them from giving rain is presumed and implied."³

In this aphorism an illustration is given. There is juice in some fruit. Suppose a man in the dark tastes juice of a mango. He

1. "कारणस्य तु कार्याविनाभावाभावादलिंगत्वम् । नावश्यं कारणानि कार्यवन्ति भवन्तीति वचनात् ।" Prameyaratnamālā.

2. "ननु कार्यं कारणानुमापकमस्तु कारणाभावे कार्यस्यानुपपत्तेः । कारणं तु कार्याभावेऽपि संभवति । यथा धूमाभावेऽपि संभवन् वह्निः सुप्रतीतः । अतएव न वह्निर्धूमं गमयति इति चेत्, तत्र । उन्मीलितशक्तिकस्य कारणस्य कार्यान्यभिचारित्वेन कार्यं प्रति हेतुत्वाविरोधात् ।" Nyāyadīpikā.

3. The Science of Thought by C. R. Jain, P. 47.

infers its form from the juice arising from previous experience that such a juice is connected with such a fruit. In this case as there is no obstruction to the inference and existence of another cause one must accept the Kāraṇa (cause)¹. So the view of the Buddhists that there are only Svabhāva-Hetu and Kārya-Hetu is not correct.

**न च पूर्वोत्तरचारिणोस्तादात्म्यं तदुत्पत्तिर्वा
कालव्यवधाने तदनुपलब्धेः ॥ ६१ ॥**

61. Na cha pūrvottarachāriṇostādātmyam tadutpattirvā kālavyavadhāne tadanupalabdheḥ.

61. In the case of antecedence and consequence, there is no identity or its appearance, for there is no knowledge of these after an interval of time.

Commentary

In this aphorism, it is asserted that the Pūrvachara and Uttarachara Hetus (i. e. Hetus concerned with antecedence and consequence) cannot be said to be included within the Svabhāva-Hetu or Kārya-Hetu as accepted by the Buddhists. Svabhāva-Hetu is concerned with identity and in Kārya-Hetu, one thing arises from another. So in both these cases the two things exist at the same time. But in antecedence and consequence, the two things do not exist together². The example of identity is as follows :—There is no jar in this room, because its Svabhāva (identity) is not to be found (that is, nothing resembling its identity is present in it). The example of Kārya is : There is fire

1. “तमस्विन्यामास्वाद्यमानादाम्रादिफलरसादेकसामग्रयानुमित्या रूपाद्यनुमितिमभिमन्यमानैरभिमतमेव किमपि कारणं हेतुतया यत्र शक्तेरप्रतिस्खलनमपरकारणसाकल्यं च ।” *Pramāṇanayatatvālokaṅkāra* III. 66.

2. “पूर्वोत्तरचरयोर्न स्वभावकार्यकारणभावौ तयोः कालव्यवहितानुपलम्भात् ।” *Ibid*, III. 67.

in this hill, because there is smoke on it. Now these illustrations will show that Svabhāva or Kārya Hetu cannot include Pūrvachara (antecedent) or Uttarachara (consequent) Hetus in which cases there is an interval between two things e. g. It will be Sunday tomorrow because it is Saturday to-day (antecedence), or yesterday was a Sunday, because it is Monday to-day (consequence).

भाव्यतीतयोर्मरणजाग्रद्बोधयोरपि नारिष्टोद्बोधौ

प्रति हेतुत्वम् ॥ ६२ ॥

62. Bhāvyatitayormaraṇajāgradbodhayorapi nāriṣṭodbodhau prati hetutvam.

62. The future and the past, death and the knowledge of waking are not the causes of Ariṣṭas (omens of death) or of rising (in the morning).

Commentary

The Buddhist logicians hold that a relationship of cause and effect can exist though there be an interval of time, as the death which will occur in the future is the cause of the Ariṣṭas (signs preceding and foretelling death) or the past knowledge of waking is the cause of rising in the morning after sleep. Jain logicians say that death which will occur in future is not the cause of omens of death and the past knowledge of waking is not the cause of our rising in the morning for the existence of an effect when there is a cause depends on the cause. In the aforesaid examples, causes do not exist up to the happening of the effect. So there cannot be any Kāraṇa Hetu in these instances. This has been propounded in another language in Pramāṇanayatatvālokaṅkāra III. 68¹.

तद्व्यापाराश्रितं हि तद्भावभावित्वम् ॥ ६३ ॥

63. Tadvyāpārāśritam hi tadbhāvabhāvitvam.

63. Because that (Kārya) happens with the existence of that (Kāraṇa) as that is connected with this.

1. “न चातिक्रान्तानागतयोर्जाग्रद्दशासंवेदनमरणयोः प्रबोध्योत्पत्तौ प्रति कारणत्वं व्यवहितत्वेन निर्व्यापारत्वात् ।”

Commentary

As a potter is the cause of a pot having connection with the latter, so the causality of a thing depends on its connection with the thing. So where there is no such connection, it is not proper to infer the relation of cause and effect¹.

सहचारिणोरपि परस्परपरिहारेणावस्थानात् सहोत्पादाच्च ॥ ६४ ॥

64. Sahachārīnorapi parasparaparihāreṇābasthānāt sahotpādāchcha.

64. Co-existence (is also a separate Hetu) because the things exist independently of each other and arise together.

Commentary

The Sahachārī (co-existent) Hetu is also not included within Kārya Hetu, Kāraṇa Hetu or Svabhāva Hetu. As the things have separate and independent existence, this Sahachārī Hetu cannot be said as the same as Svabhāva Hetu which signifies identity. Also, as these arise simultaneously, it cannot be said to be Kārya Hetu or Kāraṇa Hetu².

I. “स्वव्यापारापेक्षिणी हि कार्यं प्रति पदार्थस्य कारणत्वव्यवस्था कुलालस्येव कलसं प्रति ।”

“न च व्यवहितयोस्तयोर्व्यापारपरिकल्पनं न्याय्यमतिप्रसक्तेः ।”

“परंपराव्यवहितानां परेषामपि तत्कल्पनस्य निवारयितुमशक्यत्वात् ॥”

Pramāṇanayatattvālokaṅkāra III. 69, 70, 71.

2. “परस्परपरिहारेणोपालंभात् तादात्म्यासंभवात् स्वभावहेतावनन्तर्भावः । सहोत्पादाच्च न कार्ये कारणे वा इति । न च समानसमयवर्तिनोः कार्यकारणभावः सव्येतरगोविषाणवत् । कार्यकारणयोः प्रतिनियमाभावप्रसंगाच्च ।”

Prameyaratnamālā

“सहचारिणोः परस्परस्वरूपपरित्यागेन तादात्म्यानुपपत्तेः सहोत्पादेन तदुत्पत्तिविषयत्वे सहचरहेतोरपि प्रोक्तेषु नानुपवेशः ।”

Pramāṇanayatattvālokaṅkāra III. 72

Example of Vyāpya Hetu :—

परिणामी शब्दः कृतकत्वात् ।

य एवं स एवं दृष्टो, यथा घटः ।

कृतकश्चायं तस्मात् परिणामीति ।

यस्तु न परिणामी स न कृतको दृष्टो, यथा बन्ध्यास्तनंधयः ।

कृतकश्चायं तस्मात् परिणामीति ॥ ६५ ॥

65. Pariṇāmi śabdaḥ kṛitakatvāt.

Ya evaṃ sa evaṃ dṛiṣṭo yathā ghataḥ.

Kṛitakaśchāyaṃ tasmāt pariṇāmiti.

Yastu na pariṇāmi sa na kṛitako dṛiṣṭo, yathā vandhyāstanandhayah.

Kṛitakaśchāyaṃ tasmāt pariṇāmiti.

65. Sound is subject to modification, because it is a product.

All products are seen as liable to modifications e. g. a pitcher. This is a product, so this is subject to modification.

That which is not a product is not seen as liable to modifications as the son of a barren woman.

This is a product, so this is subject to modification¹.

Commentary

In Aphorism 59, it has been mentioned that there are six kinds of Aviruddha Upalabdhi in Vidhi. In the present aphorism an example of the first variety viz., Aviruddha Vyāpyopalaḥ is given.

1. "Here sound falls in the larger category of products which is characterised by the quality of being subject to modification. Therefore being Vyāpya (included) in the larger class Vyāpaka it is liable to have the whole class predicated of itself."

The Science of Thought by C. R. Jain, P. 47, footnote.

In this aphorism all the parts of the inference are given in detail showing Sādharmya and Vaidharmya. In subsequent aphorisms only the example in short will be given. It may be expanded like the present aphorism in all its parts.

Example of Kārya Hetu (effect) :—

अस्त्यत्र देहिनि बुद्धिर्यहारादेः ॥ ६६ ॥

66. Astyatra dehini buddhirbyāhārādeḥ.

66. There is intelligence in this animal as it shows activities like speech etc.

Commentary

The familiar example 'There is fire in this hill, because there is smoke on it' is also an illustration of Kārya Hetu.

Example of Kāraṇa Hetu (cause) :—

अस्त्यत्र छाया छत्रात् ॥ ६७ ॥

67. Astyatra chhāyā chhatrāt.

67. There is shade here, as there is an umbrella.

Commentary

Another example is this : "There will be rain, as potent rain-clouds are seen."

Example of Purvachara (antecedent) Hetu :—

उदेष्यति शकटं कृत्तिकोदयात् ॥ ६८ ॥

68. Udeṣyati śakatam kṛttikodayāt.

68. The Rohiṇi (constellation) will appear (after a muhūrta) as the Kṛttikā (constellation) has arisen.

Commentary

There are twenty seven Nakṣatras which rise one after the other. The first four are the Aśvinī, the Bharāṇi, the Kṛttikā and the Rohiṇi. Now as the time of the Kṛttikā is going to pass, we infer that the Rohiṇi will now arise. Similarly, we infer from the existence of the Kṛttikā, that the Bharāṇi had arisen before. This is an example of consequence which is mentioned in the next aphorism.

Example of Uttarachara (consequence) Hetu :—

उदगाद् भरणिः प्राकृतत एव ॥ ६९ ॥

69. Udagād bharaniḥ prāktata eva.

69. The Bharani had already risen before this.

Example of Sahachara Hetu (co-existence) :—

अस्त्यत्र मातुलिंगे रूपं रसात् ॥ ७० ॥

70. Astyatra mātuliṅge rūpaṃ rasāt.

70. There is colour in this Mātuliṅga (fruit) as there is juice (in it)¹.

We have finished the description of the six varieties of Aviruddha Upalabdhi. Now follows the illustrations of six kinds of Viruddha Upalabdhi after its definition.

विरुद्धतदुपलब्धिः प्रतिषेधे तथा ॥ ७१ ॥

71. Viruddhatadupalabdhiḥ pratiṣedhe tathā.

71. Viruddha Upalabdhi is also the same (i. e. of six varieties) implying a Sādhya of a non-existent nature (or which is refuted).

Example of Viruddha Vyāpya Upalabdhi :—

नास्त्यत्र शीतस्पर्श औष्ण्यात् ॥ ७२ ॥

72. Nāstyatra śītasparśa auṣṇyāt.

72. There is no feeling of cold here, as it is hot.

Commentary

By refuting (Pratiṣedha) the feeling of cold, its antithesis (Viruddha) fire and the heat pervading (vyāpya) the same is inferred.

1. "This illustration proceeds on the principle of concomitance or co-existence of colour and taste, so that the presence of the one is an index to the existence of the other." The Science of Thought by C. R. Jain, P. 48, footnote.

Example of Viruddha Kāryopalabdhi :—

नास्त्यत्र शीतस्पर्शो धूमात् ॥ ७३ ॥

73. Nāstyatra śītasparśo dhūmāt.

73. There is no feeling of cold here, because there is smoke.

Commentary

Here cold is the antithesis of heat the Kārya of which is smoke. So this is an example of inference of a Kārya (effect) of the antithesis.

Example of Viruddha Kāraṇopalabdhi :—

नास्मिन् शरीरिणि सुखमस्ति हृदयशल्यात् ॥ ७४ ॥

74. Nāsmiṇ śarīriṇi sukhamasti hridayaśalyāt.

74. There is no happiness in this creature because it has grief (the antithesis of happiness)

Example of Viruddha Pūrvachara Upalabdhi :—

नोदेष्यति मुहूर्तान्ते शकटं रेवत्युदयात् ॥ ७५ ॥

75. Nodesyati muhūrtānte śakatam revatyudayāt.

75. The Rohiṇi will not rise after the end of a Muhūrta as the Revati has arisen.

Commentary

The constellation of the Rohiṇi will not appear after a Muhūrta (two ghatikās = 48 minutes) as now the constellation Revati which succeeds the constellation Aśvinī (which as opposed to the Rohiṇi) has arisen.

Another example is this : Tomorrow will not be a Sunday, because it is Friday today.

Example of Viruddha Uttarachara Upalabdhi :—

नोदगाद् भरणिष्ठु हूर्तात् पूर्वं पुष्योदयात् ॥ ७६ ॥

76. Nodagād Bharaniṣṭhu hūrtāt pūrvam puṣyodayāt.

76. The Bharani (constellation) did not appear before the Muhūrta because (now) the constellation Puṣyā has arisen,

Commentary

The constellations up to Puṣyā according to sequence are these : The Aśvinī, the Bharanī, the Kṛttikā, the Rohiṇī, the Mrigaśīrā, the Ādrā, the Punarvasu, and the Puṣyā. So when there is the Puṣyā constellation which follows the Punarvasu, it follows that the Bharanī did not rise one Muhūrta before it as it was Punarvasu which rose in that time.

Another example of this is : "Yesterday was not a Friday, because it is Tuesday to-day".

Example of Viruddha Sahachara upalabdhi :—

नास्त्यत्र भित्तौ परभागाभावोऽर्वाग्भागदर्शनात् ॥ ७७ ॥

77. Nāstyatra bhittau parabhāgābhāvo'rvāgbhagadarśanāt.

77. This wall is not devoid of an outside, because it has an inside [the Sahachara (coexistent) of the outside].

Six varieties of each of Aviruddha and Viruddha upalabdhi have now been described. Next we proceed to describe the (seven) varieties of Aviruddha Anupalabdhi and (three) varieties of Viruddha Anupalabdhi.

अविरुद्धानुपलब्धिः प्रतिषेधे सप्तधा स्वभावव्यापककार्यकारण-
पूर्वोत्तरसहचरानुपलम्भभेदात् ॥ ७८ ॥

78. Aviruddhānupalabdhiḥ pratiṣedhe saptadhā svabhāva-vyāpakakāryakāraṇa-pūrvottarasahacharānupalambhabhedāt.

78. When (the Sādhya consists of) Pratiṣedha (non-existence of some fact), Aviruddha Anupalabdhi is of seven kinds viz. non-finding of Svabhāva, Vyāpaka, Kārya, Kāraṇa, Pūrvachara, Uttarachara and Sahachara

Commentary

There are seven kinds of Aviruddha Anupalabdhi which cause knowledge of nonexistence of some fact. Not finding the antithesis consists of Aviruddha Anupalabdhi and when this

establishes non-existence of some fact, we call it Aviruddha Anupalabdhī in Pratīṣedha. This is of seven kinds, examples of which will be given in the following seven aphorisms 79-85¹.

Example of Aviruddha Svabhāva Anupalabdhī :—

नास्त्यत्र भूतले घटोऽनुपलब्धेः ॥ ७९ ॥

79. Nāstyatra bhūtale ghato'nupalabdheḥ.

79. There is no pitcher in this place because (its Svabhāva or identity) is not to be found (i. e. nothing resembling its identity is present here).

Example of Aviruddha Vyāpaka Anupalabdhī :—

नास्त्यत्र शिंशपा वृक्षानुपलब्धेः ॥ ८० ॥

80. Nāstyatra śiṅśapā vrikṣānupalabdheḥ.

80. There is no Śiṅśapā (tree) here, because no tree is found here.

Example of Aviruddha Kāryānupalabdhī :—

नास्त्यत्राप्रतिबद्धसामर्थ्योऽग्निर्धूमानुपलब्धेः ॥ ८१ ॥

81. Nāstyatrāpratibaddhasāmarthyo'gnirdhūmānupalabdheḥ.

81. There is no fire whose potency (Sāmarthya) has not been obstructed here, because we do not find smoke.

Example of Aviruddha Kāraṇānupalabdhī :

नास्त्यत्र धूमोऽनग्नेः ॥ ८२ ॥

82. Nāstyatra dhūmo'nagneḥ.

82. There is no smoke here because there is no fire.

1. “तत्राविरुद्धानुपलब्धिः प्रतिषेधावबोधे सप्तप्रकाराः ।”

Pramāṇanayatattvālokaṅkāra, III. 90.

“प्रतिषेध्येनाविरुद्धानां स्वभावव्यापककार्यकारणपूर्वचरोत्तरसहचाराणामनुपलब्धिः ।” Ibid. III. 91.

Example of Aviruddha Pūrvachara Anupalabdhi :

न भविष्यति मुहूर्तान्ते शकटं कृत्तिकोदयानुपलब्धेः ॥ ८३ ॥

83. Na bhaviṣyati muhūrtānte śakataṃ kṛttikodayānupalabdheḥ.

83. There will be no rise of the Rohiṇi after a Muhūrta as we have no knowledge of the rise of the Kṛttikā.

Commentary

Another Example is this : It will not be Sunday tomorrow because it is not Saturday to-day.

Example of Aviruddha Uttarachara Anupalabdhi :

नोदगाद् भरणिर्मुहूर्तान्ते प्राक्तत एव ॥ ८४ ॥

84. Nodagād Bharanirmuhūrtāt prāktata eva.

84. The Bharani had not risen before a Muhūrta because now the Kṛttikā is not up.

Example of Aviruddha Sahachara Anupalabdhi :

नास्त्यत्र समतुलायामुन्नामो नामानुपलब्धेः ॥ ८५ ॥

85. Nāstyatra samatulāyāmunnāmo nāmānupalabdheḥ.

85. One pan of this pair of scales does not touch beam as the other one is on the same level with it.

Now, the varieties of Viruddha Anupalabdhi (nonfinding of antithesis) establishing a Sādhyā of Vidhi (existence of a fact) are being described.

विरुद्धानुपलब्धिर्विधौ त्रेधा विरुद्धकार्यकारणस्वभावा-
नुपलब्धिभेदात् ॥ ८६ ॥

86. Viruddhānupalabdhirvidhan treḍhā viruddhakārya-kāraṇāsvabhāvānupalabdhibhedāt.

86. Viruddha Anupalabdhi in Vidhi is of three kinds :— Viruddha Kārya Anupalabdhi, Viruddha Kāraṇa Anupalabdhi and Viruddha Svabhāva Anupalabdhi.

Example of Viruddha Kārya Anupalabdhi :—

यथाऽस्मिन् प्राणिनि व्याधिविशेषोऽस्ति

निरामयचेष्टानुपलब्धेः ॥ ८७ ॥

87. Yathāsmiṇ prāṇini vyādhiviśeṣostī nirāmayacheṣṭānupa-
labdheḥ.

87. As for example, some disease exists in this animal,
because the actions of a healthy body are not found.

Example of Viruddha Kāraṇa Anupalabdhi :—

अस्त्यत्र देहिनि दुःखमिष्टसंयोगाभावात् ॥ ८८ ॥

88. Astyatra dehini duḥkhamiṣṭasaṅyogābhāvat.

88. There is grief in this creature, because it has no
connection with its dear ones.

Example of Viruddha Svabhāva Anupalabdhi :—

अनेकान्तात्मकं वस्त्वेकांतस्वरूपानुपलब्धेः ॥ ८९ ॥

89. Anekāntātmakaṃ vastvekāntasvarūpānupalabdheḥ.

89. All things are Anekāntika (posessed of different aspects)
because we do not find that these have only one aspect.

Commentary

In Pramāṇanayatattvālokālāṅkāra, five varieties¹ (instead of three as described in the Parikṣāmukhaṃ) of Viruddha Anupa-
labdhi in Vidhi have been described. The first three are the same
as described in aphorisms 87, 88 and 89. The additional ones are
Viruddha Vyāpaka Anupalabdhi e. g. "There is wind here because
there is no heat" and Viruddha Sahachara Anupalabdhi e. g. 'He
has false knowledge because we do not find perfect knowledge in
him'².

1. "विरुद्धानुपलब्धिस्तु विधिप्रतीतौ पंचधा ।"

Pramāṇanayatattvālokālāṅkāra, III. 99.

2. "विरुद्धव्यापकानुपलब्धिर्यथा अस्त्यत्र छाया औष्ण्यानुपलब्धेः ।"

"विरुद्धसहचारानुपलब्धिर्यथा अस्त्यस्य मिथ्याज्ञानं सम्यग्दर्शनानुपलब्धेः ।"

Ibid III. 104, 105

परंपरया संभवत् साधनमत्रैवान्तर्भावनीयम् ॥ ९० ॥

90. Paramparayā sambhavat sādhanamatraivāntarbhāva-nīyam.

90. The Hetus which arise one after the other should be included within those (which have been described).

Commentary

There are cases where a Hetu is not the direct cause of anything but it leads to another and that leads to a third etc. In such cases there is no necessity of accepting these as separate Hetus, but we should include these within the proper Hetus already defined and illustrated. Examples of such Hetus are given in the following aphorism.

अभूदत्र चक्रे शिवकः स्थासात् ॥ ९१ ॥

91. Abhūdatra chakre śivakaḥ sthāsāt.

कार्यकार्यमविरुद्धकार्योपलब्धौ ॥ ९२ ॥

92. Kāryakāryamaviruddhakāryopalabdhou.

91. There was Śivaka (a clod of earth resembling a Śivaliṅga) on this potter's wheel because we see *Sthāsa* there.

92. (This Hetu showing) effect of an effect will be included within Aviruddha Kārya upalabdhī (as already defined).

Commentary

To manufacture a pitcher, a clod of earth is necessary. This clod resembling a Śivaliṅga is placed on the potter's wheel. *Chhatraka* (mushroom) may grow on it and after that *Sthāsa* (signs of mushroom) may be found on the earth. As *Sthāsa* is now seen, we infer Śivaka though the intervening Hetu *Chhatraka* is not seen or mentioned. *Sthāsa* is therefore the effect of *Chhatraka* which is an effect of Śivaka. This can be included within Aviruddha Kāryopalabdhī as already defined.

नास्त्यत्र गुहायां मृगक्रीडनं मृगारिसंशब्दनात् ।

कारणविरुद्धकार्यं विरुद्धकार्योपलब्धौ यथा ॥ ९३ ॥

93. Nāstyatra guhāyāṃ mṛigakṛīḍanaṃ mṛigārisaṃśabdanāt.

Kāraṇaviruddhakāryaṃ viruddhakāryopalabdhou yathā.

93. There is no play of deer in this cave because there is a roar of lion. Here there is an effect opposed to a cause. This should be (included) within Viruddha Kārya Upalabdhi.

Commentary

In the example given, deer (Kāraṇa) are the causes of play (Kārya). A lion is the antithesis (Viruddha) of deer for no deer can play in the presence of a lion. The Kārya of lion is the roaring. So we have Kāraṇa Viruddha Kārya in this place. This should be included within Viruddha Kārya Upalabdhi and not recognized as a separate inference.

व्युत्पन्नप्रयोगस्तु तथोपपत्त्याऽन्यथानुपपत्त्यैव वा ॥ ९४ ॥

94. Vyutpannaprayogastu tathopapattyānyathānupapattyaiṣa vā.

94. The use by those who are conversant (with the process of inference) is from existence or non-existence of that universal concomitance (between the Sādhya and the Sādhana).

Commentary

It has already been mentioned (Aphorism 46) that though five parts of Anumāna are used for teaching students, really there are only two parts of an inference (Aphorism 37). But those who are conversant with processes of reasoning employ inference through the knowledge of the existence of Sādhya (e. g. fire) always along with Sādhana (e. g. smoke) or the nonexistence of Sādhya where Sādhana is absent. This is amplified in the four aphorisms which follow.

अग्निमानयं देशस्तथैव धूमवत्त्वोपपत्तेर्धूमवत्त्वान्यथानुपपत्तेर्वा ॥ ९५ ॥

हेतुप्रयोगे हि यथा व्याप्तिग्रहणं विधीयते सा च

तावन्मात्रेण व्युत्पन्नैरवधार्यते ॥ ९६ ॥

95. Agnimānayaṃ deśastathaiva dhūmavattvopapatter-dhūmavattvānyathānupapattervā.

96. Hetuprayoge hi yathā vyāptigrahaṇaṃ vidhīyate sū cha tāvanmātreṇa vyutpannairavadhāryate.

तावता च साध्यसिद्धिः ॥ ९७ ॥

97. Tāvata cha sādhyasiddhiḥ.

तेन पक्षस्तदाधारसूचनायोक्तः ॥ ९८ ॥

98. Tena pakṣastadādhārasūchanāyoktaḥ.

95. This place is full of fire, for existence of smoke is only possible if there be fire here or (this place is not full of fire) as smoke does not exist here.

96. In the employment of Hetu, the use of Vyāpti (universal concomitance) is made. That (Vyāpti) is understood by the persons conversant (with the process of inference) from it (viz. Hetu) (without use of Udāharana etc.).

97. The Sādhya is established from this (viz. Hetu) only.

98. So it has been mentioned that it is necessary to mention Pakṣa to indicate the Ādhāra (abode) of Hetu consisting of universal concomitance.

Commentary

The subjectmatter of these four aphorisms has already been discussed in connection with the establishment of the principle that Driṣṭānta etc. are not necessary in inference by logicians conversant with the processes of reasoning, though these may be used in lectures to pupils for their better understanding (vide Aphorisms 37, 43, 44 and 46).

आप्तवचनादिनिवंधनमर्थज्ञानमागमः ॥ ९९ ॥

99. Āptavachanādinivandhanamarthajñānamāgamah.

99. Āgama is knowledge derived from words etc. of a reliable person.

Commentary

The characteristics of Anumāna have been described. Now the same of Āgama are mentioned. Knowledge derived from in-

terpretation of signs, symbols, words etc. is called Śruta Jñāna. Now the words, signs etc. of a person who has no motive for deceiving or misleading any one, are reliable. Such a person is known as Āpta. The knowledge derived from words etc. of an Āpta is called Āgama.

This is the same as Śabda Pramāṇa of Hindu philosophers. Knowledge may be derived from words of living beings or from scriptures. In Nyāyāvatāra, the Śabda Pramāṇa with its subdivision scriptural knowledge is thus described :—

“Knowledge arising from words, which taken in their proper acceptance express real objects not inconsistent with what are established by perception, is known as Śabda (the verbal testimony).

The scripture (Śāstra) is that which was invented (or first known) by a competent person, which is not such as to be passed over by others, which is not incompatible with the truths derived from perception, which imparts true instructions and which is profitable to all men and is preventive of the evil path¹.”

Dr. S. C. Vidyābhūṣana in his notes to these verses has written : “Śabda (the word or verbal testimony) is of two kinds, viz. (1) Laukika (the knowledge derived from a reliable person), and (2) Śāstraja (the knowledge derived from scripture). This definition sets aside the view of those (Mimāṃsakas) who maintain that the scripture (such as the Veda) is eternal and was not composed by any human being. The scripture could not have

1. “दृष्टेष्टाव्याहृतत्वाद् वाक्यात् परमार्थमिधायिनः ।

तत्त्वग्राहितयोत्पन्नमानं शाब्दं प्रकीर्तितम् ॥

आप्तोपज्ञमनुलङ्घ्यमदृष्टविरोधकम् ।

तत्त्वोपदेशकत्वं सार्वं शास्त्रं कापथ्यदृष्टम् ॥”

Nyāyāvatāra 8. 9.

Tr. by Dr. S. C. Vidyābhūṣana. The latter verse appears as verse 9 in Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakaśāhāra by Samantabhadra (2nd century).

been called a verbal testimony (Śabda or word) unless it embodied the words of any particular person or persons¹."

In Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāra it is mentioned : "Āgama is knowledge derived from words etc. of an Āpta. The words themselves are also called Āgama in a secondary sense. For example, there is a mine of jewels in this place. Hills etc. containing jewels exist. An Āpta is a person who knows the real nature of a thing about which he speaks and who speaks according to his correct knowledge. Only words of such a person are established without any opposition. Such an Āpta is of two kinds Laukika or Lokottara. A Laukika person is (an ordinary human being) like Janaka. Lokottara persons are like the Tirthankaras²." In the Hindu Nyāya philosophy also Śabda (Pramāṇa) is said to be derived from the speech of one worthy of confidence and a person who speaks the truth becomes worthy (Āpta) of such confidence³.

An Āpta is free from eighteen faults viz. hunger, thirst, senility, disease, birth, death, fear, pride, attachment, aversion, infatuation, worry, conceit, hatred, uneasiness, sweat, sleep and

1. Nyāyāvatāra Edited by S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa, Pp. 11-12.

2. "आप्तवचनादाविर्भूतमर्थसंवेदनमागमः ॥"

"उपचारादाप्तवचनञ्च ॥"

"समस्त्यत्र प्रदेशे रत्ननिधानं, सन्ति रत्नसानुप्रभृतयः ॥"

"अभिधेयं वस्तु यत्रावस्थितं यो जानीते यथाज्ञानं चाभिधत्ते स आप्तः ॥"

"तस्य हि वचनम् अविसंवादि भवति ।"

"स च द्वेधा लौकिको लोकोत्तरश्च ।"

"लौकिको जनकादिर्लोकोत्तरस्तु तीर्थकरादितः ॥"

Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāra IV. 1—7

3. "आप्तवाक्यं शब्दः । आप्तस्तु यथार्थवक्ता ।"

Tarkasaṅgraha by Annam Bhatta 48.

surprise¹. He is the knower of all things. Being free from faults, he reveals the scriptures². He is of the highest status and of unsurpassed splendour. He is free from attachment and void of impurities. He has omniscience and has no beginning, middle or end and is a friend of all living beings and their teacher³. Just as a drum sounds being struck by the hands of the drummer without any desire of its own, so an Āpta reveals the Truth for the benefit of people without any personal motive⁴. Revelation comes out of an Āpta spontaneously to remove sufferings of people.

सहजयोग्यतासंकेतवशाद्धि शब्दादयो वस्तुप्रतिपत्तिहेतवः ॥१००॥

100. Sahajayogyatāsaṃketavaśāddhi śabdādayo vastu-pratipattihetavaḥ.

यथा मेवादयः सन्ति ॥ १०१ ॥

101. Yathā mervādayaḥ santi.

100. Words etc. (signs, symbols and other things of like nature) are causes of knowledge of things through their inherent power in connoting things.

101. As for example "The Meru etc. exist."

Commentary

A question may arise, how do we have knowledge derived from words ? In Hindu Nyāya philosophy it is mentioned "The

1. "क्षुत्पिपासाजरातङ्कजन्मान्तकभयस्मयाः ।

न रागद्वेषमोहाश्च यस्याप्तः स प्रकीर्तितः ॥"

Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakaḥcāhāra, Verse 6

2. "आप्तेनोच्छिन्नदोषेण सर्वज्ञेनागमेशिना ।

भवितव्यं नियोगेन नान्यथा ह्याप्तता भवेत् ॥" Ibid Verse 5

3. "परमेष्ठी परंज्योतिर्विरागो विमलः कृती ।

सर्वज्ञोऽनादिमध्यान्तः सार्वः शास्तोपलाल्यते ॥" Ibid Verse 7

4. "अनात्मार्थं विना रागैः शास्ता शास्ति सतो हितम् ।

ध्वनन् शिल्पिकरस्पर्शान्मुरजः किमपेक्षते ॥" Ibid Verse 8

cause of the knowledge of the sense of a sentence is the inter-dependance, Compatibility and Juxta-position (of the words). Inter-dependance means the inability of a word to indicate the intended sense in the absence of another word. Compatibility consists in (a word's) not rendering futile the sense (of a sentence). Juxta-position consists in the enunciation of the words without a (long) pause between each.

A collection of words devoid of interdependance etc. is no valid sentence. For example 'cow, horse, man, elephant' gives no information, the words not looking out for one another. The expression 'He should irrigate with fire' is no cause of right knowledge, for there is no compatibility (between fire and irrigation). The words 'Bring-the-cow' not pronounced close together but with an interval of some three hours between each, are not a cause of correct knowledge, from the absence of (the requisite closeness of) juxta-position¹."

"A speech is a collection of significant sounds as for example, Bring the cow. A significant sound is that which is possessed of power (to convey a meaning)²."

Now, if we ask, who decides that such and such a word means such and such a thing, the answer given by some Hindu logicians is that it is God's will which decides this. "The power (of a word) is the appointment, in the shape of God's will that such and

1. "आकाङ्क्षा योग्यता संनिधिश्च वाक्यार्थज्ञानहेतुः । पदस्य पदान्तर-
व्यतिरेकप्रयुक्तान्वयाननुभावकत्वमाकाङ्क्षा । अर्थावाधो योग्यता । पदानामविलम्बेनोच्चारणं
संनिधिः ।

आकाङ्क्षादिरहितं वाक्यमप्रमाणम् । यथा गौरश्चः पुरुषो हस्तीति न प्रमाण-
माकाङ्क्षाविरहात् । अग्निना सिञ्चेदिति न प्रमाणं योग्यताविरहात् । प्रहरे प्रहरे-
ऽसहोच्चारितानि गामानयेत्यादिपदानि न प्रमाणं सांनिध्याभावात् ॥" Tarka-
saṅgraha, 49-50.

2. "वाक्यं पदसमूहः । यथा गामानयेति । शक्तं पदम् ।" Tarka-
saṅgraha, 48.

such an import should be recognizable from such and such a significant sound¹. Or, we may hold that we take the meaning of words from its use in a particular sense by previous users².

In this connection we may remember the conclusions arrived at by scholars dealing with the science of language regarding sematology or the science of meaning of words. "The phenomena with which sematology deals are too complicated, too dependent on psychological conditions ; the element of chance or conscious exertion of will seems to enter into them, and it is often left to the arbitrary choice of an individual to determine the change of meaning to be undergone by a word. Still this meaning must be accepted by the community before it can become part of language ; unless it is so accepted it will remain a mere literary curiosity in the pages of a technical dictionary. And since its acceptance by the community is due to general causes, influencing many minds alike, it is possible to analyze and formulate these causes, in fact, to refer significant change to certain definite principles to bring it under certain definite generalizations. Moreover, it must be remembered that the ideas suggested by most words are what Locke calls 'mixed modes.' A word like *just* or *beauty* is but a shorthand note suggesting a number of ideas more or less associated with one another. But the ideas associated with it in one mind cannot be exactly those associated with it in another ; to one man it suggests what it does not to another. So long as we move in a society subjected to the same social influences and education as ourselves we do not readily perceive the fact, since the leading ideas called up by the word will be alike for all ; but it is quite otherwise when we come to deal with those whose education has been imperfect as compared with our own. A young speaker often imagines that he makes himself intelligible to an uneducated

1. "अस्मात् पदात् अयमर्थो बोद्धव्य इतीश्वरेच्छासकेतः शक्तिः ।"

Tarkasaṅgraha, 48.

2. "सकेतस्य ग्रहः पूर्वं बृहत्स्य व्यवहारतः ।" Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā

audience by using short and homely words ; unless he also suits his ideas to theirs, he will be no better understood than if he spoke in the purest Johnsonese. If we are suddenly brought into contact with experts in a subject we have not studied, or dip into a book on an unfamiliar branch of knowledge, we seem to be listening to the meaningless sounds of a foreign tongue. The words used may not be technical words ; but familiar words and expressions will bear senses and suggest ideas to those who use them which they will not bear to us. It is impossible to convey in a translation all that is meant by the original writer. We may say that the French *juste* answers to the English *just*, and so it does in a rough way ; but the train of thoughts associated with *juste* is not that associated with *just*, and the true meaning of a passage may often depend more on the associated thoughts than on the leading idea itself. Nearly every word, in fact, may be described as a complex of ideas, which is not the same in the minds of any two individuals, its general meaning lying in the common ideas attached to it by all the members of a particular society. The significations, therefore, with which the comparative philologist has to concern himself are those unconsciously agreed upon by a body of men, or rather the common group of ideas suggested by a word to all of them alike. Here again some general causes must be at work which may yet be revealed by a careful analysis. The comparative philologist has not to trouble himself, like the classical philologist, with discovering the exact ideas connected with a word by some individual author ; it is the meaning of words as they are used in current speech, not as they illustrate the idiosyncrasies of a writer, which it is his province to investigate.¹”

We must also remember that analogy lends new senses to words. The original meaning is forgotten and metaphorical senses come to be used in its place. A dead meaning may again be

1. Introduction to the Science of Language (Sayce) Vol. I
Pp. 336-338.

revived. There are also metaphors, variation of meaning according to their application to persons or things, to what is good or bad, great or small. Words change their signification according to their use as active or passive, as subjects or as objects. An idea may also be expressed either by a compound or periphrasis or by a single word. The same word may also be applied in a variety of senses, the particular sense which it bears being determined by the context. Change of meaning may also follow from change of pronunciation or the introduction of new words¹.


In aphorism 99 it has been mentioned that knowledge can be derived from "words etc." of an Āpta. We have mentioned that by 'etc.' it is implied that signs, symbols etc. can also impart knowledge. The modern science of language also recognises that thoughts can be expressed by other symbols than words. Writing consisting of hieroglyphics or mathematical symbols and gesture language are examples of this. Onomatopaeia, interjectional or instinctive cries also of men whose language we do not know are intelligible to us.

End of Samuddeśa 3.

1. Ibid Pp. 338-343.

CHART IV.

[CHAPTER IV.]



चतुर्थः समुद्देशः

SAMUDDEŚA IV.

This samuddeśa deals with the object of Pramāṇa.

सामान्यविशेषात्मा तदर्थो विषयः ॥ १ ॥

1. Sāmānyaviśeṣatmā tadartho viṣayaḥ.

1. The subject matter of it (Pramāṇa) is viṣaya of two kinds characterised by sāmānya and viśeṣa.

Commentary

The subject matter of this samuddeśa is summarised in the Chart which faces this page.

“Things in nature are characterised by many-sidedness. Each of them presents a number of aspects which have to be known before we can be said to have exact knowledge of their nature.

The different points of view for studying things are called Nayas of which the Dravyārthika (the natural) and the Paryāyārthika (changing or conditional) are the most important.

The Dravyārthika point of view only takes into consideration the nature of the substance of material of a thing, while the Paryāyārthika confines itself to the study of the form or forms in which substances manifest themselves¹.”

“Jainism aims, from the very commencement, at a systematic classification of the subject-matter of knowledge, and divides the philosophical standpoint into two main heads, the Niśchaya and the Vyavahāra. Of these, the former deals with the permanent qualities, hence, the essential nature of things about which there can be no possibility of doubt, and which remains true under all

circumstances, conditions and states. For this reason, it is called the Nīśchaya i. e. the natural or certain. The latter, however, only deals with things not with reference to their real or essential nature, but with respect to their utility or non-natural states and conditions. The statement 'This is a jar of clay' is an illustration of the Nīśchaya Naya, while 'This is a jar of butter' is true only from the Vyavahāra or the practical point of view¹."

In Naya-kārikā by Vinaya-vijaya we have : "All objects possess two kinds of properties, viz. 1. Sāmānya or the generalizing (general) and 2. Viśeṣa or the differentiating (specific) properties ; the general expressing the genus (*jāti*) etc. and the specific expressing the species, differences and distinctions. By means of general properties in each of a hundred ('hundred' here means 'all') jars, one idea (that of jariness is recognised and by means of specific properties, people distinguish each individual particular jar as their own²."

Hemachandra writes : "The objects of Pramāṇa are things characterised by Dravya or Paryāya³." Dravya and Paryāya are the same as Sāmānya and Viśeṣa or Nīśchaya and Vyavahāra.

अनुवृत्तव्यावृत्तप्रत्ययगोचरत्वात् पूर्वोत्तराकारपरिहारावाप्ति-
स्थितिलक्षणपरिणामेनार्थक्रियोपपत्तेश्च ॥ २ ॥*

2. Anuvritta-vyāvritta-pratyaya-gocharatvāt pūrvottarākāra-parihārāvāpti-sthiti-lakṣaṇa-pariṇāmenārtha-kriyopapattēśca.

* "पूर्वोत्तराकारपरिहारस्वीकारस्थितिलक्षणपरिणामेनास्यार्थक्रियोपपत्तिः ।"

Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā I. I. 34

1. The Nayakārikā by M. D. Desai. Introduction Pp. 5-6.

2. "अर्थाः सर्वेऽपि सामान्यविशेषा उभयात्मकाः ।

सामान्यं तत्र जात्यादि विशेषश्च विभेदकाः ॥

ऐक्यबुद्धिर्घटशते भवेत् सामान्यधर्मतः ।

विशेषाच्च निजं निजं लक्ष्यन्ति घटं जनाः ॥"

Nayakārikā 3 and 4

3. "प्रमाणस्य विषयो द्रव्यपर्यायात्मकं वस्तु ।"

Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā I. 1. 31,

2. As there is attainment of the object (as a result of knowledge) from signs of changes from its original state to a later state preserving its essential characteristics and from our idea of general and special characteristics.

Commentary

In every substance, there is knowledge of its general and special characteristics. For example, we have a general knowledge of a man and a special knowledge whether he is a Brahmin or not etc. Also, a thing changes its qualities for example a man grows up, leaving his childhood and youth and becomes old. But throughout his different ages, he maintains essential characteristics of being a person.

This acceptance of change leading to the many-sidedness of a thing is a peculiarity of Jain doctrine establishing the Anekāntavāda.

“Dravya means that which flows or changes. While changing through its different qualities and modifications, its essential nature persists. This kind of progressive development is associated with Dravya. But such development is also the characteristic of substance. Hence according to Jaina attitude, Dravya is not entirely different from Sattā or substance.”

According to this view there is no unchanging substance or Sattā in Jaina system... Here... the similarity between the Hegelian concept of ‘thing’ and the Jaina concept of Dravya is worth noticing. Sattā is not ‘a thing in itself’ behind Dravya. Sattā and Dravya are one and the same as Hegel mentioned. “Thing in itself and experience are not absolutely distinct. Dravya refers to facts of experience. Sattā refers to existence or reality. One may be abstracted from the other but it is not different from the other as a fact¹.”

1. “द्वियदि गच्छदि ताई ताई सव्भाव पज्जयाईं जं ।

द्वियं तं भण्णंति अण्णण्णभूदं तु सत्तादो ॥”

Pañchāstikāyasamayāsāra. Verse 9.

This changing nature of the substance is mentioned in the Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra as "Sat (the dravya) consists of utpāda, vyaya and dhrauvya¹." Utpāda is appearance i. e., assuming new modification. This does not mean creation out of nothing. Creation by the fiat of a will is not recognised by the Jainas. Utpāda therefore means that phase of the process of the development when a new form is assumed. Vyaya is losing the previous form. Here also it is different from absolute disappearance. It only means that phase in the process of development where the earlier form is replaced by the succeeding one. Dhrauvya refers to the persistence of the essential nature of dravya which undergoes development and which makes both utpāda and vyaya simultaneously possible. In fact the process of development includes all the three phases. This fact is not only recognised by scientists like Darwin and Spencer, but by the great French philosopher Bergson who has raised it to an important philosophical principle²."

Hemachandra says that from the fact that only a thing characterised by Dravya and Paryāya is capable of producing the result of Pramāṇa viz. acceptance of things desirable and non-acceptance of undesirable things or indifference to the latter, we say that merely a Dravya or a Paryāya or both of them independently of the thing cannot be the object of Pramāṇa³.

1. "सत् द्रव्यलक्षणम् ।"

"उत्पादव्ययध्रौव्ययुक्तं सत् ।"

Tattvārtha Sūtra V. 29 and 30.

2. Sacred Books of the Jainas Vol. III. P. 9.

3. "कुतः पुनर्द्रव्यपर्यायात्मकमेव वस्तु प्रमाणानां विषयो, न द्रव्यमात्रं पर्यायमात्रमुभयं वा स्वतन्त्रमित्याह, अर्थक्रियासामर्थ्यात् । अर्थस्य हानोपादानादिलक्षणस्य क्रियानिष्पत्तिस्तत्र सामर्थ्यात् द्रव्यपर्यायात्मकस्यैव वस्तुनोऽर्थक्रियासमर्थत्वादित्यर्थः ।" Pramāṇa-mimāṃsā 1. 1. 32.

सामान्यं द्वेधा तिर्यग्ध्वताभेदात् ॥ ३ ॥

3. Sāmānyam dvedhā tiryagūrdhvatābhedāt.

3. Sāmānya is of two kinds being divided into Tiryak (sāmānya) and ūrdhvatā (sāmānya).

सदृशपरिणामस्तिर्यक् खंडमुंडादिषु गोत्ववत् ॥ ४ ॥

4. Sadriśapariṇāmastiryak khandamundādiṣu gotvavat.

4. Tiryak (sāmānya) is the same modification such as Khaṇḍa Muṇḍa etc. in the condition of a cow.

परापरविवर्तव्यापिद्रव्यमूर्द्ध्वता मृदिव स्थासादिषु ॥ ५ ॥

5. Parāparavivartavyāpidravayamūrdhvatā mridiva sthāsā-diṣu.

5. Ūrdhvatā sāmānya is a thing which remains the same through changes such as earth in its (modifications) sthāsa etc.

विशेषश्च ॥ ६ ॥

6. Viśeṣaśchā.

पर्यायव्यतिरेकभेदात् ॥ ७ ॥

7. Paryāyavyatirekabhedāt.

6. Viśeṣa (is) also (of two kinds).

7. Being divided into Paryāya and Vyatireka.

एकस्मिन् द्रव्ये क्रमभाविनः परिणामाः पर्याया आत्मनि

हर्षविषादादिवत् ॥ ८ ॥

8. Ekasmin dravye kramabhāvinah pariṇāmāḥ paryāyā ātmani harṣaviṣādādivat.

8. Paryāyās are modifications in sequence in a single substance e. g. joy and grief in oneself.

अर्थान्तरगतो विसदृशपरिणामो व्यतिरेको गोमहिषादिवत् ॥ ९ ॥

9. Arthāntaragato visadriśa-pariṇāmo vyatireko go-mahiṣādivat.

9. Vyatirekas are different modifications in different objects such as a cow and a buffalo etc.

Commentary

With this aphorism, the description of the subject matter of Pramāṇa ends. In the next samuddeśa the result of Pramāṇa will be discussed.

End of Samuddeśa IV.

पञ्चमः समुद्देशः
SAMUDDĒSA V.

अज्ञाननिवृत्तिर्हानोपादानोपेक्षाश्च फलम् ॥ १ ॥

1. Ajñāna-nivrittirhānopādānopekṣāścha phalam.

1. The result is the dispelling of false knowledge and leaving (the undesirable things), acquirement (of desirable things) and indifference (to other things).

Commentary

The result of Pramāṇa primarily consists of correct knowledge dispelling false knowledge, secondarily it leads to the acquirement of desirable objects, discarding of undesirable objects and indifference to other objects. This secondary result arises after we ascertain an object correctly by Pramāṇa¹.

Hemachandra mentions : when Pramāṇa arises in a person, the correct knowledge of an object is established. The immediate result is therefore the destruction of false knowledge², or the idea of leaving (the undesirable) etc. The following verse of Nyāya-vatāra is quoted in the commentary by Hemachandra.

“प्रमाणस्य फलं साक्षादज्ञानविनिवर्तनम् ।

केवलस्य सुखोपेक्षे शेषस्यादानहानधीः ॥”

1. “द्विविधं हि फलं साक्षात् पारस्पर्येणेति । साक्षादज्ञाननिवृत्तिः पारस्पर्येण हानादिकमिति । प्रमेयनिश्चयोत्तरकालभावित्वात् तस्येति ।”

Prameyaratnamālā.

2. “तस्यां सत्यामर्थप्रकाशसिद्धेः ।”

Pramāṇa-mimāṃsā L 1. 38.

“अज्ञाननिवृत्तिर्वा ।” Ibid. I. 1. 39.

“हानादिवुद्धयो वा ।” Ibid. I. 1. 41.

That is to say, the immediate result of Pramāṇa is the removal of ignorance. So the mediate effect is happiness and indifference or equanimity to a Kevali (one possessed of absolute knowledge) and to others, a desire to accept (desirable objects) and leave (undesirable objects).

In Āpta Mimāṃsā also the same has been mentioned :

“उपेक्षा फलमाद्यस्य शेषस्यादानहानयोः ।

पूर्वा वाऽज्ञाननाशो वा सर्वस्यास्य स्वगोचरे ॥”

In Sarvārtha-siddhi while explaining the aphorism “Tat Pramāṇe” of Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra, the result of Pramāṇa is mentioned as “अन्धकारकल्पाज्ञानाभावः अज्ञाननाशो वा फलमित्युच्यते ।” i. e. “the result is said to be the want of false knowledge resembling darkness or the destruction of false knowledge.”

We have discussed while dealing with the definition of Pramāṇa that the Jain logicians have accepted the result of Pramāṇa to be the same as Pramāṇa. In Hindu philosophical systems like the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems, the knowledge is mentioned as a result of Pramāṇa. For example Gautama in his Nyāya Sūtras has propounded that the knowledge of fire from smoke is the result known as Anumiti from Anumāna Pramāṇa (inference). But in Jain logic, this result itself has been called Anumāna and the dispelling of false knowledge is said to be the result of Pramāṇa.

It will be laid down in the two aphorisms which follow that in one sense a result is identical with Pramāṇa and in another sense it is different.

In the different stages of knowledge Avagraha, Itā, Avāya Dhāraṇā, Smṛiti, Pratyabhijñāna, Ūha, and Anumāna, the first is Pramāṇa and the second is the result of the first. Again the second becomes Pramāṇa and the third becomes the result of the second and so on¹.

1. “अवग्रहादीनां वा क्रमापेक्षजननधर्माणां पूर्वं पूर्वं प्रमाणमुत्तरमुत्तरं फलम् ।”

Pramāṇa-mimāṃsā I. 1. 40.

प्रमाणादभिन्नं भिन्नं च ॥ २ ॥

2. Pramāṇādabhinnaṃ bhinnaṃ cha.

2. (The result) is different and not different (in another sense) from the Pramāṇa.

यः प्रमिमीते स एव निवृत्ताज्ञानो जहात्यादत्त

उपेक्षते चेति प्रतीतेः ॥ ३ ॥

3. Yaḥ pramimite sa eva nivṛttajñāno jahātyādatta upekṣate cheti pratiteḥ.

3. He who takes cognizance, becomes free from false knowledge and rejects (undesirable objects), selects (desirable objects) or becomes indifferent.

Commentary

The self which is changed in the form of a Pramāṇa is also changed in the form of the result. In this sense Pramāṇa is not different from its result. But if we take that Pramāṇa is the instrumental cause (Kāraṇa) of the action (Kriyā) viz. the result, we can say in this sense, that Pramāṇa is different from the result¹.

“अवग्रहेहावायधारणास्मृतिप्रत्यभिज्ञानोहानुमानानां क्रमेणोपजायमानानां यद् यत् पूर्वं तत्तत् प्रमाणं यद्यदुत्तरं तत्तत्फलरूपं प्रतिपत्तव्यम् । अवग्रहपरिणामवान् ह्यात्मा ईहारूपफलतया परिणमति इतीहाफलापेक्षया अवग्रहः प्रमाणम्, ततोपीहा प्रमाणमवायः फलं. पुनरवायः प्रमाणं धारणा फलम्, ईहाधारणयोर्ज्ञानोपादानत्वात् ज्ञानरूपतोन्नेया, ततो धारणा प्रमाणं स्मृतिः फलम्, ततोऽपि स्मृतिः प्रमाणं प्रत्यभिज्ञानं फलं, ततोऽपि प्रत्यभिज्ञा प्रमाणमूहः फलं, ततोऽप्यूहः प्रमाणमनुमानं फलमिति प्रमाणफलविभाग इति ।” Bhāṣya to Ibid.

1. “यस्यैवात्मनः प्रमाणाकारेण परिणतिस्तस्यैव फलरूपतया परिणाम इत्येकप्रमात्रपेक्षया प्रमाणफलयोरभेदः । करणक्रियापरिणामभेदाद् भेदः ।”

Prameyaratnamālā.

This is also laid down in Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā¹.

It is mentioned in Prameyaratnamālā that the propounders of Nyāyavaiśeṣika philosophies maintain that Pramāṇa is different from its result and the Buddhists say that the result is identical with the Pramāṇa. Refuting these views, it is laid down by Māṇikyanandi that result is in one sense different from Pramāṇa and in another, identical with it².

End of Samuddeśa V.

1. “प्रमाणाद् भिन्नाभिन्नम्।” Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsa. I. I. 24.

“करणरूपत्वात् क्रियारूपत्वाच्च प्रमाणफलयोरभेदः ।...तस्यैवात्मनः प्रमाणाकारेण परिणतिस्तस्यैव फलरूपतया परिणाम इत्येकप्रमात्रपेक्षया प्रमाणफलयोरभेदः ।” Ibid. Bhāṣya.

2. “तद्विविधमपि फलं प्रमाणाद्भिन्नमेवेति यौगाः । अभिन्नमेवेति सौगताः । तन्मतद्वयनिरासेन स्वमतं व्यवस्थापयितुमाह ।” Prameyaratnamālā.

षष्ठः समुद्देशः

SAMUDDĒŚA VI.

ततोऽन्यत्तदाभासम् ॥ १ ॥

1. Tatonyattadābhāsam

1. The opposite of it, is Ābhāsa of the same.

Commentary

In this Chapter, the fallacies will be taken up and described. We have mentioned before hand the nature, number, object and result of Pramāṇa. The opposite of these will be fallacies of these. The fallacies of Pramāṇa are described in Aphorisms 2-54, those of number are described in aphorism 55 ; those of object are described in aphorism 61 and those of result in aphorism 66.

अस्वसंविदितगृहीतार्थदर्शनसंशयादयः प्रमाणाभासाः ॥ २ ॥

2. Asvasaṁviditagrihitārthadarśanasamśayādayaḥ pramāṇābhāsāḥ.

2. Pramāṇābhāsas (fallacies of Pramāṇa) are non-cognizance by one's own-self, knowledge of what has already been known, doubt etc.

स्वविषयोपदर्शकत्वाभावात् ॥ ३ ॥

3. Svaviṣayopadarśakatvābhāvāt.

3. Because (such knowledge) does not establish its own object.

पुरुषान्तरपूर्वार्थगच्छत्तृणस्पर्शस्थानुपुरुषादिज्ञानवत् ॥ ४ ॥

4. Puruṣāntarapūrvārthagachchattriṇa-sparsā-sthāṇupuruṣādijñānavat.

4. As (for example), the knowledge of another person, the knowledge of a thing previously known, the knowledge of touching

grass of a person moving, the knowledge whether this is a post or a man etc.

Commentary

That which is not cognized by one's own self does not establish one's own knowledge ; so it is not fit to establish the object of knowledge. Consequently knowledge of others is not Pramāṇa but only a fallacy.

Again Nirvikalpaka Darśana is a fallacy as the Vikalpa caused by it, (and not itself) shows the object.

Knowledge of what has already been known is a fallacy as it does not establish the object (being already known by previous experience).

By the word "doubt etc." in the aphorism, Saṁśaya (doubt), Anadhyavasāya and Viparyaya are meant. These have been thoroughly described in the commentary on Aphorism 3 Samu-
ddeśa I of this work.

चक्षुरसयोर्द्रव्ये संयुक्तसमवायवच्च ॥ ५ ॥

5. Chakṣū rasayordravye saṁyuktasamavāyavaccha.

5. Like Saṁyukta Samavāya of eye and juice in a thing.

Commentary

According to the view of Hindu Nyāya philosophy, knowledge of colour etc. arises in Samavāya Samvandha (intimate relation or co-inherence). Seven categories viz. substance (Dravya), quality (Guṇa), action (Karma), genus (Sāmānya), difference (Viśeṣa), co-inherence (Samavāya) and non-existence (Abhāva) are recognized in Hindu Nyāya philosophy¹. Samavāya is thus described : "Intimate relation is co-inherence (Samavāya). It exists in things which cannot exist separately. Two things which cannot exist separately are those of which two, the one exists only as lodged in the other. Such pairs are, parts and what is made up of the parts,

1. "द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायाभावाः सप्तपदार्थाः ।" Tarkasaṁ-
graha.

qualities and the thing qualified, action and agent, species and individual, and difference and eternal substances¹." "It exist, between the whole and its parts, the class and the individual, substance and qualities, agent and action, the ultimate atom and its viśeṣa²." When the eye sees a pitcher, the colour which is co-inherent in the pitcher is cognized by the eye. So according to Hindu Naiyāyikas, the relationship of Saṃjukta Samavāya can be the cause of the knowledge of colour.

In Jain Nyāya philosophy this view is not accepted and is refuted by this aphorism. It is urged that when we see a fruit, we do not cognise its taste though the taste has co-inherence in the fruit. So it cannot be said that knowledge arises from Saṃjukta Samavāya Saṃvandha. Though in a thing (fruit) there is co-inherence of sight and taste, Pramāṇa of taste cannot arise from the sight. In the same manner coinherence of sight and colour also cannot be accepted as Pramāṇa. So the Pramāṇa called Sannikarṣa in Hindu Nyāya philosophy is not accepted by Jain logicians.

अवैशद्ये प्रत्यक्षं तदाभासं बौद्धस्याकस्माद्

धूमदर्शनाद्वह्निविज्ञानवत् ॥ ६ ॥

6. Avaiśadye pratyakṣaṃ tadābhāsaṃ bauddhasyākasmāt dhūma-darśanādvahnivijñānavat.

6. When Pratyakṣa is accepted in (things) not clear, we have its fallacy e. g. cognizance of fire by the followers of the Buddhist philosophy from sudden vision of smoke.

Commentary

In this aphorism, fallacy of Pratyakṣa (Pratyakṣābhāsa) is described.

1. Dr. Ballantyne's Translation of the following passage from Tarkasaṅgraha : "नित्यसंबन्धः समवायोऽयुतसिद्धवृत्तिः । ययोर्द्वयोर्मध्य एकमपराश्रितमेवावतिष्ठते तावयुतसिद्धौ ॥ अवयवावयविनौ गुणगुणिनौ क्रियाक्रियावन्तौ जातिव्यक्ती विशेषनित्यद्रव्ये च ।"

2. Arthur Venis. Notes on Vedānta-Paribhāṣā.

Acceptance of Pratyakṣa knowledge without clearness is fallacy of Pratyakṣa. This happens in the case of the followers of the Buddhist Nyāya philosophy who hold that from a sudden vision of smoke, a knowledge of fire arises by Pratyakṣa and not by inference (Anumāna). Clearness has already been defined in Samuddeśa II. Aphorism 4 as illumination without any other intermediate knowledge or illumination in details. In Anumāna or inference we have an intermediate knowledge of smoke before we have a knowledge of fire and from the smoke we infer that there is fire. In Pratyakṣa we see the fire with our own eyes or learn of its existence by words of a reliable person. The view of the Buddhist Nyāya philosophy that we have a Pratyakṣa knowledge of fire from the sudden vision of smoke is held to be faulty in this aphorism. It is said that such a knowledge wants clearness which is the characteristic of Pratyakṣa is Pratyakṣābhāsa. Details of Pratyakṣa knowledge have already been mentioned in Samuddeśa II. a reference to to which may be made. In a sudden vision of smoke, there is no definite ascertainment (Niśchaya) whether it is smoke or steam. So the knowledge of concomitance of fire and smoke cannot arise. For this uncertainty the knowledge of fire as derived from a sudden vision of smoke is Pratyakṣābhāsa. The Nirvikalpa Pratyakṣa as accepted by the Buddhists is for this reason Pratyakṣābhāsa (fallacy of Pratyakṣa)¹.

वैशद्येऽपि परोक्षं तदाभासं मीमांसकस्य करणस्य ज्ञानवत् ॥ ७ ॥

7. Vaiśadyehpi parokṣaṃ tadābhāsaṃ mīmāṃsakasya karaṇasya jñānavat.

7. In Parokṣa (accepted) in clearness, (we have) its fallacy (Parokṣābhāsa) e. g. knowledge derived from the senses as accepted by the Mīmāsakas.

1. “यथा धुमवाष्पादिविवेकनिश्चयाभावाद् व्याप्तिप्रहणाभावाद् अकस्माद् धुमदर्शनाज्जातं यद्वह्निविज्ञानं तत्तदाभासं भवति कस्मादनिश्चयाद् । तथा द्रौढ्यपरिकल्पितं यन्निर्विकल्पकप्रत्यक्षं तत् प्रत्यक्षाभासं भवति कस्मादनिश्चयान् ।” Note on Prameyakamalamārtanda.

Commentary

Parokṣābhāsa (fallacy of Parokṣa) arises when we accept Parokṣa knowledge as clear. The followers of the Mīmāṃsā philosophy hold that knowledge derived from the senses is Parokṣa. This view is refuted in this aphorism which lays down that such knowledge is clear and hence cannot be Parokṣa. In Samuddeśa III of this work, Parokṣa knowledge has been described in detail and clearness has been described in Aphorism 3 Samuddeśa II. In knowledge derived from the senses, we have no intermediate knowledge (as in the case of inference e. g. of smoke before we cognise fire). So clearness exists in these cases¹ and to hold such cases to be Parokṣa will be fallacy of Parokṣa.

अतस्मिंस्तदिति ज्ञानं स्मरणाभासं जिनदत्ते
स देवदत्तो यथा ॥ ८ ॥

8. Atasminstaditi jñānam smaraṇābhāsaṃ jinadatte sa Devadatto yathā.

8. Smaraṇābhāsa (fallacy of memory) is the knowledge in one of another e. g. when we (falsely recognise) Jinadatta as Devadatta.

Commentary

Fallacies of each of the subdivisions of Pratyakṣa viz. Smṛiti, Pratyabhijñāna, Tarka, Anumāna and Āgama are described in Aphorisms 8, 9, 10, 11-50 and 51 of this Samuddeśa.

Smṛiti or Smaraṇa (recollection) has been defined in Aphorism 3 of Samuddeśa III. We see Jinadatta. Later on when we see him again, we recognise him to be that Jina-datta. This is Smṛiti or recollection. But if we have remembrance of Devadatta when we see Jinadatta, this will be a fallacy of recollection (Smaraṇābhāsa).

1. “न हि करणज्ञानेऽव्यवधानेन प्रतिभासलक्षणं वैशद्वयमसिद्धं स्वार्थयोः प्रतीत्यन्तरनिरपेक्षतया तत्र प्रतिभासनात् ।” Prameyakamalamārtanda.

सदृशे तदेवेदं तस्मिन्नेव तेन सदृशं यमलकवदित्यादि
प्रत्यभिज्ञानाभासम् ॥ ९ ॥

9. Sadriśe tadēvedaṃ tasminneva tena sadriśaṃ yamalaka-
vadityādi pratyavijñānābhāsaṃ.

9. Fallacy of Pratyabhijñāna is the knowledge of "this is that" in things bearing similarity or knowledge of similarity in the identical thing e. g. in the case of twins.

Commentary

In the case of twins, we may falsely take one of them as the other from the similarity or we may fail to recognise the real person wanted and say that he resembles the real man (without understanding that he is the real man). There are therefore two kinds of fallacy of Pratyabhijñāna one referring to identity (Ekatva Pratyabhijñānābhāsa) and the other to similarity (Sādriśya-pratyabhijñānābhāsa¹.

Pratyabhijñāna has already been defined and explained in Aphorisms 5-10 Samuddeśa III to which a reference may be made.

असम्बद्धे तज्ज्ञानं तर्काभासम् ॥ १० ॥

10. Asambaddhe tajjñānaṃ tarkābhāsaṃ.

10. Knowledge of concomitance in objects not related is fallacy of Tarka.

Commentary

Tarka or Ūha has been defined in Aphorism 11 of Samuddeśa III. In Tarka we have knowledge of universal concomitance viz. that of fire and smoke. Fallacy of Tarka occurs when we set up inseparable connection between objects which are independent of each other e. g. smoke and water.

1. "द्विविधं प्रत्यभिज्ञानाभासमुपदर्शितं ; एकत्वनिबन्धनं, सादृश्यनिबन्धन-
श्चेति । तत्रैकत्वं सादृश्यावभासः, सादृश्ये चैकत्वाभासस्तदाभासमिति ।"
Prameyaratnamālā.

इदमनुमानाभासम् ॥ ११ ॥

11. Idamanumānābhāsaṃ.

11. The following are fallacies of Anumāna.

Commentary

Anumāna has been defined in Aphorism 14 of Samuddeśa III. Anumāna is employed by using Pakṣa, Hetu and Dīṣṭānta. Fallacies of these viz Pakṣābhāsa, Hetvābhāsa and Dīṣṭāntābhāsa with their subdivisions will be described in the following aphorisms.

तत्रानिष्टादि पक्षाभासः ॥ १२ ॥

12. Tatrāniṣṭādi pakṣābhāsaḥ.

अनिष्टो मीमांसकस्यानित्यः शब्दः ॥ १३ ॥

13. Aniṣṭo mīmāṃsakasyānityaḥ śabdaḥ.

सिद्धः श्रावणः शब्दः ॥ १४ ॥

14. Siddhaḥ śrāvaṇaḥ śabdaḥ.

वाधितः प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमलोकस्ववचनैः ॥ १५ ॥

15. Vādhitaḥ pratyakṣānumānāgamalokasvavachanaiḥ.

12. Among them Pakṣābhāsa (fallacy of the minor term or thesis) is Anīṣṭa (un-accepted) etc.

13. Anīṣṭa (un-accepted) is (the view of) Mīmāṃsakas that sound is momentary.

14. It is established that sounds can be heard by the ear.

15. Opposition (may exist) from Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Āgama, popular acceptance and one's own words.

Commentary

The followers of Mīmāṃsā philosophy hold that sound is eternal. So in their case there will be Pakṣābhāsa if we establish that sound is momentary. In the definition of Pakṣa we have laid

down that it must be Iṣṭa (acceptable or that what we want). Opposite of it will be Anīṣṭa and hence it will be a fallacy of Pakṣa.

Next, to establish by inference what is accepted (Siddha) is also Pakṣābhāsa e. g. 'Sound can be heard by the ear'.

There is also Pakṣābhāsa when it involves opposition to Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Āgama, Loka-vachana and Sva-vachana. These will be illustrated in the following five aphorisms. (See Page 95).

Siddhasena Divākara has defined Pakṣābhāsa in his Nyāyāvatāra as follows :—

“If that of which the major term or predicate (Sādhyā) is affirmed is opposed by evidence (Linga), the public understanding, one's own statement etc. we have that which is known as the fallacy of the minor term or thesis (Pakṣābhāsa) of which there are many varieties¹”.

तत्र प्रत्यक्षवाधितो यथाऽनुष्णोऽग्निर्द्रव्यत्वाज्जलवत् ॥ १६ ॥

16. Tatra pratyakṣavādhito yathānusṇognirdravayatvājjalavat.

16. In these subdivisions, Pratyakṣa-vādhita (opposed to Pratyakṣa) may be exemplified by “Fire is not hot as it is a thing e. g. water”.

Commentary

Any proposition laying down anything opposed to actual perception is an instance of Pratyakṣa-vādhita. We know by actual perception that fire is hot. If anyone tries to lay down in the shape of inference “Fire is not hot as it is a thing e. g. water”, it will be an example of Pratyakṣa-vādhita.

अपरिणामी शब्दः कृतकत्वात् घटवत् ॥ १७ ॥

17. Apariṇāmi śabdah kṛitakatvāt ghatavat.

1. “प्रतिपाद्यस्य यः सिद्धः पक्षाभासोऽस्ति लिंगतः ।

लोक-स्ववचनाभ्यां च बाधितोऽनेकधा मतः ॥” Nyāyāvatāra, 21.

17. Sound is without modification as it is something caused
e. g. a pitcher.

Commentary

This aphorism gives an example of the fallacy Anumāna-vādhita. The following is the correct inference or Anumāna :

"Sound has modification.

Because it is caused.

Like a pitcher."

But if we try to establish an inference opposed to this inference as follows :

"Sound is without modification.

Because it is caused.

Like a pitcher."

It will be an instance of Anumāna-vādhita that is to say opposed by inference.

प्रेत्यासुखप्रदो धर्मः पुरुषाश्रितत्वादधर्मवत् ॥ १८ ॥

18. Pretyāsukhaprado dharmah puruṣāśritatvādharmavat.

18. Dharma will produce grief after death as it is subservient to beings like Adharma.

Commentary

This is an example of the fallacy Āgama-vādhita. In all śāstras, it is accepted that pursuit of Dharma will produce happiness after death and Adharma will cause misery. If we try to establish by inference that Dharma will produce misery after death, it will be an example of Āgama-vādhita Anumana (i. e. inference as opposed to the śāstras).

शुचि नरशिरःकपालं प्राण्यंगत्वाच्छङ्खशुक्तिवत् ॥ १९ ॥

19. Śuchi naraśiraḥkapālaṁ pranyaṅgatvāchchāṅkhaśuktivat.

19. A human skull is pure as it is a part of the body of an animal like a conch-shell or oyster.

Commentary

This is an example of Loka-vādhita Anumāna or inference opposed to public understanding. According to popular acceptance parts of bodies of some animals e. g. conch-shells and oysters are accepted as pure, while parts of bodies of other animals e. g. human skull are considered as impure. So if we try to establish by inference as mentioned in the aphorism that human skull is pure, it will be a fallacy of Loka-vādhita Anumāna.

माता मे बन्ध्या पुरुषसंयोगेऽप्यगर्भत्वात् प्रसिद्धबन्ध्यावत् ॥२०॥

20. Mātā me bandhyā puruṣasaṃyogepyagarbhatvāt prasiddhabandhyāvat.

20. My mother is barren because she does not conceive in spite of connection with a male like women famous as barren.

Commentary

This is an example of Sva-vachana-vādhita Anumāna (or inference opposed to one's own words). If a person says that his mother is barren and tries to establish this by an inference as shown in the aphorism, the inference will be opposed to his own words and will be a fallacy of Svavachana-vādhita Anumāna.

Dr. Satis Chandra Vidyābhūṣaṇa in his notes on the translation of Nyāyāvātāra has mentioned the following with reference to different kinds of Pakṣābhāsa which will further elucidate the aphorisms in Parikṣāmukhaṃ regarding this subject.

“The semblance or fallacy of the minor term or thesis (Pakṣābhāsa) arises when one predicates of the minor term (Pakṣa) that which is yet to be proved to the opponent, or which is incapable of being proved, or when it is opposed to perception and inference, or inconsistent with the public understanding or incongruous with one's statement thus :—

(1) 'The jar is corporeal (Paudgalika)'—This is a conclusion which is yet to be proved to the opponent.

(2) 'Everything is nothing'. This is a Saugata (Buddhist) doctrine which according to the Jainas, is incapable of being proved.

(3) 'The general (Sāmānya) and particular (Viśeṣa) things are without parts, are distinct from each other and are like themselves alone'. This is opposed to perception.

(4) 'There is no omniscient being'. This is, according to the Jainas, opposed to inference.

(5) 'The sister is to be taken as wife'. This is inconsistent with the public understanding.

(6) "All things are non-existent". This is incongruous with one's own statement.

हेत्वाभासा असिद्धविरुद्धानैकान्तिकाकिञ्चित्कराः ॥२१॥

21. Hetvābhāsā asiddhaviruddhānaikāntikākīñchitkarāḥ.

21. Hetvābhāsa are Asiddha, Viruddha, Anaikāntika and Akiñchitkara.

Commentary

Now the fallacies of Hetu are being described. Hetu has been defined in Aphorism 15 in Samuddeśa III. The opposites of this are fallacies of Hetu¹. These are of four kinds : Asiddha, Viruddha, Anaikāntika and Akiñchitkara.

Siddhasena has laid down "The reason (i. e. the middle term called Hetu has been defined as that which cannot exist except in connection with the major term (Sādhyā); the fallacy of the rea-

1. "साध्याविनाभावित्वेन निश्चितो हेतुरित्युक्तं प्राक् । तद्विपरीतास्तु हेत्वाभासाः ।" Prameya-kamala-mārtāṇḍa.

son (Hetvābhāsa) arises from non-conception, doubt or misconception about it (the middle term)”¹.

Siddhasena lays down that there are only three (and not four as mentioned in Parikṣāmukhaṃ) varieties of Hetvābhāsa : “ That which has not yet been established is called ‘the unproved’ (Asiddha) ; that which is possible only in the opposite way is called ‘the inconsistent’ (Viruddha) ; that which can be explained in one way as well as in the opposite way is called ‘the uncertain’ (Anaikāntika)”²

Hemachandra also in his Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā lays down that there are only three kinds of Hetvābhāsa viz. Asiddha, Viruddha and Anaikāntika³. He rejects the view of those who maintain that there are two other forms of Hetvābhāsa viz. Kālātita and Prakaraṇa-sama. According to Hemachandra, Kālātita is included within the fallacy of Pakṣa and Prakaraṇa-sama is an impossibility as none but a madman can use it. In arguments between sane men this is an impossibility⁴.

1. “अन्यथानुपपन्नत्वं हेतोर्लक्षणमीरितम् ।

तदप्रतीतिसन्देहविपर्ययसैस्तदाभता ॥” Nyāyāvatāra 22.

2. “असिद्धस्त्वप्रतीतो यो योऽन्यथैवोपपद्यते ।

विरुद्धो योऽन्यथाप्यत्र युक्तोऽनैकान्तिकः स तु ॥” Nyāyāvatāra 23.

3. “असिद्धविरुद्धानैकान्तिकास्त्रयो हेत्वाभासाः ॥”

Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā II. 1. 16.

4. “त्रय इति संख्यान्तरव्यवच्छेदार्थम् । तेन कालातीत-प्रकरणसमयो-
व्यवच्छेदः । तत्र कालातीतस्य पक्षदोषेष्वन्तर्भावः प्रत्यक्षागमवाधितधर्मिनिर्देशानन्तर-
प्रयुक्तः कालात्ययापदिष्ट इति हि तस्य लक्षणम् इति, यथाऽनुष्णस्तेजोऽवयवी कृतकत्वाद्
घटवदिति । प्रकरणसमस्तु न सम्भवत्येव न ह्यस्ति सम्भवो यथोक्तलक्षणोऽनुमाने
प्रयुक्तेऽदूषिते वानुमानान्तरस्य यत्तूदाहरणमनित्यः शब्दः पक्षसपक्षयोरन्यतरत्वादिनि
तदतीवासाम्प्रतम् । को हि चतुरंगसभायां वादी प्रतिवादी चैवंविधमसम्यग्मनुन्मत्तोऽ-
भिधीत ?” Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā. Bhāṣya to Aphorism II. 1. 16.

असत्सत्तानिश्चयोऽसिद्धः ॥ २२ ॥

22. Asatsattāniśchayo'siddhah.

22. Asiddha is that whose existence is wanting in Pakṣa and which is not definitely established.

Commentary

Asiddha Hetvābhāsa is of two kinds : Svarūpāsiddha and Sandigdhdāsiddha.

These will be described in the aphorisms which follow.

अविद्यमानसत्ताकः परिणामी शब्दश्चाक्षुषत्वात् ॥ २३ ॥

23. Avidyamānasattākah pariṇāmī śabdaśchākṣuṣatvāt.

स्वरूपेणासत्त्वात् ॥ २४ ॥

24. Svarūpeṇāsatvāt.

23. "Sound is perishable because it can be seen by the eyes." This is (an example of) non-existence of itself.

24. Because it does not exist at all in its self.

Commentary

Sound is heard by the ear and not seen by the eye. So in the Pakṣa 'Sound,' Hetu in its real nature does not exist. So this is an example of Svarūpāsiddha Hetvābhāsa where the falsehood is a matter of certainty.

अविद्यमाननिश्चयो मुग्धबुद्धिं प्रति, अग्निरत्र धूमात् ॥ २५ ॥

25. Avidyamānaniśchayo mugdhabuddhiṃ prati agniratra dhūmāt.

तस्य वाष्पादिभावेन भूतसंघाते संदेहात् ॥ २६ ॥

26. Tasya vāṣpādibhāvena bhūtasamghāte sandehāt.

25. When there is uncertainty, if one says to a man of inferior intellect 'Here is fire because there is smoke.'

26. He has doubt owing to the existence of vapour etc. in the collection of many elements (earth, water, etc. and he cannot definitely ascertain whether it is smoke or vapour.)

Commentary

Sandigdhdhāsiddha is described in these aphorisms. This fallacy arises where there is an uncertainty of the Hetu itself. For example, where there is no certainty whether what is seen is smoke or vapour, if one infers 'there is fire because there is smoke', the inference will not be sound as the very existence of the Hetu viz. smoke is involved in doubt.¹ A person who is not thoroughly conversant with the major term (Sādhya) or the middle term (Hetu or Sādhana) will not be able to ascertain 'this is smoke' and 'this is vapour'² So there is absence of certainty in these cases which is the criterion of the fallacy of Sandigdhdhāsiddha.

सांख्यं प्रति परिणामी शब्दः कृतकत्वात् ॥ २७ ॥

27. Sāṅkhyam prati pariṇāmi śabdaḥ kṛitakatvāt.

तेनाज्ञातत्वात् ॥ २८ ॥

28. Tenājñātāt.

27. To (the follower of) the Sāṅkhya (philosophy) : 'Sound is perishable, because it is caused (by some one).

28. Because he does not know (or accept) it.

Commentary

In Sāṅkhya philosophy, appearance and disappearance (and not creation and destruction) of things are accepted. So the inference 'Sound is perishable because it is created' by a follower of the Sāṅkhya philosophy is an example of Sandigdhdhāsiddha because he does not accept creating of a sound as creation is unknown (Ajñāta) to him.

1. "सत्त्वस्य संदेहेऽप्यसिद्धो हेत्वाभासः संदिग्धासिद्ध इत्यर्थः यथा वाष्पादिभावेन संदिह्यमाना धूमलताग्निसिद्धाद्युपदिश्यमाना ।" Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā. Bhāṣya on II. 1. 17.

2. "कुतोऽस्याविद्यमाननियततत्त्वाद् । मुग्धबुद्धेर्वाष्पादिभावेन भूतसंवाते संदेहात् । न खलु साध्यसाधनयोरेवमुत्पन्नप्रज्ञो धूमादिरीदृशो वाष्पादिश्चेदेष इति विवेचयितुं समर्थः ।" Prameyaka-mālā-mārtanda.

Hemachandra has mentioned that Asiddha Hetvābhāsa may be Svarūpāsiddha or Sandigdhāsiddha.¹ The first should not be held to arise from not having the quality of a Pakṣa (minor term) because the definition of a Hetu has no connection with the quality of a Pakṣa. This fallacy arises from the fact that it wants the essence of Hetu viz. that it cannot arise otherwise. Hemachandra quotes the following verse from Kumārila Bhatta :—

“To infer the son of a Brahmin, to be a Brahmin is not universally accepted as it depends on the quality of Pakṣa”.- (For the mother might be unchaste).²

Hemachandra has mentioned three subdivisions of Asiddha Hetvābhāsa viz Asiddha regarding Vādi, that regarding Prativādi and that regarding both.³ The illustration of the first of these is the same as given in Aphorism 27 of this Samuddeśa of Parikṣāmukha.⁴

Some Jain logicians have laid down that there are other varieties of Asiddha Hetvābhāsa viz. Viśeṣāsiddha, Viśeṣaṇā-

1. “नासन्ननिश्चितसत्वो नान्यथानुपपन्न इति सत्वस्यासिद्धौ सन्देहे वाऽसिद्धः ।” *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*. II. 1. 17.

2. “अपक्षधर्मत्वादयमसिद्ध इति न मन्तव्यमित्याह नान्यथानुपपन्न इति, अन्यथानुपपत्तिरूपहेतुलक्षणविरहात् अयमसिद्धो नापक्षधर्मत्वात् । नहि पक्षधर्मत्वं हेतोरलक्षणं तदभावेऽप्यन्यथानुपपत्तिबलाद्धेतुत्वोपपत्तेरित्युक्तप्रायम् । भट्टोऽप्याह—

पित्रोश्च ब्राह्मणत्वेन पुत्रब्राह्मणतानुमा ।

सर्वलोकप्रसिद्धा न पक्षधर्ममपेक्षते ॥”

Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā II. 1. 17.

3. “वादिप्रतिवाद्युभयभेदाच्चैतदभेदः ॥”

Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā II. 1. 18.

4. “तत्र वाद्यसिद्धो यथा परिणामी शब्द उत्पत्तिमत्त्वात् अयं सार्वव्यस्य स्वयंवादिनोऽसिद्धः । तन्मते उत्पत्तिमत्त्वस्यानभ्युपेतत्वात् नासदुत्पद्यते नापि सद्विनश्यत्युत्पादविनाशयोराविर्भावतिरोभावरूपत्वादिति तत्सिद्धान्ताच्च ।” *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*. II. 1. 18.

siddha, Bhāgāsiddha, Āśrayāsiddha, Āśrayakādeśāsiddha, Vyārtha-viśeṣyāsiddha, Vyārthaviśeṣaṇāsiddha, Sandigdha-viśeṣyāsiddha and Sandigdha-viśeṣaṇāsiddha¹. Hemachandra says that all these are included within Vādyasiddha, Prativādyasiddha and Ubhayāsiddha as defined by him².

In Prameyakamala-mārtanda also it is mentioned "Others accept varieties of Asiddha viz. Viśeṣyāsiddha etc. These are mere varieties of Asiddha Hetvābhāsa (as defined in Parikṣāmukhaṃ) because they bear the criterion of non-existence of itself. So these are not separate varieties, for there is no separate characteristics of these"³.

विपरीतनिश्चिताविनाभावो विरुद्धोऽपरिणामी

शब्दः कृतकत्वात् ॥ २९ ॥

29. Viparitanīśchitāvinābhāvo viruddhopariṇāmi śabdaḥ kritakatvāt.

1. "तत्र विशेष्यासिद्धादय उदाह्रियन्ते । विशेष्यासिद्धो यथाऽनित्यः शब्दः सामान्यवत्त्वे सति चाक्षुषत्वात् । विशेषणासिद्धो यथाऽनित्यः शब्दश्चाक्षुषत्वे सति सामान्यविशेषवत्त्वात् । भागासिद्धो यथानित्यः शब्दः प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वात् । आश्रयासिद्धो यथास्ति प्रधानं विश्वपरिणामित्वात् । आश्रयैकदेशासिद्धो यथा नित्याः प्रधान-पुरुषेश्वराः अकृतकत्वात् । व्यर्थविशेष्यासिद्धो यथा नित्यः शब्दः कृतकत्वे सति सामान्यवत्त्वात् । संदिग्धविशेष्यासिद्धो यथा अद्यापि रागादियुक्तः कपिलः पुरुषत्वे सत्यद्याप्यनुत्पन्नतत्त्वज्ञानत्वात् । संदिग्धविशेषणासिद्धो यथा अद्यापि रागादियुक्तः कपिलः सर्वदा तत्त्वज्ञानरहितत्वे सति पुरुषत्वात् ।" Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā.

Bhāṣya to II. 1. 19.

2. "एते असिद्धभेदा यदान्यतरवादसिद्धत्वेन विवक्ष्यन्ते तदा वादसिद्धाः प्रतिवादसिद्धा वा भवन्ति, यदोभयवादसिद्धत्वेन विवक्ष्यन्ते तदोभयसिद्धा भवन्ति ।" Ibid.

3. "ये च विशेष्यासिद्धादयोऽसिद्धप्रकाराः परैरिष्टान्तैऽनन्तकत्व-लक्षणासिद्ध-प्रकारान्नाथान्तरं. तद्वद्भ्रमभेदाभावान् ।"

Prameyakamala-mārtanda.

29. Viruddha (Hetvābhāsa) is concomitance with the opposite of the major term e. g. sound is not perishable because it is caused.

Commentary

In this aphorism, Viruddha Hetvābhāsa is defined and illustrated. Where the universal concomitance (Avinābhāva or Vyāpti) is ascertained with the opposite of the major term, we get the fallacy of Viruddha Hetvābhāsa. In this case the inseparable connection (Vyāpti) of the middle term is not with the major term but with its antithesis. The example given is "Sound is eternal because it is an effect". Now there is universal connection of an effect with perishability, but if we try to establish its opposite by the example given above, we get fallacy of Viruddha Hetvābhāsa.

Dr. S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa in his notes on Nyāyāvatāra gives another example : "The inconsistent (viruddha) such as 'This is fiery because it is a body of water'. Here the reason alleged is opposed to what is to be established".

Hemachandra defines Viruddha as that whose concomitance is the opposite or which is derived otherwise¹.

Some hold the view that there are eight kinds of Viruddha, but in Prameya-kamala-mārtanda it is mentioned that all of these come under the definition here given². Hemachandra also is of the same view³.

1. 'विपरीतनियमोऽन्यथैवोपपद्यमानो विरुद्धः ॥'

Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā II. 1. 20.

2. "ये चाष्टौ विरुद्धभेदा परैरिष्टास्तेऽप्येतद्वक्ष्यलक्षितत्वाविशेषतोऽत्रैवान्तर्भवन्ति ।" Prameyakamala-mārtanda.

3. "अनेन येऽन्यैरन्ये विरुद्धा उदाहृतास्तेऽपि संगृहीता ।" Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā Bhāṣya on II. 1. 20. These eight varieties of Viruddha are described as follows by Hemachandra. There are four varieties where Sapakṣa exists and there are four varieties when Sapakṣa

विपक्षेऽप्यविरुद्धवृत्तिरनैकान्तिकः ॥ ३० ॥

30. Vipakṣepyaviruddhavrīṭṭiranaikāntikah

30. In Anaikāntika (Hetvābhāsa), (Hetu) resides also in Vipakṣa (in addition to being in Pakṣa and Sapakṣa).

निश्चितवृत्तिरनित्यः शब्दः प्रमेयत्वाद् घटवत् ॥ ३१ ॥

31. Niśchitavrīṭṭiranityaḥ śabdaḥ prameyatvād ghaṭavat.

31. Where it is certain that (Hetu) is in (Vipakṣa) (we have the fallacy of Niśchita vipakṣa vṛṭṭi Hetvābhāsa), e. g. "Sound is perishable because it is knowable like a pitcher.

आकाशे नित्येऽप्यस्य निश्चयात् ॥ ३२ ॥

32. Ākāśe nityepyasya niśchayāt.

32. Because it (the quality of knowability) is ascertained in things like Ākāśa which are imperishable.

शङ्कितवृत्तिस्तु नास्ति सर्वज्ञो वक्तृत्वात् ॥ ३३ ॥

33. Śankitavrīṭṭistu nāsti sarvajña vaktrītvāt.

does not exist. : "सति सपक्षे चत्वारो भेदाः । (1) पक्षविपक्षव्यापको, यथा नित्यः शब्दः कार्यत्वात् । (2) पक्षव्यापको विपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिः, यथा नित्यः शब्दः सामान्यवत्वे सत्यस्मदादिबाह्येन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वात् । (3) पक्षैकदेशवृत्तिर्विपक्षव्यापको, यथा अनित्या पृथिवी कृतकत्वात् । (4) पक्षविपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिः, यथा नित्यः शब्दः प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वात् ।

असति सपक्षे चत्वारो विरुद्धाः । (5) पक्षविपक्षव्यापको, यथा आकाश-विशेषगुणः शब्दः प्रमेयत्वात् । (6) पक्षव्यापको विपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिः, यथा आकाश-विशेषगुणः शब्दो बाह्येन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वात् । (7) पक्षैकदेशवृत्तिर्विपक्षव्यापको, यथा आकाशविशेषगुणः शब्दोऽपदात्मकत्वात् । (8) पक्षविपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिः, यथा आकाश-विशेषगुणः शब्दः प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वात् । एषु च चतुर्षु विरुद्धता पक्षैकदेशवृत्तिषु चतुर्षु पुनरसिद्धता विरुद्धता च इत्युभयसमावेशः ।" Ibid.

33. Where the matter is involved in doubt (we have the fallacy of Śāṅkita vipakṣa vritti e. g. an omniscient being does not exist for he can speak.

सर्वज्ञत्वेन वक्तृत्वाविरोधात् ॥ ३४ ॥

34. Sarvajñatvena vaktritvāvirodhāt.

34. Because there is no opposition of being able to speak with omniscience.

Commentary

When Hetu is found in Pakṣa, Sapakṣa and Vipakṣa we have the fallacy of Anaikāntika Hetvābhāsa. "The effect of the presence of the Hetu in Vipakṣa is to rob the conclusion of that logical validity which Anumāna (inference) directly aims at".

"Anaikāntika Hetvābhāsa is of two kinds (1) the Nīśchita Vipakṣa vritti where it is certain that the Hetu resides in the Vipakṣa and (2) the Śāṅkita Vipakṣa vritti where the matter is involved in doubt."

The following are illustrations :

(1) "Sound is perishable because it is knowledge".

This is an instance of the Nīśchita Vipakṣa Vritti type, because it is certain that the quality of knowability resides not only in perishable things, but also in those that are imperishable e. g. space, souls and the like.

(2) Watches are fragile because they are manufactured with machinery.

This is an instance of the Śāṅkita Vipakṣa Vritti. The fallacy in this case lies in the fact that it is not certain whether the quality of being manufactured with machinery does or does not reside in things which are not fragile i. e. the Vipakṣa.²

1. The Science of Thought by C. R. Jain Page 55.

2. The Science of Thought by C. R. Jain Pages 55—56.

Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa in his note on Verse 23 of Nyāyāvatāra already quoted says :

“The uncertain (Anaikāntika) such as ‘All things are momentary, because they are existent’. Here the reason alleged is uncertain, because ‘existence’ may or may not be a proof of momentariness, for, an opponent may equally argue : ‘all things are eternal, because they are existent’.¹ This example corresponds to the Śāṅkita Vipakṣa Vritti variety of Anaikāntika Hetvābhāsa mentioned above. The first variety is not described in Nyāyāvatāra.

Hemachandra defines and illustrates both the varieties and uses the same examples as given in Parīkṣāmukhaṃ.² He mentions that some logicians accept other varieties of Anaikāntika Hetvābhāsa but it is not necessary to accept these as all of these are included in the definition of the two varieties Nīśchita Vipakṣa Vritti and Śāṅkita Vipakṣa Vritti varieties.”

1. Nyāyāvatāra by S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa Page 21.

2. “नियमस्यासिद्धौ संदेहे वाऽन्यथाप्युपपद्यमानोऽनैकान्तिकः ।”

Pramāṇamīmāṃsā II. 1. 21.

“नियमोऽविनाभावस्तस्यासिद्धावनैकान्तिको यथाऽनित्यः शब्दः प्रमेयत्वात् प्रमेयत्वं नित्येप्याकाशदावस्तीति । संदेहे यथा सर्वज्ञः कश्चिद्रागादिमान् वा वक्तृत्वात् स्वभावविप्रकृष्टाभ्यां हि सर्वज्ञत्ववीतरागत्वाभ्यां हि न वक्तृत्वस्य विरोधः सिद्धः, न च रागादिकार्यम् वचनमिति संदिग्धोऽन्वयः ।” Bhāṣya to Ibid.

3. “ये चान्येऽन्यैरनैकान्तिकभेदा उदाहृतास्ते उत्तलक्षण एवान्तर्भवन्ति ।

(1) पक्षत्रयव्यापकः, यथानित्यः शब्दः प्रमेयत्वात् । (2) पक्षसपक्षव्यापको विपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिः, यथा गौरयं विपाणित्वात् । (3) पक्षविपक्षव्यापकः सपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिः यथा नायं गौरविपाणित्वात् । (4) पक्षव्यापकः सपक्षविपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिः, यथानित्यः शब्दः प्रत्यक्षत्वात् । (5) पक्षैकदेशवृत्तिः सपक्षविपक्षव्यापको, यथा न द्रव्याप्याकाशकालदिगात्ममनांसि क्षणिकविशेषगुणरहितत्वात् । (6) पक्षविपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिः सपक्षविपक्षव्यापकः, यथा न द्रव्याप्याकाशकालदिगात्ममनांसि क्षणिकविशेषगुणरहितत्वात् ।

सिद्धे प्रत्यक्षत्वादिवाधिते च साध्ये हेतुरकिञ्चित्करः ॥३५॥

35. Siddhe pratyakṣatvādivādhite cha sādhye heturakiñchitkarah.

सिद्धः श्रावणः शब्दः शब्दत्वात् ॥ ३६ ॥

36. Siddhaḥ śrāvaṇaḥ śabdaḥ śabdatvāt.

किञ्चिदकरणात् ॥ ३७ ॥

37. Kiñchidakaranāt.

यथाऽनुष्णोऽग्निरद्रव्यत्वादित्यादौ किञ्चित् कर्तुमशक्यत्वात् ॥३८॥

38. Yathānuṣṇo'gnirdravyatvādityādaū kiñchit karttumaśakyatvāt.

लक्षण एवासौ दोषो व्युत्पन्नप्रयोगस्य पक्षदोषेणैव दुष्टत्वात् ॥३९॥

39. Lakṣaṇa evāsau doṣo vyutpannaprayogasya pakṣadoṣeṇaiva duṣṭatvāt.

35. Akiñchitkara (Hetvābbāsa) consists of (use of) Hetu (middle term) in connection with a Sādhyā (major term) which had already been established and which is opposed by Pratyakṣa etc.

36. Capability of being heard by the ear is established regarding sound, as it is sound.

37. Because (Hetu) does not do anything (in such a case).

38. As for example, fire is cold as this a thing. In such cases (Hetu) cannot do anything.

39. This fault arises only in definition. For in use by those conversant with reasoning, the fault is proved by fault of Pakṣa (minor term).

(7) पक्षविपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिः सपक्षव्यापी, यथा न द्रव्याणि दिक्कालमनांस्यमूर्त्तत्वात् ।

(8) सपक्षविपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिर्विपक्षव्यापी, यथा द्रव्याणि दिक्कालमनांस्यमूर्त्तत्वात् । (9) पक्षत्रयैकदेशवृत्तिर्यथा अनित्या पृथिवी प्रत्यक्षत्वात् ॥” Ibid.

Commentary

Akiñchitkara Hetvābhāsa is here defined. Really speaking, this is not a separate variety as this is included in the fallacy of Pakṣābhāsa as already defined being opposed to Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Āgama, Loka-vachana and Sva-vachana (Aphorism 15). This fault is included in those varieties of fallacies. If you say, that it is redundant to lay down a separate definition of Akiñchitkara Hetvābhāsa, we reply (by Aphorism 39) that this fallacy is described only for the understanding of students in a treatise dealing with definitions though this is not used at the time of discussion by logicians¹.

As this is not really a different variety, it is not mentioned in works such as Nyāyāvatāra, Pramāṇa-mimāṃsā etc.

Two examples of Akiñchitkara Hetvābhāsa are given in Parikṣāmukhaṃ. The first is : “Sound is capable being heard by the ear, because it is a sound”. Here the capability of being heard is established by itself. So it is useless to establish this by employing a Hetu. So this is an example of Akiñchitkara Hetvābhāsa where Sādhyā (Major term) is Siddha (already established). The second example is “Fire is cold as this is a thing”. Here coldness of fire is opposed to Pratyakṣa. So employment of such a reasoning cannot produce any result in such cases. This is an example of Akiñchitkara Hetvābhāsa where Sādhyā is opposed by Pratyakṣa².

1. “ननु प्रसिद्धः प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमलोकस्ववचनैश्च वाधितः पक्षाभासः प्रतिपादितः । तद्दोषेनैव चास्य दुष्टत्वात् । पृथगकिञ्चित्कराभिधानमनर्थकमित्याशङ्क्य ‘लक्षण एव’ इत्यादिना प्रतिविधत्ते । लक्षणे लक्ष्यव्युत्पादनशास्त्रे एवासावकिञ्चित्करत्व-लक्षणो दोषो विनेयव्युत्पत्त्यर्थं व्युत्पाद्यते । न तु व्युत्पन्नानां प्रयोगकाले । कुत एतदित्याह व्युत्पन्नप्रयोगस्य पक्षदोषेणैव दुष्टत्वात् ।” Prameyaka-mala-mārtanda

2. “सिद्धे निर्णीते प्रमाणान्तरात् साध्ये प्रत्यक्षादिवाधिते च हेतुर्न किञ्चित् करोतीत्यकिञ्चित्करोऽनर्थको यथा श्रावणः शब्दः शब्दत्वात् । नह्यसौ स्वसाध्यं साधयति तस्याध्यक्षादेव प्रसिद्धेः । नापि साध्यान्तरं तत्रावृत्तेरित्यत आह किञ्चिद-

“Akiñchitkara Hetvābhāsa is the fallacy of redundancy. This is also of two kinds.

(a) The Siddhasādhana which means the establishing of that which has already been proved by some other kind of Pramāṇa. Illustration : Sound is heard by the ear, because it is sound.

(b) The Vādhita viṣaya which relates to a proposition inconsistent with Pratyakṣa (direct observation or jñāna), logical inference, scriptural text or its own sense. Illustrations :

(i) Fire is not endowed with warmth, because it is a substance (inconsistent with Pratyakṣa). (ii) Sound is unchanging, because it is not an effect (inconsistent with Anumāna). (iii) Dharma (virtue or righteousness) is the cause of pain, because it resides in man (inconsistent with scripture according to which Dharma is the cause of happiness). (iv) Z is the son of a barren woman because she has never conceived (inconsistent with the proposition itself)”.¹

दृष्टान्ताभासा अन्वयेऽसिद्धसाध्यसाधनोभयाः ॥ ४० ॥

40. Dṛṣṭāntābhāsā anvaye'siddhasādhyaśādhanaobhayaḥ.

अपौरुषेयः शब्दोऽमूर्तत्वादिन्द्रियसुखपरमाणुघटवत् ॥ ४१ ॥

41. Apauruṣeyaḥ śabda'mūrttatvādindriyasukhaparamāṇu-ghatavat.

विपरीतान्वयश्च यदपौरुषेयं तदमूर्तम् ॥ ४२ ॥

42. Viparītānvayaścha yadapauruṣeyaṁ tadamūrttam.

विद्युदादिनातिप्रसंगात् ॥ ४३ ॥

43. Vidyudādinātiprasaṅgāt.

करणात्' प्रत्यक्षादिवाधिते च साध्येऽकिञ्चित्करोऽसौ अनुष्णोग्निर्द्रव्यत्वात् इत्यादौ यथा । कुतोऽस्याकिञ्चित्करत्वमित्याह 'किञ्चित्कर्तुमशक्यत्वात् ।' Prameya-kamala-mārtanda.

40. Fallacies of *Driṣṭānta* (illustration) in *Anvaya* consists of non-establishment of *Sādhya*, *Sādhana* or both of them.

41. Sound is unproduced by man because it has no form like sensual pleasure, atom or pitcher.

42. *Viparītānvaya* also : "That which is unproduced by man has no form".

43. Because this will be applied in lightening etc.

व्यतिरेके सिद्धतद्व्यतिरेकाः परमाण्विन्द्रियसुखाकाशवत् ॥४४॥

44. *Vyatireke siddha-tadvyatirekāḥ paramāṇvīndriyasukhākāśavat.*

विपरीतव्यतिरेकश्च यन्नामूर्तत्वं तन्नापौरुषेयम् ॥ ४५ ॥

45. *Viparīta-vyatirekaścha yannāmūrttatvaṃ tannāpauruṣeyaṃ.*

44. In *Vyatireka*, *Siddha* and the *Vyatirekas* of the same, like atom, sensual pleasure and *Ākāśa*.

45. *Viparīta Vyatireka* : The quality of not being without form, is not unproduced by man.

Commentary

"*Driṣṭāntābhāsa* (fallacy of illustration) occurs when a *Driṣṭānta* is not an appropriate illustration. This is of two kinds : (i) *Sādharmya* or *Anvaya Driṣṭāntābhāsa* and (ii) *Vaidharmya* or *Vyatireka Driṣṭāntābhāsa*.

The *Sādharmya* fallacy arises when a negative illustration is given in place of an affirmative one. Illustration : There is no *Sarvajña* (omniscient being) because he is not apprehended by the senses, like a jar. [The illustration should have been of some thing not perceivable with the senses].

The *Vaidharmya* is the opposite of *Sādharmya*. Illustration : *Kapila* is omniscient, because he is beset with desires like the *Arhanta* (*Tīrthaṅkara*). [Here the comparison should have

been with some one who became omniscient without giving up his desires, not with the Arhanta who is absolutely desireless].

Every illustration has reference to either the Sādhyā, or Sādhana or both. This gives us three forms of the Anvaya and three of the Vyatireka Dīṣṭāntābhāsa. Illustrations : (i) Sound is Apauruṣeya (unproduced by man) because it is devoid of sensible qualities ; whatever is devoid of sensible qualities is Apauruṣeya, like (a) sensual pleasure (b) an atom or (c) a jar. [Here (a) is an instance of the wrong illustration of the Sādhyā (because sensual pleasure is the opposite of Apauruṣeya) (b) of the Sādhana (an atom is not devoid of sensible qualities) and (c) of both, the Sādhyā and Sādhana (for a jar is neither Apauruṣeya nor devoid of sensible qualities). These are instances of the Anvaya Dīṣṭāntābhāsa. (ii) Sound is Apauruṣeya because it is Amūrttika (devoid of sensible qualities) ; whatever is not Apauruṣeya is not Amūrttika as (a) an atom (b) sense-gratification or (c) space. [This is a three-fold illustration of the Vyatireka Dīṣṭāntābhāsa. The atom, being Apauruṣeya does not furnish an instance of the not Apauruṣeya quality ; sense-gratification is not not-Amūrttika, and space is neither not-Apauruṣeya nor not-Amūrttika].

Anvaya Dīṣṭāntābhāsa also occurs where the order of the Sādhyā and Sādhana is reversed in the exemplification of Hetu. Illustration : There is fire in this hill. Because there is smoke on it. Whereever there is fire there is smoke (Anvaya Dīṣṭāntābhāsa). [The true form of the Anvaya exemplification here should be “Whereever there is smoke there is fire”].

Similarly, Vyatireka Dīṣṭāntābhāsa also occurs when the Sādhyā and Sādhana replace each other in Vyatireka exemplification. Illustration :

This hill is full of smoke.

Because it is full of fire.

Whatever is not full of smoke is also not full of fire.

[The fallacy is obvious, for there may be fire without smoke]¹.

Siddhasena has defined *Driṣṭāntābhāsa* as follows : “Logicians have declared that fallacies of the example (*Driṣṭāntābhāsa*) in the homogeneous form, arise here from an imperfect middle term or from a defect in the major term etc.

Logicians have declared that fallacies of the example in the heterogeneous form arise when the absence of the major term (*Sādhya*) or the middle term (*Sādhana* or *Hetu*) or both, is not shown, or when there is a doubt about them”².

In the commentary to *Nyāyāvatāra* the varieties of *Sādharmya* and *Vaidharmya Driṣṭāntābhāsa* are thus described :

“Fallacies of the homogeneous example (*Sādharmya Driṣṭāntābhāsa*) arise from a defect in the major term (*Sādhya*) or middle term (*Hetu*) or both, or from doubt about them, thus :—

(1) Inference is invalid (major term) because it is a source of knowledge (middle term) like perception (homogeneous example). Here the example involves a defect in the major term (*Sādhya*) for perception is not invalid.

(2) Perception is invalid (major term) because it is a source of true knowledge (middle term) like a dream (homogeneous example). Here the example involves a defect in the middle term (*Hetu*) for a dream is not a source of true knowledge.

1. The Science of Thought Pages 57—58

2. “साधर्म्येणात्र दृष्टान्तदोषा न्यायविदीरिताः ।

अपलक्षणहेतूत्याः साध्यादिविकलादयः ॥

वैधर्म्येणात्र दृष्टान्तदोषा न्यायविदीरिताः ।

साध्यसाधनयुग्मानामनिवृत्तेश्च संशयान् ॥”

Nyāyāvatāra. 24, 25. Translated by S. C. Vidyābhāṣaṇa. Pages, 21 and 23.

(3) The omniscient being is not existent (major term) because he is not apprehended by the senses (middle term) like a jar (homogeneous example). Here the example involves a defect in both the major and middle terms (Sādhya and Hetu) for the jar is both existent and apprehended by the senses.

(4) This person is devoid of passions (major term) because he is mortal (middle term) like a man in the street (homogeneous example). Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the major term, for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is devoid of passions.

(5) This person is mortal (major term) because he is full of passions (middle term) like the man in the street (homogeneous example). Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the middle term, for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is devoid of passions.

(6) This person is not omniscient (major term) because he is full of passions (middle term) like the man in the street (homogeneous example). Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of both the major and middle terms, for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is full of passions and not omniscient.¹

1. “तत्र साध्यविकलो यथा, भ्रान्तमनुमानं प्रमाणत्वात् प्रत्यक्षवत्, प्रत्यक्षस्य भ्रान्तताविकलत्वात् । साधनविकलो यथा जाग्रत्संवेदनं भ्रान्तं प्रमाणत्वात् स्वप्न-संवेदनवत्, स्वप्नसंवेदनस्य प्रमाणताव्यैकल्यात् । उभयविकलो यथा, नास्ति सर्वज्ञः प्रत्यक्षाद्यनुपलब्धत्वात् घटवत्, घटस्य सत्त्वात् प्रत्यक्षादिभिरुपलब्धत्वाच्च । संदिग्ध-साध्यधर्मो यथा, वीतरागोऽयं मरणधर्मत्वात् रथ्यापुरुषवत्, रथ्यापुरुषे वीतरागस्य संदिग्धत्वात् । संदिग्धसाधनधर्मो यथा, मरणधर्मोऽयं पुरुषो रागादिमत्त्वात्, रथ्या-पुरुषवत् द्रष्टव्यः, पुरुषे रागादिमत्त्वस्य संदिग्धत्वात् वीतरागस्यापि तथा संभवात् । संदिग्धोभयधर्मो यथा असर्वज्ञोऽयं रागादिमत्त्वात् रथ्यापुरुषवत् इति रथ्यापुरुषे प्रदर्शित-न्यायेन उभयस्यापि संदिग्धत्वात् ।” Nyāyāvātāra-vivṛiti. Translation by Dr. S. C. Vidyabhūṣaṇa.

The fallacy of the heterogeneous example (Vaidharmya Driṣṭāntābhāsa) is of six kinds, thus :—

(1) Inference is invalid (major term) because it is a source of true knowledge (middle term); whatever is not invalid is not a source of true knowledge, as a dream (heterogeneous example). Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a defect in the major term (Sādhya) for a dream is really invalid though it has been cited as not invalid.

(2) Perception is non-reflective or Nirvikalpaka (major term) because it is a source of true knowledge (middle term); whatever is reflective or Savikalpaka, is not a source of true knowledge, as inference (heterogeneous example). Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a defect in the middle term (Sādhana) for inference is really a source of true knowledge, though it has been cited as not such.

(3) Sound is eternal and non-eternal (major term), because it is an existence (middle term); whatever is not eternal and non-eternal is not an existence, as a jar (heterogeneous example). Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a defect in both the major and middle terms (Sādhya and Sādhana) for the jar is both 'eternal and non-eternal' and 'an existence'.

(4) Kapila is non-omniscient (major term) because he is a non-propounder of the four noble truths (middle term); whoever is not non-omniscient is not non-propounder of the four noble truths, as Buddha (heterogeneous example). Here the example involves in the negative form a doubt as to the validity of the major term (Sādhya) for it is doubtful whether Buddha was omniscient.

(5) This person is untrustworthy (major term) because he is full of passions (middle term); whoever is not untrustworthy is not full of passions, as Buddha (heterogeneous example). Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the middle

term (Hetu) for it is doubtful whether Buddha is not full of passions.

(6) Kapila is not devoid of passions (major term) because he did not give his own flesh to the hungry (middle term); whoever is devoid of passions gives his own flesh to the hungry as Buddha (heterogeneous example). Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of both the major and middle terms (Sādhya and Sādhana) for it is doubtful whether Buddha was devoid of passions and gave his own flesh to the hungry".¹

1. "तदनेन षड् दृष्टान्ताभासाः सूचिताः । तद् यथा साध्याव्यतिरेकी
(१) साधनाव्यतिरेकी (२) साध्यसाधनाव्यतिरेकी (३) तथा संदिग्धसाध्याव्यतिरेकः
(४) संदिग्धसाधनव्यतिरेकः (५) संदिग्धसाध्यसाधनव्यतिरेकश्च (६) । तत्र साध्या-
व्यतिरेकी यथा, भ्रान्तमनुमानं प्रमाणत्वात्, इत्यत्र वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तो यत् पुनः भ्रान्तं न
भवति न तत् प्रमाणं तद् यथा स्वप्नज्ञानमिति । स्वप्नज्ञानात् भ्रान्ततानिबृत्तेः साध्या-
व्यतिरेकित्वम् । साधनाव्यतिरेकी यथा, प्रत्यक्षं निर्विकल्पकं प्रमाणत्वात् । अत्र
वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तो, यत् पुनः सविकल्पकं न तत् प्रमाणं तद् यथानुमानमनुप्रमाणतानिबृत्तेः
साधनाव्यतिरेकित्वम् । उभयाव्यतिरेकी यथा, नित्यानित्यः शब्दः सत्त्वात् इत्यत्र
वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तो यः पुनर्न नित्यानित्यः स न सन् तद् यथा घटः घटादुभयस्यापि
अव्यावृत्तेरुभयाव्यतिरेकित्वम् । तथा संदिग्धसाध्यव्यतिरेकः, असर्वज्ञा अनाप्ता वा
कपिलादयः आर्यसत्यचतुष्टयाप्रतिपादकत्वात् । अत्र वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तः यः पुनः सर्वज्ञ
आप्तो वा असौ आर्यसत्यचतुष्टयं प्रत्यपीपदत् तद् यथा शौद्धोदनिरिति । अयं च
साध्यव्यतिरेकी वा आर्यसत्यचतुष्टयस्य दुःखसमुदयमार्गनिरोधलक्षणस्य प्रमाणवाधित-
त्वेन तद्रभाषकस्य असर्वज्ञतानाप्ततोपपत्तः ।...तस्मात् शौद्धोदनेः सकाशात् असर्वज्ञता-
नाप्ततालक्षणस्य साध्यस्य व्यावृत्तिः सन्दिग्धेति सन्दिग्धसाध्यव्यतिरेकित्वम् । सन्दिग्ध-
साधनव्यतिरेको यथा, अनादेयवाक्यः कश्चिद् विवक्षितः पुरुषो रागादिमत्वादित्यत्र
वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तो यः पुनः आदेयवाक्यो न स रागादिमान् तद्यथा सुगत इति ।...
सुगतात् रागादिमत्त्वव्यावृत्तिसंशयात् संदिग्धसाधनव्यतिरेकित्वम् । संदिग्धसाध्यसाधन-
व्यतिरेको यथा, वीतरागाः कपिलादयः करुणास्पदेषु अपि अकरुणापरीतचित्ततया दत्त-
निजमांसशकलत्वात् । अत्र वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तो ये पुनर्वीतरागास्ते करुणापरीतचित्ततया
दत्तनिजमांसशकलाः तद् यथा बोधिसत्त्वा इत्यत्र साधनसाध्यधर्मयोर्बोधिसत्त्वेभ्यो

Hemachandra in his *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* lays down that there are eight varieties of *Driṣṭāntābhāsa* according to *Sādharmya* and *Vaidharmya*¹. First, he defines and exemplifies the three varieties of *Sādharmya Driṣṭāntābhāsa* as given in the *Parikṣāmukhaṃ* viz. *Sādhyā-vikala*, *Sādhana-vikala* and *Sādhyasādhano-vaya-vikala*². Then he defines and illustrates the three varieties of *Vaidharmya-Driṣṭāntābhāsa* viz. *Sādhyā-vyatireki*, *Sādhana-vyatireki* and *Ubhaya-vyatireki*³. Then he mentions the three varieties *Sandigdha Sādhyānvaya*, *Sandigdha Sādhānvaya* and *Sandigdha Ubhaya* and the three varieties *Sandigdha Sādhyā Vyatireka*, *Sandigdha Sādhana Vyatireka* and *Sandigdha Ubhaya Vyatireka*⁴. Besides these he mentions two varieties *Viparītanvaya* and *Viparita Vyatireka* and two varieties *Apradarśita Anvaya* and *Apradarśita Vyatireka*⁵. These last four varieties are not accepted by all.

व्यावृत्तिः सन्दिग्धा ततः प्रतिपादितप्रमाणवैकल्यात् न ज्ञायते किं ते रागादिमन्तः उत
वीतरागास्तथानुकल्प्येपु किं स्वपिशितखण्डानि दत्तवन्तो नेति वा अतः सन्दिग्धसाध्य-
साधनव्यतिरेकित्वमिति ।” *Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛiti*.

1. “साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यामष्टावष्टौ दृष्टान्ताभासाः ॥”

Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā. II. 1. 22.

2. “अमूर्तत्वेन नित्ये शब्दे साध्ये कर्मपरमाणुघटाः साध्यसाधनोभय-
विकलाः ॥” *Ibid*. II. 1. 23.

3. “वैधर्म्येण परमाणुकर्माकाशाः साध्याद्व्यव्यतिरेकिणः ॥”

Ibid II. 1. 24.

4. “वचनाद्वागो रागान्मरणधर्मत्वकिञ्चिज्ज्ञत्वयोः सन्दिग्धसाध्याद्व्यव्य-
व्यतिरेका रथ्यापुरुषादयः ॥” *Ibid* II. 1. 15.

5. “विपरीतान्वयव्यतिरेकौ ॥” *Ibid* II. 1. 26.

“अप्रदर्शितान्वयव्यतिरेकौ ॥” *Ibid* II. 1. 27.

The eight varieties of *Sādharmya Driṣṭāntābhāsa* are thus summed up by Hemachandra :

For example, the author of the *Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛiti* refutes the view that there are three other varieties of *Sādharmya Dṛṣṭāntābhāsa* viz. *Ananvaya*, *Apradarśitānvaya* and *Viparitānvaya* and three other varieties of *Vaidharmya Dṛṣṭāntābhāsa* viz. *Avyatiṛeki*, *Apradarśita-vyatiṛeka* and *Viparita-vyatiṛeka*.

“Some unnecessarily lay down three other kinds of fallacy of the homogeneous example (*Sādharmya Dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*) viz. (1) Un-connected (*Ananvaya*) such as, this person is full of passions (major term), because he is a speaker (middle term) like a certain man in Magadha (example). Here though a certain man in Magadha is both a speaker and full of passions, yet there is no inseparable connection between “being a speaker” and “being full of passions”.

(2) Of connection unshown (*Apradarśitānvaya*) such as, Sound is non-eternal (major term) because it is adventitious (middle term), as a jar (example). Here though there is an inseparable connection between ‘adventitious’ and ‘non-eternal’, yet it has not been shown in the proper form, as :—‘Whatever is adventitious is non-eternal as a jar’. [*Dignāga* the Buddhist urged the necessity of converting the example into a universal proposition with a view to show the connection between the middle term and major term in the proper form].

(3) Of contrary connection (*Viparitānvaya*) such as :—Sound is non-eternal (major term) because it is adventitious,

“साध्यविकलः साधनविकलः उभयविकलः सन्दिग्धसाध्यान्वयः सन्दिग्ध-साधनान्वयः, सन्दिग्धोभयान्वयः विपरीतान्वयः अप्रदर्शितान्वयः चेत्यष्टौ साधर्म्य-दृष्टान्ताभासाः ।”

The eight varieties of *Vaidharmya Dṛṣṭāntābhāsa* are mentioned by *Hemachandra* as follows :

“साध्याव्यावृत्तसाधनाव्यावृत्तोभयव्यावृत्ताः सन्दिग्धसाध्यव्यावृत्तिसन्दिग्धसाधन-व्यावृत्तिसन्दिग्धोभयव्यावृत्तयो विपरीतव्यतिरेकोऽप्रदर्शितव्यतिरेकश्चेत्यष्टावेव वैधर्म्य-दृष्टान्ताभासा भवन्ति ।”

(middle term). Here if the inseparable connection (Vyāpti) is shown, thus 'whatever is non-eternal is adventitious as a jar' instead of thus : 'Whatever is adventitious, is non-eternal as a jar' the example would involve the fallacy of contrary connection"¹.

"Some unnecessarily lay down three other kinds of fallacy of the heterogeneous example (Vaidharmya Driṣṭāntābhāsa) viz. (1) Unseparated (Avyatiṛeki) : This person is not *devoid of passions* (major term) because he is a *speaker* (middle term) ; whoever is devoid of passions is not a speaker as a *piece of stone* (heterogeneous example). Here though a piece of stone is both 'devoid of passions' and 'not a speaker', yet there is no unavoidable separation (Vyatiṛeka Vyāpti) between 'devoid of passions' and 'a speaker'.

(2) Of separation unshown (Apradarṣita Vyatiṛeka) Sound is *non-eternal* (major term) because it is *adventitious* (middle term) just as *ether* (example). Here though there is an unavoidable separation between 'adventitious' and 'eternal', yet it has not been shown in the proper form such as 'whatever is not adventitious is eternal, just as ether'. [Dignāga the Buddhist urged the necessity of converting the heterogeneous example into a universal negative proposition, with a view to point out the connection of the middle term and major term].

(3) Of contrary separation (Viparita Vyatiṛeka) : Sound is not *eternal* (major term), because it is *adventitious* (middle

1. "ननु च परैरन्यदपि दृष्टान्ताभासत्रयमुक्तं तद् यथा अनन्वयोऽप्रदर्शितान्वयो विपरीतान्वयश्च । तत्र अनन्वयो यथा, रागादिमान् विवक्षितः पुरुषो वक्तृत्वाद् इष्टपुरुषवत् इति । यद्यपि क्लिष्टपुरुषे रागादिमत्त्वं वक्तृत्वं च साध्यसाधनधर्मौ दृष्टौ तथापि यो यो वक्ता सो सो रागादिमानिति व्याप्त्यसिद्धेरनन्वयोऽयं दृष्टान्तः । तथा-प्रदर्शितान्वयो यथा, अनित्यः शब्दः कृतकत्वात् घटवदिति । अत्र यद्यपि वास्तवोऽन्वयोऽस्ति तथापि वादिना वचनेन न प्रकाशित इति अप्रदर्शितान्वयो दृष्टान्तः । विपरीतान्वयो यथा, अनित्यः शब्दः कृतकत्वात् । हेतुमभिधाय यदनित्यं तत् कृतकं घटवदिति विपरीतव्याप्तिदर्शनात् विपरीतान्वयः ॥" Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛiti.

term); whatever is eternal, is not adventitious, just as *ether* (example). Here the example has been put in a contrary way, for the proper form should have been: 'Whatever is not adventitious is eternal just as *ether*'¹.

Hemachandra agrees that Ananvaya and Avyatiireki might be excluded from varieties of *Driṣṭāntābhāsa*².

बालप्रयोगाभासः पंचावयवेषु कियद्धीनता ॥ ४६ ॥

46. Bālaprayogābhāsaḥ pañchāvayaveṣu kiyaddhīnatā.

अग्निमानयं देशो धूमवत्वात् यदित्थं तदित्थं यथा महानसः ॥ ४७ ॥

47. Agnimānayaṁ deśo dhūmavatvāt yadittham tadittham yathā mahānasaḥ.

1. "परैः परेऽपि दृष्टान्ताभासास्त्रयो विमृश्यभाषितया दर्शितास्तद्यथा-
ऽव्यतिरेकोऽप्रदर्शितव्यतिरेकोऽविपरीतव्यतिरेकश्च । ते अस्माभिः अयुक्तत्वात्तु दर्शयि-
तव्याः । तथा हि अव्यतिरेकस्तैर्दर्शितो यथा, अवीतरागः कश्चिद् विवक्षितः पुरुषो
वक्तृत्वादित्यत्र वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तो यः पुनः वीतरागो न स वक्ता यथोपलखण्ड इति ।
यद्यपि किलोपलखण्डात् उभयं व्यावृत्तं तथापि व्याप्त्या व्यतिरेकासिद्धेः अव्यति-
रेकित्वमिति ।" तथाहि अप्रदर्शितव्यतिरेकस्तैरुक्तो यथा, अनित्यः शब्दः कृतकत्वात्
आकाशवदित्यत्र विद्वयमानोऽपि व्यतिरेको वादिना वचनेन उद्भावित इति दुष्टता ।
विपरीतव्यतिरेकः पुनरभिहितो यथा, अनित्यः शब्दः कृतकत्वात्, इत्यत्र वैधर्म्य-
दृष्टान्तो यदकृतकं तन्नित्यं भवति यथाकाशमिति इत्यत्र विपर्यस्तव्यतिरेकप्रदर्शनात्
विपरीतव्यतिरेकित्वम् ।" Nyāyāvātāra-vivṛiti.

2. "ननु अनन्वयाव्यतिरेकावपि कैश्चिद्दृष्टान्ताभासावुक्तौ, यथा रागादि-
मानयं वचनात् अत्र साधर्म्यदृष्टान्ते आत्मनि रागवचनयोः सत्यपि साहित्ये वैधर्म्य-
दृष्टान्ते चोपलखण्डे सत्यामपि सह निवृत्तौ प्रतिबन्धाभावेनान्वयव्यतिरेकयोरभाव
इत्यनन्वयाव्यतिरेकौ तौ कस्मादिह नोक्तौ । उच्यते, ताभ्यां पूर्वं न भिद्यन्त इति
साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां प्रत्येकमष्टावेव दृष्टान्ताभासा भवन्ति यदाहुः—

लिंगस्यानन्वया अष्टावष्टावव्यतिरेकिणः ।

नान्यथानुपपन्नत्वं कथंचित् ख्यापयन्त्यमी ॥"

Bhāṣya to Aphorism II. 1. 27 in Pramāṇa-mimāṃsā.

धूमवांश्चायमिति वा ॥ ४८ ॥

48. Dhūmavānśchāyamiti vā.

तस्मादग्निमान् धूमवांश्चायं ॥ ४९ ॥

49. Tasmādagnimān dhūmavānśchāyaṃ.

स्पष्टतया प्रकृत-प्रतिपत्तेरयोगात् ॥ ५० ॥

50. Spṣṭatayā prakṛita-pratipatterayogāt.

46. The fallacy of Bāla-prayoga consists of absence of one of the five limbs (of syllogism).

47. This place is full of fire as it is full of smoke. Where there is smoke there is fire. As for example, a kitchen.

48. Or, this is full of smoke.

49. So it is full of fire and it is full of smoke.

50. As clear understanding of the real thing is not established from it.

Commentary

In Chapter III, the five limbs of syllogism have been described. These are as follows :—

1. This hill is full of fire (Pratijñā).

2. Because it is full of smoke (Hetu).

3. Whatever is full of smoke is also full of fire, as a kitchen (Udāharāṇa).

4. So is this hill full of smoke (Upanaya).

5. Therefore, this hill is full of fire (Nigamana).

It has been mentioned in that Chapter, that only the first two are really necessary for inference, the last three being only used to convince children.

Fallacy in using syllogism to convince children arises if we do not mention all the five limbs of syllogism ; e. g. if we mention

only the first three or the first four of these limbs. This fallacy also arises if we mention these in a wrong order i. e. if Nigamana be mentioned before Upanaya for this debars a clear understanding of the real thing.

रागद्वेषमोहाक्रान्तपुरुषवचनाज्जातमागमाभासम् ॥ ५१ ॥

51. Rāgadveṣamohākṛāntapurūṣavachanājītamāgamābhāsam.

यथा नद्यास्तीरे मोदकराशयः सन्ति धावध्वं माणवकाः ॥५२॥

52. Yathā nadyāstīre modakarāśayaḥ santi dhāvadhvaṃ māṇavakāḥ.

अंगुल्यग्रे हस्तियूथशतमास्त इति च ॥ ५३ ॥

53. Aṅgulyagre hastiyūthaśatamāsta iti cha.

विसंवादात् ॥ ५४ ॥

54. Viśamvādāt.

51. Fallacy of Āgama arises from words of a person seized by attachment, hatred, mistake etc.

52. As for example, Run boys. There are a large quantity of sweetmeats on the river-bank.

53. Or, one hundred elephants are standing on the tip of the finger.

54. Because (these) want (the element of Pramāṇa) viz. true knowledge.

Commentary

Āgama has been defined in Aphorism 99, Samuddeśa III as the knowledge of objects got from words of reliable person etc. (viz. scripture). Now, the words of persons who are not reliable and who may be actuated to deceive people are examples of Āgamābhāsa. If one utters a falsehood urging that there are sweetmeats on the banks of a river and urges boys to run to the river side, this will be an example of fallacy of Āgama. Further, if one

says what is impossible viz. one hundred elephants are standing on the tip of a finger, it will also be Āgamābhāsa. Jain logicians also say that when true scripture is mis-quoted to support a false proposition, we have an example of Āgamābhāsa.

प्रत्यक्षमेवैकं प्रमाणमित्यादि संख्याभासम् ॥ ५५ ॥

55. Pratyakṣamevaikaṁ pramāṇamityādi saṅkhyābhāsam.

**लौकायतिकस्य प्रत्यक्षतः परलोकादिनिषेधस्य परबुद्ध्यादे-
श्चासिद्धेरतद्विषयत्वात् ॥ ५६ ॥**

56. Laukāyatikasya pratyakṣataḥ paralokādiniṣedhasya paravudhyādeśchāsiddheratadviṣayatvāt.

**सौगत-सांख्ययौगप्राभाकर-जैमिनीयानां प्रत्यक्षानुमाना-
गमोपमानार्थापत्यभावैरेकैकाधिकैर्व्याप्तिवत् ॥ ५७ ॥**

57. Saugata-sāṅkhyā-yauga-prābhākara-jaiminiyānām pratyakṣānumānāgamopamānārthāpattyabhāvairēkaikādhikairvyāptivat.

अनुमानादेस्तद्विषयत्वे प्रमाणान्तरत्वम् ॥ ५८ ॥

58. Anumānādestadviṣayatve pramāṇāntaratvam.

**तर्कस्येव व्याप्तिगोचरत्वे प्रमाणान्तरत्वम् अप्रमाणस्याव्यव-
स्थापकत्वात् ॥ ५९ ॥**

59. Tarkasyeva vyāptigocharatve pramāṇāntaratvam apramāṇasyāvyaavasthāpakatvāt.

प्रतिभासभेदस्य च भेदकत्वात् ॥ ६० ॥

60. Pratibhāsa-bhedasya cha bhedakatvāt

55. Saṅkhyābhāsa (Fallacy of number) is maintaining 'Pratyakṣa is the only Pramāṇa' etc.

56. Because according to the view of the followers of Chār-
vāka philosophy the other world is denied from Pratyakṣa and

knowledge of others cannot be derived (from Pratyakṣa), so these cannot be the subject matter of it (Pratyakṣa).

57. Like Vyāpti in case of the followers of the Buddhist, Sāṅkhya, Nyāya, Prabhākara (school of Mīmāṃsa philosophy) and Jaimini (school of Mīmāṃsa philosophy) who accept Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Āgama, Upamāna, Arthāpatti and Abhāva exceeding one by one (in their doctrines respectively).

58. Knowledge of others being the subject of Anumāna etc. will become another Pramāṇa.

59. Tarka also being understood from Vyāpti will become another Pramāṇa. For that which is not Pramāṇa cannot establish anything.

60. Because there is a difference according to difference of illumination.

Commentary

There is a great difference of opinion among Indian philosophers regarding the number of Pramāṇa. According to the Chārvāka view, there is only one Pramāṇa viz. Pratyakṣa. According to the Buddhist philosophy, there are two Pramāṇas viz. Pratyakṣa and Anumāna. In Vaiśeṣika philosophy, Pratyakṣa and Anumāna are accepted as Pramāṇas for according to this philosophy the Pramāṇas Śabda etc. are included within Anumāna.

In Sāṅkhya philosophy, three Pramāṇas viz. Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and Āgama have been accepted. In Nyāya philosophy, four kinds of Pramāṇa viz. Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna and Śabda have been mentioned. In Mīmāṃsa philosophy those who follow the school of Prabhākara mention that there are five Pramāṇas : Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna, Śabda and Arthāpatti, and those who follow the Bhatta school mention that there are six Pramāṇas viz. Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna, Śabda, Arthāpatti and Abhāva.

In Parikṣāmukhaṃ it is mentioned that denial of any kind of Pramāṇa as accepted in this work will lead to the fallacy of

Saṅkhyābhāsa (fallacy with reference to the number). It is urged that an example of this fallacy is the view of the Chārvāka philosophy that there is no other Pramāṇa except Pratyakṣa. For the other world or knowledge of others cannot be derived from Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa. That knowledge which cannot know an object cannot establish the existence or non-existence of that object. So the Chārvāka philosophy cannot establish the non-existence of the next world, or the existence of knowledge of others through Pratyakṣa.

Again the knowledge of Vyāpti has to be accepted separately. So the view of philosophers who accept two, three, four, five or six Pramāṇas commit the fallacy of Saṅkhyā (number). For example, if Chārvāka will say 'I will prove the other world by Anumāna (inference), he will have to accept a Pramāṇa other than Pratyakṣa. So the view of Chārvāka that there is only one Pramāṇa viz. Pratyakṣa, becomes vitiated by Saṅkhyābhāsa.

Again, some like the Buddhists accept Tarka to be a separate Pramāṇa to establish Vyāpti. The fallacy will be similar as shown in the acceptance of 'inference' by the Chārvākas for Tarka will increase the number of Pramāṇas as accepted by these philosophers. It cannot be said that though Tarka is accepted, it is not accepted as Pramāṇa. To hold such a view will lead to the failure of establishing Vyāpti for if Tarka be not accepted as Pramāṇa, Vyāpti will not be established by it. That which is not a Pramāṇa cannot establish an object. So if we accept establishment of Vyāpti by Tarka, we must accept Tarka to be a Pramāṇa.

There is a further reason for accepting Tarka etc. as Pramāṇas. Where illuminations are different, Pramāṇas must also be different. In Pratyakṣa, Tarka etc. the illumination is not the same. So these must be treated as different Pramāṇas.

विषयाभासः सामान्यं विशेषो द्वयं वा स्वतंत्रम् ॥ ६१ ॥

61. Viṣayābhāsaḥ sāmānyam viśeṣo dvayaṃ vā svatantraṃ.

तथा प्रतिभासनात् कार्याकरणाच्च ॥ ६२ ॥

62. Tathā pratibhāsanāt kāryākaraṇāchcha.

समर्थस्य करणे सर्वदोत्पत्तिरनपेक्षत्वात् ॥ ६३ ॥

63. Samarthasya karaṇe sarvadotpattiranapekṣatvāt.

परापेक्षणे परिणामित्वमन्यथा तदभावात् ॥ ६४ ॥

64. Parāpekṣaṇe pariṇāmitvamanyathā tadabhāvāt.

स्वयमसमर्थस्य अकारकत्वात् पूर्ववत् ॥ ६५ ॥

65. Svayamasamarthasya akāraakatvāt pūrvavat.

61. Viṣayābhāsa (fallacy of object) (happens) where Sāmānya or Viśeṣa or both of them (are) separately (accepted).

62. As it appears like the same, and as it does not do any work.

63. Accepting it to be Samartha (effective) will lead to creation (of result) at all times, being independant.

64. On accepting dependency on other (causes), the quality of being modified will have to be accepted as otherwise, this does not exist.

65. Because, that which is ineffective in itself cannot cause anything as the former.

Commentary

Fallacy of Viṣaya (object) arises when we say that the object of Pramāṇa is only Sāmānya or only Viśeṣa or that Sāmānya and Viśeṣa are separate objects of Pramāṇa. In objects only Sāmānya etc. are not seen and only Sāmānya etc. cannot produce any result. On accepting that Sāmānya etc. can effect something we are led to two stand-points viz. whether Sāmānya etc. effect anything being Samartha (effective cause) or Asamartha (non-effective cause). If we accept that Sāmānya etc. effect things being Samartha, we will be led to the inevitable conclusion that

effects will always arise for no other thing than Sāmānya etc. will be required to produce effects. If we maintain that Sāmānya etc. require other accessories, we must maintain that it consists of modification. Whenever we accept accessory causes for production of an effect, the conclusion is inevitable that modification will occur. To accept the second view viz. that Sāmānya etc. produce effect being Asamartha will not be proper. A cause which is Asamartha cannot produce anything either before or after combination with accessory causes. So Sāmānya etc. if taken as Asamartha will not be able to produce any result.

फलाभासं प्रमाणादभिन्नं भिन्नमेव वा ॥ ६६ ॥

66. Phalābhāsaṃ pramāṇādabhinnam bhinnameva vā.

अभेदे तद्व्यवहारानुपपत्तेः ॥ ६७ ॥

67. Abhede tadvyavahārānupapatteḥ.

**व्यावृत्त्यापि न तत्कल्पना फलान्तराद्व्यावृत्त्याफलत्व-
प्रसंगात् ॥ ६८ ॥**

68. Vyāvṛittyāpi na tatkalpanā phalāntarādvyāvṛittyā-phalatvaprasaṅgāt.

प्रमाणाद्व्यावृत्त्येवाप्रमाणत्वस्य ॥ ६९ ॥

69. Pramāṇādvyāvṛittyevāpramāṇatvasya.

तस्माद्वास्तवोऽभेदः ॥ ७० ॥

70. Tasmādvāstavo'bhedah.

भेदे त्वात्मान्तरवत्तदनुपपत्तेः ॥ ७१ ॥

71. Bhede tvātmāntaravattadanupapatteḥ.

समवायेऽतिप्रसंगः ॥ ७२ ॥

72. Samavāye'tiprasaṅgaḥ.

66. Phalābhāsa (fallacy of result) is either separate or not separate from Pramāṇa.

67. If we accept inseparableness, its (separate) use cannot happen.

68. Its imagination by its opposite cannot (be accepted) for (we) shall have to assume (then) non-result by its opposite (e. g.) another result.

69. Just as Apramāṇa is derived from Pramāṇa by holding the opposite.

70. So, really there is no difference.

71. (If) difference (be accepted), it will not be derived as in the case of another soul.

72. There will be Atiprasaṅga (if we urge) Samavāya.

Commentary

Phalābhāsa (fallacy of the result of Pramāṇa) is either separate from Pramāṇa or inseparable from it. If we accept that the result is always inseparable from Pramāṇa, we cannot say as usual that this is the Pramāṇa and this is the result. If it is mentioned as is done by the Buddhists, that the result will be understood by absence of non-result, it will not be correct. For non-result can then in a similar manner be understood by result of a like nature just as the Buddhists agree to Apramāṇa by absence of Pramāṇa of a like nature. If non-result is taken to be imagined in all cases, there will be nothing as result in this world. So it must be accepted that there is a real difference between Pramāṇa and its result. But it cannot be said that the difference is absolute. For in that case there will be the following difficulty. The result of Pramāṇa in a being other than myself is separate from me. If the difference of Pramāṇa and its result is taken as absolute the result of Pramāṇa of my own soul will also be different from me. It will therefore become impossible to say "this result is the result of my Pramāṇa". If you urge that though Pramāṇa and its result are separate, still according to the relationship of Samavāya (co-inherence), wherever there will be Pramāṇa in a soul, there will also be the result by relationship of co-inherence,

we will reply that there will be the fault of Atiprasaṅga viz. as Samavāya has been accepted as Nitya (eternal) and Vyāpaka (pervasive), all souls will have the quality of equal co-inherence, and it cannot be that in a particular soul Pramāṇa and the result will exist in relationship of Samavāya.

प्रमाणतदाभासौ दुष्टतयोद्भावितौ परिहृतापरिहृतदोषौ

वादिनः साधनतदाभासौ प्रतिवादिनो दूषणभूषणे च ॥७३॥

73. Pramāṇatadābhāsau duṣṭatayodbhāvitau parihritāparihritadoṣau vādinah sādhanatadābhāsau prativādinō dūṣaṇabhūṣaṇe cha.

73. Pramāṇa and its Ābhāsa being shown as faulty and being made free from or connected with fault will be Sādhana or its Ābhāsa in case of the Vādi and Duṣaṇa (fault) or Bhūṣaṇa (adornment) respectively of Prativādi (opponent).

Commentary

In a discussion between two persons, one uses Pramāṇa first. He is called the Vādi. His opponent is known as Prativādi. When the Vādi uses a Pramāṇa his Prativādi may say that this is faulty. If the Vādi can show that the fault urged is really non-existent, he wins in the argument and the Pramāṇa becomes Sādhana in case of the Vādi and Duṣaṇa in case of the Prativādi. If again, at the outset the Vādi uses Sādhanābhāsa and the Prativādi points out the fault which the Vādi fails to refute, then this Sādhanābhāsa becomes Duṣaṇa to the Vādi and Bhūṣaṇa to the Prativādi.

Hemachandra defines Dūṣaṇa as the words by which faults like Asiddha, Viruddha etc. are shown in propositions¹. There can also be Dūṣaṇābhāsa viz. an apparent Dūṣaṇa though really it can be proved to be non-existent². Vāda is laying down of a

1. “साधनदोषोद्भावनं दूषणम् ॥” Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā, II. 1. 28.

2. “अभूतदोषोद्भावनानि दूषणाभासा जात्युत्तराणि ॥”

Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā II. 1. 29.

proposition and its faults in the presence of members of a council and others to prove the real thing¹. When the Vādi lays down a proposition, the Prativādi finds out its fault. Again when the Prativādi lays down anything, the Vādi finds out its fault. The utterances of the Vādi and Prativādi in this manner are vāda².

संभवदन्यद्विचारणीयम् ॥ ७४ ॥

74. Sambhavadanyadvichāraṇīyam.

74. Other (varieties) which exist, are to be understood by reasoning (from other works).

Commentary

In Parikṣāmukhaṃ, Pramāṇa only is described in detail. But it has been laid down that Pramāṇa as well as Naya are means of instruction (“प्रमाणनयैरधिगमः” Tattvārtha Sūtra I. 6) by which right faith is established. In this aphorism it is mentioned that Nayas are not described in detail in this work but may be learnt from other works³.

1. “तत्त्वसंरक्षणार्थं प्राश्निकादिसमक्षं साधनदूषणवदनं वादः ॥”

Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā II. 1. 30.

2. “स्वपक्षसिद्धये वादिनः साधनं, तत्प्रतिषेधाय प्रतिवादिनो दूषणं, प्रतिवादिनोऽपि स्वपक्षसिद्धये साधनं तत्प्रतिषेधाय वादिनो दूषणं, तदेवं वादिनः साधनदूषणे प्रतिवादिनोऽपि साधनदूषणे तयोर्वादिप्रतिवादिभ्यां वदनमभिधानं वादः ॥” Bhāṣya to Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā. II. 1. 30. Hemachandra says that Vādi, Prativādi, Sabhāpati (the president or umpire) and members of the Council—these four are limbs of a discussion. The members of the Council must be impartial, learned, efficient in discussions and capable of balancing the arguments like a scale “स्वसमयपर-समयज्ञाः कुलजाः पक्षद्वयेप्सिताः क्षमिणः । वादपथेऽवभिमुक्तास्तुलासमाः प्राश्निकाः प्रोक्ताः ॥”

3. “संभवद्विद्यमानं अन्यत् प्रमाणतत्वात् नयस्वरूपं शास्त्रान्तरप्रसिद्धं विचारणीयमिह युक्त्या प्रतिपत्तव्यम् ।” Prameya-ratnamālā.

Nayas are mainly divided into two classes : (i) Dravyārthika Naya and (ii) Paryāyārthika Naya. Dravyārthika Naya is subdivided into (a) Naigama (b) Saṅgraha and (c) Vyavahāra and Paryāyārthika Naya is subdivided into (a) Riju-sūtra (b) Śabda (c) Samabhirudha and (d) Evambhūta¹.

Siddhasena mentions : "Since things have many characters (that is, may be conceived from many points of view) they are the objects of all-sided knowledge (omniscience) ; but a thing conceived from one particular point of view is the object of Naya (or one-sided knowledge)" ².

"Objects whether intrinsic or extrinsic, possess many different characteristics, and may be taken from different stand-points. They are understood in their entire character by omniscience alone, while to take them from a certain stand-point is the scope of Naya (the one sided method of comprehension)" ³.

To be more clear, All that exists is capable of being known and as such is an object of knowledge and each substance is possessed of innumerable attributes. We sometimes take a partial view of reality and sometimes we apprehend the whole reality. The former view is known as the Naya or the theory of stand-points, whereas the latter is called the Pramāṇa or complete comprehension⁴.

A Naya deals with only the particular aspect in view of the speaker but it does not deny the existence of the remaining attri-

1. 'तत्र मूलनयो द्वौ द्रव्यार्थिकपर्यायार्थिकभेदात् । तत्र द्रव्यार्थिकस्त्रेधा नैगम-संग्रहव्यवहारभेदात् । पर्यायार्थिकश्चतुर्धा ऋजुसूत्रसमभिरुद्धैवम्भूतभेदात् ॥'

Prameya-ratnamālā.

2. "अनेकान्तात्मकं वस्तु गोचरः सर्वसंविदाम् ।

एकदेशविशिष्टोऽर्थो नयस्य विषयो मतः ॥" Nyāyāvatāra 29.

3. Ibid. Note to the above by Dr. S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa.

4. "सकलादेशः प्रमाणाधीनः, विकलादेशो नयाधीनः ।" Quotation in Tattvārtharājavārttika,

butes. When we speak of the colour of gold, we make no mention of its weight, touch, taste, smell and other attributes but our statement does not mean that gold is devoid of all the other attributes besides colour. When speaking from a limited point of view, Jain scholars prefix the word *Syāt* to every such predication to signify that the object is of a particular type from a particular stand point but it is not so from other points of view. '*Syāt*' suggests the existence of other attributes but does not give primary importance to them. This is the differentiating point which helps in accuracy of expression by a scholar of the Jain school of thought. One school of philosophy might say that all that exists is momentary and another school might say that reality is permanent. Jainism reconciles both these seemingly contradictory statements by pointing out that the first view is true from the stand point of modifications only which are subject to change every moment and the second view is also correct from the standpoint of elements of which the thing is composed. One sided systems of philosophy deny the existence of attributes other than what they adopt, whereas the Jain point of view admits their existence though these are not described being not of primary importance. This *Nayavāda* or *Syādvāda* system is the distinctive feature of Jain philosophy and logic¹.

The *Nayas* have broadly been classified as *Dravyārthika* i. e. statements which refer only to the general attributes of a substance and not to the modifications which the substance is constantly undergoing and (2) *Paryāyārthika* i. e. statements which refer to the constantly changing conditions of a substance.

The *Nayas* are further classified into (1) *Artha-naya* and (2) *Śabda-naya*. The former deals with the objects and the latter

1. A detailed description of *Nayas* and *Saptabhaṅgi* (seven modes of predication) has been given in Pages LII—LXXXV of the Introduction to *Pañcāstikāya-samayasāra* Vol. III of The Sacred Books of the Jainas.

lays emphasis on the words and their grammatical significance.

The Nayas have again been classified as (1) Naigama, (2) Saṅgraha, (3) Vyavahāra, (4) Riju-sūtra, (5) Śabda, (6) Samabhirūḍha and (7) Evambhūta. The first three are subdivisions of Dravyārthika because they deal with objects and the last four are the same of Paryāyārthika Naya because they are concerned with the modifications of substances.

I. Naigama (Not literal or figurative). When we speak of a past or future event as a present one, we have an illustration of this Naya. It is of three kinds relating to past, present and future. If we say on the Diwali day "Lord Mahāvīra attained liberation to-day" we mean that this day is the anniversary day of the past event. Again, we see a man booking his passage and on our query, he says "I am going to England." This is a figurative way of speaking about a present event. Further, when we see a man making a fire and on our questioning him, he says "I am cooking", he really speaks of a future event for which he is making only a preparation.

II. Saṅgraha (common or general). When we use a word denoting a class to mean the whole, we have an example of this Naya. By using the word Dravya we take the six kinds of Dravyas, taking only the general attributes of Dravya (substance) and not considering the distinguishing features.

III. Vyavahāra (distributive). When we divide or separate a general term into its classes, orders, kinds or species, we have an example of this Naya. For example when we speak of Dravya (substance) implying its six subdivisions soul, matter, space, time, media of motion and rest, we have an example of this Naya.

By Saṅgraha Naya the generic properties alone are taken into consideration without any cognizance of the particular properties and by Vyavahāra Naya the particular properties alone are considered.

IV. Riju-sūtra (the straight expression). This Naya takes into account of (1) the actual condition at a particular moment and (2) the actual condition for a long time. The first variety is called Sūkṣma (fine) and the second Sthūla (gross). A soul with a momentary good thought is an example of the former while a man with a human condition for a life time is an example of the latter.

By this Naya a thing as it exists at present is considered without any reference to the past or future. The followers of this Naya say that it is useless to ponder over things as they were in the past or will become in the future. All practical purposes are served by the thing itself as it exists at the present moment.

V. Śabda (descriptive). This Naya includes grammatical correctness and propriety of expression. From this point of view we can use the present for the past tense, plural for the singular number, feminine for the masculine gender etc. An example of the first is when we speak "In 1066 A. D. we see the Normans attack the Anglo-Saxons". The second is illustrated by the use of "you" for one man. The third is exemplified by the use of a masculine name e. g. Lord Nelson for a vessel which is used in feminine gender.

VI. Samabhirūḍha (specific). This Naya is employed when we give a word a fixed meaning out of several which it has. This is exemplified by the use of the word 'Nut' to denote an extra smart man or "Dread nought" to denote a particular kind of warship.

VII. Evambhūta (active). When we restrict the name to the very activity which is connoted by the name we have an example of this Naya e. g. when we call Stratford on Avon by that name only so long as the town stands on the banks of the river Avon¹.

1. "नैगम-संग्रह व्यवहारजुं सूत्रशब्दसमभिरुद्धैवम्भूता नयाः ।" Tattvārthādhigama Sutra I. 33. See The Sacred Books of the Jainas Vol. II. P. 45,

Amongst these Nayas, the range of each becomes more and more fine according to their position in the list as mentioned above¹.

These Nayas deal with the various aspects of reality from their particular angles of vision, but they do not predicate the non-existence of other points of views. When one point of view becomes primary, the others become of secondary importance. It is incorrect to suppose that only a particular Naya is correct and others are erroneous. As a matter of fact all these stand points are equally true and valid and lead to correct knowledge, provided that they do not deny the existence of the other points of view, for

“अनभिनिवृत्तार्थसंकल्पमात्रग्राही नैगमः । सजात्यविरोधेनैकध्यमुपनीय पर्यायानाक्रान्तभेदानविशेषेण समस्तग्रहणात् संग्रहः । संग्रहनयाक्षिप्तानामर्थानां विधिपूर्वकमवहरणं व्यवहारः । ऋजुं प्रगुणं सूत्रयति तन्त्रयति इति ऋजुसूत्रः । लिंगसंख्यासाधनादिव्यभिचारनिवृत्तिपरः शब्दनयः । नानार्थसमभिरोहणात् समभिरूढः । येनात्मना भूतस्तेनैवाध्यवसाययतीति एवंभूतः ।” Sarvārtha-siddhiḥ.

The definition of Nayas with Nayābhāṣas is thus given in Prameya-ratna-mālā :

“अन्योऽन्यगुणप्रधानभूतभेदाभेदप्ररूपणो नैगमः । नैकं गमो नैगम इति निरुक्तेः । सर्वथाभेदवादस्तदाभासः । प्रतिपक्षव्यपेक्षः सन्मात्रग्राही संग्रहः । ब्रह्मवादस्तदाभासः । संग्रहगृहीतभेदको व्यवहारः । काल्पनिको भेदस्तदाभासः । शुद्धपर्यायग्राही प्रतिपक्षसापेक्ष ऋजुसूत्रः । क्षणिकैकान्तनयस्तदाभासः । कालकारकलिंगानां भेदाच्छब्दस्य कथंचिदर्थभेदकथनं शब्दनयः । अर्थभेदं विना शब्दानामेव नानात्वैकान्तस्तदाभासः । पर्यायभेदात् पदार्थनानात्वनिरूपकः समभिरूढः । पर्यायनानात्वमन्तरेणापीन्द्रादिभेदकथनं तदाभासः । क्रियाश्रयेण भेदप्ररूपणमित्थंभावः । क्रियानिरपेक्षत्वेन क्रियावाचकेषु काल्पनिको व्यवहारस्तदाभासः । इति नयस्तदाभासलक्षणं संक्षेपेणोक्तं विस्तरेण ‘नय-चक्रा’त् प्रतिपत्तव्यम् ॥” Prameya-ratnamālā.

1. ‘नैगमादयो नया उत्तरोत्तर-सूक्ष्मविषयत्वादेषां क्रमः, पूर्वपूर्वहेतुकत्वाच्च । एवमेते नयाः पूर्वपूर्वविरुद्धमहाविषया उत्तरोत्तरानुकूलाल्पविषयाः ।”

Tattvārtha-rāja-vārttika,

one will be wholly untrue without the existence of others. In other words, the valid Nayas are inter-dependent and when they become independent, the result is that their very nature is annihilated. For example, the inter-dependence of cotton threads is possessed of the potentiality of warding off cold and providing comfort to the body, but if each of these threads become independent of others, these will not be able to serve the aforesaid purpose. This principle is applied to the doctrine of Nayas. Āchārya Amritachandra Sūri has mentioned that as a milk-maid draws part of the rope of the churning rod by one hand loosening the other part to get butter out of curd, so the Jain doctrine of Naya gives prominence to a particular attribute leaving aside the other views and by this means churns the nectar of reality (Tattva)¹.

The harmonious combination of these co-ordinating Nayas paves the way to right faith (Saṃyog-darśana)².

This aphorism of Parikṣāmukhaṃ has been given an alternative explanation by Anantavīrya. He says that besides being explained as above, we may take this aphorism to mean "Vāda-lakṣmaṇa or Patra-lakṣmaṇa which are mentioned elsewhere should be noted here"³.

Vāda has been defined as words which establish their import⁴. Patra is defined as a sentence the limbs of which are well-known and which establish the import which it desires to convey

1. "एकेनाकर्षयन्ती श्लथयन्ती वस्तुतत्त्वमितरेण ।
अन्तेन जयति जैनी नीतिर्मथाननेत्रमिव गोपी ॥"

Purusārtha-siddhyupāya, Verse 225.

2. "एते गुणप्रधानतया परस्परतंत्राः सम्यग्दर्शनहेतवः ।"

Tattvārtha-rāja-vārttika.

3. "अथवा संभवद् विद्यमानं, अन्यद् वादलक्षणं पत्रलक्षणं वान्यत्रोक्तमिह द्रष्टव्यम् ।" Prameya-ratna-mālā.

4. "समर्थवचनं वादः ।" Ibid,

and which consists of correct and unambiguous words having a deep significance¹.

According to this interpretation the Aphorism will mean that Vāda and Patra have not been described in this work, but these should be studied from other works where the same have been treated in detail.

परीक्षामुखमादर्शं हेयोपादेयतत्त्वयोः ।

संविदे मादृशो बालः परीक्षादक्षवद् व्यधाम् ॥

Parikṣāmukhamādarśaṃ heyopādeyatattvayoh.

Saṁvide mādrīśo vālah parikṣādakṣavad vyadhām.

I, having little knowledge (like a child) have written as one who is conversant with Parikṣā, (this work) Parikṣāmukhaṃ (resembling) a mirror for understanding of realities to be accepted or discarded.

Commentary

The author Māṇikyanandi in this concluding verse of his work shows humility by describing himself as a child having little knowledge. This work is compared to a mirror. As good or bad looks of a person adorned with ornaments are seen in a mirror so things to be accepted or discarded will be determined by this work by means of Pramāṇa². As a man conversant with Parikṣā"

1. "प्रसिद्धावयवं वाक्यं स्येष्वस्यार्थस्य साधकम् ।

साधुगूढपदप्रायं पत्रमाहुरनाकुलम् ॥" Ibid.

2. "यथैवादृशं आत्मनोऽलंकारमंडितस्य सौरूप्यं वैरूप्यं वा प्रतिविंबोपदर्शनद्वारेण सूचयति तथेदमपि हेयोपादेयतत्त्वं साधनदूषणोपदर्शनद्वारेण निश्चाययतीत्यादर्शत्वेन निरूप्यते ।"

3. Parikṣā is a full discussion used in finding out the strength and weakness of various arguments which are opposed to one another. 'Pari' means 'full' and 'Īkṣaṇam' means discussion of of subjects. Vide :

completes the work undertaken by him, so the author also has completed this book¹.

End of Samuddesa VI.

FINIS.

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“अन्योन्यविरुद्ध-नानायुक्ति-प्राचल्यदौर्बल्यावधारणाय प्रवर्तमानो विचारः परीक्षा तर्क इति यावत् । परि समन्तादशेषनिःशेषत ईक्षणं विचारणं यत्र अर्थानामिति व्युत्पत्तेः ।” Nyāyamāṇi-dīpikā.

1. “यथा परीक्षादक्षः स्वप्रारब्धज्ञास्त्रं निरुद्धवांस्तथाहमपि ।”

Prameya-ratna-mālā.






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PRAMEYA-RATNA-MĀLĀ
(PARĪKSĀMUKHA-LAGHU-VRITTI)

BY
ANANTA VĪRYA.

अनन्तवीर्यरचिता
प्रमेयरत्नमाला
(परीक्षामुखलघुवृत्तिः)





प्रमेयरत्नमाला

॥ ॐ नमः सिद्धेभ्यः ॥

नतामरशिरोरत्न—प्रभाप्रोतनखत्विषे ।

नमो जिनाय दुर्वारमारवीरमदच्छिदे ॥ १ ॥

अकलङ्कवचोऽम्भोधेरुदध्रे येन धीमता ।

न्यायविद्यामृतं तस्मै नमो साणिक्यनन्दिने ॥ २ ॥

प्रभेन्दुवचनोदारचन्द्रिकाप्रसरे सति ।

मादृशाः क नु गण्यन्ते ज्योतिरिङ्गणसन्निभाः ॥ ३ ॥

तथाऽपि तद्वचोऽपूर्वरचनारुचिरं सताम् ।

चेतोहरं भृतं यद्वन्नद्या नवघटे जलम् ॥ ४ ॥

वैजेयप्रियपुत्रस्य हीरपस्योपरोधतः ।

शान्तिपेणार्थमारब्धा परीक्षामुखपञ्चिका ॥ ५ ॥

श्रीमन्न्यायावारपारस्यामेयप्रमेयरत्नसारस्थावगाहनमव्युत्पन्नैः कर्तुं न
पार्यत इति तदवगाहनाय पोतप्रायमिदं प्रकरणमाचार्यः प्राह ॥ तत्प्रकरणस्य
च सम्बन्धादित्रयापरिज्ञाने सति प्रेक्षावतां प्रवृत्तिर्न स्यादिति तत्रयानुवादपुरः-
सरं वस्तुनिर्देशपरं प्रतिज्ञाश्लोकमाह—

प्रमाणादर्थसंसिद्धिस्तदाभासाद्विपर्ययः ।

इति वक्ष्ये तयोर्लक्ष्म सिद्धमल्पं लघीयसः ॥ १ ॥

इत्यस्यार्थः—अहं वक्ष्ये प्रतिपादयिष्ये । किं तल्लक्ष्म, लक्षणम् । किं
विशिष्टं लक्ष्म ? सिद्धं, पूर्वाचार्यप्रसिद्धत्वात् । पुनरपि कथंभूतं ? अल्पमल्प-
ग्रन्थवाच्यत्वात् । ग्रन्थतोऽल्पमर्थतस्तु महदित्यर्थः । कान् लघीयसो विने-
यानुद्दिश्य । लाघवं मतिकृतमिह गृह्यते न परिमाणकृतं नाऽपि कालकृतं
तस्य प्रतिपाद्यत्वव्यभिचारात् । कयोस्तल्लक्ष्म तयोः प्रमाणतदाभासयोः ॥
कुतः यतोऽर्थस्य परिच्छेदस्य संसिद्धिः संप्राप्तिर्ज्ञप्तिर्वा भवति ॥ कस्मात्प्रमा-
णात् । न केवलं प्रमाणादर्थसंसिद्धिर्भवति । विपर्ययो भवति । अर्थसंसि-

द्व्यभावो भवति । कस्मात्तदाभासात् प्रमाणाभासात् ॥ इतिशब्दो हेत्वर्थे
 इति हेतोः ॥ अयमत्र समुदायार्थः । यतः कारणात्प्रमाणादर्थसंसिद्धिर्भवति ।
 यस्माच्च तदाभासाद्विपर्ययो भवति । इति हेतोस्तयोः प्रमाणतदाभासयोर्लक्ष्म-
 लक्षणमहं वक्ष्ये इति ॥ ननु सम्बन्धाभिधेयशक्यानुष्ठानेष्टप्रयोजनवन्ति हि
 शास्त्राणि भवन्ति । तत्रास्य प्रकरणस्य यावदभिधेयं सम्बन्धो वा नाभिधी-
 यते न तावदस्योपादेयत्वं भवितुमर्हति । एष बन्ध्यामुतो यातीत्यादिवाक्य-
 वत् । दशदाडिमादिवाक्यवच्च ॥ तथा शक्यानुष्ठानेष्टप्रयोजनमपि शास्त्रा-
 दाववश्यं वक्तव्यमेव । अशक्यानुष्ठानेष्टस्येष्टप्रयोजनस्य सर्वज्वरहरतक्तकचूडा-
 रत्नालङ्कारोपदेशस्येव प्रेक्षावद्भिरनादरणीयत्वात् ॥ तथा शक्यानुष्ठानस्या-
 प्यनिष्टप्रयोजनस्य विद्वद्भिरवधीरणान्मातृविवाहादिप्रदर्शकवाक्यवदिति ॥
 सत्यं, प्रमाणतदाभासपदोपादानादभिधेयमभिहितमेव । प्रमाणतदाभास-
 योरनेन प्रकरणेनाभिधानात् ॥ सम्बन्धश्चार्थायातः प्रकरणतदभिधेययो-
 र्वाच्यवाचकभावलक्षणः प्रतीयत एव ॥ तथा प्रयोजनं चोक्तलक्षणमादि-
 श्लोकेनैव संलक्ष्यते, प्रयोजनं हि द्विधा भिद्यते । साक्षात्परम्परयेति । तत्र
 साक्षात्प्रयोजनं वक्ष्ये इत्यनेनाभिधीयते । प्रथमं शास्त्रव्युत्पत्तेरेव विनेयैरन्वे-
 पणात् ॥ पारम्पर्येण तु प्रयोजनमर्थसंसिद्धिरित्यनेनोच्यते शास्त्रव्युत्पत्त्य-
 नन्तरभावित्वादर्थसंसिद्धेरिति ॥ ननु निःशेषविघ्नोपशमनायेष्टदेवतान-
 मस्कारः शास्त्रकृता कथं न कृत इति न वाच्यम् । तस्य मनःकायाभ्यामपि
 सम्भवात् ॥ अथवा वाचनिकोऽपि नमस्कारोऽनेनैवादिवाक्येनाभिहितो
 वेदितव्यः । केषाञ्चिद्वाक्यानामुभयार्थप्रतिपादनपरत्वेनापि दृश्यमानत्वात् ।
 यथा श्वेतो धावतीत्युक्ते श्वा इतो धावति श्वेतगुणयुक्तो धावति इत्यर्थद्वय-
 प्रतीतिः ॥ तत्रादिवाक्यस्य नमस्कारपरताभिधीयते ॥ अर्थस्य हेयोपादेय-
 लक्षणस्य संसिद्धिर्ज्ञप्तिर्भवति । कस्मात्प्रमाणात् । अनन्तचतुष्टयस्वरूपान्तरङ्ग-
 लक्षणा, समवसरणादिस्वभावा बहिरङ्गलक्षणा लक्ष्मीर्मा इत्युच्यते । अण-
 नमाणः शब्दः सा च आणश्च माणौ प्रकृष्टौ माणौ यस्यासौ प्रमाणः ।
 हरिहराद्यसम्भविभूतियुक्तो दृष्टेष्टाविरुद्धवाक्य भगवानर्हन्नेवाभिधीयत
 इत्यसाधारणगुणोपदर्शनमेव भगवतः संस्तवनमभिधीयते । तस्मात्प्रमाणाद-
 वधिभूतादर्थसंसिद्धिर्भवति तदाभासाच्च हरिहरादेरर्थसंसिद्धिर्न भवति । इति
 हेतोः सर्वज्ञतदाभासयोर्लक्ष्म लक्षणमहं वक्ष्ये—सामग्रीविशेषेत्यादिना ॥

अथेदानीमुपपत्तिप्रमाणतत्त्वे स्वरूपसंख्याविषयफललक्षणसु चतसृषु विप्रतिपत्तिषु मध्ये स्वरूपविप्रतिपत्तिनिराकरणार्थमाह—

स्वापूर्वार्थव्यवसायात्मकं ज्ञानं प्रमाणमिति ॥ १ ॥

प्रकर्षेण संशयादिव्यवच्छेदेन मीयते परिच्छिद्यते वस्तुतत्त्वं येन तत्प्रमाणम् ॥ तस्य च ज्ञानमिति विशेषणमज्ञानरूपस्य सन्निकर्षादेर्नैयायिकादिपरिकल्पितस्य प्रमाणत्वव्यवच्छेदार्थमुक्तम् ॥ तथा ज्ञानस्यापि स्वसंवेदनेन्द्रियमनयोगिप्रत्यक्षस्य निर्विकल्पकस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वेन प्रामाण्यं सौगतैः परिकल्पितं तन्निरासार्थं व्यवसायात्मकग्रहणम् ॥ तथा बहिरर्थापह्नोतृणां विज्ञानाद्वैतवादिनां पुरुषाद्वैतवादिनां पश्यतोहराणां शून्यैकान्तवादिनां च विपर्यासव्युदासार्थमर्थग्रहणम् ॥ अस्य चापूर्वविशेषणं गृहीतग्राहिधारावाहिज्ञानस्य प्रमाणापरिहारार्थमुक्तम् ॥ तथा परोक्षज्ञानवादिनां मीमांसकानामस्वसंवेदनज्ञानवादिनां सांख्यानां ज्ञानान्तरप्रत्यक्षज्ञानवादिनां यौगानां च मतमपाकर्तुं स्वपदोपादानमित्यव्याप्त्यतिव्याप्त्यसम्भवदोषपरिहारात्सुव्यवस्थितमेव प्रमाणलक्षणम् ॥ अस्य च प्रमाणस्य यथोक्तलक्षणत्वे साध्ये प्रमाणत्वादिति हेतुरत्रैव द्रष्टव्यः । प्रथमान्तस्यापि हेतुपरत्वेन निर्देशोपपत्तेः ॥ प्रत्यक्षं विशदं ज्ञानमित्यादिवत् ॥ तथाहि—प्रमाणं स्वापूर्वार्थव्यवसायात्मकं ज्ञानं भवति प्रमाणत्वात् ॥ यत्तु स्वापूर्वार्थव्यवसायात्मकं ज्ञानं न भवति न तत्प्रमाणम् । यथा संशयादिर्विद्वत्तत्त्वादिश्च । प्रमाणं च विवादापन्नम् । तस्मात्स्वापूर्वार्थव्यवसायात्मकं ज्ञानमेव भवतीति ॥ न च प्रमाणत्वमसिद्धम् । सर्वप्रमाणस्वरूपवादिनां प्रमाणसामान्ये विप्रतिपत्त्यभावात् अन्यथा स्वेष्टानिष्टसाधनदूषणयोगात् । अथ धर्मिणं एव हेतुत्वे प्रतिज्ञार्थैकदेशसिद्धो हेतुः स्यादिति चेन्न । विशेषं धर्मिणं कृत्वा सामान्यं हेतुं ब्रुवतां दोषाभावात् ॥ एतेनापक्षधर्मत्वमपि प्रत्युक्तम् । सामान्यस्याशेषविशेषनिष्ठत्वात् ॥ न च पक्षधर्मतावलेन हेतोर्गमकत्वमपि त्वन्यथानुपपत्तिवलेनेति । सा चात्र नियमवती विपक्षे बाधकप्रमाणवत्तान्निश्चितैव । एतेन विरुद्धत्वमनैकान्तिकत्वं च निरस्तं बोद्धव्यम् । विरुद्धस्य व्यभिचारिणश्चाविनाभावनियमनिश्चयलक्षणत्वायोगादतो भवत्येव साध्यसिद्धिरिति केवलव्यतिरेकिणोऽपि हेतोर्गमकत्वात् । सात्मकं जीवच्छरीरं प्राणादिमत्त्वादितिवत् ॥

अथेदानीं स्वोक्तप्रमाणलक्षणस्य ज्ञानमिति विशेषणं समर्थयमानः प्राह—

हिताहितप्राप्तिपरिहारसमर्थं हि प्रमाणं, ततो ज्ञानमेव तदिति ॥२॥

हितं सुखं तत्कारणं च । अहितं दुःखं तत्कारणं च । हितं चाहितं च हिताहिते । तयोः प्राप्तिश्च परिहारश्च तत्र समर्थम् ॥ हि-शब्दो यस्मादर्थे । तेनायमर्थः सम्पादितो भवति । यस्माद्धिताहितप्राप्तिपरिहारसमर्थं प्रमाणं । ततस्तत्प्रमाणत्वेनाभ्युपगतं वस्तुज्ञानमेव भवितुमर्हति । नाज्ञानरूपं सन्निकर्षादि ॥ तथा च प्रयोगः प्रमाणं ज्ञानमेव हिताहितप्राप्तिपरिहारसमर्थत्वात् । यत्तु न ज्ञानं तन्न हिताहितप्राप्तिपरिहारसमर्थम् । यथा घटादि । हिताहितप्राप्तिपरिहारसमर्थं च विवादापन्नम् । तस्मात् ज्ञानमेव भवतीति ॥ नचैतदसिद्धं । हितप्राप्तयेऽहितपरिहाराय च प्रमाणमन्वेषयन्ति प्रेक्षापूर्वकारिणो न व्यसनितया सकलप्रमाणवादिभिरभिमत्त्वात् ॥ अत्राह सौगतः—भवतु नाम सन्निकर्षादिव्यवच्छेदेन ज्ञानस्यैव प्रामाण्यं न तदस्माभिर्निषिध्यते । तत्तु व्यवसायात्मकमेवेत्यत्र न युक्तिमुत्पश्यामः । अनुमानस्यैव व्यवसायात्मनः प्रामाण्याभ्युपगमात् । प्रत्यक्षस्य तु निर्विकल्पकत्वेऽप्यविसंवादकत्वेन प्रामाण्योपपत्तेरिति तत्राह—

तन्निश्चयात्मकं समारोपविरुद्धत्वादनुमानवदिति ॥ ३ ॥

तत् प्रमाणत्वेनाभ्युपगतं वस्त्विति धर्मिनिर्देशः । व्यवसायात्मकमिति साध्यम् । समारोपविरुद्धत्वादिति हेतुः । अनुमानवदिति दृष्टान्त इति ॥ अयमभिप्रायः—संशयविपर्यासानध्यवसायस्वभावसमारोपविरोधिग्रहणलक्षणव्यवसायात्मकत्वे सत्येवाविसंवादित्वमुपपद्यते । अविसंवादित्वे च प्रमाणत्वमिति चतुर्विधस्यापि समक्षस्य प्रमाणत्वमभ्युपगच्छता समारोपविरोधिग्रहणलक्षणं निश्चयात्मकमभ्युपगन्तव्यम् ॥ ननु तथापि समारोपविरोधिव्यवसायात्मकत्वयोः समानार्थकत्वात् कथं साध्यसाधनभाव इति न मन्तव्यम् । ज्ञानस्वभावतया तयोरभेदेऽपि व्याप्यव्यापकत्वधर्माधारतया भेदोपपत्तेः । शिंशपात्ववृत्तत्ववत् ॥ अथेदानीं सविशेषणमर्थग्रहणं समर्थयमानस्तदेव स्पष्टीकुर्वन्नाह—

अनिश्चितोऽपूर्वार्थ इति ॥ ४ ॥

यः प्रमाणान्तरेण संशयादिव्यवच्छेदेनानध्यवसितः सोऽपूर्वार्थः ॥
तेनेहादिज्ञानविषयस्यावग्रहादिगृहीतत्वेऽपि न पूर्वार्थत्वम् । अवग्रहादिनेहा-
दिविषयभूतावान्तरविशेषनिश्चयाभावात् ॥ अथोक्तप्रकार एवापूर्वार्थः किम-
न्योऽप्यस्तीत्याह—

दृष्टोऽपि समारोपात्तादृगिति ॥ ५ ॥

दृष्टोऽपि गृहीतोऽपि—न केवलमानिश्चित एवेत्यपि शब्दार्थः । तादृग-
पूर्वार्थो भवति । समारोपादिति हेतुः ॥ एतदुक्तं भवति—गृहीतमपि ध्याम-
लिताकारतया यन्निर्णेतुं न शक्यते तदपि वस्त्वपूर्वमिति व्यपदिश्यते
प्रवृत्तसमारोपाव्यवच्छेदात् ॥ ननु भवतु नामापूर्वार्थव्यवसायात्मकत्वं विज्ञा-
नस्य स्वव्यवसायं तु न विद्व इत्यत्राह—

स्वोन्मुखतया प्रतिभासनं स्वस्य व्यवसाय इति ॥ ६ ॥

स्वस्योन्मुखता स्वोन्मुखता तथा स्वोन्मुखतया स्वानुभवतया प्रतिभासनं
स्वस्य व्यवसायः ॥ अत्र दृष्टान्तमाह—

अर्थस्येव तदुन्मुखतयेति ॥ ७ ॥

तच्छब्देनार्थोऽभिधीयते । यथाऽर्थोन्मुखतया प्रतिभासनमर्थव्यवसाय-
स्तथा स्वोन्मुखतया प्रतिभासनं स्वस्य व्यवसायो भवति ॥ अत्रोल्लेखमाह—

घटमहमात्मना वेद्मीति ॥ ८ ॥

ननु ज्ञानमर्थमेवाध्यवस्यति न स्वात्मानम् । आत्मानं फलं वेति
केचित् । कर्तृकर्मणोरेव प्रतीतिरित्यपरे । कर्तृकर्मक्रियाणामेव प्रतीतिरि-
त्यन्ये । तेषां मतमखिलमपि प्रतीतिबाधितमिति दर्शयन्नाह—

कर्मवत्कर्तृकरणक्रियाप्रतीतेरिति ॥ ९ ॥

ज्ञानविषयभूतं वस्तु कर्माभिधीयते । तस्यैव ज्ञप्तिक्रियया व्याप्यत्वात् ।
तस्यैव तद्वत् । कर्त्ता आत्मा । करणं प्रमाणम् । क्रिया प्रमितिः । कर्त्ता च
करणं च क्रिया च तासां प्रतीतिः तस्या इति हेतौ का प्रागुक्तानुभवोल्लेखे
यथाक्रमं तत्प्रतीतिर्दृष्टव्या ॥ ननु शब्दपरामर्शसचिवेयं प्रतीतिर्न वस्तुत्व-
वल्लोपजातेत्यत्राह—

शब्दानुच्चारणेऽपि स्वस्यानुभवनमर्थवदिति ॥ १० ॥

यथा घटादिशब्दानुच्चारणेऽपि घटाद्यनुभवस्तथाऽहमहमिकया योऽयम-
न्तर्मुखाकारतयावभासः स शब्दानुच्चारणेऽपि स्वयमनुभूयत इत्यर्थः ॥
अमुमेवार्थमुपपत्तिपूर्वकं परं प्रति सोल्लुण्ठमाचष्टे—

को वा तत्प्रतिभासनमर्थमध्यक्षमिच्छंस्तदेव तथा नेच्छेत् ॥ ११ ॥

को वा लौकिकः परीक्षको वा । तेन ज्ञानेन प्रतिभासितुं शीलं यस्य
स तथोक्तस्तं प्रत्यक्षविषयमिच्छन् विषयिधर्मस्य विषये उपचारात् तदेव
ज्ञानमेव तथा प्रत्यक्षत्वेन नेच्छेत्, अपि त्विच्छेदेव । अन्यथा अप्रासादिक-
त्वप्रसङ्गः स्यादित्यर्थः ॥ अत्रोदाहरणमाह—

प्रदीपवदिति ॥ १२ ॥

इदमत्र तात्पर्यम्—ज्ञानं स्वावभासने स्वातिरिक्तसजातीयार्थान्तरानपेक्षं
यस्यक्षार्थगुणत्वे सति अदृष्टानुयायिकरणत्वात्प्रदीपभासुराकारवत् ॥ अथ
भवतु नामोक्तलक्षणलक्षितं प्रमाणं, तथापि तत्प्रामाण्यं स्वतः परतो वा । न
तावत्स्वतः अविप्रतिपत्तिप्रसङ्गात् । नापि परतः—अनवस्थाप्रसङ्गादिति मत-
द्वयमाशंक्य तन्निराकरणेन स्वमतमवस्थापयन्नाह—

तत्प्रामाण्यं स्वतः परतश्चेति ॥ १३ ॥

सोपस्काराणि हि वाक्यानि भवन्ति । तत् इदं प्रतिपत्तव्यं—अभ्यास-
दशायां स्वतोऽनभ्यासदशायां च परत इति ॥ तेन प्रागुक्तैकान्तद्वयनि-
रासः न चानभ्यासदशायां परतः प्रामाण्येऽप्यनवस्था समाना, ज्ञानान्तर-
स्याभ्यस्तविषयस्य स्वतः प्रमाणभूतस्याङ्गीकरणात् ॥ अथवा प्रामाण्यमु-
त्पत्तौ परत एव । विशिष्टकारणप्रभवत्वाद्विशिष्टकार्यस्येति । विषयपरि-
च्छित्तिलक्षणे प्रवृत्तिलक्षणे वा स्वकार्ये अभ्यासेतरदशापेक्षया कचित्स्वतः
परतश्चेति निश्चीयते ॥ ननूत्पत्तौ विज्ञानकारणातिरिक्तकारणान्तरसव्यपे-
क्षत्वमसिद्धम् । प्रामाण्यस्य तदितरस्यैवाभावात् ॥ गुणाख्यमस्तीति वाङ्मात्रं,
विधिमुखेन कार्यमुखेन वा गुणानामप्रतीतेः ॥ नाप्यप्रामाण्यं स्वतः एव
प्रामाण्यं तु परत एवेति विपर्ययः शक्यते कल्पयितुम् ॥ अन्वयव्यतिरे-

काभ्यां हि त्रिरूपास्त्रिज्ञादेव केवलात् प्रामाण्यमुत्पद्यमानं दृष्टम् । प्रत्यक्षा-
दिष्वपि तथैव प्रतिपत्तव्यं नान्यथेति । तत एवाऽऽप्तोक्तत्वगुणसद्भावेऽपि न
तत्कृतमागमस्य प्रामाण्यम् । तत्र हि गुणेभ्यो दोषाणामभावस्तदभावाच्च
संशयविपर्यासलक्षणाप्रामाण्यद्वयासत्त्वेऽपि प्रामाण्यसौत्सर्गिकमनपादित-
मास्त एवेति । ततः स्थितं प्रामाण्यमुत्पत्तौ न सामग्र्यन्तरसापेक्षमिति ॥
नापि विषयपरिच्छित्तिलक्षणे स्वकार्ये स्वग्रहणसापेक्षम् । अगृहीतप्रा-
म्यादेव ज्ञानाद्विषयपरिच्छित्तिलक्षणकार्यदर्शनात् ॥ ननु न परिच्छित्ति-
मात्रं प्रमाणकार्यं तस्य मिथ्याज्ञानेऽपि सद्भावात् । परिच्छित्तिविशेषं तु
नागृहीतप्रामाण्यं विज्ञानं जनयतीति ॥ तदपि बालविलसितम् । नहि
प्रामाण्यग्रहणोत्तरकालमुत्पत्त्यवस्थातः परिच्छित्तेर्विशेषोऽवभासते, गृहीत-
प्रामाण्यादपि विज्ञानाभिर्विशेषविषयपरिच्छेदोपलब्धेः ॥ ननु परिच्छि-
त्तिमात्रस्य शुक्लिकायां रजतज्ञानेऽपि सद्भावात्तस्यापि प्रमाणकार्यत्वप्रसङ्ग
इति चेत्—भवेदेवं, यद्यर्थान्यथात्वप्रत्ययस्वहेतूत्थदोषज्ञानाभ्यां तन्नापोद्भूयेत ॥
तस्माद्यत्र कारणदोषज्ञानं बाधकप्रत्ययो वा नोदेति, तत्र स्वत एव प्रामा-
ण्यमिति ॥ न चैवमप्रामाण्येऽप्याशङ्कनीयं, तस्य विज्ञानकारणातिरिक्तदो-
षस्वभावसामग्रीसव्यपेक्षतयोत्पत्तेः निवृत्तिलक्षणे च स्वकार्ये स्वग्रहणसा-
पेक्षत्वात् ॥ तद्धि यावन्न ज्ञानं न तावत्स्वविषयात्पुरुषं निवर्तयतीति ॥
तदेतत्सर्वमनल्पतमोऽविलसितम् ॥ तथाहि—न तावत्प्रामाण्यस्योत्पत्तौ
सामग्र्यन्तरापेक्षत्वमसिद्धम् । आप्तप्रणीतत्वलक्षणगुणसन्निधाने सत्येवाप्त-
प्रणीतवचनेषु प्रामाण्यदर्शनात् । यद्भावाभावाभ्यां यस्योत्पत्त्यनुत्पत्तौ तत्
तत्कारणकमिति लोकेऽपि सुप्रसिद्धत्वात् ॥ यदुक्तम्—“विधिमुखेन कार्य-
मुखेन वा गुणानामप्रतीतिरिति” तत्र तावदाप्तप्रणीतशब्दे न प्रतीतिगुणा-
नामित्ययुक्तं आप्तप्रणीतत्वहानिप्रसङ्गात् ॥ अथ चक्षुरादौ गुणानामप्रतीति-
रित्युच्यते तदप्ययुक्तम् । नैर्मल्यादिगुणानामवलावालादिभिरप्युपलब्धेः ॥
अथ नैर्मल्यं स्वरूपमेव न गुणः तर्हि हेतोरविनाभाववैकल्यमपि स्वरूप-
विकलतैव न दोष इति समानम् ॥ अथ तद्वैकल्यमेव दोषः तर्हि लिङ्गस्य
चक्षुरादेर्वा तत्स्वरूपसाकल्यमेव गुणः कथं न भवेत् ? आप्तोक्तेऽपि
शब्दे मोहादिलक्षणस्य दोषस्याभावमेव यथार्थज्ञानादिलक्षणगुणसद्भा-
वमभ्युपगच्छेत् । त्र तथा नेच्छतीति कथमनुमत्तः ? अथोक्तमेव—शब्दे

गुणाः सन्तोऽपि न प्रामाण्योत्पत्तौ व्याप्रियन्ते किन्तु दोषाभाव एवेति ॥ सत्यमुक्तं, किन्तु न युक्तमेतत् । प्रतिज्ञामात्रेण साध्यसिद्धेरयोगात् ॥ नहि गुणेभ्यो दोषाणामभाव इत्यत्र किञ्चिन्निवन्धनमुत्पश्यामोऽन्यत्र महामोहात् ॥ अथानुमानेऽपि त्रिरूपलिङ्गमात्रजनितप्रामाण्योपलब्धिरेव तत्र हेतुरिति चेन्न । उक्तोत्तरत्वात् ॥ तत्र हि त्रैरूप्यमेव गुणो यथा तद्वैकल्यं दोष इति नासंमतो हेतुः । अपि चाप्रामाण्येऽप्येवं वक्तुं शक्यत एव । तत्र हि दोषेभ्यो गुणानामभावस्तदभावाच्च प्रामाण्यासत्त्वे अप्रामाण्यमौत्सर्गिकमास्त इत्यप्रामाण्यं स्वत एवेति तस्य भिन्नकारणप्रभवत्ववर्णनमुन्मत्तभाषितमेव स्यात् ॥ किञ्च गुणेभ्यो दोषाणामभाव इत्यभिदधता गुणेभ्यो गुणा एवेत्यभिहितं स्यात् । भावान्तरस्वभावत्वादभावस्य । ततोऽप्रामाण्यसत्त्वं प्रामाण्यमेवेति नैतावता परपक्षप्रतिक्षेपः । अविरोधकत्वात् । तथा अनुमानतोऽपि गुणाः प्रतीयन्त एव, तथाहि—प्रामाण्यं विज्ञानकारणातिरिक्तकारणप्रभवं, विज्ञानान्यत्त्वे सति कार्यत्वात् अप्रामाण्यवत् ॥ तथा प्रमाणप्रामाण्ये भिन्नकारणजन्ये, भिन्नकार्यत्वात् । घटवस्त्रवदिति च ॥ ततः स्थितं प्रामाण्यमुत्पत्तौ परापेक्षमिति ॥ तथा विषयपरिच्छित्तिलक्षणे प्रवृत्तिलक्षणे वा स्वकार्ये स्वग्रहणं नापेक्षत इति नैकान्तः कश्चिदभ्यस्तविषय एव परानपेक्षत्वव्यवस्थानात् ॥ अनभ्यस्ते तु जलमरीचिकासाधारणप्रदेशे जलज्ञानं परापेक्षमेव । सत्यमिदं जलं, विशिष्टाकारधारित्वात् घटचेटिकापेटकदुर्द्वारावसरोजगन्धवत्त्वाच्च, परिदृष्टजलवादित्यनुमानज्ञानादर्थक्रियाज्ञानाच्च, स्वतः सिद्धप्रामाण्यात्प्राचीनज्ञानस्य यथार्थत्वमाकल्पमवकल्पयत एव ॥ यदप्यभिहितं प्रामाण्यग्रहणोत्तरकालमुत्पत्त्यवस्थातः परिच्छित्तेर्विशेषो नावभासत इति । तत्र यद्यभ्यस्तविषयेनावभासत इत्युच्यते तदा तदिष्यत एव । तत्र प्रथममेव निःसंशयं विषयपरिच्छित्तिविशेषाभ्युपगमात् । अनभ्यस्तविषये तु तद्ग्रहणोत्तरकालमस्त्येव विषयावधारणस्वभावपरिच्छित्तिविशेषः । पूर्वं प्रमाणाप्रमाणसाधारण्या एव परिच्छित्तेरुत्पत्तेः ॥ ननु प्रामाण्यपरिच्छित्त्योरभेदात्कथं पौर्वापर्यमिति ? । नैवम् । नहि सर्वाऽपि परिच्छित्तिः प्रामाण्यात्मिका, प्रामाण्यं तु परिच्छित्त्यात्मकमेवेति न दोषः ॥ यदप्युक्तम्—बाधकारणदोषज्ञानाभ्यां प्रामाण्यमपोद्यत इति—तदपि फल्गुभाषितमेव । अप्रामाण्येऽपि तथा वक्तुं शक्यत्वात् ॥ तथाहि—प्रथमप्रमाणमेव ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते

पश्चादबाधबोधगुणज्ञानोत्तरकालं तदपोद्यत इति । तस्मात्प्रामाण्यमप्रामाण्यं
वा स्वकार्ये कचिदभ्यासानभ्यासापेक्षया स्वतः परतश्चेति निर्णेतव्यमिति ॥

देवस्य सम्मतमपास्तसमस्तदोषं

वीक्ष्य प्रपञ्चरुचिरं रचितं समस्य ।

माणिक्यनन्दिविभुना शिशुबोधहेतो-

मानस्वरूपममुना स्फुटमभ्यधायि ॥ १ ॥

इति परीक्षामुल्लवुवृत्तौ प्रमाणस्य स्वरूपोद्देशः ॥ १ ॥

अथ प्रमाणस्वरूपविप्रतिपत्तिं निरस्येदानीं संख्याविप्रतिपत्तिं प्रतिपत्ति-
पन्सकलप्रमाणभेदसन्दर्भसंग्रहपरं प्रमाणेयत्ताप्रतियादकं वाक्यमाह—

॥ तद्द्वेधेति ॥ १ ॥

तच्छब्देन प्रमाणं परामृश्यते । तत्प्रमाणं स्वरूपेणावगतं द्वेधा द्विप्रकार-
मेव । सकलप्रमाणभेदानामत्रैवान्तर्भावात् ॥ तद्द्वित्वमध्यक्षानुमानप्रकारेणा-
पि सम्भवतीति तदाशङ्कानिराकरणार्थं सकलप्रमाणभेदसंग्रहशालिनीं
संख्यां प्रव्यङ्गीकरोति—

प्रत्यक्षेतरभेदादिति ॥ २ ॥

प्रत्यक्षं वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणं, इतरत्परोक्षं, ताभ्यां भेदात्प्रमाणस्येति शेषः ॥
न हि परपरिकल्पितैकद्वित्रिचतुःपञ्चषट्प्रमाणसंख्यानियमे निखिलप्रमाण-
भेदानामन्तर्भावविभावना शक्या कर्तुम् ॥ तथाहि प्रत्यक्षैकप्रमाणवादिनश्चा-
र्वाकस्य नाध्यक्षे लैङ्गिकस्यान्तर्भावो युक्तः तस्य तद्विलक्षणत्वात् । सामग्री-
स्वरूपभेदात् ॥ अथ नाप्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणमस्ति विसंवादसम्भवात् । निश्चिता-
विनाभावाल्लिङ्गाल्लिङ्गिनि ज्ञानमनुमानमित्यानुमानिकशासनं । तत्र च स्वभा-
वल्लिङ्गस्य बहुलमन्यथाऽपि भावो दृश्यते । तथाहि कषायरसोपेतानामाम-
लकानामेतद्देशकालसम्बन्धिनां दर्शनेऽपि देशान्तरे कालान्तरे द्रव्यान्तर-
सम्बन्धे च अन्यथाऽपि दर्शनात्स्वभावहेतुर्व्यभिचार्येव लताच्यूतवल्लताशिंश-
पादिसम्भावनाच्च ॥ तथा कार्यल्लिङ्गमपि गोपालघटिकादौ धूमस्य शक्रमूर्ध्नि
चान्यथाऽपि भावात्पावकव्यभिचार्येव । ततः प्रत्यक्षमेवैकं प्रमाणमस्यैवावि-
संवादकत्वादिति ॥ तदेतद्बालविलसितमिवाभात्युपपत्तिशून्यत्वात् ॥
तथाहि—किमप्रत्यक्षस्योत्पादककारणाभावादालम्बनाभावाद्वा प्रामाण्यं

निषिध्यते ? तत्र न तावत्प्राक्तनः पक्षः । तदुत्पादकस्य सुनिश्चितान्यथानुपपत्तिनियतनिश्चयलक्षणस्य साधनस्य सद्भावात् ॥ नो खल्वप्युदीचीनः पक्षः । तदालम्बनस्य पावकादेः सकलविचारचतुरचेतसि सर्वदा प्रतीयमानत्वात् ॥ यदपि स्वभावहेतोर्व्याभिचारसम्भावनमुक्तम् तदप्यनुचितमेव स्वभावमात्रस्याहेतुत्वात् । व्याप्यरूपस्यैव स्वभावस्य व्यापकम्प्रति गमकत्वाभ्युपगमात् ॥ न च व्याप्यस्य व्यापकव्यभिचारित्वं व्याप्यत्वविरोधप्रसङ्गात् ॥ किञ्च एवंवादिनो नाध्यक्षं प्रमाणं व्यवतिष्ठते । तत्राप्यसंवादस्यागौणत्वस्य च प्रामाण्याविनाभावित्वेन निश्चेतुमशक्यत्वात् । यच्च कार्यहेतोरप्यन्यथापि सम्भावनं तदप्यशिक्षितलाक्षितं सुविवेचितस्य कार्यस्य कारणाव्यभिचारित्वात् । यादृशो हि धूमो ज्वलनकार्यं भूधरनितम्बादावतिवहलधवलतया प्रसर्पन्नुपलभ्यते, न तादृशो गोपालघटिकादाविति ॥ यदप्युक्तम् “शक्रमूर्द्धनि धूमस्यान्यथापि भाव इति” तत्र किमयं शक्रमूर्द्धा अग्निस्वभावोऽन्यथा वा ? । यद्यग्निस्वभावस्तदाग्निरेवेति कथं तदुद्भूतधूमस्यान्यथाभावः शक्यते कल्पयितुम् ॥ अथानग्निस्वभावस्तदा तदुद्भवो धूम एव न भवतीति कथं तस्य तद्व्यभिचारित्वमिति ॥ तथाचोक्तम्—अग्निस्वभावः शक्रस्य मूर्द्धा चेदग्निरेव सः । अथानग्निस्वभावोऽसौ धूमस्तत्र कथं भवेदिति ॥ १ ॥ किञ्च प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणमिति कथमयं परं प्रतिपादयेत् । परस्य प्रत्यक्षेण गृहीतुमशक्यत्वात् । व्याहारादिकार्यप्रदर्शनात्तं प्रतिपद्येतेति चेत्—आयातं तर्हि कार्यात्करणानुमानम् ॥ अथ लोकव्यवहारापेक्षयेष्यत एवानुमानमपि परलोकादावेवानभ्युपगमात्तदभावादिति । कथं तदभावोऽनुपलब्धेरिति चेत्—तदाऽनुपलब्धिलिङ्गजनितमनुमानमपरमापतितमिति ॥ प्रत्यक्षप्रामाण्यमपि स्वभावहेतुजातानुमितिमन्तरेण नोपपत्तिमियतीति प्रागेवोक्तमित्युपरम्यते ॥ यदप्युक्तं धर्मकीर्तिना—प्रमाणेतरसामान्यस्थितेरन्यधियो गतेः । प्रमाणान्तरसद्भावः प्रतिषेधाच्च कस्यचिदिति ॥ २ ॥ ततः प्रत्यक्षमनुमानमिति प्रमाणद्वयमेवेति सौगतः । सोऽपि न युक्तवादी । स्मृतेरविसंवादिन्यास्तृतीयायाः प्रमाणभूतायाः सद्भावात् ॥ न च तस्या विसंवादादप्रामाण्यम् । दत्तग्रहादिविलोपापत्तेः ॥ अथानुभूयमानस्य विषयस्याभावात् स्मृतेरप्रामाण्यं न तथापि अनुभूतेनार्थेन सालम्बनत्वोप-

पक्षेः । अन्यथा प्रत्यक्षस्याप्यनुभूतार्थविषयत्वादप्रामाण्यमनिवार्यं स्यात्
स्वविषयावभासनं स्मरणेऽप्यवशिष्टमिति ॥ किञ्च स्मृतेरप्रामाण्येऽनुमा-
नवार्ताऽपि दुर्लभा । तथा व्याप्तेरविषयीकरणे तदुत्थानायोगादिति ॥
तत इदं वक्तव्यम्— “स्मृतिः प्रमाणम्, अनुमानप्रामाण्यान्यथानुष्प-
क्षेति” सैव प्रत्यक्षानुमानस्वरूपतया प्रमाणस्य द्वित्वसंख्यानियमं
विघटयतीति किं नश्चिन्तया ॥ तथा प्रत्यभिज्ञानमपि सौगतीयप्रमाण-
संख्या विघटयत्येव । तस्यापि प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोरनन्तर्भावात् ॥ ननु
तदिति स्मरणमिदमिति प्रत्यक्षमिति ज्ञानद्वयमेव । न ताभ्यां विभिन्नं प्रत्य-
भिज्ञानाख्यं वयं प्रतिपद्यमानं प्रमाणान्तरमुपलभामहे । ततः कथं तेन
प्रमाणसंख्याविघटनमिति तदप्यघटितमेव । यतः स्मरणप्रत्यक्षाभ्यां प्रत्यभि-
ज्ञानविषयस्यार्थस्य गृहीतुमशक्यत्वात् ॥ पूर्वोत्तरविवर्तवर्त्येकद्रव्यं हि प्रत्य-
भिज्ञाविषयः । न च तस्मरणेनोपलभ्य (द्य)—ते तस्यानुभूताविषयत्वात् ।
नापि प्रत्यक्षेण तस्य वर्तमानविवर्तवर्तित्वात् ॥ यदप्युक्तम्—“ताभ्यां भिन्न-
मन्यत् ज्ञानं नास्तीति” । अभेदपरामर्शरूपतया भिन्नस्यैवावभासनात् ॥ न च
तयोरन्यतरस्य वा भेदपरामर्शकत्वमस्ति विभिन्नविषयत्वात् ॥ नचैतत्प्रत्यक्षे-
ऽन्तर्भवत्यनुमाने वा तयोः पुरोऽवस्थितार्थविषयत्वेनाविनाभूतलिङ्गसम्भावि-
तार्थविषयत्वेन च पूर्वापरविकारव्याप्येकत्वाविषयत्वात् ॥ नापि स्मरणे, तेना-
पि तदेकत्वस्याविषयीकरणात् ॥ अथ संस्कारस्मरणसहकृतमिन्द्रियमेव प्रत्य-
भिज्ञानं जनयतीन्द्रियजं चाध्यक्षमेवेति न प्रमाणान्तरमित्यपरः । सोऽप्यति-
वालिश एव । स्वविषयाभिमुख्येन प्रवर्तमानस्येन्द्रियस्य सहकारिशतसमवधा-
नेऽपि विषयान्तरप्रवृत्तिलक्षणातिशयायोगात् । विषयान्तरं चातीतसाम्प्रति-
कावस्थाव्याप्येकद्रव्यमिन्द्रियाणां रूपादिगोचरचारित्वेन चरितार्थत्वाच्च ॥
नाप्यदृष्टसहकारिसव्यपेक्षामिन्द्रियमेकत्वविषयं । उक्तदोषादेव ॥ किञ्चा-
दृष्टसंस्कारादिसव्यपेक्षादेवात्मनस्तद्विज्ञानमिति किञ्च कल्प्यते ? । दृश्यते
हि स्वप्नसारस्वतचाण्डालिकादिविद्यासंस्कृतादात्मनो विशिष्टज्ञानोत्पत्ति-
रिति ॥ नन्वज्जनादिसंस्कृतमपि चक्षुः सातिशयमुपलभ्यते इति चेत् न तस्य
स्वार्थानतिक्रमेणैवातिशयोपलब्धेर्न विषयान्तरग्रहणलक्षणातिशयस्य ।
तथाचोक्तम्—यत्राऽप्यतिशयो दृष्टः स स्वार्थानतिलङ्घनात् । दूरसूक्ष्मा-
दिदृष्टौ स्यान्नरूपे श्रोत्रवृत्तित इति ॥ ३ ॥ नन्वस्य वार्तिकस्य सर्वप्रति-

पेधपरत्वाद्विषमो दृष्टान्त इति चेन्न—इन्द्रियाणां विषयान्तरप्रवृत्तावातिशयाभावमात्रे सादृश्यात् दृष्टान्तत्वोपपत्तेः ॥ न हि सर्वो दृष्टान्तधर्मो दार्ष्टान्तिके भवितुमर्हति । अन्यथा दृष्टान्त एव न स्यादिति । ततः स्थितं प्रत्यक्षा-
नुमानाभ्यामर्थान्तरं प्रत्यभिज्ञानं सामग्रीस्वरूपभेदादिति ॥ न चैतदप्रमाणं
ततोऽर्थं परिच्छिद्य प्रवर्तमानस्यार्थक्रियायामविसंवादात् प्रत्यक्षवदिति ।
नचैकत्वापलापे बन्धमोक्षादिव्यवस्था अनुमानव्यवस्था वा । एकत्वाभावे
वद्धस्यैव मोक्षादेर्गृहीतसम्बन्धस्यैव लिङ्गस्यादर्शनादनुमानस्य च व्यवस्था-
योगादिति ॥ नचास्य विषये बाधकप्रमाणसद्भावादप्रामाण्यं तद्विषये प्रत्यक्षस्य
लौकिकस्य चाप्रवृत्तेः । प्रवृत्तौ वा प्रत्युत साधकत्वमेव न बाधकत्वमित्यलम-
तिप्रसंगेन ॥ तथा सौगतस्य प्रमाणसंख्याविरोधिविध्वस्तबाधं तर्काख्यमुपढौ-
कत एव ॥ नचैतत्प्रत्यक्षेऽन्तर्भवति । साध्यसाधनयोर्व्याप्यव्यापकभावस्य
साकल्येन प्रत्यक्षाविषयत्वात् ॥ न हि तदियतो व्यापारान्कर्तुं शक्नोति ।
अविचारकत्वात् सन्निहितविषयत्वाच्च ॥ नाप्यनुमाने, तस्यापि देशादि-
विषयविशिष्टत्वेन व्याप्त्यविषयत्वात् । तद्विषयत्वे वा प्रकृतानुमानान्तर-
विकल्पद्वयानतिक्रमात् ॥ तत्र प्रकृतानुमानेन व्याप्तिप्रतिपत्तावितरेतरा-
श्रयत्वप्रसङ्गः । व्याप्तौ हि प्रतिपन्नायामनुमानमात्मानमासादयति । तदा-
त्मलाभे च व्याप्तिप्रतिपत्तिरिति अनुमानान्तरेणाविनाभावप्रतिपत्तावन-
वस्थाचमूरी परपक्षचमूं चञ्चमीति इति नानुमानगम्या व्याप्तिः ॥ नापि
संख्यापरिकल्पितैरागमोपमानार्थापत्यभावैः साकल्येनाविनाभावावगतिः ।
तेषां समयसंगृहीतसादृश्यान्यथाऽनन्यथाभूताभावविषयत्वेन व्याप्त्यविषय-
त्वात् । परैस्तथाऽनभ्युपगमाच्च । अथ प्रत्यक्षपृष्ठभावि विकल्पात् साक-
ल्येन साध्यसाधनभावप्रतिपत्तेर्न प्रमाणान्तरं तदर्थं मृग्यमित्यपरः ।
सोऽपि न युक्तवादी—“विकल्पस्याध्यक्षगृहीतविषयस्य तदगृहीतविषयस्य
वा तद्व्यवस्थापकत्वम्” । आद्ये पक्षे दर्शनस्येव तदनन्तरभाविनिर्ण-
यस्यापि नियतविषयत्वेन व्याप्त्यगोचरत्वात् ॥ द्वितीयपक्षेऽपि विकल्प-
द्वयमुपढौकत एव । तद्विकल्पज्ञानं प्रमाणमन्यथा वेति ? प्रथमपक्षे
प्रमाणान्तरमनुमन्तव्यं, प्रमाणद्वयेऽनन्तर्भावात् ॥ उत्तरपक्षे तु न ततोऽनु-
मानव्यवस्था ॥ न हि व्याप्तिज्ञानस्याप्रामाण्ये तत्पूर्वकमनुमानं प्रमाणमा-
स्कन्दति सन्दिग्धादिलिङ्गादप्युत्पद्यमानस्य प्रामाण्यप्रसङ्गात् । ततो व्याप्ति-

ज्ञानं सविकल्पमविसंवादकं च प्रमाणं प्रमाणद्वयादन्यदभ्युपगम्यमिति न
सौमताभिमतप्रमाणसंख्यानियमः ॥ एतेनानुपलम्भात्कारणव्यापकानुपल-
म्भाच्च कार्यकारणव्याप्यव्यापकभावसंविच्चिरिति वदन्नपि प्रत्युक्तः ।
अनुपलम्भस्य प्रत्यक्षविषयत्वेन कारणाद्यनुपलम्भस्य च लिंगत्वेन तज्ज-
नितस्यानुमानत्वात् प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्यां व्याप्तिग्रहणपक्षोपक्षिसदोषानुप-
गात् ॥ एतेन प्रत्यक्षफलेनोहापोहविकल्पज्ञानेन व्याप्तिप्रतिपत्तिरित्यप्य-
पास्तम् । प्रत्यक्षफलस्यापि प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोरन्यतरत्वे व्याप्तेरविषयीकर-
णात् । तदन्यत्वे च प्रमाणान्तरत्वमनिवार्यमिति ॥ अथ व्याप्तिविकल्पस्य
फलत्वान्न प्रामाण्यमिति न युक्तम् । फलस्याप्यनुमानलक्षणफलहेतुतया
प्रमाणत्वाविरोधात् ॥ तथा सन्निकर्षफलस्यापि विशेषणज्ञानस्य विशेष्य-
ज्ञानलक्षणफलापेक्षया प्रमाणत्वमिति न वैशेषिकाभ्युपगतोहापोहविकल्पः
प्रमाणान्तरत्वमतिवर्त्तते ॥ एतेन त्रिचतुःपञ्चषट्प्रमाणवादिनोऽपि सांख्या-
क्षपादप्रभाकरजैमिनीयाः स्वप्रमाणसंख्यां न व्यवस्थापयितुं क्षमा इति
प्रतिपादितमवगन्तव्यम् ॥ उक्तन्यायेन स्मृतिप्रत्यभिज्ञानतर्काणां तदभ्यु-
पगतप्रमाणसंख्यापरिपंथित्वादिति प्रत्यक्षेतरभेदात् द्वे एव प्रमाणे इति
स्थितम् ॥ अथेदानीं प्रथमप्रमाणभेदस्य स्वरूपं निरूपयितुमाह—
विशदं प्रत्यक्षमिति ॥ ३ ॥

ज्ञानमिति वर्त्तते । प्रत्यक्षमिति धर्मिनिर्देशः । विशदज्ञानात्मकं साध्यम् ।
प्रत्यक्षत्वादिति हेतुः ॥ तथाहि—प्रत्यक्षं विशदज्ञानात्मकमेव प्रत्यक्षत्वात् ।
यन्न विशदज्ञानात्मकं तन्न प्रत्यक्षं, तथा परोक्षम् । प्रत्यक्षं च विवादापन्नं,
तस्माद्विशदज्ञानात्मकमिति ॥ प्रतिज्ञार्थैकदेशासिद्धो हेतुरिति चेत् का
पुनः प्रतिज्ञा तदेकदेशो वा ? धर्मिधर्मसमुदायः प्रतिज्ञा । तदेकदेशो धर्मो
धर्मी वा ? हेतुः प्रतिज्ञार्थैकदेशासिद्ध इति चेन्न धर्मिणो हेतुत्वे असिद्ध-
त्वायोगात् । तस्य पक्षप्रयोगकालवद्धेतुप्रयोगेऽप्यसिद्धत्वायोगात् ॥ धर्मिणो
हेतुत्वे अनन्वयदोष इति चेत् न विशेषस्य धर्मित्वात् । सामान्यस्य
च हेतुत्वात् तस्य च विशेषेष्वनुगमो विशेषनिष्ठत्वात्सामान्यस्य ॥
अथ साध्यधर्मस्य हेतुत्वे प्रतिज्ञार्थैकदेशासिद्धत्वमिति तदप्यसम्मतम् ।
साध्यस्य स्वरूपेणैवासिद्धत्वात् ॥ न प्रतिज्ञार्थैकदेशासिद्धत्वेन तस्यासिद्ध-
त्वं, धर्मिणा व्यभिचारात् ॥ सपक्षे वृत्त्यभावाद्धेतोरनन्वय इत्यप्यसत् ।

सर्वभावानां क्षणभङ्गसङ्गमभेवाङ्गभृङ्गारमङ्गीकुर्वतां तथागतानां सत्त्वादिहेतू-
नामनुदयप्रसङ्गात् । विपक्षे बाधकप्रमाणाभावात् । पक्षव्यापकत्वाच्चान्वय-
वत्त्वं प्रकृतेऽपि समानम् ॥ इदानीं स्वोक्तमेव विशदत्वं व्याचष्टे—

प्रतीत्यन्तराव्यवधानेन विशेषवृत्तया वा प्रतिभासनं वैशद्यमिति ॥४॥

एकस्याः प्रतीतेरन्या प्रतीतिः प्रतीत्यन्तरम् । तेनाव्यवधानं तेन प्रति-
भासनं वैशद्यम् ॥ यद्यप्यवायस्यावग्रहेहाप्रतीतिभ्यां व्यवधानं, तथापि न
परोक्षत्वं विषयविषयिणोर्भेदेनाप्रतिपक्षेः ॥ यत्र विषयविषयिणोर्भेदे सति
व्यवधानं तत्र परोक्षत्वम् । तर्ह्यनुमानाध्यक्षविषयस्यैकात्मग्राह्यस्याग्नेर-
भिन्नस्योपलम्भादध्यक्षस्य परोक्षतेति तदप्ययुक्तम् । भिन्नविषयत्वाभावात् ॥
विसदृशसामग्रीजन्यभिन्नविषया प्रतीतिः प्रतीत्यन्तरमुच्यते नान्यदिति न
दोषः ॥ न केवलमेतदेव । विशेषणवृत्तया वा प्रतिभासनं सविशेषवर्ण-
संस्थानादिग्रहणं वैशद्यम् ॥ “तच्च प्रत्यक्षं द्वेधा मुख्यसंव्यवहारभेदादिति”
मनसि कृत्य प्रथमं सांव्यवहारिकप्रत्यक्षस्योत्पादिकां सामग्रीं तद्भेदं
च प्राह—

इन्द्रियानिन्द्रियनिमित्तं देशतः सांव्यवहारिकमिति ॥ ५ ॥

विशदं ज्ञानमिति चानुवर्तते । देशतो विशदं ज्ञानं सांव्यवहारिकमित्यर्थः
समीचीनः प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिरूपो व्यवहारः संव्यवहारः तत्र भवं सांव्यव-
हारिकम् । भूयः किंभूतमिन्द्रियानिन्द्रियनिमित्तम् । इन्द्रियं चक्षुरादि,
अनिन्द्रियं मनः ते निमित्तं कारणं यस्य । समस्तं व्यस्तं च कारणमभ्यु-
पगन्तव्यम् ॥ इन्द्रियप्राधान्यादनिन्द्रियवलाधानादुपजातमिन्द्रियप्रत्यक्षम्,
अनिन्द्रियादेव विशुद्धिसव्यपेक्षादुपजायमानमनिन्द्रियप्रत्यक्षम् ॥ तत्रेन्द्रिय-
प्रत्यक्षमवग्रहादिधारणपर्यन्ततया चतुर्विधमपि ब्रह्मादिद्वादशभेदमष्टचत्वा-
रिंशत्संख्यं प्रतीन्द्रियं प्रतिपत्तव्यम् । अनिन्द्रियप्रत्यक्षस्य चोक्तप्रकारेणाष्ट-
चत्वारिंशद्भेदेन मनोनयनरहितानां चतुर्णामपीन्द्रियाणां व्यञ्जनावग्रहस्या-
ष्टचत्वारिंशद्भेदेन च समुदितस्येन्द्रियानिन्द्रियप्रत्यक्षस्य षट्त्रिंशदुत्तरा
त्रिंशती संख्या प्रतिपत्तव्या ॥ ननु स्वसंवेदनभेदमन्यदपि प्रत्यक्षमस्ति,
तत्कथं नोक्तमिति न वाच्यम् । तस्य सुखादिज्ञानस्वरूपसंवेदनस्य मानस-
प्रत्यक्षत्वात् । इन्द्रियज्ञानस्वरूपसंवेदनस्य चेन्द्रियसमक्षत्वादन्वया तस्य

स्वव्यवसायायोगात् ॥ स्मृत्यादिस्वरूपसंवेदनं मानसमेवेति नापरं स्व-
संवेदनं नामाध्यक्षमस्ति ॥ ननु प्रत्यक्षस्योत्पादकं कारणं वदता ग्रन्थकारे-
णेन्द्रियानिन्द्रियवदर्थालोकावपि किं न कारणत्वेनोक्तौ ? तदवचने कार-
णानां साकल्यस्यासंग्रहाद्विनेयव्यामोह एव स्यात् । तदियत्ताऽनवधारणात् ।
न च भगवतः परमकारुणिकस्य चेष्टा तद्व्यामोहाय प्रभवतीत्याशङ्काया-
मुच्यते—

नार्थालोकौ कारणं परिच्छेद्यत्वात्तमोवत् ॥ ६ ॥

सुगममेतत् ॥ ननु बाह्यालोकाभावं विहाय तमसोऽन्यस्याभावात् साधन-
विकलो दृष्टान्त इति । नैवम् । एवं सति बाह्यालोकस्यापि तमोभावादन्य-
स्यासम्भवात्तेजोद्रव्यस्यासम्भव इति विस्तरेणैतदलङ्कारे प्रतिपादितं बोद्ध-
व्यम् ॥ अत्रैव साध्ये हेत्वन्तरमाह—

तदन्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधानाभावाच्च ।

केशोण्डुकज्ञानवन्नक्तं चरज्ञानवच्च ॥ ७ ॥

अत्र व्याप्तिः । यद्यस्यान्वयव्यतिरेकौ नानुविदधाति न तत्तत्कारणकं,
यथा केशोण्डुकज्ञानं, नानुविधत्ते च ज्ञानमर्थान्वयव्यतिरेकाविति । तथा
आलोकेऽपि । एतावान् विशेषस्तत्र नक्तंचरदृष्टान्त इति । नक्तंचरा मार्ज-
रादयः ननु विज्ञानमर्थजनितमार्थाकारं चार्थस्य ग्राहकम् । तदुत्पत्तिमन्तरेण
विषयं प्रति नियमायोगात् । तदुत्पत्तेरालोकादावविशिष्टत्वात्ताद्रूप्यसहिताया
एव तस्यास्तं प्रति नियमहेतुत्वात् भिन्नकालत्वेऽपि ज्ञानज्ञेययोर्ग्राह्यग्राहक-
भावाविरोधात् ॥ तथाचोक्तम्—भिन्नकालं कथं ग्राह्यमिति चेद् ग्राह्यतां विदुः ।
हेतुत्वमेव युक्तिज्ञास्तदाकारार्पणक्षमम् ॥ इत्याशङ्कायामिदमाह—

अतज्जन्यमपि तत्प्रकाशकं प्रदीपवत् ॥ ८ ॥

अर्थाजन्यमप्यर्थप्रकाशकमित्यर्थः । अतज्जन्यत्वमुपलक्षणम् । तेनात-
दाकारमपीत्यर्थः । उभयत्रापि प्रदीपो दृष्टान्तः । यथा प्रदीपस्या-
तज्जन्यस्याऽतदाकारधारिणोऽपि तत्प्रकाशकत्वं, तथा ज्ञानस्यापीत्यर्थः ॥
ननु यद्यर्थादजातस्यार्थरूपाननुकारिणो ज्ञानस्यार्थसाक्षात्कारित्वं तदा
नियतदिग्देशकालवर्त्तिपदार्थप्रकाशप्रतिनियमे हेतोरभावात्सर्वं विज्ञानमप्रति-
नियतविषयं स्यादिति शङ्कायामाह—

॥ स्वावरणक्षयोपशमलक्षणयोग्यतया हि
प्रतिनियतमर्थं व्यवस्थापयति ॥ ६ ॥

स्वानि च तान्यावरणानि च स्वावरणानि तेषां क्षय उदयाभावः ।
तेषामेव सदवस्था उपशमः तावेव लक्षणं यस्या योग्यतायास्तया हेतुभूतया
प्रतिनियतमर्थं व्यवस्थापयति प्रत्यक्षमिति शेषः । हि यस्मादर्थे । यस्मादेवं
ततो नोक्तदोष इत्यर्थः ॥ इदमत्र तात्पर्यम्— कल्पयित्वाऽपि ताद्रूप्यं तदु-
त्पत्तिं तदध्यवसायं च योग्यताऽवश्याऽभ्युपगन्तव्या । ताद्रूप्यस्य समाना-
र्थैस्तदुत्पत्तेरिन्द्रियादिभिस्तद्द्वयस्यापि समानार्थसमनन्तरप्रत्ययैस्तद्वितय-
स्यापि शुक्ले शंखे पीताकारज्ञानेन व्यभिचाराद्योग्यताश्रयणमेव श्रेय इति ॥ एतेन
यदुक्तं परेण—“अर्थेन घटयत्येनां नहि मुक्तवार्थरूपताम् । तस्मात्प्रमेया-
धिगतेः प्रमाणं मेयरूपतेति” तन्निरस्तम् ॥ समानार्थाकारनानाज्ञानेषु
मेयरूपतायाः सद्भावात् ॥ न च परेषां साख्यं नामास्ति वस्तुभूतमिति
योग्यतयैवार्थप्रतिनियम इति स्थितम् ॥ इदानीं कारणत्वात्परिच्छेद्योऽर्थ
इति मतं निराकरोति—

कारणस्य च परिच्छेद्यत्वे करणादिना
व्यभिचार इति ॥ १० ॥

करणादिकारणं परिच्छेद्यमिति तेन व्यभिचारः । न ब्रूमः कारण-
त्वात्परिच्छेद्यत्वमपि तु परिच्छेद्यत्वात्कारणत्वमिति चेन्न । तथापि केशोण्डु-
कादिना व्यभिचारात् ॥ इदानीमतीन्द्रियप्रत्यक्षं व्याचष्टे—

सामग्रीविशेषविश्लेषिताखिलावरणमती-
न्द्रियमशेषतो मुख्यम् ॥ ११ ॥

सामग्री द्रव्यक्षेत्रकालभावलक्षणा, तस्या विशेषः समग्रतालक्षणाः ।
तेन विश्लेषितानि अखिलान्यावरणानि येन तत्तथोक्तम् । किं विशिष्टं ?
अतीन्द्रियमिन्द्रियाण्यातिक्रान्तम् । पुनरपि कीदृशमशेषतः सामंस्त्येन
विशदम् । अशेषतो वैशद्ये किं कारणमिति चेत्— प्रतिबन्धाभाव इति
ब्रूमः । तत्रापि किं कारणमिति चेत्—अतीन्द्रियत्वमनावरणत्वं चेति
ब्रूमः ॥ एतदपि कुत इत्याह—

सावरणत्वे करणजन्यत्वे च प्रतिबन्धसम्भवात् ॥ १२ ॥

नन्ववधिमनःपर्यययोरनेनासंग्रहादव्यापकमेतल्लक्षणमिति न वाच्यम् । तयोरपि स्वाविषयेऽशेषतो विशदत्वादिविधसम्भवात् । न चैवं मतिश्रुतयोरित्य-
तिव्याप्तिपरिहारः । तदेतदतीन्द्रियमवधिमनःपर्ययकेवलप्रभेदात्रिविधमपि
मुख्यं प्रत्यक्षात्मात्मसन्निधिसात्रापेक्षत्वादिति ॥ नन्वशेषविषयविशदावभासि
ज्ञानस्य तद्वतो वा प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणपञ्चकाविषयत्वेनाभावप्रमाणविषयविष-
धरविध्वस्तसत्ताकत्वात् कस्य मुख्यत्वम् ? तथाहि— नाध्यक्षमशेषज्ञ-
विषयं, तस्य रूपादिनियतगोचरचारित्वात् सम्बद्धवर्तमानविषयत्वाच्च ॥
न चाशेषवेदी सम्बद्धो वर्तमानश्चेति । नाप्यनुमानात्तत्सिद्धिः । अनुमानं
हि गृहीतसम्बन्धस्यैकदेशदर्शनादसन्निकृष्टे बुद्धिः ॥ न च सर्वज्ञसद्भावा-
विनाभाविकार्यलिङ्गं स्वभावलिङ्गं वा सम्प्रश्यामः । तद्ज्ञप्तेः पूर्वं तत्स्वभा-
वस्य तत्कार्यस्य वा तत्स्वभावाविनाभाविनो निश्चेतुमशक्तेः ॥ नाप्यागमा-
त्तत्सद्भावः । स हि नित्योऽनित्यो वा तत्सद्भावं भावयेत् । न तावन्नित्यः—
तस्यार्थवादरूपस्य कर्मविशेषसंस्तवनपरत्वेन पुरुषविशेषावबोधकत्वायोगात् ॥
अनादेरागमस्यादिमत्पुरुषवाचकत्वावटनाच्च ॥ नाप्यनित्य आगमः सर्वज्ञं
साधयति । तस्यापि तत्प्रणीतस्य तन्निश्चयमन्तरेण प्रामाण्यानिश्चयादितरे-
तराश्रयत्वाच्च ॥ इतरप्रणीतस्य त्वनासादितप्रमाणभावस्याशेषज्ञप्ररूपण-
परत्वं नितराससम्भाव्यमिति सर्वज्ञसदृशस्यापरस्य ग्रहणासम्भवाच्च नोपमा-
नम् । अनन्यथाभूतस्यार्थस्याभावान्नार्थापत्तिरपि सर्वज्ञावबोधिकेति धर्माद्यु-
पदेशस्य व्यामोहादपि सम्भवात् ॥ द्विविधो ह्युपदेशः सम्यग्मिथ्योपदेश-
भेदात् । तत्र मन्वादीनां सम्यगुपदेशो यथार्थज्ञानोदयवेदमूलत्वात् ।
बुद्धादीनां तु व्यामोहपूर्वकः तदमूलत्वात् तेषामवेदार्थज्ञत्वात् ॥ ततः
प्रमाणपञ्चकाविषयत्वादभावप्रमाणस्यैव प्रवृत्तिस्तेन चाभाव एव ज्ञायते ।
भावांशे प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणपञ्चकस्य व्यापारादिति ॥ अत्र प्रतिविधीयते ।
यत्तावदुक्तम्— प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणाविषयत्वमशेषज्ञस्येति तदयुक्तं, तद्ग्राहकस्या-
नुमानस्य सम्भवात् ॥ तथाहि— कश्चित्पुरुषः सकलपदार्थसाक्षात्कारी ।
तद्ग्रहणस्वभावत्वे सति प्रक्षीणप्रतिबन्धप्रत्ययत्वात् । यद्यद्ग्रहणस्वभावत्वे
सति प्रक्षीणप्रतिबन्धप्रत्ययं तत्तत्साक्षात्कारि । यथाऽपगततिमिरं लोचनं
रूपसाक्षात्कारि ॥ तद्ग्रहणस्वभावत्वे सति प्रक्षीणप्रतिबन्धप्रत्ययश्च विवादा-

पन्नः कश्चिदिति सकलपदार्थग्रहणस्वभावत्वं नात्मनोऽसिद्धं चोदनातः
 सकलपदार्थपरिज्ञानस्यान्यथायोगादन्धस्येवाददर्शाद्रूपप्रतिपत्तेरिति ॥ व्याप्ति-
 ज्ञानोत्पत्तिबलाच्चाशेषविषयज्ञानसम्भवः केवलं वैशद्ये विवादः । तत्र चाव-
 रणापगम एव कारणं रजोनीहाराद्यावृत्तार्थज्ञानस्येव तदपगम इति ॥
 प्रक्षीणप्रतिबन्धप्रत्ययत्वं कथमिति चेदुच्यते—दोषावरणे कचिन्निर्मूलं
 प्रलयमुपव्रजतः प्रकृष्यमाणहानिकत्वात् । यस्य प्रकृष्यमाणहानिः स
 कचिन्निर्मूलं प्रलयमुपव्रजति । यथाऽग्निपुटपाकापसारितकिट्टकालि-
 काद्यन्तरङ्गवहिरङ्गमलद्वयात्मनि हेस्त्रि मलमिति निर्हासातिशयवती च
 दोषावरणे इति ॥ कथं पुनर्विवादाध्यासितस्य ज्ञानस्यावरणं सिद्धं ? प्रति-
 पेधस्य विधिपूर्वकत्वात् इति ॥ अत्रोच्यते—विवादापन्नं ज्ञानं सावरणं,
 विशदतया स्वविषयावबोधकत्वाद्रजोनीहाराद्यन्तरितार्थज्ञानवदिति ॥ न
 चात्मनोऽमूर्त्तत्वादावारकावृत्त्ययोगः । अमूर्ताया अपि चेतनाशक्तेर्मदिरा-
 मदनकोद्रवादिभिरावरणोपपत्तेः ॥ न चेन्द्रियस्य तैरावरणं, इन्द्रियाणाम-
 चेतनानामप्यनावृत्तप्रख्यत्वात् । स्मृत्यादिप्रतिबन्धायोगात् ॥ नापि मनसस्तै-
 रावरणमात्मव्यतिरेकेणापरस्य मनसो निषेत्स्यमानत्वात् । ततो नामूर्त्त-
 स्यावरणाभावः ॥ अतो नासिद्धं तद्ग्रहणस्वभावत्ये सति प्रक्षीणप्रति-
 बन्धप्रत्ययत्वम् । नापि विरुद्धं विपरीतनिश्चिताविनाभावात् । नाप्यनै-
 कान्तिकं देशतः सामस्त्येन वा विपक्षे वृत्त्यभावात् । विपरीतार्थोपस्था-
 पकप्रत्यक्षागमासम्भवान्न कालात्ययापदिष्टत्वम् । नापि सत्प्रतिपक्षं प्रति-
 पक्षसाधनस्य हेतोरभावात् ॥ अथेदमस्त्येव विवादापन्नः पुरुषो नाशेषज्ञो
 वक्तृत्वात्पुरुषत्वात्पाण्यादिमत्वाच्च । रथ्यापुरुषवदिति ॥ नैतच्चारु वक्तृ-
 त्वादेरसम्यग्घेतुत्वात् ॥ वक्तृत्वं हि दृष्टेष्टविरुद्धार्थवक्तृत्वं तदविरुद्धवक्-
 तृत्वं वक्तृत्वसामान्यं वा गत्यन्तराभावात् ॥ न तावत् प्रथमः पक्षः
 सिद्धसाध्यतानुषङ्गात् । नापि द्वितीयः पक्षः विरुद्धत्वात् । तदविरुद्धव-
 क्तृत्वं हि ज्ञानातिशयमन्तरेण नोपपद्यत इति ॥ वक्तृत्वसामान्यमपि
 विपक्षाविरुद्धत्वान्न प्रकृतसाध्यसाधनायालं, ज्ञानप्रकर्षे वक्तृत्वापकर्षा-
 दर्शनात्प्रत्युत ज्ञानातिशयवतो वचनातिशयस्यैव सम्भवात् ॥ एतेन पुरुष-
 त्वमपि निरस्तं—पुरुषत्वं हि रागादिदोषदूषितं, तदा सिद्धसाध्यता, तद-
 दूषितं तु विरुद्धं वैराग्यज्ञानादिगुणयुक्तपुरुषत्वस्याशेषत्वमन्तरेणायोगात् ॥

पुरुषत्वसामान्यं तु सन्दिग्धविषयव्यावृत्तिकमिति सिद्धं सकलपदार्थसा-
क्षात्कारित्वं कस्यचित्पुरुषस्य । अतोऽनुमानादिति न प्रमाणपञ्चकाविष-
यत्वमशेषज्ञस्य ॥ अथास्मिन्ननुमानेऽर्हतः सर्ववित्त्वमनर्हतो वा ? । अनर्ह-
तश्चेदर्हद्वाक्यप्रमाणं स्यात् । अर्हतश्चेत्सोऽपि न श्रुत्या सामर्थ्येन वाऽव-
गन्तुं पार्यते । स्वशक्त्या दृष्टान्तानुग्रहेण वा हेतोः पक्षान्तरेऽपि तुल्य-
वृत्तित्वादिति । तदेतत्परेषां स्वव्याय कृत्योत्थापनं, एवंविधविशेषप्रश्नस्य
सर्वज्ञसामान्याभ्युपगमपूर्वकत्वात् । अन्यथा न कस्याप्यशेषज्ञत्वमित्येवं
वक्तव्यम् । प्रसिद्धानुमानेऽप्यस्य दोषस्य सम्भवेन, जात्युत्तरत्वाच्च ॥
तथाहि— नित्यः शब्दः प्रत्यभिज्ञायमानत्वादित्युक्ते व्यापकः शब्दो नित्यः
प्रसाध्यते अव्यापको वा ? यद्यव्यापकः तदा व्यापकत्वे नोपकल्प्यमानो
न कश्चिदर्थं पुष्पाति । अथ व्यापकः सोऽपि न । श्रुत्या सामर्थ्येन
वाऽवगम्यते । स्वशक्त्या दृष्टान्तानुग्रहेण वा । पक्षान्तरेऽपि तुल्यवृत्तित्वा-
दिति ॥ सिद्धमतो निर्दोषात्साधनादशेषज्ञत्वमिति । यच्चाभावप्रमाणकव-
लितसत्ताकत्वमशेषज्ञस्येति तदयुक्तमेवानुमानस्य तद्ग्राहकस्य सद्भावे सति
प्रमाणपञ्चकाभावमूलस्याभावप्रमाणस्योपस्थापनायोगात् “गृहीत्वा वस्तु-
सद्भावं स्मृत्वा च प्रतियोगिनम् । मानसं नास्तिताज्ञानं जायतेऽज्ञानपेक्ष-
या” इति च भावत्वं दर्शनम् । तथा च कालत्रयत्रिलोकलक्षणवस्तुसद्भावग्रह-
णेऽन्यत्रान्यदागृहीतस्मरणे च सर्वज्ञनास्तिताज्ञानमभावप्रमाणं युक्तम् । नाप-
रथा ॥ न च कस्यचिद्वर्गादर्शिनस्त्रिजगत्त्रिकालज्ञानमुपपद्यते सर्वज्ञस्याती-
न्द्रियस्य वा । सर्वतत्त्वं हि चेतोर्धर्मतयाऽतीन्द्रियं तदपि न प्राकृतपुरुषविषय-
मिति कथमभावप्रमाणमुदयमासादयेत् ॥ असर्वज्ञस्य तदुत्पादसामग्र्या असं-
भवात् । सम्भवे वा तथाज्ञातुरेव सर्वज्ञत्वमिति । अत्राधुना तदभावसाधन-
मित्यपि न युक्तं सिद्धसाध्यतानुषंगात् । ततः सिद्धं मुख्यमतीन्द्रियज्ञानम-
शेषतो विशदम् । सार्वज्ञज्ञानस्यातीन्द्रियत्वादश्रुत्यादिदर्शनं तद्रसास्वादन-
दोषोऽपि परिहृत एव ॥ कथमतीन्द्रियज्ञानस्य वैशद्यमिति चेत् । यथा सत्य-
स्वप्नज्ञानस्य भावनाज्ञानस्य चेति । दृश्यते हि भावनावलादतद्देशवस्तुनोऽपि
विशददर्शनमिति । पिहिते कारागारे तमसि च सूचीमुखाग्रदुर्भेदे ॥ मयि
च निमीलितनयने तथापि कान्ताननं व्यक्तमिति बहुलमुपलम्भात् ॥ ननु च
नावर्णविश्लेषादशेषज्ञत्वमपि तु तनुकरणभुवनादिनिमित्तत्वेन । न चात्र

तन्वादीनां बुद्धिमद्धेतुकत्वमसिद्धमनुमानादेस्तस्य सुप्रसिद्धत्वात् । तथाहि-
विमत्यधिकरणभावापन्नं उर्वीपर्वततत्तन्वादिकं बुद्धिमद्धेतुकं कार्यत्वादचे-
तनोपादानत्वात्सन्निवेशविशिष्टत्वाद्वा वस्त्रादिवदिति । आगमोऽपि तदावे-
दकः श्रूयते— “विश्वतश्चक्षुरुत विश्वतोमुखो विश्वतोबाहुस्त विश्वतः-
पात् । सम्बाहुभ्यां धमति सम्पतत्रैर्घावाभूमी जनयन्देव एकः” तथा व्यास-
वचनं च “अज्ञो जन्तुरनीशोऽयमात्मनः सुखदुःखयोः । ईश्वरप्रेरितो गच्छे-
त्स्वर्गं वा श्वभ्रमेव वा ॥ १ ॥” न चाचेतनैरेव परमाणवादिकारणैः पर्याप्त-
त्वाद्वुद्धिमत्तः कारणस्यानर्थक्यम् । अचेतनानां स्वयंकार्योत्पत्तौ व्यापारा-
योगात्तुर्यादिवत् ॥ न चैवं चेतनस्यापि चेतनान्तरपूर्वकत्वादनवस्था । तस्य
सकलपुरुषज्येष्ठत्वान्निरतिशयत्वात्सर्वज्ञबीजस्य क्लेशकर्मविपाकाशयैरपरा-
मृष्टत्वादनादिभूतानश्वरज्ञानसम्भवाच्च ॥ यदाह पतञ्जलिः— “क्लेशकर्म-
विपाकाशयैरपरामृष्टः पुरुषः सर्वज्ञः स पूर्वेषामपि गुरुः कालेनाविच्छेदा-
दि” ति च “ऐश्वर्यमप्रतिहतं सहजो विरागस्तृप्तिर्निसर्गजनिता वाशितेन्द्रि-
येषु ॥ आत्यन्तिकं सुखमनावरणा च शक्तिर्ज्ञानं च सर्वविषयं भगवंस्तवैव”
इत्यवधूतवचनाच्च ॥ न चात्र कार्यत्वमसिद्धम् । सावयवत्वेन कार्यत्वसिद्धेः ॥
नापि विरुद्धं, विपक्ष एव वृत्त्यभावात् ॥ नाप्यनैकान्तिकं, विपक्षे परमा-
णवादावप्रवृत्तेः । प्रतिपक्षसिद्धिनिवन्धनस्य साधनान्तरस्याभावान्न प्रकरण-
समम् ॥ अथ तन्वादिकं बुद्धिमद्धेतुकं न भवति दृष्टकर्तृकप्रासादादिविलक्षण-
त्वादाकाशवदित्यस्त्येव प्रतिपक्षसाधनमिति । नैतद्युक्तं, हेतोरसिद्धत्वात् ।
सन्निवेशविशिष्टत्वेन प्रासादादिसमानजातीयत्वेन तन्वादीनामुपलम्भात् ॥
अथ यादृशः प्रासादादौ सन्निवेशविशेषो दृष्टो न तादृशस्तन्वादाविति चेन्न
सर्वात्मना सदृशस्य कस्यचिदप्यभावात् । सातिशयसन्निवेशो हि सातिशयं
कर्तारं गमयति प्रासादादिवत् । न च दृष्टकर्तृकत्वादृष्टकर्तृकत्वाभ्यां बुद्धि-
मन्निमित्तेतरत्वसिद्धिः । कृत्रिमैर्मणिमुक्ताफलादिभिर्व्यभिचारात् ॥ एतेनाचे-
तनोपादानत्वादिकमपि समर्थितमिति सूक्तं बुद्धिमद्धेतुकत्वं तत्तश्च सर्ववे-
दित्वमिति ॥ तदेतत्सर्वमनुमानमुद्राद्रविणदारिद्र्यवचनमेव कार्यत्वादेरसम्य-
ग्धेतुत्वेन तज्जनितज्ञानस्य मिथ्यारूपत्वात् ॥ तथाहि— कार्यत्वं स्वकारण-
सत्तासमवायः स्यादभूत्वाभावित्वमाक्रियादर्शिनोऽपि कृतबुद्ध्युत्पादकत्वं
कारणव्यापारानुविधायित्वं वास्याद्गत्यन्तराभावात् । अथाद्यः पक्षस्तदा

योगिनामशेषकर्मक्षये पक्षान्तःपातिनि हेतौ कार्यत्वलक्षणस्याप्रवृत्तेर्भागा-
सिद्धत्वम् ॥ न च तत्र सत्तासमवायः स्वकारणसमवायो वा समस्ति, तत्प्र-
क्षयस्य प्रध्वंसरूपत्वेन सत्तासमवाययोरभावात् सत्ताया द्रव्यगुणक्रियाधार-
त्वाभ्यनुज्ञानात् समवायस्य च परैर्द्रव्यादिपञ्चपदार्थवृत्तित्वाभ्युपगमात् ॥
अथाभावपरित्यागेन भावस्यैव विवादाध्यासितस्य पक्षीकरणान्नायं दोषः
प्रवेशभागिति चेत्— तर्हि मुक्त्यर्थिनां तदर्थमीश्वराराधनमनर्थकमेव
स्यात् । तत्र तस्याकिञ्चित्करत्वात् सत्तासमवायस्य विचारमधिरोहतः शतधा
विशीर्यमाणत्वात् स्वरूपासिद्धं च कार्यत्वम् ॥ स हि समुत्पन्नानां भवेदु-
त्पद्यमानानां वा ? यद्युत्पन्नानां, सतामसतां वा ? न तावदसतां खरविषा-
णादेरपि तत्प्रसङ्गात् । सतां चेत् सत्तासमवायात्स्वतो वा ? न तावत्सत्ता-
समवायादनवस्थाप्रसङ्गात् प्रागुक्तविकल्पद्वयाऽनतिवृत्तेः । स्वतः सतां तु सत्ता-
समवायानर्थक्यम् ॥ अथोत्पद्यमानानां सत्तासम्बन्धो निष्ठासम्बन्धयोरेक-
कालत्वाभ्युपगमादिति मतम् । तदा सत्तासम्बन्ध उत्पादाद्भिन्नः किं वा
अभिन्न इति । यदि भिन्नस्तदोत्पत्तेरसत्ताविशेषादुत्पत्त्यभावयोः किं कृतो भेदः ।
अथोत्पत्तिसमाक्रान्तवस्तुसत्त्वेनोत्पत्तिरपि तथा व्यपदिश्यते इति मतम् ।
तदपि अतिजाड्यवलिगतमेव । उत्पात्तिसत्त्वप्रतिविवादे वस्तुसत्त्वस्यातिदुर्घ-
टत्वात् ॥ इतरेतराश्रयदोषश्च । इत्युत्पात्तिसत्त्वे वस्तुनि तदेककालीनसत्ता-
सम्बन्धावगमस्तदवगमे च तत्रत्यसत्त्वेनोत्पत्तिसत्त्वनिश्चय इति ॥ अथैत-
दोषपरिजिहीर्षया तयोरैक्यमभ्यनुज्ञायते, तर्हि तत्सम्बन्ध एव कार्यत्वमिति ।
ततो बुद्धिमद्धेतुकत्वे गगनादिभिरनेकान्तः ॥ एतेन स्वकारणसम्बन्धोऽपि
चिन्तितः ॥ अथोभयसम्बन्धो कार्यत्वमिति मतिः सापि न युक्ता । तत्सम्ब-
न्धस्यापि कादाचित्कत्वे समवायस्यानित्यत्वप्रसङ्गात् घटादिवत् अकादा-
चित्कत्वे सर्वदोषलम्भप्रसङ्गः ॥ अथ वस्तुत्पादकारणानां सन्निधाना-
भावान्न सर्वदोषलम्भप्रसङ्गः ॥ ननु वस्तुत्पत्त्यर्थं कारणान्तं व्यापारः ।
उत्पादश्च स्वकारणसत्तासमवायः स च सर्वदाप्यस्ति, इति तदर्थं कारणो-
पादानमनर्थकमेव स्यात् । अभिव्यक्त्यर्थं तदुपादानमित्यपि वार्त्तं वस्तुत्पादा-
पेक्षया अभिव्यक्तेरघटनात् । वस्त्वपेक्षयाऽभिव्यक्तौ कारणसम्पातात्प्रागपि
कार्यवस्तुसद्भावाप्रसङ्गात् । तल्लक्षणत्वाद्बस्तुसत्त्वस्य प्राक् सत एव हि केन-
चित् तिरोहितस्याभिव्यक्त्येकेनाभिव्यक्तिस्तमस्तिरोहितस्य घटस्येव प्रदीपा-

दिनेति । तन्नाभिव्यक्त्यर्थं कारणोपादानं युक्तं, तन्न स्वकारणसत्तासम्बन्धः
कार्यत्वम् । नाप्यभूत्वाभावित्वम् । तस्यापि विचारासहत्वात् । अभूत्वा-
भावित्वं हि भिन्नकालक्रियाद्वयाधिकरणभूते कर्त्तरि सिद्धे सिद्धिमध्यास्ते ।
क्त्वान्तपदविशेषितवाक्यार्थत्वाद्भुक्त्वा व्रजतीत्यादिवाक्यार्थवत् ॥ न
चात्र भवनाभवनयोराधारभूतस्य कर्तुरनुभवोऽस्ति । अभवनाधारस्याविद्य-
मानत्वेन भवनाधारस्य च विद्यमानतया भावाभावयोरेकाश्रयविरोधात् ।
अविरोधे च तयोः पर्यायमात्रेणैव भेदो न वास्तव इति ॥ अस्तु वा यथा-
कथंचिदभूत्वाभावित्वं, तथापि तन्वादौ सर्वत्रानभ्युपगमाद्भागासिद्धम् ।
न हि महीमहीधराकूपारारामादयः प्रागभूत्वाभवन्तोऽभ्युपगम्यन्ते परैः ।
तेषां तैः सर्वदावस्थानाभ्युपगमात् ॥ अथ सावयवत्वेन तेषामपि सादित्वं
प्रसाध्यते, तदप्यशिक्षितलक्षितम् । अवयवेषु वृत्तेरवयवैरारभ्यत्वेन च
सावयवत्वानुपपत्तेः ॥ प्रथमपक्षे सावयवसामान्येनानेकान्तात् । द्वितीयपक्षे
साध्याविशिष्टत्वात् ॥ अथ सन्निवेश एव सावयवत्वं तच्च घटादिवत् पृथि-
व्यादानुपलभ्यते इत्यभूत्वाभावित्वमभिधीयते तदप्यपेशलम् । सन्निवेश-
स्यापि विचारासहत्वात् ॥ स ह्यवयवसम्बन्धो भवेद्रचनाविशेषो वा । यद्यवय-
वसम्बन्धस्तदा गगनादिनानेकान्तः सकलमूर्तिमद्रव्यसंयोगनिवन्धनप्रदेश-
नानात्वस्य सद्भावात् । अथोपचरिता एव तत्र प्रदेशा इति चेत् तर्हि सकल-
मूर्तिमद्रव्यसम्बन्धस्याप्युपचरितत्वात्सर्वगतत्वमप्युपचरितं स्यात् । श्रोत्र-
स्यार्थक्रियाकारित्वं च न स्यात् । उपचरितप्रदेशरूपत्वात् ॥ धर्मादिना
संस्कारात्ततः सेत्ययुक्तम् । उपचरितस्यासद्रूपस्य तेनोपकारायोगात् । खर-
विषाणस्येव ततो न किञ्चिदेतत् ॥ अथ रचनाविशेषस्तदा परम्प्रतिभागा-
सिद्धत्वं तदवस्थमेवेति नाभूत्वाभावित्वं विचारं सहते ॥ नाप्यक्रियादर्शि-
नोऽपि कृतबुद्ध्युत्पादकत्वम् । तद्धि कृतसमयस्याकृतसमयस्य वा भवेत् ॥
कृतसमयस्य चेत् गगनादेरपि बुद्धिमद्धेतुकत्वं स्यात् । तत्रापि खननोत्से-
चनात् कृतमिति गृहीतसङ्केतस्य कृतबुद्धिसम्भवात् । सा मिथ्येति चेत् भवदी-
यापि किं न स्यात् । बाधासद्भावस्य प्रतिप्रमाणविरोधस्य चान्यत्रापि
समानत्वात् । प्रत्यक्षेणोभयत्रापि कर्तुरग्रहणात् ॥ क्षित्यादिकं बुद्धिम-
द्धेतुकं न भवति अस्मदाद्यनवग्राह्यपरिमाणाधारत्वात् गगनादिवदिति प्रमा-
णस्य साधारणत्वात् । तन्न कृतसमयस्य कृतबुद्ध्युत्पादकत्वम् ॥ नाप्यकृत

समयस्याऽसिद्धत्वादविप्रतिपत्तिप्रसङ्गाच्च॥कारणव्यापारानुविधायित्वं च कारणमात्रापेक्षया यदीष्यते तदा विरुद्धं साधनम् । कारणविशेषापेक्षया चेदितरेतराश्रयत्वम् । सिद्धे हि कारणविशेषे बुद्धिमति तदपेक्षया कारणव्यापारानुविधायित्वं कार्यत्वम् । ततस्तद्विशेषसिद्धिरिति सन्निवेशविशिष्टत्वमचेतनोपादानत्वं चोक्तदोषदुष्टत्वान्न पृथक् चिन्त्यते । स्वरूपभागासिद्धत्वादेस्तत्रापि सुलभत्वात् ॥ विरुद्धाश्चामी हेतवो दृष्टान्तानुग्रहेण सशरीरासर्वज्ञपूर्वकत्वसाधनात् । न धूमात्पावकानुमानेऽप्ययं दोषः । तत्र तारार्णपायणादिविशेषाधाराग्निमात्रव्याप्तधूमस्य दर्शनात् । नैवमत्र सर्वज्ञा सर्वज्ञकर्तृविशेषाधिकरणतत्सामान्येन कार्यत्वस्य व्याप्तिः सर्वज्ञस्य कर्तुरतोऽनुमानात्प्रागसिद्धत्वात् ॥ व्यभिचारिणश्चामी हेतवो बुद्धिमत्कारणमन्तरेणापि विद्युदादीनां प्रादुर्भावसम्भवात् ॥ सुप्ताद्यवस्थायामबुद्धिपूर्वकस्यापि कार्यस्य दर्शनात् ॥ तदवश्यं तत्रापि भर्गाख्यं कारणमित्यतिमुग्धविलसितं, तद्व्यापारस्याप्यसम्भवादशरीरत्वात् ॥ ज्ञानमात्रेण कार्यकारित्वाघटनादिच्छाप्रयत्नयोः शरीराभावेऽसम्भवात्तदसम्भवश्च पुरातनैर्विस्तरेणाभिहित आप्तपरीक्षादौ । अतः पुनरत्र नोच्यते ॥ यच्च महेश्वरस्य क्लेशादिभिरपामृष्टत्वं निरतिशयत्वमैश्वर्याद्युपेतत्वं तत्सर्वमपि गगनावजसौरभव्यावर्णनमिव निर्विषयत्वादुपेक्षामर्हति । ततो न महेश्वरस्याशेषज्ञत्वम् । नापि ब्रह्मणः । तस्यापि सद्भावावेदकप्रमाणाभावात् ॥ न तावत्प्रत्यक्षं तदावेदकमविप्रतिपत्तिप्रसङ्गात् ॥ न चानुमानमविनाभाविलिङ्गाभावात् । ननु प्रत्यक्षं तद्ग्राहकमस्त्येव, अक्षिविस्फालनानन्तरं निर्विकल्पकस्य सन्मात्रविधिविषयतयोत्पत्तेः । सत्तायाश्च परमब्रह्मरूपत्वात् ॥ तथाचोक्तम्—“अस्ति ह्यालोचनाज्ञानं प्रथमं निर्विकल्पम् । बालमकादिविज्ञानसदृशं शुद्धवस्तुजम् ॥” न च विधिवत् परस्परव्यावृत्तिरप्यध्यक्षतः प्रतीयत इति द्वैतसिद्धिः । तस्य निषेधाविषयत्वात् ॥ तथा चोक्तम्—“आहुर्विधातृप्रत्यक्षं न निषेधविपश्चितः । नैकत्वे आगमस्तेन प्रत्यक्षेण प्रवाध्यते ॥” अनुमानादपि तत्सद्भावो विभाव्यत एव । तथाहि ग्रामारामादयः पदार्थाः प्रतिभासान्तःप्रविष्टाः प्रतिभासमानत्वात् । यत्प्रतिभासते तत्प्रतिभासान्तःप्रविष्टम् । यथा प्रतिभासस्वरूपं प्रतिभासन्ते च विवादापन्ना इति ॥ तदागमानामपि पुरुष एवेदं यद्भूतं यच्च भाव्यमिति बहुलमुपलम्भात् । “सर्वं वै खल्विदं ब्रह्म नेह नानास्ति

किञ्चन ॥ आरामं तस्य पश्यन्ति न तं पश्यति कश्चन ॥” इति श्रुतेश्च ॥ ननु परब्रह्मण एव परमार्थसत्त्वे कथं घटादिभेदोऽवभासत इति न चोद्यम् । सर्वस्यापि तद्विवर्ततयावभासनात् । न चाशेषभेदस्य तद्विवर्तत्वमसिद्धं प्रमाण-
प्रसिद्धत्वात् । तथाहि—विवादाध्यासितं विश्वमेककारणपूर्वकमेकरूपान्वि-
तत्वात् । घटघटीसरावोदञ्चनादीनां मृदूपान्वितानां यथा मृदेककारण-
पूर्वकत्वं सद् रूपेणान्वितं च निखिलं वस्त्विति । तथाऽगमोऽप्यस्ति—
“ऊर्णनाभ इवांशूनां चन्द्रकान्त इवाम्भसाम् । प्ररोहाणामिव स्रक्तः स
हेतुः सर्वजन्मनामि” ति ॥ तदेतन्मादिरारसास्वादगद्गदोदितमिव मद-
नकोद्रवाद्युपयोगजनितव्यामोहमुग्धविलसितमिव निखिलमवभासते विचा-
रासहत्वात् ॥ तथा हि— यत्प्रत्यक्षसत्ताविषयत्वमभिहितं तत्र किं निर्वि-
शेषसत्ताविषयत्वं सविशेषसत्तावबोधकत्वम् वा ? न तावत्पौरस्त्यः पक्षः ।
सत्तायाः सामान्यरूपत्वात् । विशेषनिरपेक्षतयाऽनवभासनात् । शाबलेया-
दिविशेषानवभासने गोत्वाऽनवभासनवत् ॥ निर्विशेषं हि सामान्यं भवेच्छश-
विषाणवादित्यभिधानात् ॥ सामान्यरूपत्वं च सत्तायाः सत्सदित्यन्वयदु-
द्धिविषयत्वेन सुप्रसिद्धमेव ॥ अथ पाश्चात्यः पक्षः कक्षीक्रीयते, तदा न
परमपुरुषसिद्धिः । परस्परव्यावृत्ताकारविशेषाणामध्यक्षतोऽवभासनात् । यदपि
साधनमभ्यधायि प्रतिभासमानत्वं तदपि न साधु, विचारासहत्वात् ॥ तथाहि
प्रतिभासमानत्वं स्वतः परतो वा ? न तावत्स्वतोऽसिद्धत्वात् । परतश्चे-
द्विरुद्धम् । परतः प्रतिभासमानत्वं हि परं विना नोपपद्यते प्रतिभासनमात्र-
मपि न सिद्धिमधिवासति । तस्य तद्विशेषणान्तरीयकत्वात्तद्विशेषाभ्युपगमे
च द्वैतप्रसक्तिः ॥ किञ्च धर्मिहेतुदृष्टान्ता अनुमानोपायभूताः प्रतिभासन्ते न
वेति । प्रथमपक्षे प्रतिभासान्तःप्रविष्टाः प्रतिभासग्रहिर्भूता वा । यद्याद्यः पक्ष-
स्तदा साध्यान्तःपातित्वान्न ततोऽनुमानम् । तद्वहिर्भावे तैरेव हेतोर्व्यभि-
चारः ॥ अप्रतिभासमानत्वेऽपि तद्व्यवस्थाभावात् ततो नानुमानमिति ॥
अथानाद्यविद्याविजृम्भितत्वात्सर्वमेतदसम्बद्धमित्यनल्पतमो विलसितम् ।
अविद्यायामप्युक्तदोषानुषङ्गात् । सकलविकल्पविकलत्वात्तस्या नैव दोष
इत्यप्यतिमुग्धभाषितम् । केनापि रूपेण तस्याः प्रतिभासाभावे तत्स्वरूपान-
वधारणात् ॥ अपरमप्यत्र विस्तरेण देवागमालङ्कारे चिन्तितमिति नेह प्रत-
न्यते ॥ यच्च परमब्रह्मविवर्तत्वमखिलभेदानामित्युक्तम् । तत्राप्येक रूपेणान्वि-

तत्त्वं हेतुरन्यत्रान्वीयमानद्वयाविनाभावित्वेन पुरुषाद्वैतं प्रतिवधनातीति स्वेष्ट-
विधातकारित्वाद्विरुद्धः । अन्वितत्वमेकहेतुके घटादावनेकहेतुके स्तम्भकुम्भा-
म्भोरुहादावप्युपलभ्यत इत्यनैकान्तिकश्च । किमर्थं चेदं कार्यससौ विदधाति ?
अन्येन प्रयुक्तत्वात् कृपावशात् क्रीडावशात् स्वभावाद्वा ? अन्येन प्रयुक्तत्वे स्वा-
तन्व्यहानिर्द्वैतप्रसङ्गश्च । कृपावशादिति नोत्तरम् । कृपायां दुःखिनामकारुण्यप्र-
सङ्गात् । परोपकारकरणनिष्ठत्वात्तस्याः सृष्टेः प्रागनुकम्पाविषयप्राणिनामभा-
वाच्च न सा युज्यते । कृपापरस्य प्रत्ययविधानायोगाच्च ॥ अदृष्टवशात्तद्विधाने
स्वातन्व्यहानिः कृपापरस्य पीडाकारणाददृष्टव्यपेक्षायोगाच्च ॥ क्रीडाव-
शात्प्रवृत्तौ न प्रभुत्वं क्रीडोपायव्यपेक्षाणाद्बालकवत् । क्रीडोपायस्य तत्सा-
ध्यस्य च युगपदुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गश्च । सति समर्थे कारणे कार्यस्यावश्यम्भावात् ॥
अन्यथा क्रमेणापि सा ततो न स्यात् ॥ अथ स्वभावादसौ जगन्निर्मि-
नोति यथाग्निर्दहति वायुर्वातीति मतं, तदपि बालभाषितमेव पूर्वोक्तदोषा-
निवृत्तेः ॥ तथाहि— क्रमवर्तिविवर्तजातमखिलमपि युगपदुत्पद्येत । अपे-
क्षणीयस्य सहकारिणोऽपि तत्साध्यत्वेन यौगपद्यसम्भवात् उदाहरणवैषम्यं
च । वह्न्यादेः कादाचित्कस्य हेतुजनितस्य नियतशक्त्यात्मकत्वोपपत्तेरन्यत्र
नित्यव्यापिसमर्थैकस्वभावकारणजन्यत्वेन देशकालप्रतिनियमस्य कार्ये दुरु-
पपादात् ॥ तदेवं ब्रह्मणोऽसिद्धौ वेदानां तत्सुप्रबुद्धावस्थात्वप्रतिपादनं परम-
पुरुषाख्यमहाभूतानिःश्वसिताभिधानं च गगनारविन्दमकरन्दव्यावर्णनवदनव-
धेयार्थविषयत्वादुपेक्षामर्हति ॥ यच्चागमः प्रमाणं “सर्वं वै खल्विदं ब्रह्मे”-
त्यादि “ऊर्णनाभ” इत्यादि च तत्सर्वमुक्तविधिना अद्वैतविरोधीति
नावकाशं लभते ॥ न चापौरुषेय आगमोऽस्तीत्यग्रे प्रपञ्चयिष्यते । तस्माच्च
पुरुषोत्तमोऽपि विचारणां प्राश्नति ॥

प्रत्यक्षेतरभेदभिन्नममलं मानं द्विधैवोदितं

देवैर्दीप्तगुणैर्विचार्य विधिवत्संख्याततेः संग्रहात् ।

मानानामिति तदिगप्यभिहितं श्रीरत्ननन्द्याद्वयै-

स्तद्व्याख्यानमदो विशुद्धधिषणैर्वोद्धव्यमव्याहृतम् ॥ १ ॥

मुख्यसंव्यवहाराभ्यां प्रत्यक्षमुपदर्शितम् ।

देवोक्तमुपजीवद्भिः सूरिभिर्ज्ञापितं मया ॥ २ ॥

इति परीक्षामुखस्य लघुवृत्तौ द्वितीयः समुद्देशः ॥ २ ॥

तृतीयः समुद्देशः ।

अथेदानीमुद्दिष्टे प्रत्यक्षेतरभेदेन प्रमाणद्वित्वे प्रथमभेदं व्याख्याय,
इतरद्वयाचष्टे—

परोक्षमितरदिति ॥ १ ॥

उक्तप्रतिपक्षमितरच्छब्दो ब्रूते । ततः प्रत्यक्षादितरदिति लभ्यते, तच्च
परोक्षमिति ॥ तस्य च सामग्रीस्वरूपे निरूपयन्नाह—

प्रत्यक्षादिनिमित्तं स्मृतिप्रत्यभिज्ञानतर्कानुमानागमभेदमिति ॥ २ ॥

प्रत्यक्षादिनिमित्तमित्यत्रादिशब्देन परोक्षमपि गृह्यते । तच्च यथावसरं
निरूपयिष्यते ॥ प्रत्यक्षादिनिमित्तं यस्य इति विग्रहः ॥ स्मृत्यादिषु द्वंद्वः ॥
ते भेदा यस्य इति विग्रहः ॥ तत्र स्मृतिं क्रमप्राप्तं दर्शयन्नाह—

संस्कारोद्बोधनिबन्धना तदित्याकारा स्मृतिरिति ॥ ३ ॥

संस्कारस्योद्बोधः प्राकट्यं स निबन्धनं यस्याः सा तथोक्ता तदित्या-
कारा तदित्युल्लेखिनी, एवम्भूता स्मृतिर्भवतीति शेषः ॥ उदाहरणमाह—

स देवदत्तो यथेति ॥ ४ ॥

प्रत्यभिज्ञानं प्राप्तकालमाह—

दर्शनस्मरणकारणकं सङ्कलनं प्रत्यभिज्ञानम् ।

तदेवेदं तत्सदृशं तद्विलक्षणं तत्प्रतियोगीत्यादि ॥ ५ ॥

अत्र दर्शनस्मरणकारणत्वात् सादृश्यादिविषयस्यापि प्रत्यभिज्ञानत्व-
मुक्तम् । येषां तु सादृश्यविषयमुपमानाख्यं प्रमाणान्तरं तेषां वैलक्षण्यादि-
विषयं प्रमाणान्तरमनुषज्येत ॥ तथा चोक्तम्—॥ उपमानं प्रसिद्धार्थसा-
धर्म्यात्साध्यसाधनम् । तद्वैधर्म्यात्प्रमाणं किं स्यात्संज्ञिप्रतिपादनम् ॥ १ ॥
इदमल्पं महद्दूरमासन्नं प्रांशु नैति वा । व्यपेक्षातः समक्षेऽर्थे विकल्पः
साधनान्तरमिति ॥ २ ॥ एषां क्रमेणोदाहरणं दर्शयन्नाह—

यथा स एवायं देवदत्तः ॥ ६ ॥ गोसदृशो गवयः ॥ ७ ॥

गोविलक्षणो महिषः ॥ ८ ॥ इदमस्माद्दूरम् ॥ ९ ॥ वृक्षोऽय-
मित्यादि ॥ १० ॥

आदिशब्देन—पयोम्बुभेदी हंसः स्यात् पट्पादैर्ध्रमरः स्मृतः ॥
सप्तपर्णैस्तु तत्त्वज्ञैर्विज्ञेयो विषमच्छदः ॥ १ ॥ पञ्चवर्णं भवेद्रत्नं मेचकाख्यं

पृथुस्तनी ॥ युवतिश्चैकशृङ्गोऽपि गरुडकः परिकीर्तितः ॥ २ ॥ शरभोऽ-
प्यष्टभिः पादैः सिंहश्चारुसटान्वितः ॥ इत्येवमादिशब्दश्रवणात्तथाविधानेव
मरालादीनवलोक्य तथा सत्यापयति यदा तदा तत्सङ्कलनमपि प्रत्यभि-
ज्ञानमुक्तं, दर्शनस्मरणकारणत्वाविशेषात् ॥ परेषां तु तत्प्रमाणान्तरमेवोप-
पद्यते उपमानादौ तस्यान्तर्भावाभावात् । अथोहोऽवसरप्राप्त इत्याह—

उपलम्भानुपलम्भनिमित्तं व्याप्तिज्ञानमूहः ॥ ११ ॥

इदमस्मिन्सत्येव भवत्यसति न भवत्येवेति च ॥ १२ ॥

उपलम्भः प्रमाणमात्रमत्र गृह्यते । यदि प्रत्यक्षमेवोपलम्भशब्देनोच्यते
तदा साधनेष्वनुमेयेषु व्याप्तिज्ञानं न स्यात् ॥ अथ व्याप्तिः सर्वोपसंहारेण
प्रतीयते, सा कथमतीन्द्रियस्य साधनस्यातीन्द्रियेण साध्येन भवेदिति ।
नैवं प्रत्यक्षविषयेष्विवानुमानविषयेष्वपि व्याप्तेरविरोधात् ॥ तज्ज्ञानस्या-
प्रत्यक्षत्वाभ्युपगमात् ॥ उदाहरणमाह—

यथाग्नावेव धूमस्तदभावे न भवत्येवेति च ॥ १३ ॥

इदानीमनुमानं क्रमायातमिति तल्लक्षणमाह—

साधनात्साध्यविज्ञानमनुमानम् ॥ १४ ॥

साधनस्य लक्षणमाह—

साध्याविनाभावित्वेन निश्चितो हेतुः ॥ १५ ॥

ननु त्रैलोक्यमेव हेतोर्लक्षणं, तस्मिन्सत्येव हेतोरसिद्धादिदोषपरिहा-
रोपपत्तेः । तथा हि— पक्षधर्मत्वप्रसिद्धत्वव्यवच्छेदार्थमभिधीयते । सपक्षे
सत्त्वं तु विरुद्धत्वापनोदार्थम् । विपक्षे चासत्त्वमेवानैकान्तिकव्युदा-
सार्थमिति ॥ तदुक्तम् । “हेतोस्त्रिष्वपि रूपेषु निर्णयस्तेन वर्णितः । असिद्ध-
विपरीतार्थव्यभिचारिविपक्षतः” इति ॥ १ ॥ तदयुक्तं— अविनाभाव-
नियमनिश्चयादेव दोषत्रयपरिहारोपपत्तेः । अविनाभावो ह्यन्यथानुपपन्नत्वं,
तच्चासिद्धस्य न सम्भवत्येव । अन्यथानुपपन्नत्वमासिद्धस्य न सिद्ध्यतीत्य-
भिधानात् ॥ नापि विरुद्धस्य तल्लक्षणत्वोपपत्तिर्विपरीतनिश्चिताविनाभा-
विनि यथोक्तसाध्यविनाभावनियमलक्षणस्यानुपपत्तेर्विरोधात् ॥ व्यभि-
चारिण्यपि न प्रकृतलक्षणावकाशः । तत एव ततोऽन्यथाऽनुपपत्तिरेव

श्रेयसी । न त्रिरूपता । तस्यां सत्यामपि यथोक्तलक्षणाभावे हेतोर्गम-
कत्वाददर्शनात् ॥ तथाहि— स श्यामस्तत्पुत्रत्वादितरतत्पुत्रवदित्यत्र त्रैरूप्य-
सम्भवेऽपि न गमकत्वमुपलक्ष्यते । अथ विपक्षाद्व्यावृत्तिर्नियमवती तत्र न
दृश्यते । ततो न गमकत्वमिति । तदपि मुग्धविलसितमेव । तस्या एवाविना-
भावरूपत्वात् ॥ इतररूपसद्भावेऽपि तदभावे हेतोः स्वसाध्यसिद्धिम्प्रातिगम-
कत्वानिष्ठौ सैव प्रधानं लक्षणमनुपलक्षणीयमिति ॥ तत्सद्भावे चैतररूप-
द्वयनिरपेक्षतया गमकत्वोपपत्तेश्च । यथा सन्त्यद्वैतवादिनोऽपि प्रमाणानिष्ठा-
निष्ठसाधनदूषणाऽन्यथाऽनुपपत्तेः ॥ न चात्र पक्षधर्मत्वं सपक्षान्वयो वाऽस्ति ।
केवलमविनाभावमात्रेण गमकत्वप्रतीतिः ॥ यदप्यपरमुक्तं परैः पक्षधर्मताभावेऽपि
काकस्य काष्ण्याद्धवलः प्रासाद इत्यस्यापि गमकत्वापत्तिरिति तदप्यनेन
निरस्तम् ॥ अन्यथानुपपत्तिबलेनैव पक्षधर्मस्यापि साधुत्वाभ्युपगमात् ॥ न
चेह साऽस्ति । ततोऽविनाभाव एव हेतोः प्रधानं लक्षणमभ्युपगन्तव्यम् ।
तस्मिन्सत्यसति त्रिलक्षणत्वेऽपि हेतोर्गमकत्वदर्शनादिति न त्रैरूप्यं हेतुलक्ष-
णमव्यापकत्वात् ॥ सर्वेषां क्षणिकत्वे साध्ये सत्त्वादेः साधनस्य सपक्षे
सतोऽपि स्वयं सौगतेर्गमकत्वाभ्युपगमात् । एतेन पञ्चलक्षणत्वमपि यौगप-
रिकल्पितं न हेतोरुपपत्तिमियत्तीत्यभिहितं वोद्धव्यम् । पक्षधर्मत्वे सत्य-
न्वयव्यतिरेकाववाधितविषयत्वमसत्प्रातिपक्षत्वं चेति पञ्चलक्षणानि,
तेषामप्यविनाभावप्रपञ्चेत्वावाधितविषयस्याविनाभावायोगात् । सत्प्रातिप-
क्षस्येवेति साध्याभासविषयत्वेनासम्यग्घेतुत्वाच्च ॥ यथोक्तपक्षविषयत्वाभावा-
त्तदोपेणैव दुष्टत्वात् । अतः स्थितं साध्याविनाभावित्वेन निश्चितो हेतु-
रिति ॥ इदानीमविनाभावभेदं दर्शयन्नाह—

सहक्रमभावनियमोऽविनाभावः ॥ १६ ॥

तत्र सहभावनियमस्य विषयं दर्शयन्नाह—

सहचारिणोर्व्याप्यव्यापकयोश्च सहभावः ॥ १७ ॥

सहचारिणो रूपरसयोर्व्याप्यव्यापकयोश्च वृत्तत्वशिंशपात्वयोरिति
सप्तम्या विषयो निर्दिष्टः ॥ क्रमभावनियमस्य विषयं दर्शयन्नाह—

पूर्वोत्तरचारिणोः कार्यकारणयोश्च क्रमभावः ॥ १८ ॥

पूर्वोत्तरचारिणोः कृत्तिकोदयशकटोदययोः कार्यकारणयोश्च धूमधूम-

ध्वजयोः क्रमभावः ॥ नन्वेवेम्भूतस्याविनाभावस्य न प्रत्यक्षेण ग्रहणं,
तस्य सन्निहितविषयत्वात् ॥ नाप्यनुमानेन, प्रकृतापरानुमानकल्पनाया-
मितरेतराश्रयत्वानवस्थावतारात् ॥ आगमादेरपि भिन्नविषयत्वेन सुप्रसिद्ध-
त्वान्न ततोऽपि तत्प्रतिपत्तिरित्यारेकायामाह—

तर्कात्तन्निर्णयः ॥ १६ ॥

तर्काद्यथोक्तलक्षणदूहात्तन्निर्णय इति ॥ अथेदानीं साध्यलक्षणमाह—

इष्टमबाधितमसिद्धं साध्यम् ॥ २० ॥

अत्रापरे दूषणमाचक्षते—आसनशयनभोजनयाननिधुवनादेरपीष्टत्वात्त-
दपि साध्यमनुषज्यत इति । तेऽप्यतिवालिशा अप्रस्तुतप्रलापित्वात् ॥
अत्र हि साधनमधिक्रियते । तेन साधनविषयत्वेनेप्सितमिष्टमुच्यते ॥
इदानीं स्वाभिहितसाध्यलक्षणस्य विशेषणानि सफल्यन्नसिद्धविशेषणं
समर्थयितुमाह—

सन्दिग्धविपर्यस्ताव्युत्पन्नानां साध्यत्वं

यथा स्यादित्यसिद्धपदम् ॥ २१ ॥

तत्र सन्दिग्धं स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वेत्येनवधारणेनोभयकोटिपरामर्शिसंश-
याकलितं वस्तु उच्यते ॥ विपर्यस्तं तु विपरीतावभासिविपर्ययज्ञानविषय-
भूतं रजतादि ॥ अव्युत्पन्नं तु नामजातिसंख्यादिविशेषापरिज्ञानेनानि-
र्णीतविषयानध्यवसायग्राह्यम् ॥ एषां साध्यत्वप्रतिपादनार्थमासिद्धपदो-
पादानमित्यर्थः ॥ अधुनेष्टाबाधितविशेषणद्वयस्य साफल्यं दर्शयन्नाह—

अनिष्टाध्यक्षादिबाधितयोः साध्यत्वं मा भू-

दितीष्टाबाधितवचनम् ॥ २२ ॥

अनिष्टो मीमांसकस्यानित्यः शब्दः प्रत्यक्षादिबाधितश्चाश्रावण-
त्वादिः । आदिशब्देनानुमानागमलोकस्ववचनबाधितानां ग्रहणम् । तदुदा-
हरणं चाकिञ्चित्करस्य हेत्वाभासस्य निरूपणावसरे स्वयमेव ग्रन्थकारः
प्रपञ्चयिष्यतीत्युपरम्यते ॥ तत्रासिद्धपदं प्रतिवाद्यपेक्षयैव, इष्टपदं तु वाद्य-
पेक्षयेति विशेषमुपदर्शयितुमाह—

न चासिद्धवदिष्टं प्रतिवादिनः ॥ २३ ॥

अयमर्थः—न हि सर्वं सर्वापेक्षया विशेषणमपि तु किञ्चित्कमप्युद्दिश्य भवतीति । असिद्धवदिति व्यतिरेकमुखेनोदाहरणम् । यथा असिद्धं प्रतिवाद्यपेक्षया न तथेष्टमित्यर्थः ॥ कुत एतदित्याह—

प्रत्यायनाय हीच्छा वक्तुरेव ॥ २४ ॥

इच्छायाः खलु विषयी कृतमिष्टमुच्यते । प्रत्यायनाय हीच्छा वक्तुरेवेति ॥ तच्च साध्यं धर्मः किं वा तद्विशिष्टो धर्मीति प्रश्ने तद्भेदं दर्शयन्नाह—

साध्यं धर्मः क्वचित्तद्विशिष्टो वा धर्मीति ॥ २५ ॥

सोपस्काराणि वाक्यानि भवन्ति । ततोऽयमर्थो लभ्यते—व्याप्तिकाला-
पेक्षया तु साध्यं धर्मः । कचित्प्रयोगकालापेक्षया तु तद्विशिष्टो धर्मी
साध्यः ॥ अस्यैव धर्मिणो नामान्तरमाह—

पक्ष इति यावत् ॥ २६ ॥

ननु धर्मधर्मिसमुदायः पक्ष इति पक्षस्वरूपस्य पुरातनैर्निरूपितत्वा-
द्धर्मिणस्तद्वचने कथं न राज्ञान्तविरोध इति ॥ नैवं—साध्यधर्माधारतया
विशेषितस्य धर्मिणः पक्षत्ववचनेऽपि दोषानवकाशात् । रचनावैचित्र्य-
मात्रेण तात्पर्यस्यानिराकृतत्वात्तिसद्धान्ताविरोधात् ॥ अत्राह सौगतः भवतु
नाम धर्मी पक्षव्यपदेशभाक् तथापि सविकल्पबुद्धौ परिवर्तमान एव न
वास्तवः । सर्व एवानुमानानुमेयव्यवहारो बुद्ध्यारूढेन धर्मधर्मिन्यायेन बहिः
सदसत्त्वमपेक्षत इत्यभिधानादिति तन्निरासार्थमाह—

प्रसिद्धो धर्मीति ॥ २७ ॥

अयमर्थः—नेयं विकल्पबुद्धिर्वहिरन्तर्वा नासादितालम्बनभावा धर्मिणं
व्यवस्थापयति । तदवास्तवत्वेन तदाधारसाध्यसाधनयोरपि वास्त-
वत्वानुपपत्तेस्तद्बुद्धेः पारंपर्येणापि वस्तुव्यवस्थानिवन्धनत्वायोगात् ।
ततो विकल्पेनान्येन वा व्यवस्थापितः पर्वतादिविषयभावं भजन्नेव धर्मितां
प्रतिपद्यत इति स्थितं प्रसिद्धो धर्मीति । तत्प्रसिद्धिश्च क्वचिद्विकल्पतः क्वचि-
त्प्रमाणतः क्वचिच्चोभयत इति नैकान्तेन विकल्पाधिरूढस्य प्रमाणप्रसिद्धस्य वा
धर्मित्वम् ॥ ननु धर्मिणो विकल्पात्प्रतिपत्तौ किं तव साध्यमित्याशङ्क्यामाह—

विकल्पसिद्धे तस्मिन्सत्तेतरे साध्ये ॥ २८ ॥

तस्मिन्धर्मिणि विकल्पसिद्धे सत्ता च तदपेक्षयेतराऽसत्ता च ते द्वे अपि साध्ये सुनिर्णीतासम्भवाद्वाधकप्रमाणबलेन योग्यानुपलब्धिवलेन चेति शेषः ॥ अत्रोदाहरणमाह—

अस्ति सर्वज्ञो नास्ति खरविषाणमिति ॥ २९ ॥

सुगमम् ॥ ननु धर्मिण्यसिद्धसत्ताके भावाभावोभयधर्माणामसिद्धविरुद्धा-
नैकान्तिकत्वादानुमानविषयत्वायोगात् कथं सत्तेतरयोः साध्यत्वम् ? ॥ तदु-
क्तम्—असिद्धो भावधर्मश्चेद्व्यभिचार्युभयाश्रितः । विरुद्धो धर्मो भावस्य सा
सत्ता साध्यते कथम् । इति ॥ तदयुक्तम्—मानसप्रत्यक्षे भावरूपस्यैव धर्मिणः
प्रतिपन्नत्वात् ॥ न च तत्सिद्धौ तत्सत्त्वस्यापि प्रतिपन्नत्वाद्वच्यमनुमानम् ।
तदभ्युपेतमपि वैययात्याद्यदा परो न प्रतिपद्यते तदाऽनुमानस्य साफल्यत् ॥
न च मानसज्ञानाद्गगनकुसुमादेरपि सद्भावसम्भावनाऽतोऽतिप्रसङ्गः ।
तज्ज्ञानस्य बाधकप्रत्ययव्यपाकृतसत्ताकवस्तुविषयतया मानसप्रत्यक्षासत्त्वात्
कथं तर्हि तुरगभृङ्गादेर्धर्मित्वमिति न चोद्यम्—धर्मिप्रयोगकाले बाधकप्रत्य-
यानुदयात्सत्त्वसम्भावनोपपत्तेः ॥ न च सर्वज्ञादौ साधकप्रमाणासत्त्वेन
सत्त्वं प्रति संशीतिः सुनिश्चितासम्भवाद्वाधकप्रमाणत्वेन सुखादाविव सत्त्वनि-
श्चयात्तत्र संशयायोगात् ॥ इदानीं प्रमाणोभयसिद्धे धर्मिणि किं साध्यमि-
त्याशङ्क्यामाह—

प्रमाणोभयसिद्धे तु साध्यधर्मविशिष्टता ॥ ३० ॥

साध्ये इति शब्दः प्राक् द्विवचनान्तोऽप्यर्थवशादेकवचनान्ततया सम्ब-
ध्यते । प्रमाणं चोभयं च विकल्पप्रमाणद्वयं, ताभ्यां सिद्धे धर्मिणि साध्य-
धर्मविशिष्टता साध्या ॥ अयमर्थः—प्रमाणप्रतिपन्नमपि वस्तु विशिष्टधर्मा-
धारतया विवादपदमारोहतीति साध्यतां नातिवर्त्तत इति एवमुभयसिद्धेऽपि
योज्यम् ॥ प्रमाणोभयसिद्धं धर्मिद्वयं क्रमेण दर्शयन्नाह—

अग्निमानयं देशः परिणामी शब्द इति यथा ॥ ३१ ॥

देशो हि प्रत्यक्षेण सिद्धः शब्दस्तूभयसिद्धः । नहि प्रत्यक्षेणार्वाग्दर्शि-
भिरनियतदिग्देशकालावच्छिन्नाः सर्वे शब्दा निश्चेतुं पार्यन्ते । सर्वदर्शिनस्तु

तन्निश्चयेऽपि तं प्रत्यनुमानानर्थक्यात् ॥ प्रयोगकालापेक्षया धर्मविशिष्ट-
धर्मिणः साध्यत्वमभिधाय व्याप्तिकालापेक्षया साध्यनियमं दर्शयन्नाह—

व्याप्तौ तु साध्यं धर्म एवेति ॥ ३२ ॥

सुगमम् ॥ धर्मिणोऽपि साध्यत्वे को दोष इत्यत्राह—

अन्यथा तदघटनादिति ॥ ३३ ॥

उक्तविपर्ययेऽन्यथाशब्दः । धर्मिणः साध्यत्वे तदघटनात् व्याप्त्यघटना-
दिति हेतुः ॥ न हि धूमदर्शनात्सर्वत्र पर्वतोऽग्निमानिति व्याप्तिः शक्या
कर्तुं प्रमाणविरोधात् ॥ नन्वनुमाने पक्षप्रयोगस्यासम्भवात् प्रसिद्धो
धर्मित्यादिवचनमयुक्तम् । तस्य सामर्थ्यलब्धत्वात् ॥ तथापि तद्वचने
पुनरुक्तताप्रसङ्गात् । अर्थादापन्नस्यापि पुनर्वचनं पुनरुक्तमित्यभिधाना-
दिति सौगतस्तत्राह—

साध्यधर्माधारसन्देहापनोदाय गम्यमानस्यापि पक्षस्य
वचनम् ॥ ३४ ॥

साध्यमेव धर्मस्तस्याधारस्तत्र सन्देहो महानसादिः पर्वतादिवेति ।
तस्यापनोदो व्यवच्छेदस्तदर्थं गम्यमानस्यापि साध्यसाधनयोर्व्याप्त्यव्या-
पकभावप्रदर्शनान्यथानुपपत्तेस्तदाधारस्य गम्यमानस्यापि पक्षस्य वचनं
प्रयोगः ॥ अत्रोदाहरणमाह—

साध्यधर्मिणि साधनधर्मावबोधनाय पक्षधर्मोपसंहारवत् ॥ ३५ ॥

साध्येन विशिष्टो धर्मो पर्वतादिस्तत्र साधनधर्मावबोधनाय पक्षधर्मो-
पसंहारवत् । पक्षधर्मस्य हेतोरुपसंहार उपनयस्तद्वदिति ॥ अयमर्थः—
साध्यव्याप्तसाधनप्रदर्शनेन तदाधारावगतावपि नियतधर्मिसम्बन्धिता-
प्रदर्शनार्थं यथोपनयस्तथा साध्यस्य विशिष्टधर्मिसम्बन्धितावबोधनाय पक्ष-
वचनमपीति ॥ किञ्च हेतुप्रयोगेऽपि समर्थनमवश्यं वक्तव्यम् । असमर्थितस्य
हेतुत्वायोगात् ॥ तथा च समर्थनोपन्यासादेव हेतोः सामर्थ्यसिद्धत्वाद्धेतु-
प्रयोगोऽनर्थकः स्यात् । हेतुप्रयोगाभावे कस्य समर्थनमिति चेत्—पक्षप्रयोगा-
भावे क हेतुर्वर्ततामिति समानमेतत् ॥ तस्मात्कार्यस्वभावानुपलम्भभेदेन

पक्षधर्मत्वादिभेदेन च त्रिधा हेतुमुक्त्वा समर्थयमानेन पक्षप्रयोगोऽप्यभ्यु-
पगन्तव्य एवेति ॥ अमुमेवार्थमाह—

को वा त्रिधा हेतुमुक्त्वा समर्थयमानो न पक्षयति ॥ ३६ ॥

को वा वादी प्रतिवादी चेत्यर्थः । किलार्थे वा-शब्दः । युक्त्या पक्ष-
प्रयोगस्यावश्यभावे कः किल न पक्षयति ? पक्षं न करोत्यपितु करोत्येव ॥
किं कुर्वन्समर्थयमानः । किं कृत्वा हेतुमुक्त्यैव । न पुनरनुक्त्वेत्यर्थः ।
समर्थनं हि हेतोरसिद्धत्वादिदोषपरिहारेण स्वसाध्यसाधनसामर्थ्यप्ररूपण-
प्रवणं वचनम् । तच्च हेतुप्रयोगोत्तरकालं परेणाङ्गीकृतमित्युक्त्वेति
वचनम् ॥ ननु भवतु पक्षप्रयोगस्तथापि पक्षहेतुदृष्टान्तभेदेन व्यवयवमनु-
मानमिति सांख्यः । प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयभेदेन चतुरवयवमिति
मीमांसकः । प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनभेदात्पञ्चावयवमिति यौगः ।
तन्मतमपाकुर्वन्स्वमतसिद्धमवयवद्वयमेवोपदर्शयन्नाह—

एतद्व्ययमेवानुमानाङ्गं नोदाहरणमिति ॥ ३७ ॥

एतयोः पक्षहेत्वोद्वयमेव नातिरिक्तमित्यर्थः । एवकारेणैवोदाहरणादि
व्यवच्छेदे सिद्धेऽपि परमतनिरासार्थं पुनर्नोदाहरणमित्युक्तम् । तद्धि
किं साध्यप्रतिपत्त्यर्थमुतस्विद्धेतोरविनाभावनियमार्थमाहोस्विद्व्याप्तिस्मरणा-
र्थमिति विकल्पान् क्रमेण दूषयन्नाह—

न हि तत्साध्यप्रतिपत्त्यङ्गं तत्र यथोक्तहेतोरेव व्यापारात् ॥ ३८ ॥

तदुदाहरणं साध्यप्रतिपत्तेरङ्गं कारणं नेति सम्बन्धः । तत्र साध्य-
प्रतिपत्तौ यथोक्तस्य साध्याविनाभावित्वेन निश्चितस्य हेतोर्व्यापारादिति ॥
द्वितीयविकल्पं शोधयन्नाह—

तदविनाभावनिश्चयार्थं वा विपक्षे बाधकादेव तत्सिद्धेः ॥ ३९ ॥

तदिति वर्तते । नेति च । तेनायमर्थः तदुदाहरणं तेन साध्येना-
विनाभावानिश्चयार्थं वा न भवतीति । विपक्षे बाधकादेव तत्सिद्धेर-
विनाभावानिश्चयसिद्धेः ॥ किञ्च व्याक्तिरूपं निदर्शनं तत्कथं साकल्येन
व्याप्तिं गमयेत् । व्यक्त्यन्तरेषु व्याप्त्यर्थं पुनरुदाहरणान्तरं मृग्यम् ।
तस्यापि व्यक्तिरूपत्वेन सामान्येन व्याप्तेरवधारयितुमशक्यत्वादपरापर-
तदन्तरापेक्षायामनवस्था स्यात् ॥ एतदेवाह—

व्यक्तिरूपं च निदर्शनं सामान्येन तु व्याप्तिस्तत्रापि तद्विप्रति-
पत्तावनवस्थानं स्यात् दृष्टान्तान्तरापेक्षणात् ॥ ४० ॥

तत्रापि उदाहरणेऽपि । तद्विप्रतिपत्तौ सामान्यव्याप्तिविप्रतिपत्तावित्यर्थः ॥
शेषं व्याख्यातम् ॥ तृतीयविकल्पे दूषणमाह—

नापि व्याप्तिस्मरणार्थं तथाविधहेतुप्रयोगादेव तत्स्मृतेः ॥ ४१ ॥

गृहीतसम्बन्धस्य हेतुप्रदर्शनेनैव व्याप्तिसिद्धिरगृहीतसम्बन्धस्य दृष्टान्त-
शतेनापि न तत्स्मरणमनुभूतविषयत्वात्स्मरणस्येति भावः ॥ तदेवमुदा-
हरणप्रयोगस्य साध्यार्थं प्रति नोपयोगित्वं प्रत्युत संशयहेतुत्वमेवेति
दर्शयति—

तत्परमभिधीयमानं साध्यधर्मिणि साध्य-

साधने सन्देहयति ॥ ४२ ॥

तदुदाहरणं परं केवलमभिधीयमानं साध्यधर्मिणि साध्यविशिष्टे
धर्मिणि साध्यसाधने सन्देहयति सन्देहवती करोति । दृष्टान्तधर्मिणि
साध्यव्याप्तसाधनोपदर्शनेऽपि साध्यधर्मिणि तन्निर्णयस्य कर्तुमशक्य-
त्वादिति शेषः ॥ अमुमेवार्थं व्यतिरेकमुखेन समर्थयमानः प्राह—

कुतोऽन्यथोपनयनिगमने ॥ ४३ ॥

अन्यथा संशयहेतुत्वाभावे कस्माद्धेतोरुपनयनिगमने प्रयुज्येते ॥
अपरः प्राह—उपनयनिगमनयोरप्यनुमानाङ्गत्वमेव, तदप्रयोगे निरवकर-
साध्यसंविक्तेरयोगादिति । तन्निषेधार्थमाह—

न च ते तदङ्गे । साध्यधर्मिणि हेतुसाध्ययो-

र्वचनादेवासंशयात् ॥ ४४ ॥

ते उपनयनिगमने अपि वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणो तस्यानुमानस्याङ्गे न
भवतः । साध्यधर्मिणि हेतुसाध्ययोर्वचनादेवेत्येवकारेण दृष्टान्तादिक-
मन्तरेणेत्यर्थः ॥ किञ्चाभिधायापि दृष्टान्तादिकं समर्थनमवश्यं वक्तव्यमसम-
र्थितस्याहेतुत्वादिति तदेव वरं हेतुरूपमनुमानावयवो वाऽस्तु साध्यसिद्धौ-
तस्यैवोपयोगान्नोदाहरणादिकमेतदेवाह—

समर्थनं वा वरं हेतुरूपमनुमानावयवो
वाऽस्तु साध्ये तदुपयोगात् ॥ ४५ ॥

प्रथमो वाशब्द एवकारार्थे । द्वितीयस्तु पक्षान्तरसूचने । शेषं
सुगमम् ॥ ननु दृष्टान्तादिकमन्तरेण मन्दधियामवबोधयितुमशक्यत्वात्कथं
पक्षहेतुप्रयोगमात्रेण तेषां साध्यविप्रतिपत्तिरिति तत्राह—

बालव्युत्पत्त्यर्थं तत्रयोपगमे शास्त्र एवासौ
न वादेऽनुपयोगादिति ॥ ४६ ॥

बालानां अल्पप्रज्ञानां व्युत्पत्त्यर्थं तेषामुदाहरणादीनां त्रयोपगमे शास्त्र
एवासौ तत्रयोपगमो न वादे नहि वादकाले शिष्या व्युत्पाद्याः ।
व्युत्पन्नानामेव तत्राधिकारादिति ॥ बालव्युत्पत्त्यर्थं तत्रयोपगम इत्यादिना
शास्त्रेऽभ्युपगतमेवोदाहरणादित्रयमुपदर्शयति—

दृष्टान्तो द्वेधा । अन्वयव्यतिरेकभेदादिति ॥ ४७ ॥

दृष्टान्तौ साध्यसाधनलक्षणौ धर्मावन्वयमुखेन व्यतिरेकद्वारेण वा
यत्र स दृष्टान्त इत्यन्वर्थसंज्ञाकरणात् । स द्वेधैवोपपद्यते ॥ तत्रान्वयदृष्टान्तं
दर्शयन्नाह—

साध्यव्याप्तं साधनं यत्र प्रदर्श्यते सोऽन्वयदृष्टान्तः ॥ ४८ ॥

साध्येन व्याप्तं नियतं साधनं हेतुर्यत्र दर्श्यते व्याप्तिपूर्वकतयेति भावः ॥
द्वितीयभेदमुपदर्शयति—

साध्याभावे साधनाभावो यत्र कथ्यते स व्यतिरेकदृष्टान्तः ॥ ४९ ॥

असत्यसद्भावो व्यतिरेकः । तत्प्रधानो दृष्टान्तो व्यतिरेकदृष्टान्तः ।
साध्याभावे साधनस्याभाव एवेति सावधारणं द्रष्टव्यम् ॥ क्रमप्राप्तमुपनयस्व-
रूपं निरूपयति—

हेतोरूपसंहार उपनयः ॥ ५० ॥

पक्षे इत्यध्याहारः । तेनायमर्थः—हेतोः पक्षधर्मतयोपसंहार उपनय
इति ॥ निगमनस्वरूपमुपदर्शयति—

प्रतिज्ञायास्तु निगमनमिति ॥ ५१ ॥

उपसंहार इति वर्त्तते । प्रतिज्ञाया उपसंहारः साध्यधर्मविशिष्टत्वेन प्रदर्शनं निगमनमित्यर्थः ॥ ननु शास्त्रे दृष्टान्तादयो वक्तव्या एवेति नियमानभ्युपगमात्कथं तत्रयमिह सूरिभिः प्रपञ्चितमिति न चोद्यम् । स्वयमनभ्युपगमेऽपि प्रतिपाद्यानुरोधेन जिनमतानुसारिभिः प्रयोगपरिपाट्याः प्रतिपन्नत्वात् । सा चाज्ञाततत्स्वरूपैः कर्तुं न शक्यत इति तत्स्वरूपमपि शास्त्रेऽभिधातव्यमेवेति ॥ तदेवं मतभेदेन द्वित्रिचतुःपञ्चावयवरूपमनुमानं द्विप्रकारमेवेति दर्शयन्नाह—

तदनुमानं द्वेधा ॥ ५२ ॥

तद्द्वैविध्यमेवाह—

स्वार्थपरार्थभेदादिति ॥ ५३ ॥

स्वपरविप्रतिपत्तिनिरासफलत्वाद्द्विविधमेवेति भावः स्वार्थानुमानभेदं दर्शयन्नाह—

स्वार्थमुक्तलक्षणम् ॥ ५४ ॥

साधनात्साध्यविज्ञानमनुमानमिति प्रागुक्तं लक्षणं यस्य तत्तथोक्तमित्यर्थः ॥ द्वितीयमनुमानभेदं दर्शयन्नाह—

परार्थं तु तदर्थपरामर्शिवचनाज्जातमिति ॥ ५५ ॥

तस्य स्वार्थानुमानस्यार्थः साध्यसाधनलक्षणः । तं परामृशतीत्येवं शीलं तदर्थपरामर्शं । तच्च तद्वचनं च तस्माज्जातमुत्पन्नं विज्ञानं परार्थानुमानमिति ॥ ननु वचनात्मकं परार्थानुमानं प्रसिद्धं, तत्कथं तदर्थप्रतिपादकवचनजनितविज्ञानस्य परार्थानुमानत्वमभिदधता न संश्रुहीतमिति न वाच्यम् । अचेतनस्य साक्षात्प्रमितिहेतुत्वाभावेन निरूपचरितप्रमाणभावाभावात् । मुख्यानुमानहेतुत्वेन तस्योपचरितानुमानव्यपदेशो न वार्यत एव ॥ तदेवोपचरितं परार्थानुमानत्वं तद्वचनस्याचार्यः प्राह—

तद्वचनमपि तद्धेतुत्वादिति ॥ ५६ ॥

उपचारो हि मुख्याभावे सति प्रयोजने निमित्ते च प्रवर्त्तते । तत्र वचनस्य परार्थानुमानत्वे निमित्तं तद्धेतुत्वम् । तस्य प्रतिपाद्यानुमानस्य हेतुस्तद्धे-

तुस्तस्य भावस्तत्त्वम् । तस्मान्निमित्तात्तद्वचनमपि परार्थानुमानप्रतिपाद-
कवचनमपि परार्थानुमानमिति सम्बन्धः । कारणे कार्यस्योपचारात् ॥
अथवा तत्प्रतिपादकानुमानं हेतुर्यस्य तत्तद्धेतुस्तस्य भावस्तत्त्वं ततस्तद्वचन-
मपि तथेति सम्बन्धः ॥ अस्मिन्पक्षे कार्ये कारणस्योपचार इति शेषः ॥
वचनस्यानुमानत्वे च प्रयोजनमनुमानावयवाः प्रतिज्ञादय इति शास्त्रे व्यवहार
एव ॥ ज्ञानात्मन्यनंशे तद्व्यवहारस्याशक्यकल्पनत्वात् ॥ तदेवं साधनात्
साध्यविज्ञानमनुमानमित्यनुमानसामान्यलक्षणम् ॥ तदनुमानद्वेधेत्यादिना
तत्प्रकारं च सप्रपञ्चमभिधाय साधनमुक्कलक्षणापेक्षयैकमप्यातिसंक्षेपेण भिद्य-
मानं द्विविधमित्युपदर्शयति—

स हेतुर्द्वेधोपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिभेदादिति ॥ ५७ ॥

सुगममेतत् ॥ तत्रोपलब्धिर्विधिसाधिकैव । अनुपलब्धिः प्रतिषेधसाधि-
कैवेति ॥ परस्य नियमं विघटयन्नुपलब्धेरनुपलब्धश्चाविशेषेण विधिप्रति-
षेधसाधनत्वमाह—

उपलब्धिर्विधिप्रतिषेधयोरनुपलब्धिश्चेति ॥ ५८ ॥

गतार्थमेतत् ॥ इदानीमुपलब्धेरपि संक्षेपेण विरुद्धाविरुद्धभेदात् द्वैविध्य-
मुपदर्शयन्नविरुद्धोपलब्धेर्विधौ साध्ये विस्तरतो भेदमाह—

अविरुद्धोपलब्धिर्विधौ षोढा व्याप्यकार्यकारणपूर्वोत्तरसहचर-
भेदादिति ॥ ५९ ॥

पूर्वं च उत्तरं च सह चेति द्वन्द्वः । पूर्वोत्तरसंह इत्येतेभ्यश्चर इत्यनुकरण-
निर्देशः ॥ द्वन्द्वात् श्रूयमाणश्चरशब्दः प्रत्येकमभिसम्बध्यते । तेनायमर्थः
पूर्वचरोत्तरचरसहचरा इति । पश्चाद्व्याप्यादिभिः सह द्वन्द्वः ॥ अत्राह
सौगतः—विधिसाधनं द्विविधमेव । स्वभावकार्यभेदात् । कारणस्य तु
कार्याविनाभावाभावादलिङ्गत्वम् । नावश्यं कारणानि कार्यवन्ति भवन्तीति
वचनात् ॥ अप्रतिबद्धसामर्थ्यस्य कार्यम्प्रति गमकत्वमित्यपि नोत्तरम् ।
सामर्थ्यस्यातीन्द्रियतया विद्यमानस्यापि निश्चेतुमशक्यत्वादिति ॥ तदस-
मीक्षिताभिधानमिति दर्शयितुमाह—

रसादेकसामग्र्यनुमानेन रूपानुमानमिच्छद्भिरिष्टमेव किञ्चित्कारणं
हेतुर्यत्रसामर्थ्याप्रतिबन्धकारणान्तरावैकल्ये ॥ ६० ॥

आस्वाद्यमानाद्धि रसात्तज्जनिका सामग्र्यनुमीयते । ततो रूपानुमानं
भवति । प्राक्कनो हि रूपक्षणः सजातीयं रूपक्षणान्तरलक्षणं कार्यं कुर्वन्नेव
विजातीयं रसलक्षणं कार्यं करोतीति रूपानुमानमिच्छद्भिरिष्टमेव किञ्चि-
त्कारणं हेतुः प्राक्तनस्य रूपलक्षणस्य सजातीयरूपक्षणान्तराव्यभिचारात् ।
अन्यथा रससमानकालरूपप्रतिपत्तेरयोगात् ॥ नह्यनुकूलमात्रमन्यक्षणप्राप्तं
वा कारणं लिङ्गमिष्यते । येन मणिमन्त्रादिना सामर्थ्यप्रतिबन्धात्कारणान्तर-
वैकल्येन वा कार्यव्यभिचारित्वं स्यात् ॥ द्वितीयक्षणे कार्यप्रत्यक्षीकरणे-
नाऽनुमानानर्थक्यं वा । कार्याविनाभावितया निश्चितस्य विशिष्टकारणस्य
छत्रादेर्लिङ्गत्वेनाङ्गीकरणात् ॥ यत्र सामर्थ्याप्रतिबन्धः कारणान्तरावैकल्यं
निश्चीयते तस्यैव लिङ्गत्वं नान्यस्येति नोक्तदोषप्रसङ्गः ॥ इदानीं
पूर्वोत्तरचरयोः स्वभावकार्यकरणेष्वनन्तर्भावाद्भेदान्तरत्वमेवेति दर्शयति—

न च पूर्वोत्तरचारिणोस्तादात्म्यं तदुत्पत्तिर्वा काल-
व्यवधाने तदनुपलब्धेरिति ॥ ६१ ॥

तादात्म्यसम्बन्धे साध्यसाधनयोः स्वभावहेतावन्तर्भावः, तदुत्पत्ति-
सम्बन्धे च कार्ये कारणे वान्तर्भावो विभाव्यते । न च तदुभयसम्भवः
कालव्यवधाने तदनुपलब्धेः । सहभाविनोरेव तादात्म्यसम्भवादनन्तरयोरेव
पूर्वोत्तरक्षणयोर्हेतुफलभावस्य दृष्टत्वात् । व्यवहितयोस्तदघटनात् ॥ ननु
कालव्यवधानेऽपि कार्यकारणभावो दृश्यत एव । यथा जाग्रत्प्रबुद्धदशा-
भाविप्रबोधयोर्मरणारिष्टयोर्वेति ॥ तत्परिहारार्थमाह—

भाव्यतीतयोर्मरणजाग्रद्बोधयोरपि नारि-
ष्टोद्बोधौ प्रति हेतुत्वम् ॥ ६२ ॥

सुगममेतत् ॥ अत्रैवोपपत्तिमाह—

तद्व्यापाराश्रितं हि तद्भावभावित्वम् ॥ ६३ ॥

हिशब्दो यस्मादर्थे । यस्मात्तस्य कारणस्य भावे कार्यस्य भावित्वं

तद्भावभावित्वं तच्च तद्व्यापाराश्रितं तस्मान्न प्रकृतयोः कार्यकारणभाव इत्यर्थः ॥ अयमर्थः— अन्वयव्यतिरेकसमाधिगम्यो हि सर्वत्र कार्यकारणभावः । तौ च कार्यम्प्रति कारणव्यापारसव्यपेक्षावेवोपपद्येते कुलालस्येव कलशम्प्रति । न चातिव्यवहितेषु तद्व्यापाराश्रितत्वमिति ॥ सहचरस्याप्युक्तहेतुष्वनन्तर्भावं दर्शयति—

सहचारिणोरपि परस्परपरिहारेणावस्थानात्सहोत्पादाच्च ॥ ६४ ॥

हेत्वन्तरत्वमिति शेषः । अयमभिप्रायः परस्परपरिहारेणोपालम्भात्तादात्म्यासम्भवात्स्वभावहेतावनन्तर्भावः । सहोत्पादाच्च न कार्ये कारणे वेति ॥ न च समानसमयवर्तिनोः कार्यकारणभावः सव्येतरगोविपाणवत् । कार्यकारणयोः प्रतिनियमाभावप्रसङ्गाच्च ॥ तस्माद्धेत्वन्तरत्वमेवेति ॥ इदानीं व्याप्यहेतुं क्रमप्राप्तमुदाहरन्तुक्कान्वयव्यतिरेकपुरस्सरं प्रतिपाद्याशयवशात्प्रतिपादितप्रतिज्ञाद्यवयवपञ्चकं प्रदर्शयति—

परिणामी शब्दः कृतकत्वात् । य एवं स एवं दृष्टो, यथा घटः, कृतकश्चायं, तस्मात्परिणामीति, यस्तु न परिणामी स न कृतको दृष्टो यथा बन्ध्यास्तनन्धयः,

कृतकश्चायं, तस्मात्परिणामीति ॥ ६५ ॥

स्वोत्पत्तौ अपेक्षितव्यापारो हि भावः कृतक उच्यते । तच्च कृतकत्वं न कूटस्थनित्यपक्षे नापि क्षणिकपक्षे किन्तु परिणामित्वे सत्येवेत्यग्रे वक्ष्यते ॥ कार्यहेतुमाह—

अस्त्यत्र देहिनि बुद्धिर्व्याहारादेः ॥ ६६ ॥

कारणहेतुमाह—

अस्त्यत्र च्छाया छत्रात् ॥ ६७ ॥

अथ पूर्वचरहेतुमाह—

उदेष्यति शकटं कृत्तिकोदयात् ॥ ६८ ॥

मुहूर्तान्ते इति सम्बन्धः ॥ अथोत्तरचरः—

उदगाद्धरणिः प्राक्तत एव ॥ ६६ ॥

अत्रापि मुहूर्तात्मागिति सम्बन्धनीयं, तत एव कृत्तिकोदयादेवेत्यर्थः ॥
सहचरलिङ्गमाह—

अस्त्यत्र मातुलिङ्गे रूपं रसात् ॥ ७० ॥

विरुद्धोपलब्धिमाह—

विरुद्धतदुपलब्धिः प्रतिषेधे तथेति ॥ ७१ ॥

प्रतिषेधे साध्येऽप्रतिषेध्येन विरुद्धानां सम्बन्धिनस्ते व्याप्यादयस्ते-
षामुपलब्धय इत्यर्थः । तथेति षोढेति भावः ॥ तत्र साध्यविरुद्धव्याप्यो-
पलब्धिमाह—

नास्त्यत्र शीतस्पर्श औष्ण्यात् ॥ ७२ ॥

शीतस्पर्शप्रतिषेधेन हि विरुद्धोऽग्निस्तद्व्याप्यमौष्ण्यमिति ॥ विरुद्ध-
कार्योपलम्भमाह—

नास्त्यत्र शीतस्पर्शो धूमात् ॥ ७३ ॥

अत्रापि प्रतिषेध्यस्य साध्यस्य शीतस्पर्शस्य विरुद्धोऽग्निस्तस्य कार्यं
धूम इति ॥ विरुद्धकारणोपलब्धिमाह—

नास्मिन् शरीरिणि सुखमस्ति हृदयशल्यत् ॥ ७४ ॥

सुखविरोधि दुःखं, तस्य कारणं हृदयशल्यमिति ॥ विरुद्धपूर्वचरमाह—

नोदेष्यति मुहूर्तान्ते शकटं रेवत्युदयात् ॥ ७५ ॥

शकटोदयविरुद्धो ह्यश्विन्युदयस्तत्पूर्वचरो रेवत्युदय इति ॥ विरुद्धो-
त्तरचरं लिङ्गमाह—

नोदगाद्धरणिमुहूर्तात्पूर्वं पुष्योदयात् ॥ ७६ ॥

भरण्युदयविरुद्धो हि पुनर्वसूदयस्तदुत्तरचरः पुष्योदय इति ॥ विरुद्ध-
सहचरमाह—

नास्त्यत्र भित्तौ परभागाभावोऽर्वाभागदर्शनादिति ॥ ७७ ॥

परभागाभावस्य विरुद्धस्तद्भावस्तत्सहचरोऽर्वाभाग इति ॥ अविरुद्धा-
नुपलब्धिभेदमाह—

अविरुद्धानुपलब्धिः प्रतिषेधे सप्तधा स्वभावव्यापककार्यकारण-

पूर्वोत्तरसहचरानुपलम्भभेदादिति ॥ ७८ ॥

स्वभावादिपदानां द्वन्द्वः तेषामनुपलम्भ इति पश्चाच्छृणीतत्पुरुषः
समासः ॥ स्वभावानुपलम्भोदाहरणमाह—

नास्त्यत्र भूतले घटोऽनुपलब्धेः ॥ ७९ ॥

अत्र पिशाचयरमाणवादिभिर्व्यभिचारपरिहारार्थमुपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तत्वे
सतीति विशेषणमुन्नेयम् ॥ व्यापकानुपलब्धिमाह—

नास्त्यत्र शिशपा वृक्षानुपलब्धेः ॥ ८० ॥

शिशपात्वं हि वृक्षत्वेन व्याप्तम् । तदभावे तद्व्याप्यशिशपाया
अप्यभावः । कार्यानुपलब्धिमाह—

नास्त्यत्राप्रतिबद्धसामर्थ्योऽग्निधूमानुपलब्धेः ॥ ८१ ॥

अप्रतिबद्धसामर्थ्यं हि कार्यं प्रत्यनुपहतशक्तिकत्वमुच्यते । तदभावश्च
कार्यानुपलम्भादिति ॥ कारणानुपलब्धिमाह—

नास्त्यत्र धूमोऽनग्नेः ॥ ८२ ॥

पूर्वचरानुपलब्धिमाह—

न भविष्यति मुहूर्तान्ते शकटं कृत्तिकोदयानुपलब्धेः ॥ ८३ ॥

उत्तरचरानुपलब्धिमाह—

नोदगाद्धरणिमुहूर्तात्प्राक्त एव ॥ ८४ ॥

तत एव कृत्तिकोदयानुपलब्धेरेवेत्यर्थः ॥ सहचरानुपलब्धिः प्राप्त-
कालेत्याह—

नास्त्यत्र समतुलायामुन्नामो नामानुपलब्धेः ॥ ८५ ॥

विरुद्धकार्याद्यनुपलब्धिर्विधौ सम्भवतीत्याचक्ष्णस्तद्भेदास्त्रय एवेति
तानेव प्रदर्शयितुमाह—

विरुद्धानुपलब्धिर्विधौ त्रेधा । विरुद्धकार्यकारणस्वभावा-
नुपलब्धिभेदात् ॥ ८६ ॥

विरुद्धकार्याद्यनुपलब्धिर्विधौ सम्भवतीति विरुद्धकार्यकारणस्वभावा-
नुपलब्धिरिति ॥ तत्र विरुद्धकार्यानुपलब्धिमाह—

यथाऽस्मिन्प्राणिनि व्याधिविशेषोऽस्ति निरामयचेष्टा-
नुपलब्धेरिति ॥ ८७ ॥

व्याधिविशेषस्य हि विरुद्धस्तद्भावस्तस्य कार्यं निरामयचेष्टा तस्या
अनुपलब्धेरिति ॥ विरुद्धकारणानुपलब्धिमाह—

अस्त्यत्र देहिनि दुःखमिष्टसंयोगाभावात् ॥ ८८ ॥

दुःखविरोधि सुखं, तस्य कारणमिष्टसंयोगस्तदनुपलब्धेरिति ॥ विरुद्ध-
स्वभावानुपलब्धिमाह—

अनेकान्तात्मकं वस्त्वेकान्तस्वरूपानुपलब्धेः ॥ ८९ ॥

अनेकान्तात्मकविरोधी नित्याद्येकान्तः । न पुनस्ताद्विषयविज्ञानम् । तस्य
मिथ्याज्ञानरूपतयोपलम्भसम्भवात् ॥ तस्य स्वरूपं वास्तवाकारस्तस्यानु-
पलब्धिः ॥ ननु च व्यापकविरुद्धकार्यादीनां परम्परया विरोधिकार्या-
दिलिङ्गानां च बहुलमुपलम्भसम्भवात्तान्यपि किमिति नाचार्यैरुदाहृतानी-
त्याशङ्कयामाह—

परम्परया सम्भवत्साधनमत्रैवान्तर्भावनीयम् ॥ ९० ॥

अत्रैवैतेषु कार्यादिष्वित्यर्थः ॥ तस्यैव साधनस्योपलक्षणार्थमुदाहरण-
द्वयं प्रदर्शयति—

अभूदत्र चक्रे शिवकः स्थासात् ॥ ९१ ॥

एतच्च किं संज्ञिकं कान्तर्भवतीत्यारेकायामाह—

कार्यकार्यमविरुद्धकार्योपलब्धौ ॥ ९२ ॥

अन्तर्भावनीयमिति सम्बन्धः । शिवकस्य हि कार्यं छत्रकं, तस्य कार्यं
स्थास इति ॥ दृष्टान्तद्वारेण द्वितीयहेतुमुदाहरति—

नास्त्यत्र गुहायां मृगक्रीडनं मृगारिसंशब्दनात् । कारण-
विरुद्धकार्यं विरुद्धकार्योपलब्धौ यथेति ॥ ९३ ॥

मृगक्रीडनस्य हि कारणं मृगस्तस्य विरोधी मृगारिस्तस्य कार्यं तच्छ-
ब्दनमिति । इदं यथा विरुद्धकार्योपलब्धावन्तर्भवति तथा प्रकृतमपीत्यर्थः ॥
वाल्गव्युत्पत्त्यर्थं पञ्चावयवप्रयोगे इत्युक्तं व्युत्पन्नं प्रति कथं प्रयोगनियम इति
शङ्कयामाह—

व्युत्पन्नप्रयोगस्तु तथोपपत्त्याऽन्यथानुपपत्त्यैव वा ॥ ६४ ॥

व्युत्पन्नस्य व्युत्पन्नाय वा प्रयोगः क्रियते इति शेषः । तथोपपत्त्या
तथा साध्ये सत्येवोपपत्तिस्तथा अन्यथानुपपत्त्यैव वा अन्यथा साध्याभावे-
ऽनुपपत्तिस्तथा ॥ तामेवानुमानमुद्रामुन्मुद्रयति—

अग्निमानयं देशस्तथैव धूमवत्वोपपत्तेर्धूमवत्वान्यथा-
नुपपत्तेर्वेति ॥ ६५ ॥

ननु तदतिरिक्तदृष्टान्तादेरपि व्याप्तिप्रतिपत्तावुपयोगित्वात् । व्युत्पन्ना-
पेक्षया कथं तदप्रयोग इत्याह—

हेतुप्रयोगा हि यथाव्याप्तिग्रहणं विधीयते सा च तावन्मात्रेण
व्युत्पन्नैरवधार्यत इति ॥ ६६ ॥

हिशब्दो यस्मादर्थे, यस्माच्चथाव्याप्तिग्रहणं व्याप्तिग्रहणानतिक्रमेणैव
हेतुप्रयोगो विधीयते । सा च तावन्मात्रेण व्युत्पन्नैस्तथोपपत्त्याऽन्यथानु-
पपत्त्या वाऽवधार्यते दृष्टान्तादिकमन्तरेणैवेत्यर्थः ॥ यथा दृष्टान्तादेर्व्याप्ति-
प्रतिपत्तिम्प्रत्यनङ्गत्वं तथा प्राक् प्रपञ्चितमिति नैह पुनः प्रतन्यते ॥ नापि
दृष्टान्तादिप्रयोगः साध्यसिद्धयर्थं फलवानित्याह—

तावता च साध्यसिद्धिः ॥ ६७ ॥

चकार एवकारार्थे । निश्चितविपक्षासम्भवहेतुप्रयोगमात्रेणैव साध्य-
सिद्धिरित्यर्थः ॥ तेन पक्षप्रयोगोऽपि सफल इति दर्शयन्नाह—

तेन पक्षस्तदाधारसूचनायोक्तः ॥ ६८ ॥

यतस्तथोपपत्त्यन्यथानुपपत्तिप्रयोगमात्रेण व्याप्तिप्रतिपत्तिस्तेन हेतुना
पक्षस्तदाधारसूचनाय साध्यव्याप्तसाधनाधारसूचनायोक्तः ॥ ततो यदुक्तं
परेण—तद्भावहेतुभावौ हि दृष्टान्ते तदवेदिनः ॥ ख्याप्येते विदुषां वाच्यो
हेतुरेव हि केवलः ॥ १ ॥ इति तन्निरस्तम् ॥ व्युत्पन्नं प्रति यथोक्तहेतुप्रयो-
गोऽपि पक्षप्रयोगाभावे साधनस्य नियताधारतानवधारणात् ॥ अथानुमा-
नस्वरूपं प्रतिपाद्येदानीं क्रमप्राप्तमागमस्वरूपं निरूपयितुमाह—

आप्तवचनादिनिबन्धनमर्थज्ञानमागमः ॥ ६६ ॥

यो यत्रावञ्चकः स तत्राप्तः । आप्तस्य वचनम् । आदिशब्देनांगुल्या-
दिसंज्ञापरिग्रहः । आप्तवचनमादिर्यस्य तत्तथोक्तं तन्निबन्धनं यस्यार्थज्ञा-
नस्येति ॥ आप्तशब्दोपादानादपौरुषेयत्वव्यवच्छेदः । अर्थज्ञानमित्यनेना-
न्याप्तेहज्ञानस्याभिप्रायसूचनस्य च निरासः ॥ नन्वसम्भवीदं लक्षणं,
शब्दस्य नित्यत्वेनापौरुषेयत्वादाप्तप्रणीतत्वायोगात् । तन्नित्यत्वं च
तदवयवानां वर्णानां व्यापकत्वान्नित्यत्वाच्च ॥ न च तद्व्यापकत्वमसिद्धम् ।
एकत्र प्रयुक्तस्य गकारादेः प्रत्यभिज्ञया देशान्तरेऽपि ग्रहणात् ॥ स एवायं
गकार इति नित्यत्वमपि तयैवावसीयते । कालान्तरेऽपि तस्यैव गकारादे-
र्निश्चयात् ॥ इतो वा नित्यत्वं शब्दस्य सङ्केतान्यथानुपपत्तेरिति । तथाहि
गृहीतसङ्केतस्य शब्दस्य प्रध्वंसे सत्यगृहीतसंकेतः शब्द इदानीमन्य एवो-
पलभ्यते इति तत्कथमर्थप्रत्ययः स्यात् ? न चासौ न भवतीति स एवायं
शब्द इति प्रत्यभिज्ञानस्यात्रापि सुलभत्वाच्च ॥ न च वर्णानां शब्दस्य वा
नित्यत्वे सर्वैः सर्वदा श्रवणप्रसङ्गः । सर्वदा तदभिव्यक्तेरसम्भवात् ।
तदसम्भवश्चाभिव्यञ्जकवायूनां प्रतिनियतत्वात् ॥ न च तेषामनु-
पपन्नत्वम् । प्रमाणप्रतिपन्नत्वात् ॥ तथाहि—वक्तृमुखनिकटदेशवर्तिभिः
स्पर्शनेनाध्यक्षेण व्यञ्जका वायवो गृह्यन्ते । दूरदेशस्थितेन मुखसमी-
पस्थिततूलचलनादनुमीयन्ते । श्रोतृश्रोत्रदेशे शब्दश्रवणान्यथानुपपत्तेरर्था-
पत्त्यापि निश्चीयन्ते ॥ किञ्चोत्पत्तिपक्षेऽपि समानोऽयं दोषः । तथाहि
वाय्वाकाशसंयोगादसमवायिकारणादाकाशाच्च समवायिकारणाद्दिग्देशा-
द्यविभागेनोत्पद्यमानोऽयं शब्दो न सर्वैरनुभूयते । अपि तु निश्चितदिग्देशस्थै-
रेव तथाऽभिव्यज्यमानोऽपि ॥ नाप्यभिव्यक्तिसांकर्यमुभयत्रापि समान-
त्वादेव । तथाहि—अन्यैस्तात्वादिसंयोगैर्यथान्यो वर्णो न क्रियते तथा
ध्वन्यन्तरसारिभिस्तात्वादिभिरन्यो ध्वनिर्नारभ्यते इत्युत्पत्त्यभिव्यक्त्योः
समानत्वेनैकत्रैव पर्यनुयोगावसर इति सर्वं सुस्थम् ॥ माभूद्वर्णानां तदात्म-
कस्य वा शब्दस्य कौटस्थानित्यत्वम् । तथाप्यनादिपरम्परायातत्वेन
वेदस्य नित्यत्वात्प्रकृतलक्षणस्याव्यापकत्वम् ॥ न च प्रवाहनित्यत्वमप्रमा-
णकमेवास्येति युक्तं वक्तुम् ॥ अधुना तत्कर्तुरनुपलम्भादतीतानागतयोरपि

कालयोस्तदनुमापकस्य लिङ्गस्याभावात्तदभावोऽपि सर्वदाप्यतीन्द्रिय-
साध्यसाधनसम्बन्धस्येन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वायोगात् ॥ प्रत्यक्षप्रतिपक्षमेव हि
लिङ्गम् । अनुमानं हि गृहीतसम्बन्धस्यैकदेशसन्दर्शनादसन्निवृष्टेऽर्थे
बुद्धिरित्यभिधानात् ॥ नाप्यर्थापत्तेस्तत्सिद्धिः । अन्यथाभूतस्यार्थस्याभा-
वादुपमानोपमेययोरप्रत्यक्षत्वाच्च नाप्युपमानं साधकम् ॥ केवलमभावप्र-
माणमेवावशिष्यते तच्च तदभावसाधकमिति ॥ न च पुरुषसद्भावव-
दस्यापि दुःसाध्यत्वात्संशयापत्तिस्तदभावसाधकप्रमाणानां सुलभत्वात् ॥
अधुना हि तदभावप्रत्यक्षमेवातीतानागतयोः कालयोरनुमानं तदभावसा-
धकमिति ॥ तथा च—अतीतानागतौ कालौ वेदकारविवर्जितौ ॥ कालश-
ब्दाभिधेयत्वादिदानीन्तनकालवत् ॥ १ ॥ वेदस्याध्ययनं सर्वं तदध्ययन-
पूर्वकम् ॥ वेदाध्ययनवाच्यत्वादधुनाध्ययनं तथेति ॥ २ ॥ तथा अपौ-
रुषेयो वेदः अनवच्छिन्नसम्प्रदायत्वे सत्यस्मर्यमाणकर्तृकत्वादाकाशवत् ॥
अर्थापत्तिरपि प्रामाण्यलक्षणस्यार्थस्यानन्यथाभूतस्य दर्शनात्तदभावे
निश्चीयते ॥ धर्माद्यतीन्द्रियार्थविषयस्य वेदस्यार्वाग्दार्शिभिः कर्तुमशक्य-
त्वात् । प्रतीन्द्रियार्थदर्शिनश्चाभावात्प्रामाण्यमपौरुषेयतामेव कल्पयतीति ॥
अत्र प्रतिविधीयते—यत्तावदुक्तं वर्णानां व्यापित्वे नित्यत्वे च प्रत्यभिज्ञा-
प्रमाणमिति, तदसत् । प्रत्यभिज्ञायास्तत्र प्रमाणत्वायोगात् ॥ देशान्तरेऽपि
तस्यैव वर्णस्य सत्त्वे खण्डशः प्रतिपत्तिः स्यात् । नहि सर्वत्र व्याप्त्या
वर्तमानस्यैकस्मिन्प्रदेशे सामस्त्येन ग्रहणमुपपत्तियुक्तम् । अव्यापकत्वप्रस-
ङ्गात् ॥ घटादेरपि व्यापकत्वप्रसङ्गः । शक्यं हि वक्तुमेवं घटः सर्वगतश्च-
क्षुरादिसन्निधानादनेकत्र देशे प्रतीयत इति ॥ ननु घटोत्पादकस्य मृत्पि-
ण्डादेरनेकस्योपलम्भादनेकत्वमेव । तथा महदणुपरिमाणसम्भवाच्चेति ॥
तच्च वर्णेष्वपि समानम् । तत्रापि प्रतिनियततात्वादि कारणकलापस्य तीव्रा-
दिधर्मभेदस्य च सम्भवाविरोधात् । तात्वादीनां व्यञ्जकत्वमत्रैव निपेत्यत
इत्यास्तां तावदेतत् ॥ अथ व्याप्तित्वेऽपि सर्वत्र सर्वात्मना वृत्तिमत्त्वान्न
दोषोऽयमिति चेन्न । तथा सति सर्वथैकत्वविरोधात् । नहि देशभेदेन युग-
पत्सर्वात्मना प्रतीयमानस्यैकत्वमुपपन्नं प्रमाणविरोधात् ॥ तथा च प्रयोगः—
प्रत्येकं गकारादिवर्णोऽनेक एव युगपद्भिन्नदेशतया तथैव सर्वात्मनोपलभ्य-
मानत्वात् घटादिवत् ॥ न सामान्येन व्यभिचारः । तस्यापि सदृशपरिणा-

मात्मकस्यानेकत्वात् । नापि पर्वताद्यनेकप्रदेशस्थतया युगपदनेकदेश-
स्थितपुरुषपरिदृश्यमानेन चन्द्रार्कादिना व्यभिचारः । तस्यातिदविष्टतयैक-
देशस्थितस्यापि भ्रान्तिवशादनेकदेशस्थत्वेन प्रतीतेः ॥ न चाभ्रान्तस्य
भ्रान्तेन व्यभिचारकल्पना युक्तेति । नापि जलपात्रप्रतिबिम्बेन । तस्यापि
चन्द्रार्कादिसन्निधिमपेक्ष्य तथापरिणममानस्यानेकत्वात् । तस्मादनेकप्रदेशे
युगपत्सर्वात्मनोपलभ्यमानविषयस्यैकस्यासम्भाव्यमानत्वात्तत्र प्रवर्तमानं
प्रत्यभिज्ञानं न प्रमाणमिति स्थितम् ॥ तथा नित्यत्वमपि न प्रत्यभिज्ञानेन
निश्चीयत इति । नित्यत्वं हि एकस्यानेकक्षणव्यापित्वम् । तच्चान्तराले
सत्तानुपलम्भेन न शक्यते निश्चेतुम् । न च प्रत्यभिज्ञानबलेनैवान्तराले
सत्तासम्भवः । तस्य सादृश्यादपि सम्भवाविरोधात् ॥ न च घटादावप्येवं
प्रसङ्गः । तस्योत्पत्तावपरापरमृत्पिण्डान्तरलक्षणस्य कारणस्यासम्भाव्य-
मानत्वेनान्तराले सत्तायाः साधयितुं शक्यत्वात् । अत्र तु कारणानाम-
पूर्वाणां व्यापारसम्भावनातो नान्तराले सत्तासम्भव इति ॥ यच्चान्यदुक्तं
संकेतान्यथानुपपत्तेः शब्दस्य नित्यत्वमिति । इदमप्यनात्मज्ञभाषितमेव ।
अनित्येऽपि योजयितुं शक्यत्वात् ॥ तथा हि गृहीतसंकेतस्य दण्डस्य
प्रध्वंसे सत्यगृहीतसंकेत इदानीमन्य एव दण्डः समुपलभ्यत इति दण्डीति
न स्यात् । तथा धूमस्यापि गृहीतव्याप्तिकस्य नाशे अन्यधूमदर्शनाद्वह्निविज्ञाना-
भावश्च ॥ अथ सादृश्यात्तथाप्रतीतेर्न दोष इति चेदत्रापि सादृश्यवशादर्थ-
प्रत्यये को दोषः ? । येन नित्यत्वेऽत्र दुरभिनिवेश आश्रीयते । तथा
कल्पनायामन्तराले सत्त्वमप्यदृष्टं, न कल्पितं स्यादिति ॥ यच्चान्यदभिहितं
व्यञ्जकानां प्रतिनियतत्वान्न युगपत् श्रुतिरिति तदप्यशिक्षितलक्षितम् ।
समानेन्द्रियग्राह्येषु समानधर्मसु समानदेशेषु विषयिविषयेषु नियमायोगात् ॥
तथाहि—श्रोत्रं समानदेशसमानेन्द्रियग्राह्यसमानधर्मापन्नानामर्थानां ग्रहणाय
प्रतिनियतसंस्कारकसंस्कार्यं न भवति । इन्द्रियत्वात् चक्षुर्वत् ॥ शब्दा वा
प्रतिनियतसंस्कारकसंस्कार्या न भवन्ति । समानदेशसमानेन्द्रियग्राह्यसमान-
धर्मापन्नत्वे सति युगपदिन्द्रियसम्बद्धत्वात् । घटादिवत् ॥ उपपत्तिपक्षे-
ऽप्ययं दोषः समान इति न वाच्यं मृत्पिण्डदीपदृष्टान्ताभ्यां कारकव्यञ्जक-
पक्षयोर्विशेषसिद्धेरित्यलमतिजल्पितेन ॥ यच्चान्यत्प्रवाहनित्यत्वेन वेदस्या-

पौरुषेयत्वमिति तत्र किं शब्दमात्रस्यानादिनित्यत्वमुत विशिष्टानामिति ?
 आद्यपक्षे य एव शब्दा लौकिकास्त एव वैदिका इत्यल्पमिदमभिधीयते वेद
 एवापौरुषेय इति । किन्तु सर्वेषामपि शास्त्राणामपौरुषेयतेति ॥ अथ विशि-
 ष्टानुपूर्विका एव शब्दा अनादित्वेनाभिधीयन्ते तेषामवगतार्थानामनवगता-
 र्थानां वा अनादिता स्यात् ? यदि तावदुत्तरः पक्षस्तदाऽज्ञानलक्षणमप्रामा-
 ण्यमनुषज्यते ॥ अथ आद्यः पक्ष आश्रीयते तद्व्याख्यातारः किञ्चिज्ज्ञाभवेयुः
 सर्वज्ञा वा ? प्रथमपक्षे दुरधिगमसम्बन्धानामन्यथाप्यर्थस्य कल्पयितुं
 शक्यत्वात् मिथ्यात्वलक्षणमप्रामाण्यं स्यात् । तदुक्तम्—अयमर्थो नायमर्थ
 इति शब्दा वदन्ति न । कल्प्योऽयमर्थः पुरुषैस्ते च रागादिविप्लुताः ॥१॥
 किञ्च किञ्चिज्ज्ञव्याख्यातार्थाविशेषात् अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् स्वर्गकाम इत्यस्य
 खादेच्छवमांसमित्यपि वाक्यार्थः किं न स्यात् संशयलक्षणमप्रामाण्यं वा ॥
 अथ सर्वविद्विदितार्थ एव वेदोऽऽनादिपरंपराऽयात् इति चेत् । हन्त धर्म
 चोदनैव प्रमाणमिति हतमेतत् ॥ अतीन्द्रियार्थप्रत्यक्षीकरणसमर्थस्य पुरुषस्य
 सद्भावे च तद्वचनस्यापि चोदनावत्तदवबोधकत्वेन प्रामाण्याद्वेदस्य पुरुषा-
 भावसिद्धेस्तत्प्रातिबन्धकं स्यात् ॥ अथ तद्व्याख्यातृणां किञ्चिज्ज्ञत्वेऽपि यथा-
 र्थव्याख्यानपरम्पराया अनवच्छिन्नसन्तानत्वेन सत्यार्थ एव वेदोऽवसीयत
 इति चेन्न । किञ्चिज्ज्ञानामतीन्द्रियार्थेषु निःसंशयव्याख्यानायोगादन्वेना-
 कृष्यमाणस्यान्धस्यानिष्टदेशपरिहारेणाभिमतपथप्रमाणानुपपत्तेः ॥ किञ्चा-
 नादिव्याख्यानपरम्परागतत्वेऽपि वेदार्थस्य गृहीतविस्मृतसम्बन्धवचनाकौ-
 शलदुष्टाभिप्रायतया व्याख्यानस्यान्यथैव करणादविसंवादायोगादप्रामाण्य-
 मेव स्यात् । दृश्यन्ते ह्यधुनातना अपि ज्योतिःशास्त्रादिषु रहस्यं यथार्थमव-
 यन्तोऽपि दुरभिसंधेरन्यथा व्याचक्षाणाः । केचिज्ज्ञानन्तोऽपि वचनाकौश-
 लादन्यथोपदिशन्तः । केचिद्विस्मृतसम्बन्धा अयाथातथ्यमभिदधाना इति ॥
 कथमन्यथा भावनाविधिनियोगवाक्यार्थप्रतिपत्तिर्वेदे स्यान्मनुयाज्ञवल्क्या-
 दीनां श्रुत्यर्थानुसारिस्मृतिनिरूपणायां वा ? तस्मादनादिप्रवाहपतितत्वेऽपि
 वेदस्याथथार्थत्वमेव स्यादिति स्थितम् ॥ यच्चोक्तमतीतानागतावित्यादि
 तदपि स्वमतनिर्मूलनहेतुत्वेन विपरीतसाधनात्तदाभासमेवेति ॥ तथाहि—
 “अतीतानागतौ कालौ वेदार्थज्ञविवर्जितौ ॥ कालशब्दाभिधेयत्वादधुनात-
 नकालवदिति” ॥ १ ॥ किञ्च कालशब्दाभिधेयत्वमतीतानागतयोः काल-

योर्ग्रहणे सति भवति । तद्ग्रहणं च नाध्यक्षतस्तयोरतीन्द्रियत्वात् ॥ अनु-
मानतस्तद्ग्रहणेऽपि न साध्येन सम्बन्धस्तयोर्निश्चेतुं पार्यते । प्रत्यक्षगृही-
तस्यैव तत्सम्बन्धाभ्युपगमात् ॥ न च कालाख्यं द्रव्यं मीमांसकस्यास्ति ॥
प्रसङ्गसाधनाददोष इति चेन्न । परम्प्रति साध्यसाधनयोर्व्याप्यव्यापकभा-
वाभावादिदानीमपि देशान्तरे वेदकारस्याष्टकादेः सौगतादिभिरभ्युपगमात् ॥
यदप्यपरं वेदाध्ययनमित्यादि तदपि विपक्षेऽपि समानम्—“भारताध्य-
यनं सर्वं गुर्वध्ययनपूर्वकम् । तदध्ययनवाच्यत्वादधुनाध्ययनं यथे”ति ॥ १ ॥
यच्चान्यदुक्तम्—अनवच्छिन्नसम्प्रदायत्वे सत्यस्मर्यमाणकर्तृत्वादिति । तत्र
जीर्णकूपारामादिभिर्व्यभिचारनिवृत्त्यर्थमनवच्छिन्नसम्प्रदायत्वविशेषणेषु वि-
शेष्यस्थास्मर्यमाणकर्तृकत्वस्य विचार्यमाणस्यायोगादसाधनत्वम् ॥ कर्तुर-
स्मरणं हि वादिनः प्रतिवादिनश्च सर्वस्य वा ? वादिनश्चेदनुपलब्धेरभा-
वाद्वा ? । आद्ये पक्षे पिटकत्रयेऽपि स्यादनुपलब्धेरविशेषात् ॥ तत्र परैः
कर्तुरङ्गीकरणान्नो चेत् । अत एवात्रापि न तदस्तु । अभावादिति चेदस्मा-
त्तदभावसिद्धावितरेतराऽऽश्रयत्वम् । सिद्धे हि तदभावे तन्निवन्धनं तदस्मरण-
मस्माच्च तदभाव इति ॥ प्रामाण्यान्यथानुपपत्तेस्तदभावान्नेतरेतराश्रयत्व-
मिति चेन्न । प्रामाण्येनाप्रामाण्यकारणस्यैव पुरुषविशेषस्य निराकरणात्
पुरुषमात्रस्यानिराकृतेः ॥ अथातीन्द्रियार्थदर्शिनोऽभावादन्यस्य च प्रामाण्य-
कारणत्वानुपपत्तेः सिद्ध एव सर्वथा पुरुषाभाव इति चेत् कुतः सर्वज्ञाभावो
विभावितः ? । प्रामाण्यान्यथानुपपत्तेरिति चेदितरेतराश्रयत्वम् । कर्तुर-
स्मरणादिति चेच्चक्रकप्रसङ्गः अभावप्रमाणादिति चेन्न । तत्साधकस्यानुमा-
नस्य प्राक्प्रतिपादितत्वादभावप्रमाणोत्थानायोगात् प्रमाणपञ्चकाभावे-
ऽभावप्रमाणप्रवृत्तेः—“प्रमाणपञ्चकं यत्र वस्तुरूपेण जायते । वस्तुसत्तावबो-
धार्थं तत्राभावप्रमाणते”ति परैरभिधानात् । ततो न वादिनः कर्तुरस्मरण-
मुपपन्नम् ॥ नापि प्रतिवादिनोऽसिद्धेः । तत्र हि प्रतिवादी स्मरत्येव कर्तार-
मिति ॥ नापि सर्वस्य, वादिनो वेदकर्तुरस्मरणेऽपि प्रतिवादिनः स्मरणात् ॥
ननु प्रतिवादिना वेदेऽष्टकादयो बहवः कर्तारः स्मर्यन्तेऽतस्तत्स्मरणस्य
विवादविषयस्याप्रामाण्याद्भवेदेव सर्वस्य कर्तुरस्मरणमिति चेत् न । कर्तृ-
विशेषविषय एवासौ विवादो न कर्तृसामान्ये ॥ अतः सर्वस्य कर्तुरस्मरण-
मप्यसिद्धम् । सर्वात्मज्ञानविज्ञानराहितो वा कथं सर्वस्य कर्तुरस्मरणमवैति ।

तस्मादपौरुषेयत्वस्य वेदे व्यवस्थापयितुमशक्यत्वान्न तल्लक्षणस्याव्याप-
कत्वमसम्भवितत्वं वा सम्भवति ॥ पौरुषेयत्वे पुनः प्रमाणानि बहूनि
सन्त्येव सजन्ममरणविंशोत्रचरणादिनामश्रुतेरनेकपदसंहतिप्रतिनियमसंदर्श-
नात्फलार्थिपुरुषप्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिहेत्वात्मनां श्रुतेश्च मनुसूत्रवत् पुरुषकर्तृकैव
श्रुतिरिति वचनात् ॥ अपौरुषेयत्वेऽपि वा न प्रामाण्यं वेदस्योपपद्यते
तद्धेतूनां गुणानामभावात् ॥ ननु न गुणकृतमेव प्रामाण्यं किन्तु दोषाभाव-
प्रकारेणापि, स च दोषाश्रयपुरुषाभावेऽपि निश्चीयते न गुणसद्भाव एवेति ।
तथाचोक्तम्—शब्दे दोषोद्भवस्तावद्वक्त्रधीन इति स्थितम् । तदभावः कचि-
त्तावद्गुणवद्वक्तृकत्वतः ॥ १ ॥ तद्गुणैरपकृष्टानां शब्दे संक्रान्त्यसम्भवात् ।
यद्वा वक्तुरभावेन न स्युर्दोषा निराश्रयाः ॥ २ ॥ इति ॥ तदप्ययुक्तम् ।
पराभिप्रायापरिज्ञानात् ॥ नास्माभिर्वक्तुरभावे वेदस्य प्रामाण्याभावः
समुद्भाव्यते । किं तु तद्व्याख्यातृणामतीन्द्रियार्थदर्शनादिगुणाभावे । ततो
दोषाणामनपोदितत्वान्न प्रामाण्यानेश्चय इति । ततोऽपौरुषेयत्वेऽपि वेदस्य
प्रामाण्यनिश्चयायोगान्नानेन लक्षणस्याव्यापित्वमसम्भवित्वं वेत्यलमति-
जल्पितेन ॥ ननु शब्दार्थयोः सम्बन्धाभावादन्यापोहमात्राभिधायित्वादास-
प्रणीतादपि शब्दात् कथं वस्तुभूतार्थावगम इत्यत्राह—

सहजयोग्यतासङ्केतवशाद्धि शब्दादयो वस्तुप्रतिपत्तिहेतवः ॥ १०० ॥

सहजा स्वभावभूता योग्यता शब्दार्थयोर्वाच्यवाचकशक्तिः तस्यां सङ्के-
तस्तद्वशाद्धि स्फुटं शब्दादयः प्रागुक्ता वस्तुप्रतिपत्तिहेतव इति ॥ उदाहर-
णमाह—

यथा मेवादयः सन्ति ॥ १०१ ॥

ननु य एव शब्दाः सत्यर्थे दृष्टास्त एवार्थाभावेऽपि दृश्यन्ते तत्कथमर्था-
भिधायकत्वमिति । तदप्ययुक्तम्—अनर्थकेभ्यः शब्देभ्योऽर्थवतामन्यत्वात् ॥
न चान्यस्य व्यभिचारेऽन्यस्यासौ युक्तोऽतिप्रसङ्गात् ॥ अन्यथा गोपालव-
टिकान्तर्गतस्य धूमस्य पावकस्य व्यभिचारे पर्वतादिधूमस्यापि तत्प्रसङ्गात् ॥
“यत्नतः परीक्षितं कार्यं कारणं नातिवर्तते” इत्यन्यत्रापि समानम् । सुप-
क्षितो हि शब्दोऽर्थं न व्यभिचरतीति ॥ तथा चान्यापोहस्य शब्दार्थत्व-
कल्पनं प्रयासमात्रमेव ॥ न चान्यापोहः शब्दार्थो व्यवतिष्ठते प्रतीतिविरो-

धात् ॥ न हि गवादिशब्दश्रवणादगवादिव्यावृत्तिः प्रतीयते । ततः सास्ना-
दिमत्यर्थे प्रवृत्तिदर्शनादगवादिवृद्धिजनकं तत्र शब्दान्तरं शृण्वम् ॥ अथै-
कस्मादेव गोशब्दार्थद्वयस्यापि सम्भावनान्नार्थः शब्दान्तरेणेति चेन्नैवम् ।
एकस्य परस्परविरुद्धार्थद्वयप्रतिपादनविरोधात् ॥ किञ्च गोशब्दस्यागोव्या-
वृत्तिविषयत्वे प्रथममगौरिति प्रतीयेत न चैवमतो नान्यापोहः शब्दार्थः ॥
किञ्च अपोहाख्यं सामान्यं वाच्यत्वेन प्रतीयमानं पर्युदासरूपं प्रसज्यरूपं
वा ? प्रथमपक्षे गोत्वमेव नामान्तरेणोक्तं स्यात् । अभावाभावस्य भावान्त-
रस्वभावेन व्यवस्थितत्वात् ॥ कश्चायमश्वादिनिवृत्तिलक्षणो भावोऽभि-
धीयते ? न तावत्स्वलक्षणरूपस्तस्य सकलविकल्पवाग्वोचरातिक्रान्तत्वात् ॥
नापि शाबलेयादिव्यक्तिरूपस्तस्यासामान्यत्वप्रसङ्गात् ॥ तस्मात् सकलगो-
व्यक्तिष्वनुवृत्तप्रत्ययजनकं तत्रैव प्रत्येकं परिसमाप्त्या वर्तमानं सामान्यमेव
गोशब्दवाच्यम् । तस्यापोह इति नामकरणे नाममात्रं भिद्येत नार्थ इति ।
अतो नाद्यः पक्षः श्रेयान् ॥ नापि द्वितीयो गोशब्दादेः कचिद्वाह्येऽर्थे प्रवृ-
त्त्ययोगात् । तुच्छाभावाभ्युपगमे परमतप्रवेशानुपगमाच्च ॥ किञ्च गवादयो ये
सामान्यशब्दा ये च शाबलेयादयस्तेषां भवदभिप्रायेण पर्यायता स्यात् ।
अर्थभेदाभावाद्बृत्तपादपादिशब्दवत् ॥ न खलु तुच्छाभावस्य भेदो युक्तो
वस्तुन्येव संसृष्टत्वैकत्वनानात्वादिविकल्पानां प्रतीतेः ॥ भेदे वा अभावस्य
वस्तुतापत्तिः तल्लक्षणत्वाद्ब्रह्मस्तुत्वस्य ॥ न चापोल्लक्षणसम्बन्धिभेदाद्भेदः ।
प्रमेयाभिधेयादिशब्दानामप्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गात् ॥ व्यवच्छेद्यस्यातद्रपेणाप्यप्रमेया-
दिरूपत्वे ततो व्यवच्छेदायोगात्कथं तत्र सम्बन्धिभेदाद्भेदः ? किञ्च
शाबलेयादिष्वेकोऽपोहो न प्रसज्येत किन्तु प्रतिव्यक्ति भिन्न एव स्यात् ॥
अथ शाबलेयादयस्तन्न भिन्दन्ति तर्ह्यश्वादयोऽपि भेदका माभूवन् ॥
यस्यान्तरङ्गाः शाबलेयादयो न भेदकास्तस्याश्वादयो भेदका इत्यतिसाह-
सम् ॥ वस्तुनोऽपि सम्बन्धिभेदाद्भेदो नोपलभ्यते किमुतावस्तुनि ॥ तथाह्येक
एव देवदत्तादिः कटककुण्डलादिभिरभिसम्बन्ध्यमानो न नानात्वमास्तिधनु-
वानः समुपलभ्यत इति ॥ भवतु वा सम्बन्धिभेदाद्भेदस्तथापि न वस्तुभूत-
सामान्यमन्तरेणान्यापोहाश्रयः सम्बन्धी भवतां भवितुमर्हति । तथाहि यदि
शाबलेयादिषु वस्तुभूतसारूप्याभावोऽश्वादिपरिहारेण तत्रैव विशिष्टाभिधा-
नप्रत्यर्थौ कथं स्याताम् । ततः सम्बन्धिभेदाद्भेदमिच्छतापि सामान्यं वास्त-

वमङ्गीकर्तव्यमिति ॥ किञ्चापोहशब्दार्थपक्षे संकेत एवानुपपन्नस्तद्ग्रहणोपा-
यासम्भवात् ॥ न प्रत्यक्षं तद्ग्रहणसमर्थं तस्य वस्तुविषयत्वात् । अन्यापो-
हस्य चावस्तुत्वात् ॥ अनुमानमपि न तत्सद्भावमवबोधयति तस्य कार्यस्व-
भावलिङ्गसम्पाद्यत्वात् ॥ अपोहस्य निरुपाख्येयत्वेनानर्थक्रियाकारित्वेन
च स्वभावकार्ययोरसम्भवात् ॥ किञ्च गोशब्दस्यागोपोहाभिधायित्वे गौरि-
त्यत्र गोशब्दस्य किमभिधेयं स्यादज्ञातस्य विधेनिषेधयोरनधिकारात् ॥
अगोवृत्तिरिति चेदितरेतराश्रयत्वमगोव्यवच्छेदो हि अगोनिश्चये भवति
स चागौर्गोनिवृत्त्यात्मा' गौश्चागोव्यवच्छेदरूप इति ॥ अगौरित्यत्रोत्तर-
पदार्थोऽप्यनयैव दिशा चिन्तनीयः ॥ नन्वगौरित्यत्रान्य एव विधिरूपो
गोशब्दाभिधेयस्तदाऽपोहः शब्दार्थ इति विप्रटेत । तस्मादपोहस्योक्त्युक्त्या
विचार्यमाणस्यायोगान्नान्यापोहः शब्दार्थ इति, स्थितं सहजयोग्यतासङ्के-
तवशाच्छब्दादयो वस्तुप्रतिपत्तिहेतव इति ॥

स्मृतिरनुपहत्यं प्रत्यभिज्ञानवज्ञा

प्रमितिनिरतचिन्ता लैङ्गिकं सङ्गतार्थम् ।

प्रवचनमनवद्यं निश्चितं देववाचा

रचितमुचितवाग्भिस्तथ्यमेतेन गीतम् ॥ १ ॥

इति परीक्षामुखस्य लघुवृत्तौ परोक्षप्रपञ्चस्तृतीयः समुद्देशः ॥ ३ ॥

अथ स्वरूपसंख्याविप्रतिपत्तिं निराकृत्य विषयविप्रतिपत्तिनिरासा-
र्थमाह—

सामान्यविशेषात्मा तदर्थो विषयः ॥ १ ॥

तस्य प्रामाण्यस्य ग्राह्योऽर्थो विषय इति यावत् । स एव विशिष्यते
सामान्यविशेषात्मा । सामान्यविशेषौ वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणौ तावात्मानौ यस्येति
विग्रहः ॥ तदुभयग्रहणात्समग्रहणं च केवलस्य सामान्यस्य विशेषस्य तदु-
भयस्य वा स्वतन्त्रस्य प्रमाणविषयत्वप्रतिषेधार्थम् । तत्र सन्मात्रदेहस्य पर-
ब्रह्मणो निरस्तत्वात्तदितरद्विचार्यते ॥ तत्र सांख्यैः प्रधानं सामान्यमुक्तं
“त्रिगुणमविवेकिविषयः सामान्यमचेतनं प्रसवधार्मिव्यक्तं तथा प्रधानं तद्विष-

रीतस्तथा च पुमानिति” वचनात् ॥ तच्च केवलं प्रधानं महदादिकार्यानिष्पादनाय प्रवर्तमानं किमप्यपेक्ष्य प्रवर्तते निरपेक्ष्य वा ? प्रथमपक्षे तन्निमित्तं वाच्यं यदपेक्ष्य प्रवर्तते ॥ ननु पुरुषार्थ एव तत्र कारणं, पुरुषार्थेन हेतुना प्रधानं प्रवर्तते । पुरुषार्थश्च द्वेधा, शब्दाद्युपलब्धिर्गुणपुरुषान्तरविवेकदर्शनं चेत्यभिधानादिति चेत् सत्यम् । तथा प्रवर्तमानमपि बहुधानकं पुरुषकृतं कश्चिदुपकारं समासादयत्प्रवर्तेतानासादयद्वा ? प्रथमपक्षे स उपकारस्तस्माद्भिन्नोऽभिन्नो वा ? यदि भिन्नस्तदा तस्येति व्यपदेशाभावः । सम्बन्धाभावात्तदभावश्च समवायादेरनभ्युपगमात् । तादात्म्यं च भेदविरोधीति ॥ अथाभिन्न उपकार इति पक्ष आश्रीयते तदा प्रधानमेव तेन कृतं स्यात् ॥ अथोपकारनिरपेक्षमेव प्रधानं प्रवर्तते तर्हि मुक्तात्मानमप्रत्यपि प्रवर्तेताविशेषात् ॥ एतेन निरपेक्षप्रवृत्तिपक्षोऽपि प्रत्युक्तस्तत एव ॥ किञ्च सिद्धे प्रधाने सर्वमेतदुपपन्नं स्यात् न च तत्सिद्धिः कुतश्चिन्निरचीयत इति ॥ ननु कार्याणामेकान्वयदर्शनादेककारणप्रभवत्वं भेदानां परिणामदर्शनाच्चेति । तदप्यचारुचर्वितं सुखदुःखमोहरूपतया घटादेरन्वयाभावादनन्तस्तत्त्वस्यैव तथोपलम्भात् ॥ अथान्तस्तत्त्वस्य न सुखादिपरिणामः किन्तु तथापरिणाममानप्रधानसंसर्गादात्मनोऽपि तथा प्रतिभास इति तदप्यनुपपन्नम् । अप्रतिभासमानस्यापि संसर्गकल्पनायां तत्त्वेयत्ताया निश्चेतुमशक्तेः । तदुक्तम्—संसर्गादविभागश्चेदयोगोलकवह्निवत् ॥ भेदाभेदव्यवस्थैवमुत्पन्ना सर्ववस्तुषु ॥ १ ॥ इति । यदपि परिणामाख्यं साधनं, तदप्येकप्रकृतिकेषु घटघटीशरावोदञ्चनादिष्वनेकप्रकृतिकेषु पटकुटमकुटशकटादिषु चोपलम्भादनैकान्तिकमिति न ततः प्रकृतिसिद्धिः । तदेवं प्रधानग्रहणोपायासम्भवात्सम्भवे वा ततः कार्योदयायोगाच्च ॥ यदुक्तं परेण—प्रकृतेर्महान् ततोऽहंकारस्तस्माद्द्वयश्च षोडशकः ॥ तस्मादपि षोडशकात्पञ्चभूतानीति ॥ सृष्टिक्रमे, “मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिर्महदाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्त । षोडशकश्च विकारो न प्रकृतिर्न विकृतिः पुरुषः ॥” इति स्वरूपाख्यानं च बन्ध्यासुतसौरूप्यवर्णनमिवासद्विषयत्वादुपेक्षामर्हति ॥ अमूर्तस्याकाशस्य मूर्तस्य पृथिव्यादेशचैककारणकत्वायोगाच्च ॥ अन्यथा अचेतनादपि पञ्चभूतकदम्बकाच्चैतन्यसिद्धिश्चार्वाकमतसिद्धिप्रसङ्गात् सांख्यगन्ध एव न भवेत् ॥ सत्कार्यवादप्रतिषेधश्चान्यत्र विस्तरणोक्त इति नेहोच्यते संक्षेपस्वरूपादस्येति ॥ तथा

विशेषा एव तत्त्वं तेषामसमानेतरविशेषेभ्योऽशेषात्मनो विश्लेषात्मकत्वात्सामान्यस्यैकस्थानेकत्र व्याप्त्या वर्तमानस्य सम्भवाभावाच्च ॥ तस्यैकव्यक्तिनिष्ठस्य सामस्त्येनोपलब्धस्य तथैव व्यक्त्यन्तरेऽनुपलम्भप्रसङ्गात् ॥ उपलम्भे वा तन्नानात्वापत्तेर्युगपत् भिन्नदेशतया सामस्त्येनोपलब्धेस्तद्व्यक्तिवदन्यथा व्यक्तयोऽपि भिन्ना माभूवन्निति ॥ ततो बुद्ध्यभेद एव सामान्यम् । तदुक्तम्—एकत्र दृष्टो भावो हि कचिन्नान्यत्र दृश्यते । तस्मान्न भिन्नमस्त्यन्यत्सामान्यं बुद्ध्यभेदतः ॥ १ ॥ इति ॥ ते च विशेषाः परस्परासम्बद्धा एव, तत्सम्बन्धस्य विचार्यमाणस्यायोगात् ॥ एकदेशेन सम्बन्धे अणुपट्केन युगपद्योगादणोः षडंशतापत्तेः ॥ सर्वात्मनाभिसम्बन्धे पिण्डस्याणुमात्रकत्वापत्तेः ॥ अवयविनिषेधाच्चासम्बद्धत्वमेषामुपपद्यत एव ॥ तन्निषेधश्च वृत्तिविकल्पादिबाधनात् ॥ तथाहि अवयवा अवयविनि वर्तन्त इति नाभ्युपगतम् । अवयवी चावयवेषु वर्तमानः किमेकदेशेन वर्तते सर्वात्मना वा ? एकदेशेन वृत्तावयवान्तरप्रसङ्गः । तत्राप्येकदेशान्तरेणावयविनो वृत्तावनवस्था ॥ सर्वात्मना वर्तमानोऽपि प्रत्यवयवं स्वभावभेदेन वर्तत, आहोस्विदेकरूपेणेति ? प्रथमपक्षे अवयविबहुत्वापत्तिः ॥ द्वितीयपक्षे तु अवयवानामेकरूपत्वापत्तिरिति । प्रत्येकं परिसमाप्त्या वृत्तावयवविविबहुत्वमिति ॥ तथा यत् दृश्यं सन्नोपलभ्यते तन्नास्त्येव यथा गगनेन्दीवरं नोपलभ्यते चावयवेष्ववयवीति ॥ तथा यदग्रहे यद्बुद्ध्याभवस्तत्ततो नार्थान्तरम् । यथा वृत्ताग्रहे वनमिति ॥ ततश्च निरंशा एवान्योन्यासंस्पर्शिणो रूपादिपरमाणवस्ते च एकक्षणस्थायिनो न नित्या, विनाशं प्रत्यन्यानपेक्षणात् ॥ प्रयोगश्च यो यद्भावं प्रत्यन्यानपेक्षः स तत्स्वभावनियतो यथान्त्या कारणसामग्री स्वकार्ये ॥ नाशो हि मुद्गरादिना क्रियमाणस्ततो भिन्नोऽभिन्नो वा क्रियते ? भिन्नस्य करणे घटस्य स्थितिरेव स्यात् ॥ अथ विनाशसम्बन्धान्नष्ट इति व्यपदेश इति चेत्, भावाभावयोः कः सम्बन्धः ? न तावत्तादात्म्यं तयोर्भेदात् । नापि तदुत्पत्तिरभावस्य कार्याधारत्वाघटनात् । अभिन्नस्य करणे घटादिरेव कृतः स्यात् । तस्य च प्रागेव निष्पन्नत्वाद्यर्थं कारणमित्यन्यानपेक्षत्वं सिद्धमिति, विनाशस्वभावनियतत्वं साधयत्येव ॥ सिद्धे चानित्यानां तत्स्वभावनियतत्वे तदितरेषामात्मादीनां विमत्यधिकरणभावापन्नानां सत्त्वादिना साधनेन तद्दृष्टान्ताद्भवत्येव क्षणस्थितिस्वभावत्वम् ॥

तथा हि यत्सत्तत्सर्वमेकक्षणस्थितिस्वभावं यथा घटः सन्तश्चामी भावा इति ॥ अथवा सत्त्वमेव विपक्षे बाधकप्रमाणबलेन दृष्टान्तनिरपेक्षमशेषस्य वस्तुनः क्षणिकत्वमुपापयति ॥ तथाहि सत्त्वमर्थक्रियया व्याप्यम् । अर्थक्रिया च क्रमयौगपद्याभ्यां, ते च नित्यादिवर्त्तमाने स्वव्याप्यामर्थक्रियामादाय निवर्तते । सापि स्वव्याप्यं सत्त्वमिति, नित्यस्य क्रमयौगपद्याभ्यामर्थक्रिया-विरोधात्सत्त्वासम्भावनं विपक्षे बाधकप्रमाणमिति ॥ नहि नित्यस्य क्रमेण युगपद्वा सा सम्भवति । नित्यस्यैकेनैव स्वभावेन पूर्वापरकालभाविकार्यद्वयं कुर्वतः कार्याभेदकत्वात्तस्यैकस्वभावत्वात् । तथापि कार्यनानात्वे अन्यत्र कार्यभेदात् कारणभेदकल्पना विफलैव स्यात् । तादृशमेकमेव किञ्चित्कारणं कल्पनीयं, येनैकस्वभावेनैकेनैव चराचरमुत्पद्यत इति ॥ अथ स्वभावनाना-त्वमेव तस्य कार्यभेदादिष्यत इति चेत्तर्हि, ते स्वभावास्तस्य सर्वदा सम्भ-विनस्तदा कार्यसाङ्कर्यम् । नो चेत्तदुत्पत्तिकारणं वाच्यम् । तस्मादेवमित्ये-कस्वभावात्तदुत्पत्तौ तत्स्वभावानां सदा सम्भवात्सैव कार्याणां युगपत्प्राप्तिः ॥ सहकारिक्रमापेक्षया तत्स्वभावानां क्रमेण भावान्नोक्तदोष इति चेत्तदपि न साधुसङ्गतम् । समर्थस्य नित्यस्य परापेक्षायोगात् ॥ तैः सामर्थ्यकरणे नित्यताहानिः ॥ तस्माद्भिन्नमेव सामर्थ्यं तैर्विधीयत इति न नित्यता-हानिरिति चेत्तर्हि नित्यमकिञ्चित्करमेव स्यात् । सहकारिजनितसा-मर्थ्यस्यैव कार्यकारित्वात्तत्सम्बन्धात्तस्यापि कार्यकारित्वे तत्सम्बन्धस्यैक-स्वभावत्वे सामर्थ्यनानात्वाभावान्न कार्यभेदः । अनेकस्वभावत्वे क्रमवत्त्वे च कार्यवत्तस्यापि साङ्कर्यमिति सर्वमावर्तत इति चक्रकप्रसङ्गः ॥ तस्मान्न क्रमेण कार्यकारित्वं नित्यस्य । नापि युगपत् अशेषकार्याणां युगपदुत्पत्तौ द्वितीयक्षणे कार्याकरणादनर्थक्रियाकारित्वेनावस्तुत्वप्रसंगादिति नित्यस्य क्रमयौगपद्याभावः सिद्ध एवेति सौगताः प्रतिपेदिरे ॥ तेऽपि न युक्त्वा-दिनः—सजातीयेतरव्यावृत्तात्मनां विशेषाणामनंशानां ग्राहकस्य प्रमाण-स्याभावात् ॥ प्रत्यक्षस्य स्थिरस्थूलसाधारणाकारवस्तुग्राहकत्वेन निरंशवस्तु-ग्रहणयोगात् ॥ न हि परमाणवः परस्परासंबद्धाश्चक्षुरादिवुद्धौ प्रतिभा-न्ति तथा सत्यविवादप्रसंगात् ॥ अथानुभूयन्त एव प्रथमं तथाभूताः क्षणाः पश्चात्तु विकल्पवासनावलादान्तरादन्तरालानुपलम्भलक्षणाद्वाह्याच्चाविद्य-मानोऽपि स्थूलाद्याकारो विकल्पबुद्धौ चकास्ति ॥ स च तदाकारेणानुर-

ज्यमानः स्वव्यापारं तिरस्कृत्य प्रत्यक्षव्यापारपुरःसरत्वेन प्रवृत्तत्वात्प्रत्य-
 क्षायत इति । तदप्यतिबालविलासितम् ॥ निर्विकल्पकबोधस्यानुपलक्षणात् ।
 गृहीते हि निर्विकल्पकेतरयोर्भेदे अन्याकारानुरागस्यान्यत्र कल्पना युक्ता
 स्फटिकजपाकुसुमयोरिव नान्यथेति ॥ एतेन तयोर्युगपद्वृत्तेर्लघुवृत्तेर्वा तदे-
 कत्वाध्यवसाय इति निरस्तं तस्यापि कोशपानप्रत्येयत्वादिति ॥ केन वा
 तयोरेकत्वाध्यवसायः ? न तावद्विकल्पेन, तस्य विकल्पवार्तानभिज्ञत्वात् ॥
 नाप्यनुभवेन, तस्य विकल्पागोचरत्वात् ॥ न च तदुभयाविषयं तदेकत्वा-
 ध्यवसाये समर्थमिति प्रसङ्गात् ॥ ततो न प्रत्यक्षबुद्धौ तथाविधविशेषावभासः ॥
 नाप्यनुमानबुद्धौ तदविनाभूतस्वभावकार्यलिङ्गाभावादनूपलम्भोऽसिद्ध एव ।
 अनुवृत्ताकारस्य स्थूलाकारस्य चोपलब्धेरुक्तत्वात् ॥ यदपि परमाणूनामे-
 कदेशेन सर्वात्मना वा सम्बन्धो नोपपद्यत इति तत्रानभ्युपगम एव परिहारः ॥
 स्निग्धरूक्षाणां सजातीयानां च द्व्यधिकगुणानां कथञ्चित्स्कन्धाकारपरिणा-
 मात्मकस्य सम्बन्धस्याभ्युपगमात् ॥ यच्चाद्यविनि वृत्तिविकल्पादि
 बाधकमुक्तं तत्राद्यविनि वृत्तिरेव यदि नोपपद्यते तदा न वर्तत इत्यभि-
 धातव्यम् ॥ नैकदेशादिविकल्पस्तस्य विशेषान्तरान्तरीयकत्वात् ॥ तथा हि
 नैकदेशेन वर्तते नापि सर्वात्मनेत्युक्ते प्रकारान्तरेण वृत्तिरित्यभिहितं स्यात् ।
 अन्यथा न वर्तत इत्येव वक्तव्यमिति विशेषप्रतिषेधस्य शेषाभ्यनुज्ञानरु-
 पत्वात् कथञ्चित्तादात्म्यरूपेण वृत्तिरित्यवसीयते ॥ तत्र यथोक्तदोषाणा-
 मनवकाशाद्विरोधादिदोषश्रात्रे प्रतिषेत्स्यत इति नेह प्रतन्यते ॥ यच्चैक-
 क्षणस्थायित्वे साधनं 'यो यद्भावं प्रती' त्याद्युक्तं, तदप्यसाधनमसिद्धादि-
 दोषदुष्टत्वात् ॥ तत्रान्यानपेक्षत्वं तावदसिद्धं घटाद्यभावस्य मुद्गरादिव्या-
 पारान्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधायित्वात् तत्कारणत्वोपपत्तेः ॥ कपालादिपर्या-
 यान्तराभावो हि घटादेरभावस्तुच्छाभावस्य सकलप्रमाणगोचरातिक्रान्त-
 त्वात् ॥ किञ्च अभावो यदि स्वतन्त्रो भवेत्तदाऽन्यानपेक्षत्वं विशेषणं
 युक्तम् । न च सौगतमते सोऽस्तीति हेतुप्रयोगानवतार एव, अनैकान्तिकं
 चेदं शालिनीजस्य कोद्रवाङ्कुरजननम्प्रति अन्यानपेक्षत्वेऽपि तज्जननस्व-
 भावानियतत्वात् ॥ तत्स्वभावत्वे सतीति विशेषणान्न दोष इति चेत्— न
 सर्वथा पदार्थानां विनाशस्वभावासिद्धेः । पर्यायरूपेणैव हि भावानामुत्पा-
 दविनाशावङ्गीक्रियेते न द्रव्यरूपेण ॥ समुदेति विलयमृच्छति भावो

नियमेन पर्ययनयस्य । नोदेति नो विनश्यति भावनया लिङ्गितो नित्यम् ॥
 १ ॥ इति वचनात् ॥ नहि निरन्वयविनाशो पूर्वक्षणस्य ततो मृताच्छिखिनः
 क्रेकायितस्येवोत्तरक्षणस्योत्पत्तिर्घटते । द्रव्यरूपेण कथञ्चिदत्यक्त्वरूपस्यापि सम्भवात् न सर्वथा भावानां विनाशस्वभावत्वं युक्तम् ॥
 न च द्रव्यरूपस्य गृहीतुमशक्यत्वादभावस्तद्ग्रहणोपायस्य प्रत्यभिज्ञानस्य बहुलमुपलम्भात्तत्प्राप्ताण्यस्य च प्रागेवोक्तत्वादुत्तरकार्योत्पत्त्यन्थानुपपत्तेश्च सिद्धत्वात् ॥ यच्चान्यत्साधनं सत्त्वाख्यं तदपि विपक्षवत्स्वपक्षेऽपि समानत्वान्न साध्यसिद्धिनिबन्धनम् ॥ तथा हि सत्त्वमर्थक्रियया व्याप्तमर्थक्रिया च क्रमयौगपद्याभ्यां ते च क्षणिकान्निवर्तमाने स्वव्याप्यामर्थक्रियामादाय निवर्तेते । सा च निवर्तमाना स्वव्याप्यं सत्त्वमिति नित्यस्येव क्षणिकस्यापि खरविषाणवदसत्त्वमिति न तत्र सत्त्वव्यवस्था ॥ न च क्षणिकस्य वस्तुनः क्रमयौगपद्याभ्यामर्थक्रियाविरोधोऽसिद्धस्तस्य देशकृतस्य कालकृतस्य वा क्रमस्यासम्भवात् ॥ अवस्थितस्यैकस्य हि नानादेशकालकलाव्यापित्वं देशक्रमः कालक्रमश्चाभिधीयते ॥ न च क्षणिके सोऽस्ति, 'यो यत्रैव स तत्रैव यो यदैव तदैव सः ॥ न देशकालयोर्व्याप्तिर्भावानामिह विद्यत' इति स्वयमेवाभिधानात् ॥ न च पूर्वोत्तरक्षणानामेकसन्तानापेक्षया क्रमः सम्भवति, सन्तानस्य वास्तवत्वे तस्यापि क्षणिकत्वेन क्रमायोगादक्षणिकत्वेऽपि वास्तवत्वे तेनैव सत्त्वादिसाधनमनैकान्तिकम् । अवास्तवत्वे न तदपेक्षः क्रमो युक्त इति ॥ नापि यौगपद्येन तत्रार्थक्रिया सम्भवति, युगपदेकेन स्वभावेन नानाकार्यकरणे तत्कार्यैकत्वं स्यात् ॥ नानास्वभावकल्पनायां ते स्वभावास्तेन व्यापनीयाः । तत्रैकेन स्वभावेन तद्व्याप्तौ तेषामेकरूपता, नानास्वभावेन चेदनवस्था ॥ अथैकत्रैकस्योपादानभाव एवान्यत्र सहकारिभाव इति न स्वभावभेद इष्यते । तर्हि नित्यस्यैकरूपस्यापि वस्तुनः क्रमेण नानाकार्यकारिणः स्वभावभेदः कार्यसाङ्ग्यं वा माभूत् ॥ अक्रमात् क्रमिणामनुत्पत्तेर्नैवमिति चेदेकानंशकारणाद्युगपदनेककारणसाध्यानेककार्यविरोधादक्रमिणोऽपि न क्षणिकस्य कार्यकारित्वमिति ॥ किञ्च भवत्पक्षे सतोऽसतो वा कार्यकारित्वम् ? सतः कार्यकर्तृत्वे सकलकालकलाव्यापिक्षणानामेकक्षणवृत्तिप्रसङ्गः ॥ द्वितीयपक्षे खरविषाणादेरपि कार्यकारित्वमसत्त्वाविशेषात् सत्त्वलक्षणस्य व्यभिचारश्च, तस्मान्न विशेषैकान्तपक्षः

श्रेयान् ॥ नापि सामान्यविशेषौ परस्परानपेक्षाविति यौगमतमपि युक्तियुक्तं-
मवभाति, तयोरन्योन्यभेदे द्वयोरन्यतरस्यापि व्यवस्थापयितुमशक्तेः ॥ तथा
हि—विशेषास्तावत् द्रव्यगुणकर्मात्मनः सामान्यं तु परापरभेदाद्विविधं,
तत्र परसामान्यात्सत्तालक्षणाद्विशेषाणां भेदे सत्त्वापत्तिरिति । तथाच
प्रयोगः । द्रव्यगुणकर्माण्यसद्रूपाणि सत्त्वादत्यन्तं भिन्नत्वात्प्रागभावादिव-
दिति ॥ न सामान्यविशेषसमवायैर्व्यभिचारः । तत्र स्वरूपसत्त्वस्याभिन्नस्य
परैरभ्युपगमात् ॥ ननु द्रव्यादीनां प्रमाणोपपन्नत्वे धर्मिग्राहकप्रमाणवाधितो
हेतुर्येन हि प्रमाणेन द्रव्यादयो निश्चीयन्ते तेन तत्सत्त्वमपीति ॥ अथ 'न
प्रमाणप्रतिपन्ना द्रव्यादयस्तर्हि हेतोराश्रयासिद्धिरिति' तदयुक्तम् । प्रसङ्गसाध-
नात्प्रागभावादौ हि सत्त्वाद्भेदोऽसत्त्वेन व्याप्त उपलभ्यते ततश्च व्याप्यस्य
द्रव्यादावभ्युपगमो व्यापकाभ्युपगमनान्तरीयक इति प्रसङ्गसाधने अस्य
दोषस्याभावात् ॥ एतेन द्रव्यादीनामप्यद्रव्यादित्वं द्रव्यत्वादेर्भेदे चिन्तितं
बोद्धव्यम् । कथं वा षण्णां पदार्थानां परस्परं भेदे प्रतिनियतस्वरूपव्य-
वस्था ? द्रव्यस्य हि द्रव्यमिति व्यपदेशस्य द्रव्यत्वाभिसम्बन्धाद्विधाने
ततः पूर्वं द्रव्यस्वरूपं किञ्चिद्वाच्यं, येन सह द्रव्यत्वाभिसम्बन्धः स्यात् ॥
द्रव्यमेव स्वरूपमिति चेन्न, तद्रव्यपदेशस्य द्रव्यत्वाभिसम्बन्धनिवन्धनतया
स्वरूपत्वायोगात् ॥ सत्त्वं निजं रूपमिति चेन्न, तस्यापि सत्तासम्बन्धादेव
तद्रव्यपदेशकरणात् ॥ एवं गुणादिष्वपि वाच्यम् ॥ केवलं सामान्यविशे-
षसमवायानामेव स्वरूपसत्त्वेन तथाव्यपदेशोपपत्तेस्तत्रयव्यवस्थैव स्यात् ॥
ननु जीवादिपदार्थानां सामान्यविशेषात्मकत्वं स्याद्वादिभिरभिधीयते
तयोश्च वस्तुनोर्भेदाभेदाविति ॥ तौ च विरोधादिदोषोपनिपातान्नैकत्र
सम्भविनाविति ॥ तथाहि—भेदाभेदयोर्विधिनिषेधयोरेकत्राभिन्ने वस्तुन्य-
सम्भवः शीतोष्णस्पर्शयोर्वेति ॥ भेदस्यान्यदधिकरणमभेदस्य चान्यदिति
वैयधिकरण्यम् । यमात्मानं पुरोधाय भेदो यं च समाश्रित्याभेदः तावा-
त्मानौ भिन्नौ चाभिन्नौ च तत्रापि तथा परिकल्पनादनवस्था । येन रूपेण
भेदस्तेन भेदश्चाभेदश्चेति सङ्करः । येन भेदस्तेनाभेदो येनाभेदस्तेन भेद इति
व्यतिकरः । भेदाभेदात्मकत्वे च वस्तुनोऽसाधारणाकारेण निश्चेतुमशक्तेः
संशयः । ततश्चाप्रतिपत्तिस्ततोऽभावः । इत्यनैकान्तात्मकमपि न सौस्थ्य-
माभजतीति केचित् । तेऽपि न प्रातीतिकवादिनः । विरोधस्य प्रतीयमान-

योरसम्भवादनुपलम्भसाध्यो हि विरोधः, तत्रोपलभ्यमानयोः को विरोधः ॥
यच्च शीतोष्णस्पर्शयोर्वेति दृष्टान्ततयोक्तं तच्च धूपदहनाद्येकावयविनः शीतो-
ष्णस्पर्शस्वभातस्योपलब्धेरयुक्तमेव ॥ एकस्य चलाचलरक्कारक्तावृतानावृता-
दिविरुद्धधर्माणां युगपदुपलब्धेश्च प्रकृतयोरपि न विरोध इति ॥ एतेन वैयधि-
करणमप्यपास्तम् । तयोरेकाधिकरणत्वेन प्रतीतेः । अत्रापि प्रागुक्तनिदर्श-
नान्येव बोद्धव्यानि ॥ यच्चानवस्थानं दूषणं तदपि स्याद्वादिमतानभिज्ञैरेवा-
पादितम् । तन्मतं हि सामान्यविशेषात्मके वस्तुनि सामान्यविशेषावेव भेदः ।
भेदध्वनिना तयोरेवाभिधानात् । द्रव्यरूपेणाभेद इति । द्रव्यमेवाभेद एका-
नेकात्मकत्वाद्वस्तुनः ॥ यदि वा भेदनयप्राधान्येन वस्तुधर्माणामानन्त्या-
च्चानवस्था । तथा हि— यत्सामान्यं यश्च विशेषस्तयोरनुवृत्तव्यावृत्ता-
कारेण भेदस्तयोश्चार्थक्रियाभेदाद्भेदश्च शक्तिभेदात् । सोऽपि सहका-
रिभेदादित्यनन्तधर्माणामङ्गीकरणात् कुतोऽनवस्था ॥ तथा चोक्तम् ।
मलक्षतिकरीमाहुरनवस्थां हि दूषणम् । वस्त्वानन्त्येप्यशक्तौ च नानवस्था
विचार्यते ॥ १ ॥ इति ॥ यौ च सङ्करव्यतिकरौ तावपि मेचकज्ञाननिदर्श-
नेन सामान्यविशेषदृष्टान्तेन च परिहृतौ ॥ अथ तत्र तथा प्रतिभासनं परस्यापि
वस्तुनि तथैव प्रतिभासोऽस्तु तस्य पक्षपाताभावान्निर्णीते संशयोऽपि न
युक्तः । तस्य चलितप्रतिपत्तिरूपत्वादचलितप्रतिभासे दुर्घटत्वात् । प्रतिपन्ने
वस्तुन्यप्रतिपत्तिरित्यतिसाहसम् । उपलब्ध्यभिधानादनुपलम्भोऽपि न
सिद्धस्ततो नाभाव इति दृष्टेष्टाविरुद्धमनेकान्तशासनं सिद्धम् । एतेनावयवा-
वयविनोर्गुणगुणिनोः कर्मतद्वतोश्च कथंचिद्भेदाभेदौ प्रतिपादितौ बोद्धव्यौ ॥
अथ समवायवशाद्भिन्नेष्वप्यभेदप्रतीतिरनुपपन्नब्रह्मतुलाख्यज्ञानस्येति चेत्
न, तस्यापि ततोऽभिन्नस्य व्यवस्थापयितुमशक्तेः । तथा हि— समवायवृत्तिः
स्वसमवायिषु वृत्तिमती स्यादवृत्तिमती वा ? वृत्तिमत्वे स्वेनैव वृत्त्यन्तरेण
वा ? न तावदाद्यः पक्षः समवाये समवायानभ्युपगमात् । पञ्चानां
समवायित्वमिति वचनात् ॥ वृत्त्यन्तरकल्पनायां तदपि स्वसम्बन्धिषु
वर्तते न वेति कल्पनायां वृत्त्यन्तरपरम्पराप्राप्तेरनवस्था ॥ वृत्त्यन्तरस्य
स्वसंबन्धिषु वृत्त्यन्तरानभ्युपगमान्नानवस्थेति चेत्, तर्हि समवायेऽपि
वृत्त्यन्तरं माभूत् ॥ अथ समवायो न स्वाश्रयवृत्तिरङ्गीक्रियते, तर्हि
पण्णामाश्रितत्वमिति ग्रन्थो विरुध्यते ॥ अथ समवायिषु सत्स्वेव समवाय-

प्रतीतेस्तस्याश्रितत्वमुपकल्प्यते तर्हि मूर्तद्रव्येषु सत्स्वेव दिग्लिङ्गस्ये-
दमतः पूर्वेण इत्यादिज्ञानस्य कालालिङ्गस्य च परापरादिप्रत्ययस्य
सद्भावात्तयोरपि तदाश्रितत्वं स्यात् । तथा चायुक्लमेतदन्यत्र नित्यद्रव्येभ्य
इति ॥ किञ्च समवायस्यानाश्रितत्वे सम्बन्धरूपतैव न घटते । तथा च
प्रयोगः—समवायो न सम्बन्धः । अनाश्रितत्वादिगादिवदिति ॥ अत्र
समवायस्य धर्मिणः कथंचित्तादात्म्यरूपस्यानेकस्य च परैः प्रतिपन्नत्वा-
धर्मिग्राहकप्रमाणबाध आश्रयासिद्धिश्च न वाच्येति ॥ तस्याश्रितत्वेऽप्येतद-
भिधीयते न समवाय एकः सम्बन्धात्मकत्वे सत्याश्रितत्वात् संयोगवत् ।
सत्तयाऽनेकान्त इति सम्बन्धविशेषणम् ॥ अथ संयोगे निविडशिथिलादि-
प्रत्ययनानात्वान्नानात्वं नान्यत्र विपर्ययादिति चेत् न, समवायेऽप्युत्पत्ति-
मत्वनश्वरत्वप्रत्ययनानात्वस्य सुलभत्वात् ॥ सम्बन्धिभेदाद्भेदोऽन्यत्रापि
समान इति नैकत्रैव पर्यनुयोगो युक्तः ॥ तस्मात्समवायस्य परपरिकल्पितस्य
विचारासहत्वान्न तद्वशाद्गुणगुण्यादिष्वभेदप्रतीतिः ॥ अथ भिन्नप्रति-
भासादवयवायव्यव्यादीनां भेद एवेति चेन्न, भेदप्रतिभासस्याभेदाविरोधात् ।
घटपटादीनामपि कथञ्चिदभेदोपपत्तेः ॥ सर्वथा प्रतिभासभेदस्यासिद्धेश्च ॥
इदमित्याद्यभेदप्रतिभासस्यापि भावात्ततः कथंचिद्भेदाभेदात्मकं द्रव्यपर्या-
यात्मकं सामान्यविशेषात्मकं च तत्त्वं तीरादर्शिशकुनिन्यायेनायातमित्यल-
मतिप्रसङ्गेन ॥ इदानीमनेकान्तात्मकवस्तुसमर्थनार्थमेव हेतुद्वयमाह—

अनुवृत्तव्यावृत्तप्रत्ययगोचरत्वात्पूर्वोत्तराकारपरिहारावसिस्थिति-
लक्षणपरिणामेनार्थक्रियोपपत्तेश्चेति ॥ २ ॥

अनुवृत्ताकारो हि गौर्गौरित्यादिप्रत्ययः । व्यावृत्ताकारः श्यामः शबल
इत्यादिप्रत्ययः । तयोर्गोचरस्तस्य भावस्तत्त्वं तस्मात् । एतेन तिर्यक्-
सामान्यव्यतिरेकलक्षणविशेषद्वयात्मकं वस्तु साधितम् । पूर्वोत्तराकारयो-
र्यथासंख्येन परिहारावाप्ती, ताभ्यां स्थितिः, सैव लक्षणं यस्य, स चासौ
परिणामश्च, तेनार्थक्रियोपपत्तेश्चेत्यनेन तूर्ध्वतासामान्यपर्यायाख्यविशेषद्वय-
रूपं वस्तु समर्थितं भवति ॥ अथ प्रथमोद्दिष्टसामान्यभेदं दर्शयन्नाह—

सामान्यं द्वेधा तिर्यगूर्ध्वताभेदात् ॥ ३ ॥

प्रथमभेदं सोदाहरणमाह—

सदृशपरिणामस्तिर्यक्, खण्डमुण्डादिषु गोत्ववत् ॥ ४ ॥

नित्यैकरूपस्य गोत्वादेः क्रमयौगपद्याभ्यामर्थक्रियाविरोधात् । प्रत्येकं परिसमाप्त्या व्यक्तिषु वृत्त्ययोगाच्चात्रेकं सदृशपरिणामात्मकमेवेति तिर्यक-सामान्यमुक्तम् ॥ द्वितीयभेदमपि सदृष्टान्तमुपदर्शयति—

परापरविवर्तन्यापिद्रव्यमूर्ध्वता मृदिव स्थासादिष्विति ॥ ५ ॥

सामान्यमिति वर्तते तेनायमर्थः— ऊर्ध्वतासामान्यं भवति । किं तत् ? द्रव्यम् । तदेव विशिष्यते परापरविवर्तन्यापीति पूर्वापरकालवर्तित्रिकाला-नुयायीत्यर्थः । चित्रज्ञानस्यैकस्य युगपद्भाव्यनेकस्वगतनीलाद्याकारव्या-प्तिवदेकस्य क्रमभाविपरिणामव्यापित्वमित्यर्थः ॥ विशेषस्यापि द्वैविध्य-मुपदर्शयति—

विशेषश्चेति ॥ ६ ॥

द्वेधेत्यधिक्रियमाणेनाभिसम्बन्धः । तदेव प्रतिपादयति—

पर्यायव्यतिरेकभेदादिति ॥ ७ ॥

प्रथमविशेषभेदमाह—

एकस्मिन्द्रव्ये क्रमभाविनः परिणामाः पर्याया आत्मनि हर्षविषादा-दिवदिति ॥ ८ ॥

अत्रात्मद्रव्यं स्वदेहप्रमितिमात्रमेव न व्यापकम् । नापि वटक-णिकामात्रम् । न च कायाकारपरिणतभूतकदम्बकमिति, तत्र व्यापकत्वे परेषामनुमानमात्मा व्यापकः द्रव्यत्वे सत्यमूर्तत्वादा-काशवदिति । तत्र यदि रूपादिलक्षणं मूर्तत्वं तत्प्रतिषेधोऽमूर्तत्वं तदा मनसाऽनेकान्तः ॥ अथासर्वगतद्रव्यपरिमाणं मूर्तत्वं तन्निषेधस्तथा चेत्परं-प्रति साध्यसमो हेतुः ॥ यच्चापरमनुमानम्—आत्मा व्यापकः अणुपरिमाणा-नधिकरणत्वे सति नित्यद्रव्यत्वादाकाशवदिति । तदपि न साधुसाधनम् । अणुपरिमाणानधिकरणत्वमित्रत्य किमयं नञर्थः पर्युदासः प्रसज्यो वा भवेत् ? तत्राप्यपक्षे अणुपरिमाणप्रतिषेधेन महापरिमाणमवान्तरपरिमाणं परिमाणमात्रं वा ? महापरिमाणं चेत् साध्यसमो हेतुः । अवान्तरपरिमाणं चेत् विरुद्धो हेतुरवान्तरपरिमाणाधिकरणत्वं ह्यव्यापकत्वमेव साधयतीति ॥

परिमाणमात्रं चेत्—तत्परिमाणसामान्यसङ्गीकर्तव्यम् । तथाचाणुपरिमाण-
प्रतिषेधेन परिमाणसामान्याधिकरणत्वमात्मन इत्युक्तम् । तच्चानुपपन्नं, व्य-
धिकरणासिद्धिप्रसङ्गात् । न हि परिमाणसामान्यमात्मनि व्यवस्थितं किन्तु
परिमाणव्यक्तिष्वेवेति ॥ न चावान्तरमहापरिमाणद्वयाधारतयाऽऽत्मन्यप्रति-
पन्ने परिमाणमात्राधिकरणता तत्र निश्चेतुं शक्या । दृष्टान्तश्च साधनवि-
कलः । आकाशस्य महापरिमाणाधिकरणतया परिमाणमात्राधिकरणत्वा-
योगात् ॥ नित्यद्रव्यत्वं च सर्वथाऽसिद्धम् । नित्यस्य क्रमाक्रमाभ्यामर्थ-
क्रियाविरोधादिति ॥ प्रसज्यपक्षेऽपि तुच्छा भावस्य ग्रहणोपायासम्भवात् न
विशेषणत्वम् । न चागृहीतविशेषणं नाम न चागृहीतविशेषणाविशेष्ये
बुद्धिरिति वचनान्न प्रत्यक्षं तद्ग्रहणोपायः सम्बन्धाभावादिन्द्रियार्थसन्नि-
कर्षजं हि प्रत्यक्षं तन्मतेऽप्रसिद्धम् ॥ विशेषणविशेष्यभावकल्पनायामभा-
वस्य नागृहीतस्य विशेषणत्वमिति तदेव दूषणम् । तस्मान्न व्यापकमात्म-
द्रव्यम् । नापि वटकणिकामात्रं कमनीयकान्ताकुचजघनसंस्पर्शकाले प्रति-
लोमकूपमाह्लादनाकारस्य सुखस्यानुभवनात् । अन्यथा सर्वाङ्गीणरोमाश्चा-
दिकार्योदयायोगात् ॥ आशुष्ट्यालातचक्रवत् क्रमेणैव तत्सुखमित्यनुपप-
न्नम् ॥ परापरान्तःकरणसम्बन्धस्य तत्कारणस्य परिकल्पनायां व्यवधान-
प्रसङ्गात् । अन्यथा सुखस्य मानसप्रत्यक्षत्वायोगादिति ॥ नापि पृथिव्या-
दिचतुष्टयात्मकत्वमात्मनः सम्भाव्यते । अचेतनेभ्यश्चेतन्योत्पत्त्ययोगाद्धा-
रणेरणद्रवोष्णतालक्षणान्वयाभावाच्च । तदहर्जातबालकस्य स्तनादावभि-
लाषाभावप्रसङ्गाच्च । अभिलाषो हि प्रत्यभिज्ञाने भवति, तच्च स्मरणे स्मरणं
चानुभवे भवतीति पूर्वानुभवः सिद्धः । मध्यदशायां तथैव व्याप्तेः । मृतानां
रक्षोयक्षादिकुलेषु स्वयमुत्पन्नत्वेन कथयतां दर्शनात् ॥ केपाश्वित् भवस्मृते-
रुपलम्भाच्चानादिश्चेतनः सिद्ध एव ॥ तथा चोक्तम्—तदहर्जस्तनेहातो
रक्षोदृष्टेर्भवस्मृतेः । भूतानन्वयनात्सिद्धः प्रकृतिज्ञः सनातनः ॥ १ ॥
इति ॥ न च स्वदेहप्रमितिरात्मेत्यत्रापि प्रमाणाभावात् सर्वत्र संशय इति
वक्तव्यं तत्रानुमानस्य सद्भावात् । तथाहि देवदत्तात्मा तद्देह एव तत्र सर्वत्रैव
च विद्यते तत्रैव तत्र सर्वत्रैव च स्वासाधारणगुणाधारतयोपलम्भात् । यो
यत्रैव यत्र सर्वत्रैव च स्वासाधारणगुणाधारतयोपलभ्यते स तत्रैव तत्र
सर्वत्रैव च विद्यते यथा देवदत्तगृहे एव तत्र सर्वत्रैव चोपलभ्यमानः स्वा-

साधारणभासुरत्वादिगुणः प्रदीपः तथा चार्यं तस्मात्तथेति । तदसाधारण-
गुणा ज्ञानदर्शनसुखवीर्यलक्षणस्ते च सर्वाङ्गीणास्तत्रैव चोपलभ्यन्ते ॥
सुखमाह्लादनाकारं विज्ञानं मेयबोधनम् । शक्तिः क्रियानुमेया स्याद्यूनः
कान्तासमागमः ॥ १ ॥ इति वचनात् ॥ तस्मादात्मा देहप्रमितिरेव
स्थितः ॥ द्वितीयं विशेषभेदमाह—

अर्थान्तरगतो विसदृशपरिणामो व्यतिरेको

गोमहिषादिवत् ॥ ८ ॥

वैसादृश्यं हि प्रतियोगिग्रहणे सत्येव भवति । न चापेक्षिकत्वादस्या-
वस्तुत्वमवस्तुन्यापेक्षिकत्वायोगात् । अपेक्षाया वस्तुनिष्ठत्वात् ॥

स्यात्कारलाञ्छितमबाध्यमनन्तधर्म-

संदोहवर्मितमशेषमपि प्रमेयम् ॥

देवैः प्रमाणबलतो निरचायि यच्च

संक्षिप्तमेव मुनिभिर्विवृतं मयैतत् ॥ १ ॥

इति परीक्षामुखस्य लघुवृत्तौ विषयसमुद्देशश्चतुर्थः ॥ ४ ॥

अथेदानीं फलविप्रतिपत्तिनिरासार्थमाह—

अज्ञाननिवृत्तिर्हानोपादानोपेक्षाश्च फलम् ॥ १ ॥

द्विविधं हि फलं साक्षात्पारम्पर्येणेति । साक्षादज्ञाननिवृत्तिः पारम्प-
र्येण हानादिकमिति, प्रमेयनिश्चयोत्तरकालभावित्वात्तस्येति ॥ तद्द्विविध-
मपि फलं प्रमाणाद्विन्नमेवेति यौगाः । अभिन्नमेवेति सौगताः । तन्मत-
द्वयनिरासेन स्वमतं व्यवस्थापयितुमाह—

प्रमाणादभिन्नं भिन्नं च ॥ २ ॥

कथञ्चिदभेदसमर्थनार्थं हेतुमाह—

यः प्रमिमीते स एव निवृत्ताज्ञानो जहात्या-

दत्त उपेक्षते चेति प्रतीतेः ॥ ३ ॥

अयमर्थः—यस्यैवात्मनः प्रमाणाकारेण परिणतिस्तस्यैव फलरूपतया

परिणाम इत्येकप्रमात्रपेक्षया प्रमाणफलयोरभेदः । करणक्रियापरिणाम-
भेदाद्भेद इत्यस्य सामर्थ्यसिद्धत्वान्नोक्तम् ॥

पारम्पर्येण साक्षाच्च फलं द्वेधाऽभिधायि यत् ।

देवैर्भिन्नमभिन्नं च प्रमाणात्तदिहोदितम् ॥ १ ॥

इति परीक्षामुसलघुवृत्तौ फलसमुद्देशः पञ्चमः ॥ ५ ॥

अथेदानीमुक्तप्रमाणस्वरूपादिचतुष्टयाभासमाह—

ततोऽन्यत्तदाभासमिति ॥ १ ॥

तत् उक्तात् प्रमाणस्वरूपसंख्याविषयफलभेदादन्यद्विपरीतं तदाभा-
समिति ॥ तत्र क्रमप्राप्तं स्वरूपाभासं दर्शयति—

अस्वसंविदितगृहीतार्थदर्शनसंशयादयः प्रमाणाभासाः ॥ २ ॥

अस्वसंविदितश्च गृहीतार्थश्च दर्शनश्च संशय आदिर्येषां ते संशया-
दयश्चेति सर्वेषां द्वंद्वः ॥ आदिशब्देन विपर्यानध्यवसाययोरपि ग्रहणम् ॥
तत्रास्वसंविदितं ज्ञानं ज्ञानान्तरप्रत्यक्षत्वादिति नैयायिकाः । तथाहि
ज्ञानं स्वव्यतिरिक्तवेदनवेद्यं वेद्यत्वात् घटवदिति । तदसङ्गतम्— धर्मिज्ञानस्य
ज्ञानान्तरवेद्यत्वे साध्यान्तःपातित्वेन धर्मित्वायोगात् ॥ स्वसंविदितत्वे
तेनैव हेतोरनेकान्तात् ॥ महेश्वरज्ञानेन च व्यभिचाराद्व्याप्तिज्ञानेनाप्यने-
कान्तादर्थप्रतिपत्त्ययोगाच्च ॥ नहि ज्ञापकप्रत्यक्षं ज्ञाप्यं गमयति
शब्दलिङ्गादीनामपि तथैव गमकत्वप्रसङ्गात् ॥ अनन्तरभाविज्ञानग्रह्यात्वे
तस्याप्यगृहीतस्य पराज्ञापकत्वात्तदनन्तरं कल्पनीयम् । तत्रापि तदनन्तर-
मित्यनवस्था ॥ तस्मान्नायं पक्षः श्रेयान् ॥ एतेन करणज्ञानस्य परोक्ष-
त्वेनास्वसंविदितत्वं ब्रुवन्नपि मीमांसकः प्रत्युक्तः । तस्यापि ततोऽर्थप्रत्यक्ष-
त्वायोगात् ॥ अथ कर्मत्वेनाप्रतीयमानत्वादप्रत्यक्षत्वे तर्हि फलज्ञानस्या-
प्रत्यक्षता तत् एव स्यात् ॥ अथ फलत्वेन प्रतिभासनं नो चेत् करणज्ञान-
स्यापि करणत्वेनावभासनात् प्रत्यक्षत्वमस्तु । तस्मादर्थप्रतिपत्त्यन्यथाऽनु-
पपत्तेः करणज्ञानकल्पनावदर्थप्रत्यक्षत्वान्यथाऽनुपपत्तेर्ज्ञानस्यापि प्रत्यक्ष-
त्वमस्तु ॥ अथ करणस्य चक्षुरादेरप्रत्यक्षत्वेऽपि रूपमाकट्याद्व्यभिचार
इति चेन्न, भिन्नकर्तृककरणस्यैव तद्व्यभिचारात् ॥ अभिन्नकर्तृके करणे

सति कर्तृप्रत्यक्षतायां तदभिन्नस्यापि करणस्य कथञ्चित्प्रत्यक्षत्वेनाप्रत्यक्ष-
तैकान्तविरोधात्प्रकाशात्मनोऽप्रत्यक्षत्वे प्रदीपप्रत्यक्षत्वविरोधवदिति ॥ गृ-
हीतग्राहिधारावाहिज्ञानं, गृहीतार्थं दर्शनं, सौगताभिमतं निर्विकल्पकं,
तच्च स्वविषयानुपदर्शकत्वादप्रमाणं व्यवसायस्यैव तज्जनितस्य तदुपदर्श-
कत्वात् ॥ अथ व्यवसायस्य प्रत्यक्षाकारेणानुरक्तत्वात्ततः प्रत्यक्षस्यैव
प्रामाण्यं व्यवसायस्तु गृहीतग्राहित्वादप्रमाणमिति तन्न सुभाषितं—
दर्शनस्याविकल्पकस्यानुपलक्षणात्तत्सद्भावायोगात् सद्भावा वा नीलादाविव
क्षणक्षयादावपि तदुपदर्शकत्वप्रसङ्गात् ॥ तत्र विपरीतसमारोपान्नेति
चेत्तर्हि सिद्धं नीलादौ समारोपविधिग्रहणलक्षणो निश्चय इति तदात्मक-
मेव प्रमाणमितरत्तदाभासमिति ॥ संशयादयश्च प्रसिद्धा एव । तत्र संशय-
उभयकोटिसंस्पर्शी स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वेति परामर्शः ॥ विपर्ययः पुरस्तस्मिन्स्त-
दिति विकल्पः । विशेषानवधारणमध्यवसायः ॥ कथमेषामस्वसंविदितादीनां
तदाभासतेन्यत्राह—

स्वविषयोपदर्शकत्वाभावात् ॥ ३ ॥

गतार्थमेतत् । अत्र दृष्टान्तं यथाक्रममाह—

पुरुषान्तरपूर्वार्थगच्छत्तृणस्पर्शस्थाणुपुरुषादिज्ञानवत् ॥ ४ ॥

पुरुषान्तरं च पूर्वार्थश्च गच्छत्तृणस्पर्शश्च स्थाणुपुरुषादिश्च तेषां ज्ञानं
तद्वत् ॥ अपरं च सन्निकर्षवादिनं प्रति दृष्टान्तमाह—

चक्षुरसयोर्द्रव्ये संयुक्तसमवायवच्च ॥ ५ ॥

अयमर्थो यथा चक्षुरसयोः संयुक्तसमवायः सन्नपि न प्रमाणं तथा चक्षु-
रूपयोरपि । तस्मादयमपि प्रमाणाभास एवेति ॥ उपलक्षणमेतत् अतिव्याप्ति-
कथनमव्याप्तिश्च । सन्निकर्षप्रत्यक्षत्वादीनां चक्षुषि सन्निकर्षस्याभावात् ॥
अथ चक्षुः प्राप्तार्थपरिच्छेदकं व्यवहितार्थाप्रकाशकत्वात् प्रदीपवदिति तत्सि-
द्धिरिति मतं तदपि न साधीयः । काचाभ्रपटलादिव्यवहितार्थानामपि
चक्षुषा प्रतिभासनाद्धेतोरसिद्धेः । शाखाचन्द्रमसोरेककालदर्शनानुपपत्तिप्रस-
क्तेश्च ॥ न च तत्र क्रमेऽपि यौगपद्याभिमान इति वक्तव्यम् । कालव्यवधा-
नानुपलब्धेः ॥ किञ्च क्रमप्रतिपत्तिः प्राप्तिनिश्चये सति भवति । न च क्रम-
प्राप्तौ प्रमाणान्तरमस्ति । तैजसत्वमस्तीति चेन्न तस्यासिद्धेः ॥ अथ चक्षुस्तै-

जसं रूपादीनां मध्ये रूपस्यैव प्रकाशकत्वात् प्रदीपवदिति । तदेत्यपर्यालो-
चिताभिधानं मणयञ्जनादेः पार्थिवत्वेऽपि रूपप्रकाशकत्वदर्शनात् ॥ पृथिव्या-
दिरूपप्रकाशकत्वे पृथिव्याधारबन्धत्वप्रसङ्गाच्च । तस्मात्सन्निकर्षस्याव्यापक-
त्वान्न प्रमाणत्वं करणज्ञानेन व्यवधानाच्चेति ॥ प्रत्यक्षाभासमाह—

अवैशद्ये प्रत्यक्षं तदाभासं बौद्धस्याकस्माद्धूमदर्शनाद्व-
ह्निविज्ञानवदिति ॥ ६ ॥

परोक्षाभासमाह—

वैशद्येऽपि परोक्षं तदाभासं मीमांसकस्य करणज्ञानवत् ॥ ७ ॥

प्राक् प्रपञ्चितमेतत् । परोक्षभेदाभासमुपदर्शयन् प्रथमं क्रमप्राप्तं स्मरणा-
भासमाह—

अतस्मिंस्तदिति ज्ञानं स्मरणाभासं जिनदत्ते स
देवदत्तो यथेति ॥ ८ ॥

अतस्मिन्नननुभूत इत्यर्थः शेषं सुगमम् ॥ प्रत्यभिज्ञानाभासमाह—

सदृशे तदेवेदं तस्मिन्नेव तेन सदृशं यमलकवदित्यादि
प्रत्यभिज्ञानाभासम् ॥ ९ ॥

द्विविधं प्रत्यभिज्ञानाभासमुपदर्शितं, एकत्वनिवन्धनं सादृश्यनिवन्धनं
चेति ॥ तत्रैकत्वे सादृश्यावभासः सादृश्ये चैकत्वाभासस्तदाभासमिति ॥
तर्काभासमाह—

असम्बद्धे तज्ज्ञानं तर्काभासम् ॥ १० ॥

यावाँस्तत्पुत्रः स श्याम इति यथा । तज्ज्ञानमिति व्याप्तिलक्षणसम्बन्ध-
ज्ञानमित्यर्थः ॥ इदानीमनुमानाभासमाह—

इदमनुमानाभासम् ॥ ११ ॥

इदं वक्ष्यमाणमिति भावः ॥ तत्र तदवयवाभासोपदर्शनेन समुदाय-
रूपानुमानाभासमुपदर्शयितुकामः प्रथमावयवाभासमाह—

तत्रानिष्टादिः पक्षाभासः ॥ १२ ॥

इष्टमवाधितमित्यादि तल्लक्षणमुक्तमिदानीं तद्विपरीतं तदाभासमिति
कथयति—

अनिष्टो मीमांसकस्यानित्यः शब्दः ॥ १३ ॥

असिद्धाद्विपरीतं तदाभासमाह—

सिद्धः श्रावणः शब्द इति ॥ १४ ॥

अवाधितमविपरीतं तदाभासमावेदयन् स च प्रत्यक्षादिबाधित एवेति
दर्शयन्नाह—

बाधितः प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमलोकस्ववचनैः ॥ १५ ॥

एतेषां क्रमेणोदाहरणमाह—

तत्र प्रत्यक्षबाधितो यथा अनुष्णोऽग्नि-

द्रव्यत्वाज्जलवत् ॥ १६ ॥

स्पर्शनप्रत्यक्षेण ह्युष्णस्पर्शात्मकोऽग्निरनुभूयते ॥ अनुमान-
बाधितमाह—

अपरिणामी शब्दः कृतकत्वात् घटवत् ॥ १७ ॥

अत्र पक्षोऽपरिणामी शब्दः कृतकत्वादित्यनेन बाध्यते ॥ आगम-
बाधितमाह—

प्रेत्यासुखप्रदो धर्मः पुरुषाश्रितत्वादधर्मवत् ॥ १८ ॥

आगमे हि पुरुषाश्रितत्वाविशेषेऽपि परलोके धर्मस्य सुखहेतुत्वमुक्तम् ।
लोकबाधितमाह—

शुचि नरशिरःकपालं प्राण्यंगत्वाच्छंखशुक्तिवत् ॥ १९ ॥

लोके हि प्राण्यंगत्वेऽपि कस्यचिच्छुचित्वमशुचित्वं च । तत्र नर-
कपालादीनामशुचित्वमेवेति लोकबाधितत्वम् । स्ववचनबाधितमाह—

माता मे वन्ध्या पुरुषसंयोगेऽप्यगर्भत्वात्प्र-

सिद्धवन्ध्यावत् ॥ २० ॥

इदानीं हेत्वाभासान् क्रमापन्नानाह—

हेत्वाभासा असिद्धविरुद्धानैकान्तिकाकिञ्चित्कराः ॥ २१ ॥

एषां यथाक्रमं लक्षणं सोदाहरणमाह—

असत्सत्तानिश्चयोऽसिद्धः ॥ २२ ॥

सत्ता च निश्चयश्च सत्तानिश्चयौ, असन्तौ सत्तानिश्चयौ यस्य स
भवत्यसत्सत्तानिश्चयः । तत्र प्रथमभेदमाह—

अविद्यमानसत्ताकः परिणामी शब्दश्चानुषत्वात् ॥ २३ ॥

कथमस्यासिद्धत्वमित्याह—

स्वरूपेणासत्त्वात् ॥ २४ ॥

द्वितीयासिद्धभेदमुपदर्शयति—

अविद्यमाननिश्चयो मुग्धबुद्धिं प्रत्यग्निरत्र धूमादिति ॥ २५ ॥

अस्याप्यसिद्धता कथमित्यारेकायामाह—

तस्य वाष्पादिभावेन भूतसंघाते संदेहात् ॥ २६ ॥

तस्येति मुग्धबुद्धिं प्रतीत्यर्थः । अपरमपि भेदमाह—

सांख्यम्प्रति परिणामी शब्दः कृतकत्वादिति ॥ २७ ॥

अस्यासिद्धतायां कारणमाह—

तेनाज्ञातत्वादिति ॥ २८ ॥

तेन सांख्येनाज्ञातत्वात्तन्मते ह्याविर्भावतिरोभाववेव प्रसिद्धौ नोत्पत्त्या-
दिरिति ॥ अस्याप्यनिश्चयादसिद्धत्वमित्यर्थः ॥ विरुद्धं हेत्वाभासमुप-
दर्शयन्नाह—

विपरीतनिश्चिताविनाभावो विरुद्धोऽपरिणामी शब्दः

कृतकत्वात् ॥ २९ ॥

कृतकत्वं ह्यपरिणामविरोधिना परिणामेन व्याप्तमिति ॥ अनैकान्तिकं
हेत्वाभासमाह—

विपक्षेऽप्यविरुद्धवृत्तिरनैकान्तिकः ॥ ३० ॥

अपिशब्दान्न केवलं पक्षसपक्षयोरिति द्रष्टव्यम् । स च द्विविधो विपक्षे
निश्चितवृत्तिः शङ्कितवृत्तिश्चेति ॥ तत्राद्यं दर्शयन्नाह—

निश्चितवृत्तिरनित्यः शब्दः प्रमेयत्वात् घटवदिति ॥ ३१ ॥

कथमस्य विपक्षे निश्चिता वृत्तिरित्याशङ्क्याह—

आकाशे नित्येऽप्यस्य निश्चयात् ॥ ३२ ॥

शङ्कितवृत्तिमुदाहरति—

शङ्कितवृत्तिस्तु नास्ति सर्वज्ञो वक्तृत्वादिति ॥ ३३ ॥

अस्यापि कथं विपक्षे वृत्तिराशङ्क्यत इत्यत्राह—

सर्वज्ञत्वेन वक्तृत्वाविरोधादिति ॥ ३४ ॥

अविरोधश्च ज्ञानोत्कर्षे वचनानामपकर्षादर्शनादिति निरूपितमायम् ॥
अकिञ्चित्करस्वरूपं निरूपयति—

सिद्धे प्रत्यक्षादिबाधिते च साध्ये हेतुरकिञ्चित्करः ॥ ३५ ॥

तत्र सिद्धे साध्ये हेतुरकिञ्चित्कर इत्युदाहरति—

सिद्धः श्रावणः शब्दः शब्दत्वात् ॥ ३६ ॥

कथमस्याकिञ्चित्करत्वमित्याह—

किञ्चिदकरणात् ॥ ३७ ॥

अपरं च भेदं प्रथमस्य दृष्टान्तीकरणद्वारेणोदाहरति—

यथाऽनुष्णोऽग्निर्द्रव्यत्वादित्यादैर्किञ्चित्कर्तुं मशक्यत्वात् ॥ ३८ ॥

अकिञ्चित्करत्वमिति शेषः ॥ अयं च दोषो हेतुलक्षणविचारावसर एव,
न वादकाल इति व्यक्तीकुर्वन्नाह—

लक्षणा एवासौ दोषो व्युत्पन्नप्रयोगस्य पक्षदोषेणैव द्रष्टृत्वात् ॥ ३९ ॥

दृष्टान्तोऽन्वयव्यतिरेकभेदाद्द्विविध इत्युक्तं तत्रान्वयदृष्टान्ताभासमाह—

दृष्टान्ताभासा अन्वयेऽसिद्धसाध्यसाधनोभयाः ॥ ४० ॥

साध्यं च साधनं च उभयं च साध्यसाधनोभयानि असिद्धानि तानि
येष्विति विग्रहः ॥ एतानेकत्रैवानुमाने दर्शयति—

अपौरुषेयः शब्दोऽमूर्तत्वादिन्द्रियसुखपरमाणुघटवत् ॥ ४१ ॥

इन्द्रियसुखमसिद्धसाध्यं तस्य पौरुषेयत्वात् । परमाणुरसिद्धसाधनं तस्य मूर्तत्वात् । घटश्चासिद्धोभयः पौरुषेयत्वान्मूर्तत्वाच्च ॥ साध्यव्याप्तं साधनं दर्शनीयमिति दृष्टान्तावसरे प्रतिपादितं तद्विपरीतदर्शनमपि तदाभासमित्याह—

विपरीतान्वयश्च यदपौरुषेयं तदमूर्तम् ॥ ४२ ॥

कुतोऽस्य तदाभासतेत्याह—

विद्युदादिनाऽतिप्रसङ्गात् ॥ ४३ ॥

तस्याप्यमूर्तताप्राप्तेरित्यर्थः । व्यतिरेकोदाहरणाभासमाह—

व्यतिरेके सिद्धतद्व्यतिरेकाः परमाण्विन्द्रियसुखाकाशवत् ॥ ४४ ॥

अपौरुषेयः शब्दोऽमूर्तत्वादित्यत्रैवासिद्धाः साध्यसाधनोभयव्यतिरेका यत्रेति विग्रहः । तत्रासिद्धसाध्यव्यतिरेकः परमाणुस्तस्यापौरुषेयत्वात् इन्द्रियसुखमसिद्धसाधनव्यतिरेकम् ॥ आकाशं त्वसिद्धोभयव्यतिरेकमिति । साध्याभावे साधनव्यावृत्तिरिति व्यतिरेकोदाहरणप्रघट्टके ख्यापितं तत्र तद्विपरीतमपि तदाभासमित्युपदर्शयति—

विपरीतव्यतिरेकश्च यन्नामूर्तं तन्नापौरुषेयम् ॥ ४५ ॥

बालव्युत्पत्त्यर्थं तत्रयोपगम इत्युक्तमिदानीं तान्प्रत्येव कियद्धीनतायां प्रयोगाभासमाह—

बालप्रयोगाभासः पञ्चावयवेषु कियद्धीनता ॥ ४६ ॥

तदेवोदाहरति—

अग्निमानयं देशो धूमवत्त्वात् यदित्थं तदित्थं यथा

महानस इति ॥ ४७ ॥

इत्यवयवत्रयप्रयोगे सतीत्यर्थः । चतुरवयवप्रयोगे तदाभासत्वमाह—

धूमवांश्चायमिति वा ॥ ४८ ॥

अवयवविपर्ययेऽपि तत्त्वमाह—

तस्मादग्निमान् धूमवांश्चायमिति ॥ ४६ ॥

कथमवयवविपर्यये प्रयोगाभास इत्यारेकायामाह—

स्पष्टतया प्रकृतप्रतिपत्तेरयोगात् ॥ ५० ॥

इदानीमागमाभासमाह—

रागद्वेषमोहाक्रान्तपुरुषवचनाज्जातमागमाभासम् ॥ ५१ ॥

उदाहरणमाह—

यथा नद्यास्तीरे मोदकराशयः सन्ति, धावध्वं माणवकाः ॥ ५२ ॥

कश्चिन्माणवकैराकुलीकृतचेतास्तत्सङ्गपरिजिहीर्षया प्रतारणवाक्येन नद्या देशं तान् प्रस्थापयतीत्यात्सोक्तेरन्यत्वादागमाभासत्वम् । प्रथमोदाहरण-
मात्रेणानुष्यन्नुदाहरणान्तरमाह—

अंगुल्यग्रे हस्तियूथशतमास्त इति च ॥ ५३ ॥

अत्रापि सांख्यपशुः स्वदुरागमजनितवासनाहितचेता दृष्टेष्टविरुद्धं सर्वं सर्वत्र विद्यत इति मन्यमानस्तथोपदिशतीत्यनाप्तवचनत्वादिदमपि तथे-
त्यर्थः ॥ कथमनन्तरयोर्वाक्ययोस्तदाभासत्वमित्यारेकायामाह—

विसंवादात् ॥ ५४ ॥

अविसंवादरूपप्रमाणलक्षणाभावान्न तद्विशेषरूपमपीत्यर्थः ॥ इदानीं
संख्याभासमाह—

प्रत्यक्षमेवैकं प्रमाणमित्यादि संख्याभासम् ॥ ५५ ॥

प्रत्यक्षपरोक्षभेदात् द्वैविध्यमुक्तं तद्वैपरीत्येन प्रत्यक्षमेव प्रत्यक्षानुमाने,
एवेत्याद्यवधारणं संख्याभासम् ॥ प्रत्यक्षमेवैकमिति कथं संख्याभास-
मित्याह—

लौकायतिकस्य प्रत्यक्षतः परलोकादिनिषेधस्य परबुद्ध्या-

देशचासिद्धेरतद्विषयत्वात् ॥ ५६ ॥

अतद्विषयत्वात् अप्रत्यक्षविषयत्वादित्यर्थः । शेषं सुगमम् ॥ प्रपञ्चितमे-
वैतत्संख्याविप्रतिपत्तिनिराकरण इति नेह पुनरुच्यते ॥ इतरवादिप्रमाणे-

यत्तावधारणमपि विघटत इति लौकायतिकदृष्टान्तद्वारेण तन्मतेऽपि संख्या-
भासमिति दर्शयति—

सौगतसांख्ययौगप्राभाकरजैमिनीयानां प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमो-
पमानार्थापत्यभावैरेकैकाधिकैर्व्याप्तिवत् ॥ ५७ ॥

यथा प्रत्यक्षादिभिरेकैकाधिकैर्व्याप्तिः प्रतिपत्तुं न शक्यते सौग-
तादिभिस्तथा प्रत्यक्षेण लौकायतिकैः परबुद्ध्यादिरपीत्यर्थः ॥ अथ
परबुद्ध्यादिप्रतिपत्तिः प्रत्यक्षेण माभूदन्यस्माद्भविष्यतीत्याशङ्क्याह—

अनुमानादेस्तद्विषयत्वे प्रमाणान्तरत्वम् ॥ ५८ ॥

तच्छब्देन परबुद्ध्यादिरभिधीयते । अनुमानादेः परबुद्ध्यादिविषयत्वे
प्रत्यक्षैकप्रमाणवादो हीयत इत्यर्थः ॥ अत्रोदाहरणमाह—

तर्कस्येव व्याप्तिगोचरत्वे प्रमाणान्तरत्वम् ।

अप्रमाणस्याव्यवस्थापकत्वात् ॥ ५९ ॥

सौगतादीनामिति शेषः ॥ किञ्च प्रत्यक्षैकप्रमाणवादिना प्रत्यक्षाद्ये-
कैकाधिकप्रमाणवादिभिश्च स्वसंवेदनेन्द्रियप्रत्यक्षभेदोऽनुमानादिभेदश्च प्रति-
भासभेदेनेव वक्तव्यो गत्यन्तराभावात् । स च तद्भेदो लौकायतिकं प्रति
प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोरितरेषां व्याप्तिज्ञानप्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणेष्विति सर्वेषां प्रमाण-
संख्या विघटते ॥ तदेव दर्शयति—

प्रतिभासभेदस्य च भेदकत्वात् ॥ ६० ॥

इदानीं विषयाभासमुपदर्शयितुमाह—

विषयाभासः सामान्यं विशेषो द्वयं वा स्वतंत्रम् ॥ ६१ ॥

कथमेषां तदाभासतेत्याह—

तथाप्रतिभासनात्कार्याकरणाच्च ॥ ६२ ॥

किञ्च तदेकान्तात्मकं तत्त्वं स्वयं समर्थमसमर्थं वा कार्याकारि स्यात् ?
प्रथमपक्षे दूषणमाह—

समर्थस्य करणे सर्वदोषोत्पत्तिरनपेक्षत्वात् ॥ ६३ ॥

सहकारिसान्निध्यात् तत्करणेति चेदत्राह—

परापेक्षणे परिणामित्वमन्यथा तदभावात् ॥ ६४ ॥

वियुक्तावस्थायामकुर्वतः सहकारिसमवधानवेलायां कार्यकारिणः पूर्वो-
त्तराकारपरिहारावाप्तिस्थितिलक्षणपरिणामोपपत्तेरित्यर्थः । अन्यथा
कार्यकारणाभावात् । प्रागभावावस्थायामेवेत्यर्थः । अथ द्वितीयपक्ष-
दोषमाह—

स्वयमसमर्थस्य अकारकत्वात्पूर्ववत् ॥ ६५ ॥

अथ फलाभासं प्रकाशयन्नाह—

फलाभासं प्रमाणादभिन्नं भिन्नमेव वा ॥ ६६ ॥

कुतः पक्षद्वयेऽपि तदाभासतेत्याशङ्क्यामाद्यपक्षे तदाभासत्वे हेतुमाह—

अभेदे तद्व्यवहारानुपपत्तेः ॥ ६७ ॥

फलमेव प्रमाणमेव वा भवेदिति भावः । व्यावृत्त्या संवृत्यपरनामधेयया
तत्कल्पनाऽस्त्वित्याह—

व्यावृत्त्याऽपि न तत्कल्पना फलान्तराद्व्या-

वृत्त्याऽफलत्वप्रसङ्गात् ॥ ६८ ॥

अयमर्थः—यथा फलाद्विजातीयात् फलस्य व्यावृत्त्या फलव्यवहार-
स्तथा फलान्तरादपि सजातीयाद्व्यावृत्तिरप्यस्तीत्यफलत्वम् । अत्रैवाभेद-
पक्षे दृष्टान्तमाह—

प्रमाणाद्व्यावृत्त्येवाप्रमाणत्वस्येति ॥ ६९ ॥

अत्रापि प्राक्न्येव प्रक्रिया योजनीया ॥ अभेदपक्षं निराकृत्य आचार्य
उपसंहरति—

तस्माद्वास्तवोऽभेद इति ॥ ७० ॥

भेदपक्षं दूषयन्नाह—

भेदे त्वात्मान्तरवत्तदनुपपत्तेः ॥ ७१ ॥

अथ यत्रैवात्मनि प्रमाणं समवेतं फलमपि तत्रैव समवेतमिति समवाय-
लक्षणप्रत्यासत्त्या प्रमाणफलव्यवस्थितिरिति ॥ नात्मान्तरे तत्प्रसङ्ग इति
चेत्तदपि न सूक्तमित्याह—

समवायेऽतिप्रसङ्ग इति ॥ ७२ ॥

समवायस्य नित्यत्वाद्ब्यापकत्वाच्च सर्वात्मनामपि समवायसमान-
धर्मिकत्वान्न ततः प्रतिनियम इत्यर्थः ॥ इदानीं स्वपरपक्षसाधनदूषण-
व्यवस्थामुपदर्शयति—

प्रमाणतदाभासौ दुष्टतयोद्भाविता परिहृतापरिहृतदोषौ वादिनः
साधनतदाभासौ प्रतिवादिनो दूषणभूषणौ च ॥ ७३ ॥

वादिना प्रमाणमुपन्यस्तं तच्च प्रतिवादिना दुष्टतयोद्भाविता पुनर्वादिना
परिहृतं तदेव तस्य साधनं भवति प्रतिवादिनश्च दूषणमिति ॥ यदा तु
वादिना प्रमाणाभासमुक्तं प्रतिवादिना तथैवोद्भाविता वादिना चापरिहृतं
तदा तद्वादिनः साधनाभासो भवति प्रतिवादिनश्च भूषणमिति ॥ अथोक्त-
प्रकारेणाशेषविप्रतिपत्तिनिराकरणद्वारेण प्रमाणत्वं स्वप्रतिज्ञातं परीक्ष्य
नयादितत्त्वमन्यत्रोक्तमिति दर्शयन्नाह—

सम्भवदन्यद्विचारणीयमिति ॥ ७४ ॥

सम्भवद्विद्यमानमन्यत्प्रमाणतत्त्वान्नयस्वरूपं शास्त्रान्तरप्रसिद्धं विचार-
णीयमिह युक्त्या प्रतिपत्तव्यम् । तत्र मूलनयो द्वौ द्रव्यार्थिकपर्यायार्थिक-
भेदात् । तत्र द्रव्यार्थिकत्वेधा नैगमसंग्रहव्यवहारभेदात् । पर्यायार्थिकश्च-
तुर्धा ऋजुसूत्रशब्दसमभिरूढवद्भूतभेदात् । अन्योऽन्यगुणप्रधानभूतभेदाभेद-
प्ररूपणी नैगमः नैकं गमो नैगम इति निरुक्तेः ॥ सर्वथाऽभेदवादस्तदा-
भासः ॥ प्रतिपत्तव्यपेक्षः सन्मात्रग्राही संग्रहः ॥ ब्रह्मवादस्तदाभासः ॥
संग्रहगृहीतभेदको व्यवहारः ॥ काल्पनिको भेदस्तदाभासः ॥ शुद्धपर्या-
यग्राही प्रतिपत्तसापेक्ष ऋजुसूत्रः ॥ क्षणिकैकान्तनयस्तदाभासः ॥ काल-
कारकलिङ्गानां भेदाच्छब्दस्य कथञ्चिदर्थभेदकथनं शब्दनयः ॥ अर्थभेदं
विना शब्दानामेव नानात्वैकान्तस्तदाभासः ॥ पर्यायभेदात्पदार्थनानात्व-
निरूपकः समभिरूढः ॥ पर्यायनानात्वमन्तरेणापीन्द्रादिभेदकथनं तदा-
भासः ॥ क्रियाश्रयेण भेदप्ररूपणमित्यभ्यासः ॥ क्रियानिरपेक्षत्वेन क्रिया-
वाचकेषु काल्पनिको व्यवहारस्तदाभास इति ॥ इति नयतदाभासलक्षणं
सङ्क्षेपेणोक्तं विस्तरेण नयचक्रात्प्रतिपत्तव्यम् ॥ अथवा सम्भवद्विद्यमान-

पृष्ठाङ्कः	पृष्ठाङ्कः
तर्कान्निर्णयः १६
तर्कस्यैव व्याप्तिगोचरत्वे ७१
तस्मादग्निमान् धूमवांश्चायम् ७०
तस्माद् वास्तवोऽभेदः ७२
तस्य वाष्पादिभावेन ६७
तावता च साध्यसिद्धिः ४३
तेनाज्ञातत्वात् ६७
तेन पक्षस्तदाधार ४३
दर्शनस्मरणकारणकम् २६
दृष्टान्ताभासा अन्वये ६२
दृष्टान्तो द्वेधा ३५
दृष्टोऽपि समारोपात्तादृक् ५
धूमवांश्चायमिति वा ६६
न च ते तदंगे ३४
न च पूर्वोत्तरचारिणोः ३८
न चासिद्धवदिष्टं ३०
न भविष्यति मुहूर्त्तान्ते ४१
न हि तत्साध्यप्रतिपत्त्यंगं ३३
नापि व्याप्तिस्मरणार्थं ३४
नास्त्यत्र गुहायां ४२
नास्त्यत्र धूमोऽनग्नेः ४१
नास्त्यत्र भित्तौ ४०
नास्त्यत्र भूतले घटः ४१
नास्त्यत्र शिशपा ४१
नास्त्यत्र शीतस्पर्श औष्ण्यात् ४०
नास्त्यत्र शीतस्पर्शो धूमात् ४०
नास्त्यत्र समनुलाया ४१
नास्त्यत्राप्रतिबद्धसामर्थ्ये ४१
नार्थालोकौ कारणं १५
नास्मिन् शरीरिणि ४०
निश्चितवृत्तिरनित्य ६२
नोदगाद् भरणिर्मुहूर्त्तान्ते प्राकृत एव ४१
नोदगाद् भरणिर्मुहूर्त्तान्ते पूर्वं ४०
पुण्योदयात् ४०
नोदेप्यति मुहूर्त्तान्ते ४०
पक्ष इति यावत् ३०
परंपरया संभवत् ४२
परापरविवर्तव्यापि ६०
परापेक्षणे परिणामि ७२
परार्थं तु तदर्थपरामर्शि ३६
परिणामी शब्दः कृतकत्वात् ३६
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